

THE LIFE AND OPINIONS  
OF  
MAJOR-GENERAL  
SIR CHARLES METCALFE MACGREGOR

**“Disce puer virtutem ex me verumque laborem  
Fortunam ex aliis**





MAGDALA







THE LIFE AND OPINIONS  
OF  
MAJOR - GENERAL  
SIR CHARLES METCALFE MACGREGOR  
K.C.B, C.S.I, C.I.E.  
QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL IN INDIA

—  
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MAJOR-GENERAL  
SIR CHARLES MACGREGOR.



CHAPTER I.

CENTRAL ASIA.

1875-1877


*It vexes me—for I would fain  
Have paid them insult back again  
I paid it well in after days "*

EXPLORATION AND ADVENTURE IN KHORASSAN, ARMENIA, AND BALUCHISTAN—ON FURIOUGH—AFGHAN TERRITORY FORBIDDEN—THE PERSIAN GULF—AN UNKNOWN ROUTE—RUINS OF PERSEPOLIS—THE ARID PLAINS OF YEZD—STRANGE FATALITY AT TABBAS—FAULTY INFORMATION—MARAUDING TURKOMANS—AN ATAMAN—AFGHAN RECEPTION—AN INSULTING REBUFF—MASHAD—THE FOREIGN SECRETARY—DISAPPOINTING REPLY—A PERSIAN GARRISON—VISIT TO SARAKHS—TOWARDS MERV—THE RUSSIAN PRISONER—ALUB KHAN—ALONG THE ATRAK—ACROSS THE CASPIAN—LORD SALISBURY'S ENCOURAGEMENT—RENEWED EXPLORATIONS—ARMENIA—THE THEATRE OF WAR—BALUCHISTAN—A BANDIT CHIEF—ZIRREEH—A DESERT AREA—WANT OF WATER—ARRIVAL IN INDIA—DEATH OF CAPTAIN

## LOCKWOOD — THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR — QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

## APPENDIX A.—MEMORANDUM ON ARMENIA. APPENDIX B.—THE 'STATESMAN' ON THE EXPEDITION TO BAGHDAD.

IN 1875 Colonel MacGregor thought of going on furlough to Europe, not however merely for relaxation and frivolous amusement, but more for change of work after incessant duty; and with this object in view he wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Mr C. U. Aitchison, asking for something stirring to do: "I have luckily had hard work up to this; but now it is nearly over, and I cannot stand the prospect of comparative idleness in a cantonment, in the hot weather. I mean to go and travel somewhere; but as I have no object in doing so, beyond change of scene and occupation for my thoughts, if you have anything you want doing I may as well offer myself. I do not care for any pay, nor, indeed, for anything much beyond having some object in life for a time, and I would gladly undertake any duty, however dangerous or onerous it might be. I was thinking of going to Persia, and then to Russia, but have not settled any route." The Calcutta Foreign Office, with its usual cautiousness and nervous dread of responsibility, rejected Colonel MacGregor's offer for any information; but General F. Roberts, then Quartermaster-General in India, warmly entered into his brother officer's schemes. "What we want," he wrote, "are *routes*. Any number of these will be most valuable; and you will assist the Department greatly if you



ROUTES OF COLONEL C M MACGREGOR THROUGH PERSIA, KHORASSAN, ARMENIA AND BALUCHISTAN.  
1876 - 1877

will send me every route you can get hold of. I have got sanction for two additional officers, to be attached to our office for six months, to collate information; and I intend to set them to work at routes *beyond our border*, so as to have a Central Asia Route-book. Any help towards the completion of this I shall be most thankful for. No one knows better than you do the points on which information is required."

At first Colonel MacGregor projected a ride to Herat, and thence, *viâ* Mashad, to Astrabad; but unfortunately it was then considered unsafe for a British officer to ride across Afghanistan.

On reaching Bombay, therefore, he decided to proceed *viâ* Bushire to Teheran, and thence across the Caspian and Russia to England.

He started from Bombay to Karachi by himself, in but poor spirits. "No one to talk to, no one to get cranky with—all by myself; none but my own sad thoughts to keep me company. For did I not know that the eye that used to look lighter on my coming, will never welcome me more? On the other side of this interminable waste of water there is only the grave of my happiness. In truth, I felt as if the very sap had been taken out of my future, that once was full of high ambition and bright hopes."

Landing at Bushire, MacGregor rode to Shiraz; but meeting here with Colonel Ross, the British Resident, a conversation about Persian geography unsettled all previous plans; and on hearing there

was a route from Shiraz to Yezd, which had never been traversed by any Englishman, MacGregor determined to make a reconnaissance in this direction.

Accordingly,<sup>1</sup> having engaged a muleteer to accompany him wherever he wished, in order that he might be free to follow his own bent, Colonel MacGregor left Shiraz on the 24th April, pitching his tent among the ruins of Persepolis on the following day. By the 6th May, Yezd was reached, and here the traveller halted a couple of days. Practically, he had found that to travel in Persia meant to roam over bare burnt-up plains, and rough, brown, arid hills, with nothing to see at the beginning of the day's stage, or in the middle of it, or at the end. However, he determined to wander on, with no settled plan, and so proceed towards Tabbas, employing himself in plotting the route, and adding to and correcting his Persian Gazetteer. All his spare time was spent in inquiring about various routes, communications, the country, and its people; for even on furlough Colonel MacGregor never wasted a day. He found he could not do profitably more than twenty-five miles' marching each day, in order properly to record all the available information along

<sup>1</sup> Narrative of a Journey through the Province of Khorassan, and on the North-West Frontier of Afghanistan, in 1875. By Colonel C. M. MacGregor, Bengal Staff Corps. In two volumes, with illustrations. London, Allen & Co.: 1879. The proper names given by Colonel W. W. Knollys, who saw Colonel MacGregor's work through the press, have in the present book been adapted to the orthography of the Royal Geographical Society's map of 1881.

the road. A march of seventy miles across the desert of Kavir, where no water was obtainable, brought him to Tabbas, where, on the 24th May, a most unfortunate fatality occurred, which might have led to disastrous consequences. A messenger, one Hoosen Ali, after an interview with Colonel MacGregor, accidentally fell from a window, and was killed on the spot. In that country, if a man is killed, his nearest male relation can demand the death of his murderer; and as Colonel MacGregor's two discarded servants had spread evil reports of their former master, the situation was not without disagreeable complications. Fortunately the nearest male relation was not dissatisfied; the funeral expenses were paid, and a present made to the widow by the Colonel, who was not sorry to get off so cheaply.

At sixty-five miles from Tabbas, Bushrueh was reached—a locality hitherto never visited by an Englishman. To show how faulty our information was of this country, General Chesney described it, from report, as a town in an oasis in the great salt desert of Persia, said to contain 30,000 souls. "In the first place," writes Colonel MacGregor, "it is not in the great salt desert of Persia at all, nor anywhere near it; next, it has not now, and never could have had, anything like 30,000 inhabitants. Bushrueh is simply a large village of some 800 houses, situated in the middle of a wide plain, surrounded by a larger amount of cultivation than any place I have seen since Shiraz." This instance is but an example of



one out of hundreds, where Colonel MacGregor was able to correct the wholly inaccurate topography as laid down in previous maps of Central Asian routes.

By the 8th June, Colonel MacGregor arrived in Birjand, an important centre, although but poorly fortified, as roads lead from it to Herat, Sabzawar, Farah, Lash Juwain, and Sistan.

Here were to be seen Turkoman prisoners, in chains, awaiting their ransom, being worth from £9 to £13 apiece. The Amir, Alam Khan, of this district was a trusted officer of the Persian Government, having commanded a detached force against Sabzawar and Lash Juwain, when Herat was captured in 1857. Under him was a force of 11 guns, 1000 cavalry, and 2000 infantry.

Colonel MacGregor now made a discovery which interested him excessively. He found that a few years before four or five Russian officers had been at Tabbas, ostensibly on a scientific mission, which necessitated their taking copious notes regarding the routes, the food-supply, and transport resources of the district, and as he went on, he found they had been to Bushrueh and Tun. From this they had gone by Bajistan and Gunabad, a well-cultivated district between Bajistan and Kauf, to Ghain; but as this was a roundabout way, Colonel MacGregor proceeded by Kakhk and Ghain, where he came again on the track of the Russians, who, he found, had also visited Birjand, where they had remained fifteen days. At Birjand it appeared the

Russians had divided, some going on to Sistan, others to Herat. The question for Colonel MacGregor now became, by what route he should proceed. First, it was a great deal too hot to go to Sistan in June; next, if he went back straight to Mashad, he should be going over the same road twice; but by going to Herat he would traverse a country totally unknown to the British. He could obtain information of the routes leading from this part of Persia to Herat, Sabzawar, Anardara, and Farah, and of the west frontier of Afghanistan; and lastly, he would perhaps be able to run the Russians to earth. On the other hand, he was aware that it was necessary to get permission to travel in Afghanistan; but as that was then impossible, he considered the knowledge to be gained worth the risk, and he had no reason to expect anything but the most favourable reception. He therefore determined to take the responsibility of going on, and took the road to Herat.<sup>1</sup>

*June 11.*—At Baj, seven miles outside Birjand, was the residence of Sirdar Behbood Khan (Alikozai), grandson of the famous Yar Mahamad of Herat. This chief told Colonel MacGregor that he had a party in Herat, and that some day he intended to teach the usurping Barakzais a lesson.

The route now lay across plains frequented by marauding bands, and the order of march was

<sup>1</sup> Letter to Mr C. U. Aitchison, C.S.I., Foreign Secretary, Simla, from Mashad, 5th July 1875.

arranged with a view to the possibility of meeting some of these border ruffians.

“As we were coming up to the tower of Gulwarda, I noticed rather a commotion among the garrison of the post, which consisted of two decrepit old gentlemen, and on arriving found there was reason for it; for on going to the top of the hill, and looking in the direction pointed, I saw a party of horse marching swiftly across the front in compact order. This was an *alaman*, or raiding party of Turkomans. They seemed to number about one hundred men, and luckily did not seem to have any intentions in our direction, for they passed without once looking our way.”

“Near Yezdan<sup>1</sup> were noticed the Turkoman towers with which the whole plain is dotted, and on getting closer we saw at first people scattered about through the fields. Presently a matchlock was fired from the high tower of the fort, and then there was a skedaddle marvellous to behold; and almost before we had time to look out, not a man was to be seen below—all had clambered up into the nearest tower. Seeing this, I thought it prudent to stop the party till we had assured them that we were friends, so I

<sup>1</sup> Mr Merk, political officer attached to the Afghan Boundary Commission in December 1885, writes: “Near Yezdan, at Burj-i-Gulwarda, I again heard of Sir Charles MacGregor. This time he was described as a Russian who endeavoured to reach Herat, and got as far as Pahlrah, where he was arrested and taken to Mashad, and thence into captivity in Russia!”—See *Northern Afghanistan*, by Major C. E. Yate, p. 148.

rode on with only Ali Akbar to the fort. After some doubt, the party inside became reassured, and presently the gate was opened, and about twenty heavily armed men came out, like prudent soldiers, cautiously, with one eye on us and the other on the gate. They were headed by a fine young man, Rustem, who said we must excuse them; they lived far away from any one, in a desert where no man was a friend till he had proved himself so. Nevertheless, they would not let us into the fort, but made us bivouac outside."

After leaving Yezdan ten miles to the rear, on the 18th June Colonel MacGregor crossed the frontier into Afghanistan, and entered the valley of the Hari-rud. Fifty miles of Afghan territory were traversed without meeting a soul except a caravan bound from Herat to Birjand; but on reaching Pahrab, two or three facts indicated that the traveller had left Persia. "When my servants were pitching the tent, there was the usual crowd enjoying the novel spectacle of a *Feringhi*; but whereas I had marched over 1000 miles in Persia, and had never once been offered the slightest assistance by any of the crowd, here several men came forward, and assisted in driving in pegs, &c."

Here Colonel MacGregor despatched a letter to the Mustaufi of Herat, advising him of his approach, and intention to visit Herat; but on starting the next morning towards the city, a messenger from the Mustaufi stopped his advance until further in-

structions were received from the Afghan governor. Nevertheless, the next day Colonel MacGregor went on to a small village called Kargan, within five miles of Herat, where he awaited in a cool garden the invitation from the Mustaufi.

Instead of a courteous invitation, however, an official, Shah Mahamad, and another officer, Mahamad Alam, with a ragged escort of sowars, were sent to convey Colonel MacGregor back across the frontier. The Afghans, who evidently believed Colonel MacGregor to be a Russian spy, as Mr Merk afterwards heard, treated Colonel MacGregor with some incivility until he reached Ghorian, the frontier town, where Mahamad Sarwar (Ghilzai), the governor, showed him proper attention.

From Ghorian the discomfited traveller was escorted along the left bank of the Hari-rud to Sang-i-Dakhtar, where the river was crossed, and then on to Kusan, a position of considerable importance, as being the first village in the valley of the Hari-rud which would be reached by forces coming from the west, and the point on which the roads from Turbat,<sup>1</sup> Mashad, and Sarakhs join. Here was a delightful garden, where the wearied colonel was able to lie on his back in the airiest of costumes, devouring bunch after bunch of the most delicious grapes.

An uneventful journey along the road from Kusan to Kehriz,<sup>2</sup> which bore an unenviable reputation, brought the party out of Afghanistan into Persia ;

<sup>1</sup> Turbat-i-Shaikh Jami.

<sup>2</sup> See *post*, chap. ii. p. 60.

but the escort under Mahamad Alam insisted on taking their *quasi* prisoner safe to the Persian village celebrated for its melons. It may here be mentioned that after his return to England, Colonel MacGregor was informed that his proceeding into Afghanistan near Herat, and his communicating with the Mustaufi of that city, were highly disapproved of by the Indian Government; but after explanation, his conduct was *not* disapproved of by Lord Salisbury in Downing Street, as will appear afterwards.

Next day Colonel MacGregor reached Mashad-i-Reza, and later traversed the district of Bakharz, getting to the fort and village of Hamitabad on the 27th June. After an incidental rencontre with some Turkomans, who made off after an interchange of a few shots, the village of Faraimun was gained (June 29), where the chief, Nusrola Khan, showed great hospitality, and here acquaintance was made with the breed of the Tekke Turkoman horses. "They are, in my opinion, one of the few things in that fearful imposture, Central Asia, that come up to their reputation, and are far and away the best oriental horses, after Arabs, that I have seen.

"In some respects they are superior; indeed, in stature and bone they approach the English horse. . . . For chargers, light weights, or ladies' horses in India, they would be most suitable."

Here also was met the first specimen of a Turkoman chief, who impressed his visitor very favourably.

On the 1st of July Colonel MacGregor marched into Mashad, where he was entertained by Abbass Khan, who appears to have remembered particular years by the arrival of particular Englishmen. Thus 1872 was assigned to Captain Marsh, 1873 was named after Colonel Baker, 1874 after Captain Napier, and doubtless 1875 would in future be handed down as Sal-i-Colonel MacGregor. Mashad is the residence of the *Wali*, or Governor-General, of Khorassan, and here Colonel MacGregor had the opportunity of inspecting some eight or nine regiments of the Persian army.

One of the first things Colonel MacGregor did on arrival at Mashad was to telegraph to Mr Aitchison, the Foreign Secretary to the Indian Government, for permission to visit Herat with permit from the Amir, Sher Ali. He also expressed his intention of visiting Merv, from which place he projected a reconnaissance along the right bank of the Oxus to Kolab, over ground quite new to the European world then, and on to Bamiam *viâ* the Hazarajat, back to Herat. But the anticipated, adventurous journey was not to be. Lord Northbrook, the Viceroy of India, telegraphed to the Minister at Teheran, who at once sent to inform Colonel MacGregor that he was prohibited from travelling in Afghanistan or Turkistan or going beyond the boundary of Persia. At this very time Russian officers were thoroughly exploring the very tracts of country which Colonel MacGregor proposed to visit,

and yet the Government of India were so blind to their own interests as to discourage the acquirement of information by one of their best qualified officers.

There is no doubt that, had Colonel MacGregor been encouraged and supported in his endeavour to enter Herat, British influence and prestige would have been reawakened in that city; and possibly Ayub Khan would have found it impossible later to assemble an expedition there against Kandahar.

“The results of this trip, I am vain enough to believe, would have been that the English Government would have been in possession of every route from Turkistan to the Oxus, from the Oxus to Afghanistan, and between Kabal and Herat—of the resources of all the States passed through, and of the feeling of the chiefs towards us,—in fact, of the information which my knowledge of the amount we possessed told me was what was most required to enable our Government to arrive at a clear idea of what ought to be done when called on to provide measures for the defence of our Indian empire.”

Hearing that the Persian garrison of Sarakhs was about to be relieved, Colonel MacGregor determined to accompany the relief, and see as much of the country in that direction as he could. The tract of country he proposed visiting afforded considerable interest, as no Englishman had hitherto traversed this particular route. A start was made on the 18th July, and Colonel MacGregor was not a little



amused at witnessing the utter confusion of the whole order of march. Cavalry were mixed up inextricably with camels carrying baggage; the infantry were mostly riding on donkeys, whilst the advance-guard riding in front had their wives mounted behind them. Even the guns were surrounded by such a throng of donkeys, horses, and camels as would have made their services utterly inoperative in case of an attack. However, there was more discipline among the gunners, whose *physique* is splendid, and the way in which they got their 9-pounders over difficult ground extorted the admiration of the Bengal Staff officer. The superiority of the artillery over the rest of the Persian army is supposed to be due to the remnant of the good effects instilled into that branch by the gallant Christie in the days of 1810. Abbass Khan's small army, which, if it had been properly handled, was really a very compact little form of a battalion of infantry, three guns, and 500 horse, was quite lost in a chaotic throng of camels, ponies, and mules, so that its fighting powers were completely annulled. It took eight days' marching to get to Sarakhs, the frontier post at the north-east extremity of Persia. "With regard to its strategical importance, I think a glance at the map will show that, in the complications which must arise ere the Russo-Indian question can be deemed settled, its future is likely to be a stirring one. Placed at the junction of roads from Herat and Mashad by the Hari-rud and Ab-i-

· Mashad valleys respectively, and at the best entrance to the province of Khorassan from the north, it cannot fail to exercise a very serious influence on the momentous issue of the above question. This must happen whether it falls into the hands of the friends of England or into those of her foes. Whether Russia uses Sarakhs as a base for offensive measures against Herat, or England as a defensive outpost to defeat any such operations, that position will be heard of again. And if my feeble voice can effect a warning ere it is too late, let it be here raised in these words: *If England does not use Sarakhs for defence, Russia will use it for offence* ! I think, however, the actual site now occupied is, from a tactical point of view, too far forward, and I should myself be inclined to draw it back as far as Daulatabad, near which on the right bank of the river are some heights which might soon be rendered a very strong position for a fort, while arrangements might be made for storing water in the river-bed below to any extent."

On the 28th July, Colonel MacGregor got Abbass Khan to give him 200 horsemen, with whom he rode out across the Hari-rud a dozen miles or so towards the endless desert in the direction of Merv. "Deserts," he writes, "have the same effect on me as unknown mountain-ranges—I always want to look beyond !"

Whilst at Sarakhs, Colonel MacGregor learned that the Tekke Turkomans had a Russian prisoner, whom

they were keeping till a ransom of £2000 was paid for him. The amount required was beyond the power of Colonel MacGregor to offer, but feeling sympathy for the unfortunate wretch, said to be a gunner, he sent him a note and a little money by some Tekkes who were leaving Sarakhs for Merv. The note and money reached Ivanoff, the prisoner in question, but the answer fell into the hands of the Governor of Khorassan, who forwarded it to Teheran. Here it caused at once a diplomatic problem, and Colonel MacGregor was called upon by the British Government for explanations. No wonder is it that Colonel MacGregor condemned the mercenary and selfish spirit which dictates the policy of Great Britain, in Persia at least. —

“I have now seen a good deal of these Persians, and my opinion, formed after very many talks with all classes, is, that while they fear the Russians, and know themselves to be powerless, they like us personally, and would gladly, *as far as in them lies*, do anything for us if they dared. But, they say, what are we to do? The English do not seem to care, and the Russians are very powerful.” “In fact, it has been industriously spread all over Khorassan that the Russians are much more to be feared *on the land* than we are even on the sea; and although they know they must distrust the Russians, yet they cannot turn to us.”<sup>1</sup>

Aug. 1.—Leaving with the relieved guard of that

<sup>1</sup> Letter to Mr Aitchison.

station, Colonel MacGregor re-entered Mashad on the 1st August. Whilst residing at Mashad, a very decided attempt was made by interested parties to get the British officer to visit Ayub Khan, the rebellious son of Sher Ali, the Amir of Afghanistan, and own brother to the gallant Yakub who was kept by his father in prison at Kabak. Under other circumstances, Colonel MacGregor would gladly have gone to see this exiled prince, but he thought that an interview with him might cause some political embarrassment, and perhaps another complication, so he declined the honour. However, he met Ayub himself in the streets, and exchanged salutes, and Ayub seemed half inclined to call on the Colonel to stop and talk; but, not meeting with any encouragement, he desisted from making further advances. How little did either foresee that five years subsequently they should meet as enemies on the field of battle outside of Kandahar!

Ayub, it appears, was well treated at Mashad, having quarters and a pension of 4000 *tomams* per annum. The fact is that the Persians have always had a hankering after Herat, and were consequently ever ready to receive kindly any fugitive chief from that country, in hopes of making use of him at a future time as a stalking-horse for their own purposes. Thus they had Shah Nawaz Khan, a son of Sultan Jan, at Teheran, and a grandson of Yar Mahamad at Birjand, either of whom they were prepared to play off against the Amir of Afghanistan when times

should be propitious. At this time Colonel MacGregor impressed on the Foreign Secretary at Simla the importance of preserving a friendly alliance with Persia. He wrote: "There is this to be said in favour of trying the effect of supporting Persia,—as long as the Russians can be kept to their present boundaries, the danger with which we are menaced by their proximity may be *prevented*; but directly they come to get possession of such vital points as Merv and Sarakhs, the disease may be said to have begun, and will have to be *cured*. Now, if Russia could calculate on the assistance of Persia in men, supplies, and information, no one can doubt that there need be no hesitation on their parts, in not only taking those places when the proper time comes, but also in advancing on Herat; and as Persia by herself is helpless, there is no reasonable ground for supposing she can refuse any assistance that is asked for. But if, on the other hand, Persia, assured of our aid, was unfriendly, Russia could not move a step towards either Merv or Sarakhs as long as there was a Power on the flank of her communications unfriendly and unsubdued."

*Aug. 7.*—A week was spent in Mashad, and then the indefatigable traveller rode on to examine the small khanate of Daragez, the chief town of which, Mahamadabad, he entered after a rough journey of some eight days. Daragez is a tract in the Atak hills, some 1200 feet above the sea, with plenty of

water and good grazing for the fine breed of horses which is here reared.

*Aug. 18.*—The Khan of Daragez was not too pressing in his hospitality, so Colonel MacGregor started again on the 18th to Kochan, where the Mir Hoosen Khan proved a most desirable host, and consequently a most pleasant visit was enjoyed by the traveller. The town, however, had recently suffered from earthquakes, so that the majority of the people lived in tents.

After staying here two days, the Colonel left for Shirwan on the 22d, following the road down the right bank of the Atrak river. The next day a march of thirty-seven miles brought the explorer to Bujnurd, lower down but some distance south of the Atrak. At Bujnurd, situated in one of the prettiest valleys in Persia, Colonel MacGregor was met in the kindest manner possible by the Elkhani. "I have seen some more intelligent men in Persia, but have met no one whose kindness has left a more grateful recollection on me than has that of Yar Michund Khan." Before leaving Bujnurd, where Colonel MacGregor stayed four days, the Elkhani presented his visitor with a carpet and a fine piece of chain-mail armour, and rode out some three or four miles on his journey westward. On the 29th Jajarm was reached, after a march of thirty miles over a level plain of hideous aspect, without a particle of vegetation, and for two miles over a regular bit of sand desert. Almost the whole plain

near Jajarm, which boasts of considerable cultivation dependent on *karezes* (artificial irrigation), is covered by Turkoman towers, showing what a dangerous spot this was.<sup>1</sup>

Colonel MacGregor arrived at Shahrud, a walled town, but weakly defended, on 2d September; and here a Russian spy appeared to take an impertinent curiosity in the British officer's movements.

On the 4th September Colonel MacGregor got away from Shahrud, and proceeded north *viâ* Tash, over the Shalwar Kuh pass (at 9000 feet elevation), across the lofty range of the Hazar Jarih mountains, a confused mass of jungle-clad hills, and along a break-neck path through dense forest for miles to Astrabad, in the plain bordering on the Caspian Sea below.

On the 10th the Colonel reached the shores of the Caspian at Bundur Gez, and took steamer past Ashurada and Mashad-i-Sar to Enzelleh, the port of Resht. From Resht Teheran was reached by road on the 29th. Here Captain the Hon. G. Napier, who had been travelling over much the same ground as Colonel MacGregor, made that officer's acquaintance, and the two proceeded together by *chuppur* stages on miserable hired steeds to Tabriz. Leaving Napier at Tabriz, MacGregor rode on to the Russian frontier (23d October), and thence, by *troika*, drove

<sup>1</sup> In the reproduction of Colonel MacGregor's sketch of "Jajarm from the East" ('Journey through Khorassan,' vol. ii. p. 105), these towers by mistake have been, strangely enough, altered into solitary trees, thus altogether transforming the characteristic of the landscape.

to Nukohvan, the first Russian cantonment. The journey *via* Erivan and Tiflis across the Caucasus is not described by Colonel MacGregor in his volumes. He merely records that he took rail from Vladikavkas to Rostof, and by way of Kharkof, Cracow, and Vienna, reached England on the 15th November.

Colonel MacGregor had now reached *home*. "Alas! not such a home as I had often dreamed of going to, where each pleasure would have been enhanced and reflected in the bright eyes of her who has gone from me, but still a home where I should see our child, and begin with her a new life." This little daughter, Viva, was now three years and a half old, and her father had brought home with him some silk embroidery all the way from Ghain, to make cushion-covers for her.

During his journey from Sarakhs, Colonel MacGregor wrote a paper on the "Merv Question," in which he discusses the anticipated conquest of Merv by the Russians, which has since become an accomplished fact. This paper was subsequently published as an appendix to the author's work on Khorassan four years later; and the course of events which happened during that interval amply justifies the prescient warnings given in the document. Colonel MacGregor pointed out that if the Russians were in possession of Merv they could move up troops and stores for any further offensive advance in absolute secrecy. He pointed out how easily Herat is accessible from Merv—the distance



being only 260 miles, and the route practicable for infantry, cavalry, and even guns. He proceeded to urge that Herat was well termed the "key of India," because it was the best point at which an invader from the west could concentrate and prepare for the invasion of that country—because its strategical position commanded all the important approaches to India—because its fortifications were strong, and capable of being improved by modern appliances—and because its climate was admirable; and the possessor of Herat would ever command a widely extended prestige throughout Central Asia. Taking it for granted that, unless England interfered, Russia would successfully carry out her designs against Merv, Colonel MacGregor next considered the result of such an advance. He had only to bid his readers look back on the history of Russian progress in Central Asia to forecast the next move on the chess-board—which, undoubtedly, must be the taking of Herat. Once in possession of that city, they would fortify it so that we should be unable to retake it with 50,000 men. They could then secure the direct line of communication with the Caspian, along the Atrak, and Northern Khorassan would be absorbed by the Muscovite.

Colonel MacGregor advised the conciliation of Turkey, the strengthening of Persia, and above all, the necessity of making Afghanistan unassailable. He would have British officers despatched to put the defences of Bala-Murghab, Kusan, and Herat in or-

der; next, the acquisition of sites at Mohumrah and Ormuz from the Persians for the formation of depots;<sup>1</sup> and thirdly, officers sent to discipline and instruct the Persian troops. Such measures, it was urged, need not commit England to war with Russia; but should Russia resent such measures, then, undoubtedly, it would be necessary to act decisively by the military occupation of Herat. Colonel MacGregor, however, recorded his dissent from any plan which went further than a purely military occupation of Herat, as he considered that interference in the political management of a single Afghan district would only lead to a recurrence of the disasters of 1842. Herat in English possession, the Russians would not care to retain Merv.

On the 31st December Colonel MacGregor was made a Companion of the Order of the Star of India, a not undeserved decoration.

Captain the Honourable G. Napier, son of the Commander-in-Chief in India, who had been sent to Persia to examine into the circumstances of a raid which had taken place on the frontier, sent to the Foreign Office an elaborate Report upon the Persian territory between the Hari-rud and the Caspian. His route corresponded closely with the latter portion of Colonel MacGregor's journey from Sarakhs; and when Sir Frederic Goldsmid read portions of Napier's report at a meeting of the Geographical

<sup>1</sup> The island of Bahrein has since (1888) been acquired by the promulgation of a British Protectorate.

Society on the 24th January, Colonel MacGregor was requested to attend and give some particulars of his reconnaissance in those regions adjacent to the Turkoman frontier. Accordingly, Colonel MacGregor complied with the request, and gave a brief account of his travels—in which he confirmed and illustrated Captain Napier's observations satisfactorily. The ensuing discussion was turned on the ancient bed of the river Oxus, and the origin and power of ancient Parthia, by Sir Henry Rawlinson.

Shortly afterwards, in reply to some disparaging remarks which had appeared in the newspapers, Colonel MacGregor addressed the following explanation to the press: "I was proceeding home through Persia, when the perhaps not altogether inexcusable wish occurred to me to try and add some information to our knowledge of that country; and I was the more induced to take this step because I knew, better than most men, that of a very important part of Central Asia we are curiously ignorant. The object I set before myself was to complete our information regarding,—first, the routes leading into Persia from the south; secondly, the routes leading from Persia into Afghanistan; thirdly, the routes leading into Afghanistan from the Oxus; fourthly, to see with my own eyes the valley of Herat, the fortifications of Herat, and the other important fortresses of the frontier. I fully accomplished the first and second of these objects, I failed in the third, and partially succeeded in the fourth. The reason of my thus

partial success was owing entirely to the action of our own Government; and of course, as a loyal servant of her Majesty, I accept that decision without comment and without cavil.

“Being thus disappointed in my object, and adhering strictly to both the letter and spirit of my orders, I still determined to see as much of Persia as was possible; and was thus enabled to add still more to our information.

“With reference to the sneer contained in the paragraph, of my having asked for accommodation suitable to my rank, it implies that I made too much of my rank. But the fact is, that I asked the *mustaufi* for no more than I had asked and received at every Persian town or village I had stopped at—a place to lay my head in. It is true I informed him at the same time who I was; but this—though I am extremely proud of serving in her Majesty’s military forces—was merely from the wish not to conceal anything. I was asked by the *mustaufi*’s first messenger, who was very civil, who I was? Not being a tinker, or a tailor, or a private gentleman, I could but answer, ‘A lieutenant-colonel in her Majesty’s service.’

“Then as to my not waiting for a reply: this is inaccurate again. The first reply I received was from an officer of the *mustaufi*’s; and as he gave me to understand I would not be received, I took advantage of the cool of the morning to ride from Pahrah, the frontier village of Afghanistan, in the

direction of Herat, and I stopped for several hours in a garden on the road and waited for the reply.

“That reply being a refusal to receive me, because I was a British officer, I got on my horse and rode down the valley, and was escorted by Afghan horsemen to the Persian frontier post at Kehriz, and not to Teheran, as the paper rather ludicrously supposes.

“Next, I did not report the matter to Mr Thomson, nor did I ask his permission to visit Herat, because, in the first place, I had nothing to do with that gentleman; and in the second, I knew quite well he could not give the permission.

“When I was at Sarakhs, on the Merv frontier, I discovered there was a Russian prisoner there, and I had every reason to believe there he will remain till the Russians find it convenient to release him by force of arms.

“The last paragraph comments on a simple bit of chaff in a private letter as if it was said in sober earnest. I laughingly remarked that if I was captured by Turkomans, I hoped Mrs Aitchison and other mutual lady friends would get up a fancy bazaar for my relief.

“I confess that from causes quite beyond my control my journey has not realised quite all I hoped of it; but however that may be, I have learnt enough to give me a very fair general idea of how affairs stand, and also to know that the day may come when the information I was debarred from procuring will be worth far more than its weight in gold; and

even if I had learnt nothing and seen nothing, the feeling that I have risked danger, undergone considerable hardship, and spent a large sum of money out of my own pocket in an endeavour to benefit my country, is worth something to a soldier who only serves for the 'name of the thing.'"

When returning through Persia after his attempt to reach Herat, and after receiving the discouraging prohibition from the Indian Government to cross the Turkoman frontier, one resolve was uppermost in Colonel MacGregor's mind—viz., that nothing would ever induce him to travel in those countries again. The fact was, that having undertaken his private journey in the interests of the State, and the Government having jealously interfered with his movements when on furlough, all the salt, as he expressed it, had been taken out of the trip, and henceforth the dreary wastes and long stages seemed interminable, and he always repeated to himself that never, never would he undertake again such a thankless task. If there was one thing on which he was fixed, it was that Central Asia should see his face no more. In this frame of mind he continued throughout the winter of 1875-76, during which no more irritating subject could be broached in his presence than frontier work in Asia; but in the spring of 1876<sup>1</sup> the spirit of the true traveller re-

<sup>1</sup> Lord Lytton succeeded Lord Northbrook as Viceroy, and inaugurated a forward policy in India in April, a circumstance which

vived, and by the summer-time Colonel MacGregor was making renewed preparations for filling up certain blank spaces on the map, which he felt looked reproachfully at him.

Lord Salisbury, then her Majesty's Secretary for India in Lord Beaconsfield's Administration, had been particularly considerate towards Colonel MacGregor in the expression of sympathy with his unsuccessful attempt to reach Herat; and during an interview at the India Office, the Deputy Quarter-master-General informed the Marquis that he was ready to go anywhere and do anything which the Secretary for India might wish him to undertake. Colonel MacGregor particularly suggested Mekran as a useful field for exploration. Lord Salisbury said that any information about this country could not fail to be interesting, and he promised to consider whether he would allow him to travel in those regions. On a subsequent occasion Lord Salisbury informed the Colonel that he had obtained the assent of the Council of India to his returning to duty *visâ* Baluchistan, with the view of procuring detailed geographical information of the districts through which he should pass.<sup>1</sup> His friend Captain Lockwood was also permitted to accompany him.

contributed not a little towards the restoration of Colonel MacGregor's ardour for exploration.

<sup>1</sup> "INDIA OFFICE, LONDON, 14th Sept. 1876.

"MY LORD,—I have to acquaint you that, having authorised Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. MacGregor, C.S.I., of the Bengal Staff Corps,

All preliminaries being settled, Colonel MacGregor and Captain Lockwood took train from Charing Cross, Eastward bound, on the 25th September 1876. There being no hurry, they travelled leisurely through Paris, Vienna, and Pesth; then, steaming down the Danube to Rustchuk, there took rail to Varna, and thence by steamer to Constantinople and Trebizond.

From Trebizond the officers rode to Erzroum, where they carefully inspected the fortifications, and proceeding to Kars, they examined the defences of that historical fortress minutely.<sup>1</sup>

This fortress, it will be remembered, subsequently fell into the hands of the Russians, who gallantly took it by storm on the 15th of November 1877. The journey through the highlands of Armenia to the Tigris was performed during snowstorms and

and Captain R. B. Lockwood, of the Panjab Frontier Force, who are at present in this country, to proceed to India by way of the Kharan river and Baluchistan, I have decided that, in addition to travelling expenses, those officers shall receive the full Indian pay and allowances of their appointments during the period which will be occupied by their journey, reckoning from the date of their leaving England, and that such period shall count as service for pension.—I have, &c.

“SALISBURY.

“To his Excellency the

Right Hon. The GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.”

—See “Wanderings in Baluchistan, by Major-General Sir C. M. MacGregor, Quartermaster-General in India.” One volume, p. 315. Allen & Co., London: 1882.

<sup>1</sup> Kars was a formidable fortress, consisting of a solid stonework citadel, with a series of detached masonry forts and earthworks mounting some 300 guns.—See the Campaign in Armenia, by Lieutenant F. V. Greene, United States Engineers.



wintry weather, after which the raft-voyage down the Tigris seemed luxurious travelling.

On the 25th November the travellers reached Baghdad, and proceeded *viâ* Basrah and Bushire to the station of the Indo-European Telegraph Company at Jask—a barren, uninviting spot on the coast of Mekran.

Colonel MacGregor thus had an opportunity of seeing a part of the world which was soon to be the theatre of stirring scenes. He sent an exhaustive report<sup>1</sup> to Lord Salisbury concerning the capabilities of those strong positions, Erzroum and Kars, which were already fully armed and equipped with Krupp guns, whilst great efforts were then being made to provision both of these fortified towns adequately, and reinforcements were being hurried up to increase their garrisons.

Troops were met on the road down to the Tigris from Erzroum at almost every stage *en route* to Erzroum or Kars; for by this time the Turks were thoroughly convinced of the certainty and imminence of the coming war, and feeling that it was to come sooner or later, they were looking forward to its commencement to put an end to their harassing anxiety. Kars was found to be, as far as the plan of its fortification went, in much the same state as when it was taken in 1855 and handed back by the Russians after the Crimean war; but all the batteries had been immensely strengthened and more

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix A, p. 43.

powerfully armed. The forts had been lately inspected and reported on by Blum Pasha, a Prussian officer of considerable reputation in the Turkish service, and the defences put in order by Hoosein Pasha, who had been educated at Woolwich. The Turkish garrison was composed also of troops far superior to any that could have been brought into the field in 1854-55; but still there was much rottenness observable in their administration, and above all, there was a lack of educated officers.

Before leaving Jask, Colonel MacGregor drew up a suggestive Memorandum for the India Office, which was highly approved of by Lord Salisbury and forwarded to Calcutta, where fifty copies were printed for confidential distribution. It was entitled "Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. MacGregor, C.S.I., Assistant-Quartermaster-General, on Armenia as a Theatre of War, 15th December 1876."<sup>1</sup>

The explorers arrived at Gwadar on the 1st January 1877, and were there assisted in procuring camels and guides by Major Mockler, who accompanied them from Jask for that purpose. The first objective point to be attained was Panjgur, to which place there were two routes which had not been visited before by Europeans. Major Lovett had

<sup>1</sup> This paper was subsequently reprinted as an appendix to 'The Defence of India,' a work published by General Sir C. MacGregor in 1884 (see *post*, p. 43). It had already been published by 'The Statesman,' in January 1880, and had thereby lost its confidential character.

pointed out the first of these routes—viz., that from the mouth of the Dasht river—as a suitable line for an advance of troops into the interior ; and Captain Lockwood undertook to reconnoitre this road, whilst Colonel MacGregor made an exploration of the second communication *viâ* the village of Pasni. A start was effected on the 3d of January, Lockwood turning west round the head of the bay, and MacGregor along the sea-shore to the east. At the fifth mile Colonel MacGregor came to one of the mud-volcanoes which are peculiar to this locality. It is named the Darrya Cham, and consists of a crater of dried mud with a basin of liquid mud in its centre, which every now and then bubbled up with a faint sound. At certain periods the mud is said to rise up and overflow the sides of the crater when affected by the high tides of the neighbouring sea. After travelling some fifty miles from Gwadar, the Colonel had only passed ten hovels, for there was not a sign of any village anywhere between the sea and the hills.

The state of affairs in the Panjgur valley made it necessary for the travellers to approach it from their different roads with a certain amount of caution. Colonel MacGregor marched by the road which is the regular caravan-route through Shahbaz, where he heard that Azad Khan, a notorious bandit chief, had sent a message to the *killadar* of the **fort** there that unless he made his *salaam*, he would come and attack him. Consequently he made a long detour

to the west in order to keep clear of Azad's warriors, and turned towards Isa, the residence of the Khan's *naib* (lieutenant). The Colonel selected Thal as the most fitting place for his stay in Panjgur, where he could keep aloof from the feudal dispute between Mir Gazian, the present, and Mir Isa, the former ruler of Panjgur. Azad Khan made several attempts to open communication with Colonel MacGregor whilst that officer was awaiting Captain Lockwood to rejoin him in Panjgur, which he did on the 25th January.

Of the tract between the Helmand, Sistan, and the mountains of Panjgur and Sarhad, the information existing was *nil*. At this time on the map there was a blank only broken by two names—one ZIRREH, in large letters, the other Pīr-i-Kaisar, in small. Pottinger and Christie had skirted this district (which extends 200 miles north and south, and the same distance east and west) on the north and south, Goldsmid's party had passed west of it, and St John looked at it from Jalk; but no one had hitherto examined this country, and now Colonel MacGregor and Lockwood proposed to explore the resources of this uninviting area of desert. From cross-examination of a Baluchi guide, Nur Mahammad, the travellers gleaned that it was four or five marches to a place called Tankh-i-Zorati, where the river Mashkel goes through the hills into the unknown land beyond; hence a road went to a district called Naru (the first heard of this hitherto un-

known locality), and another to Pir-i-Kaisar, so it was determined to push on to the pass where the Mashkel found its way through the hills.

The 29th of January found the small party fairly started on their way with provision for fifty days. The defile called Tankh-i-Zorati was reached on the 4th of February, and was found to be an intricate road winding with the turnings of the river, which it crosses and recrosses several times; and when the river is low the way is easy, but with a flooded river the pass would be impracticable. "The heights on both sides are very steep and rugged, and are composed of sandstone rock, the strata of which are upheaved straight on end. The defile is, of course, eminently defensible. In fact, it is of that nature that it would be described by a *non-military* traveller as a place where a few men could stay thousands. But the fact is, like most defiles through rugged hills, while it would present an almost unforcible obstacle to a front attack, yet it is very open to be turned both as a whole and in detail; so that, unless defended by an intelligent enemy, it would not detain well-commanded troops a single day." The explorers were now north of the range which bounds the desert on the south, and they were puzzled where the river, called "Budu," by Pottinger, could have its course. It was tolerably evident that the Budu and the Mashkel were one and the same river. The bed of the river Mashkel was followed for some days along the stream which

but partially filled it, and as they proceeded north, found only pools here and there, but plenty of tamarisk for camel-forage. The weather meantime at night was so cold that all the water in the skin-bags was frozen, although the temperature in the daytime was high.

A halt was made at a place called Shandak on the 14th and 15th, until another guide to Zirreh made his appearance on the 16th, on which day all extra hands and animals being sent to Lal-Khan-Chah to wait for instructions, the expedition, reduced to as small a size as possible, pushed on into Zirreh. By the 20th all the water-supply had been finished, and the camels began giving in one by one; and on the 22d, when no water had been obtained for forty-eight hours, seven of the camels were missing, and the guide disappeared, presumably in search of the camels. However, pushing on, the undismayed explorers reached the *shela* or old waterway of the Helmand at Shah Godar,<sup>1</sup> near the ruins of Gumbazi-Shah Maksud. The lost camels and guide turned up late on the following day, and having reached the projected objective of the reconnaissance, the track of the small caravan was directed towards the

<sup>1</sup> Mr Merk, a political officer attached to the Afghan Boundary Commission, when at Sarshela in December 1885, was told by some Persians deputed to meet him by the Amir of Ghain, "That eight years ago a big *Feringhi* had visited Shah Godar, a point some fifty miles south of Sarshela, and had built a pillar there. Possibly they meant," he writes, "Sir Charles MacGregor, who visited these parts about that time."—See Northern Afghanistan, by Major C. E. Yate, p. 146.

Sind frontier, or, as Colonel MacGregor termed it, homewards. During these three weeks in the desert the food of the travellers consisted principally of dried dates; and in the evening, at the end of a long dreary march, their greatest treat was a cup of cocoa, a luxury, however, used most sparingly, for they were only able to carry two or three tins with them.

On the 4th of March it was settled that Lockwood should go by the most direct and practicable route he could find from Lal-Khan-Chah *via* Nushki. From this last post he was to proceed *via* Mastung to Bibi-Naru in the Bolan Pass, and thence to Jacobabad as far as possible. The greater part of the Baluchi retinue was sent back to Panigur. Colonel MacGregor traversed Brahui Land by another route, which led through the Pisi defile in the Tazinan range. On each side of this pass, which is a mile in length and only about thirty yards wide, the cliffs rise perpendicularly for about 100 feet. "No doubt to a front attack in the old approved manner of taking the bull by the horns, this defile would be very strong; and this is the way non-military travellers generally look at these places. I am, however, surprised to see that Colonel Neil Campbell, who reported on the route in 1840, seems to consider it very strong, saying an enemy by merely throwing a few stones might render it impracticable. . . . It did not strike me as the place to detain a decent general a couple of days."

On the 23d March Colonel MacGregor arrived safely in Major Sandeman's camp at Gandava, in Kelat territory, and without delay pushed on to Jacobabad (Sind) by the 26th, whence he telegraphed news of the safe termination of his expedition to the Military Secretary. Captain Lockwood came down to Bolan Pass, and reached Jacobabad the following day, and the Viceroy telegraphed his congratulations on the happy result of the journey.<sup>1</sup> Colonel MacGregor, on resuming duty with the Quartermaster-General's Department, was able to construct a valuable map from the observations taken during his reconnaissance in Baluchistan. This was lithographed at the Surveyor-General's Office in Calcutta in June 1877 on a scale of sixteen miles to one inch.

Colonel MacGregor was able to throw considerable light on the much-vexed question of the boundaries of Afghanistan, and conclusively showed that the territory where Azad Khan held sway could not be considered tributary to Sher Ali.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram, March 28, from the Military Secretary to Colonel MacGregor, Jacobabad :—

"Viceroy (Lord Lytton) is very glad to hear of your arrival, and congratulates you and Captain Lockwood on safe termination of your adventurous journey. Political Superintendent Jacobabad was instructed to remit to Kelat 4000 rupees for your use. Please communicate with Colonel Nuttall. If the money you require be additional to that sum, Viceroy will authorise a further advance. His Excellency thinks you had better frame your report, and bring it up to Simla for consideration. He thanks you for all your interesting letters and reports, addressed to Burne.

"Colonel BURNE,  
*Secretary to Military Department,  
Government for India."*



"The mere fact," he wrote, "of Azad Khan having declared himself at various times during his checkered career a subject of the Afghans, cannot entitle them to claim his allegiance any more than if one of our Indian tributaries were to do so, and therefore, if he is not really a subject of the Afghans or the Persians, he must be that of the Khan of Kelat. Even if there was a shadow of right in favour of an Afghan claim, it must give way before the fatal inexpediency of permitting such an arrangement. In my opinion there are but two courses open, either Azad Khan must acknowledge the Khan of Kelat unreservedly, and give up the Afghan allegiance completely, or he should be brought to his senses without delay."

Captain Lockwood was unfortunately taken ill at Multan a few days afterwards, the disease being brought on by the exposure and bad food during the journey through the deserts of Baluchistan. He lingered some months at Mari, but eventually succumbed to dropsy and Bright's disease.<sup>1</sup>

From March 1877 to October 1881, a period of four years and a half, the diary of Colonel Charles MacGregor's travels with Captain Lockwood was laid aside.

"This journal," the author says, "was written from

<sup>1</sup> "Captain Lockwood, who was MacGregor's companion during this expedition, died soon afterwards from the hardships they underwent; and I have often thought it was during this time of extreme privation that MacGregor sowed the seeds of the disease which ultimately carried him off."—Speech of Sir Frederick Roberts at Simla, June 3, 1888.

day to day, and copied out of my note-book by a *baboo*. He has made endless mistakes, and these I have corrected with red ink; but even with these corrections the book is quite in the rough. I have had no time to polish it up." It was not until after the close of the Afghan Campaign 1878-81 that Sir Charles wrote to Captain W. E. Gill, R.E., of the Intelligence Branch, War Office (the well-known officer who was shortly afterwards murdered together with Professor Palmer, in Egypt, 1882), asking if he knew any one who would undertake the revision of his manuscript 'ZIRREH,' as he then called it. "What I want is," he wrote, "that it should be carefully gone over, and any palpable errors in English or spelling corrected; and sentences may, where necessary, be turned into better English, so long as the sense and meaning of my words is strictly preserved." In reply, Captain Gill advised the general to name a friend to deal with the publishers, mentioning at the same time the names of several men who would be likely to carry out his wishes. Major H. B. Hanna was then asked to act as reviser, on the understanding that he was not to be at liberty to show it to any one at the India Office. "I do not want to make a penny by the book," said General Sir Charles MacGregor, "nor will I pay a penny for its publication."

As Major Hanna's duties did not allow him leisure to revise the manuscript, this work was undertaken by Mr A. V. Wollaston, of the India Office. The diary

was finally published, in 1882, by Messrs Allen of Waterloo Place. "Lord Salisbury," wrote Mr Wolleston, "has expunged the whole of the chapter narrating your dealings with him, merely leaving a few lines to say that you undertook the journey at his request, with the view of exploring a region the geography of which was comparatively unknown."

When Colonel MacGregor wrote his memorandum of the 15th December 1876, the Russo-Turkish war was yet in embryo. However, hostilities commenced in April 1877, and the Russians, as Colonel MacGregor had foreseen, invested Kars, with results which concurred entirely with the Colonel's predictions. Under this changed aspect of affairs, Colonel MacGregor prepared another memorandum (dated May 8th) for the Indian and Home Governments, in which the question as to the aid which could be rendered to Turkey from India was considered in the new light which actual events had thrown on it. This document has only been published "confidentially;" but although it was reprinted in the famous work, 'The Defence of India, 1884,' as that volume was also branded "confidential," this valuable paper can only be alluded to here. It is sufficient to mention that it goes far to confirm the reputation of the prescience and political acumen of the late general in a remarkable degree.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The despatch of a British Indian force to the Mediterranean within twelve months of the appearance of Colonel MacGregor's second memorandum is good evidence that the suggestion of an advance from the Mediterranean was not lost upon the authorities.

Throughout the year 1877, Colonel<sup>1</sup> MacGregor worked hard in the Quartermaster-General's Department, and numerous are the memoranda, notes, reports, and papers which attest the untiring zeal with which he interested himself in working out the proper way of dealing with the various questions of importance submitted to him by his Chief, Sir Frederick Roberts, who, it should be remembered, was at this period only a major regimentally, although he had brevet rank as a colonel, and local rank of major-general whilst Quartermaster-General in India. Among some of the most valuable papers written by Colonel MacGregor during this period are those on Herat; Committee Report on Intelligence; on Care of Arms by Native Troops; Operations in Jawaki Land, and Punishment of the Jawaki Tribe; on Clandestine Prostitution; on the Schemes of Defence and Fortified Posts; places of Refuge for Europeans in case of an Outbreak among the Natives, &c.

In April 1876, Lord Lytton had succeeded Lord Northbrook as Viceroy, and as he came out with special injunctions from Lord Salisbury to press the residence of a British Envoy with the Court of Sher Ali at Kabal, it was not long before negotiations were entered into for carrying out the policy of Lord Beaconsfield. The outposts of Russia in Central Asia were now almost immediately upon the frontier of Afghanistan, and during 1877 frequent confer-

<sup>1</sup> Lieut.-Colonel MacGregor was promoted Brevet Colonel on 18th June 1877.

ences with the agents of Sher Ali were held, but with highly unsatisfactory results.

Meanwhile Colonel MacGregor did not cease to press upon the Indian Government the necessity of putting Herat in a state of defence by sending British officers to strengthen the fortifications of that city, and to organise the Herati and Kabal regiments in garrison there. He fully foresaw the course of events, and duly prepared schemes for the invasion of Afghanistan when the time for action should come.

“ TO THE QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL IN INDIA,  
Army Headquarters Camp.

“SIMLA, *December 7, 1877.*

“SIR,—I have the pleasure to-day to forward to your address a map to illustrate my travels in Persia in 1875. In doing so, I beg to point out that the whole of the red line represents my actual route, and is the result of a survey made by me while in that country ; the rest is put in from native information. In addition, I have already embodied in Part IV., *Routes in Asia*, 112 routes, most of them quite new, and nearly all collected by me during my travels. These travels were accomplished by me during furlough, and most of the time taken—viz., from 26th March 1875, date of leaving Bombay, to 15th November 1875, date of reaching London—was devoted by me to increasing our knowledge of Persia for the benefit of the Government at an expense of not under £600. The fact, therefore, is, that I am en-

abled to present Government with a survey of 1870 miles of country in Persia, together with the descriptions of 112 routes, without costing them one penny. This being the case, may I request the favour of your soliciting his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to recommend to Government that such portion of the time between 26th March and 15th November 1875 as may be deemed fair may be allowed to count to me as service towards pension? In any case I should have taken a month to reach England, so that from 26th April 1875 to date of my reaching London is the time actually spent by me in obtaining the information above specified."

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## APPENDIX A. TO CHAPTER I.

### COLONEL MACGREGOR'S FIRST "MEMORANDUM ON ARMENIA AS A THEATRE OF WAR, 15TH DECEMBER 1876."

A BRIEF notice of this Memorandum cannot fail to be interesting, more especially if a comparison is made between the estimates of the forces and the conclusions drawn by Colonel MacGregor before the war with the actual numbers and results of the real war itself.

A campaign in Armenia naturally inferred an invasion of that country by Russia. The success or failure of this invasion would depend—first, on the number of troops Russia could bring into the field in this quarter; second, whether Turkey would be supported, or not, by England. As Russia would be forced to keep up large forces for the protection

of her Polish, Galician, and other frontiers, besides increasing her forces in Central Asia, in addition to the large army required for the invasion of Bulgaria, it was evident that no very overwhelming force could be available for the invasion of Asiatic Turkey.

The force available for such a purpose was calculated not to exceed 170,000 men. (The actual force with which Russians began operations in Armenia, on the 24th April 1877, was about 55,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 210 field-guns of all kinds, besides a siege-train in the Caucasus of 336 guns, of which half only was mobilised at first—in all, not more than 100,000 men.)

If Persia became the ally of Russia, there would be in addition 50,000 rabble, unofficered, unfed, and untrustworthy.

Samch Pasha, the Governor-General of Erzroum, showed Colonel MacGregor returns putting the Turkish forces at 200,000 men; but their returns were so evidently untrustworthy that the Colonel puts down 70,000 as the number of disciplined troops in the pashalic.<sup>1</sup> (The Turkish forces in Armenia at the outbreak of the war under command of Monktar Pasha numbered in all 70,000 men and 108 field-guns.)

The garrison of Kars would consume not under 25,000 men, and with such a garrison, it could hope to stand a siege throughout the summer, and the enemy could neither besiege nor blockade that place with a less force than 50,000 men.<sup>2</sup> Loris Melikoff's column established itself 10 miles from Kars on the 24th April, and established siege-batteries (60 guns and mortars) by the end of May, when the bombardment commenced; but by the be-

<sup>1</sup> "I think that, turning out every available man, and calling out all the *Redifs*, the utmost strength of what I may call for the moment Turkish discipline troops in this pashalic would be 70,000 men."

<sup>2</sup> Batoum, 20,000; Ardahan, 7500; Kars, 25,600; Erzroum, 8250; at other points 9000—total, 70,250.—The Campaign in Armenia, by Lieutenant Greene, U.S. Engineers.

ginning of July the offensive campaign of the Russians in Armenia had come to a halt for *lack of sufficient troops*.

The garrison of Kars was 16,000 infantry, 30 field-guns, 1000 cavalry, and over 300 siege-guns—in all, with artillery, 22,000 men.

Loris Melikoff's army in September was 35,000 infantry, with 5000 or more Cossacks—total, 40,000.

"If indeed the Russians attacked Kars with an overwhelming force, and were prepared to sacrifice 20,000 for its capture, it might fall sooner."

In all, 41 battalions, or 30,000 infantry, with 53 squadrons and 144 guns, field and position, constituted the army of investment of Kars under General Lazareff in October. Forty-eight guns arrived on the 4th November. The Turkish force was 22,500 men at this time. Kars fell on the 18th November.

"There is little doubt that in this case the Russians would have the best chance of success, though it is by no means certain that they would be victorious in the long-run."

Now comes the gist of the suggestion: "How would it be *if a corps d'armée* of British troops 30,000 strong landed at Trebizond, *if* 60,000 mixed British and Indian troops advanced from Baghdad, and *if* the fighting powers of the Turks were more than doubled by the presence of British officers at their head?"

Colonel MacGregor then proceeds to discuss at some length the routes by which the British columns could move from Trebizond, and next the line of operations of a force advancing from India either to assist the Turks or to co-operate with the force sent from Europe. The details are interesting enough, but too lengthy to find a place in this sketch.

Some years later this Memorandum was published at length in the columns of the 'Statesman,' to which paper it had been intrusted "*confidentially*" by some one whose con-



fidence was evidently misplaced; and in Appendix B. will be found the comments on the confidential document, and the remarks of Sir Charles MacGregor on the apparent breach of confidence.

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## APPENDIX B. TO CHAPTER I.

### THE EXPEDITION TO BAGHDAD—COLONEL MACGREGOR'S MEMORANDUM.<sup>1</sup>

"WE have stated in our earlier issues that an insane Ministerial project was on foot in 1876-77 for invading Armenia *via* Baghdad. Lord Lytton declared the statement to be a pure fabrication of the 'Statesman.' We shall therefore now inform our readers, since the truth of our statement has been publicly challenged, on what grounds we made them. We have before us a 'Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel MacGregor, C.S.I., Assistant-Quartermaster-General, on Armenia as a Theatre of War, December 15, 1876.' The reader will observe the date of the Memorandum. It was just before the Constantinople Conference, when Lord Beaconsfield was steadfastly contemplating the failure of the conference, and the subsequent outbreak of the war, in alliance with Turkey, to defend its 'integrity and independence' against Russian invasion. Colonel MacGregor, an Indian officer of some consideration as a strategist, was about that time, it seems, returning from England to India; and he was plainly deputed by the English Ministry to return by way of Armenia, to undertake the task of planning an Armenian campaign for the guidance of the Ministry. Colonel MacGregor did return to India *via* Armenia; and

<sup>1</sup> The 'Statesman,' January 17, 1880, pp. 236-238.

he took a very painstaking survey of the country that was expected to become the theatre of war, and made an estimate of the probable forces that could be brought into the field by Russia and Turkey respectively; and this he embodied in a Memorandum, which bears absolute evidence of having been written to order, and submitted to superior authorities. We shall now, as we have no doubt, be asked to believe that Colonel MacGregor undertook and executed this laborious task of his own option and for his own amusement, and that it was never under serious consideration by any one but himself. Let those believe who can. It will of course be convenient to repudiate the mad scheme now; and after the extraordinary statement of Lord Salisbury in reply to Lord Grey and to Lord Derby, it would not of course surprise us if that nobleman were to disown for himself and his colleagues all responsibility for Colonel MacGregor's Memorandum. The best answer we can, by anticipation, make to such a repudiation, will be to publish the Memorandum, and let it speak for itself. Our readers will find it below, and we leave it to their unprejudiced judgment to say whether it bears intrinsic marks of having been written under instruction for submission to the authorities, or of being from first to last a freak of Colonel MacGregor's alone. The latter hypothesis is plainly absurd on the face of it: had Colonel MacGregor been only a less dashing Captain Burnaby, scouring Armenia out of curiosity, love of adventure, or the gratification of a strategical turn of mind—had he made his survey of the country, and planned the campaign without instruction from English Ministers that they were prepared to entertain the idea of such a campaign—he would neither have been at the pains to study, in all its difficult details, the topography of the country, nor would he have detailed his scheme in the style he has adopted. The style is distinctly the official style, and that of a man who is performing an official duty, who writes not as a military adventurer, with a wild

scheme of his own which he would fain recommend to the Government, but as an officer of the Government acting with the cognisance and approval of his superiors ; and altogether untroubled by a doubt as to the acceptability of his services, he plunges at once *in medias res*, without giving an explanation of the circumstances which led him to visit Armenia, and to take upon himself the task of making strategical arrangements for a war. The superior authority under which he was acting is assumed in every line, and the serious consideration of his proposals, which he submits with deference, is assumed throughout as a matter of course. We do not know that his scheme was approved in all its details, or that such a campaign as he sketches was ever actually determined on. But that it was under 'serious consideration,' and that it, or something resembling it, would have been adopted, could Lord Beaconsfield have had his way, and been allowed to enter upon a war with Russia, no one can entertain a doubt.

"We may say, in closing our remarks for the present, that the 'Memorandum' was given to us 'confidentially,' and that so long as there was the least likelihood of war, and of the scheme being put into practice, we felt bound, perhaps wrongly, to keep the matter secret. Had we been under no such obligation we should have at once exposed the insane project, believing that in so doing we were serving the interest of our country. But so long as war was possible, and the publication of the scheme might have embarrassed the Government in its Eastern diplomacy, we felt ourselves in honour bound to respect the confidence reposed in us. Now that the Eastern question has been settled for the present, and the transactions connected with it have become matters of history, and the country is called upon to sit in judgment on the policy of the Government during the last two years, every document that can shed light on their policy and their intentions ought to be published ; and we have no hesitation in publishing Colonel MacGregor's

Memorandum, that it may be brought to the knowledge of Parliament in the coming session. We did not feel justified in producing it till the Berlin Treaty had closed the present chapter of the history of the Eastern question."

"TO THE EDITOR OF THE 'STATESMAN.'"

"KABAL, 20th February 1880.

"SIR,—I have just read your article entitled 'The Expedition to Baghdad—Colonel MacGregor's Memorandum' (of 17th January), in which you are good enough to assume that because, taking advantage of my journey through Armenia in 1876, I chose to submit 'A Memorandum on Armenia as a Theatre of War,' therefore a campaign in that country against Russia was actually contemplated by her Majesty's Ministers. With your views or your belief I have nothing to do, but you will perhaps do me the favour to give the same publicity to this letter as you have to the article in question.

"My statement then is, that I was not ordered to proceed through Armenia, I was not ordered to prepare any such Memorandum, and I did undertake what you are pleased to call 'this laborious task' of my own option, and for my own amusement. I am not in the secrets of her Majesty's Ministers, and therefore I do not know what they may have intended to do in the event of a war with Russia; but the above is 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth of the matter,' as far as I am concerned.

"There is one other point to which I may perhaps call your attention—viz., that my memorandum is entitled, 'On Armenia as a Theatre of War,' and it does not therefore necessarily recommend the plan of operations sketched. What it does attempt is to show that if aid were wanted from India for a campaign in Armenia, how the Baghdad route to that province could best be utilised for it. As a matter of fact, I did not recommend its adoption.

"You proclaim your inability to believe that unless I had been commissioned to write this Memorandum, I would

‘neither have been at the pains to study, in all its difficult details, the topography of the country,’ therefore you will, of course, be utterly unable to believe the following statement, which, nevertheless, I have no hesitation in making—viz., it has been my invariable custom, whenever travelling in countries which may become a theatre of war, in which our army may be engaged, always to be ‘at the pains to study, in all its difficult details, the topography of the country’ I am visiting. I have submitted many such memoranda—scores of other officers have done so; and I hope both they and I will continue to do so whenever we have a chance.

“C. M. MACGREGOR, *Ast.-Qr.-Mr.-General*,  
*Chief of the Staff, Kabal Field Force.*”

## CHAPTER II.

THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR—THE KHAIBAR TO  
GANDAMAK.

1878-1879.

*"No cymbal clashed, no clarion rang,  
Still wore the pipe and drum;  
Save heavy tread and armour's clang,  
The sullen march was dumb."*

ORIGIN OF THE WAR—SHER ALI'S GRIEVANCES—LORD LYTTON'S  
ENVOY—PRECARIOUS RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA—PLANS AND  
PROJECTS—THE CROSSING OF THE INDUS—ROUTES INTO  
AFGHANISTAN—ROAD TO QUETTA—PERSIA AND HERAT—NO  
AFGHAN CAN BE TRUE—PROPOSAL TO GO TO HERAT—CHECK-  
MATING THE ADVANCE OF RUSSIA—GETTING RID OF THE  
BARAKZAIS—THE INDIAN TROOPS AT MALTA—FRONTIER  
ADMINISTRATION—THE BERLIN CONGRESS—SIR NEVILLE  
CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION—REPULSE OF CAVAGNARI—FORCING  
THE KHAIBAR—ALI MAJID—ROAD COMMANDANT—BAZAR  
VALLEY EXPEDITION—GUERILLA WARFARE—RECONNAISSANCE  
OF THE BOKHAR PASS—TRANSPORT ORGANISATION—INSPECTION  
OF THE KURAM LINE—SAFED SANG—TREATY OF GANDAMAK—  
THE RETIREMENT—AFRIDI BLACK-MAIL.  
APPENDIX.—ADVANTAGES OF THE LAKARAI PASS—PROJECT FOR  
THE ADVANCE ON KABAL.


SHER ALI, the Amir of Afghanistan, had long nursed  
several grievances against the British—in fact, ever

since he had first reported his accession to power in 1863, on the death of his father, the famous Dost Mahamad Khan. After having fought his way to the throne, in 1864, when he proposed to enter into a new treaty of friendship and defensive alliance with the Indian Government, he was told by Sir John Lawrence that the old treaty of 1855, still in force, was sufficient to meet the requirements of the situation; and Sir Henry Rawlinson asserts that the successive slights which the ruler of Kabal received at our hands gave rise to those deep feelings of mistrust which ever afterwards marked Sher Ali's intercourse with India.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless the Amir had no scruple in continuing to receive large subsidies in money and arms from the English Government, although he was constantly encouraging the border tribes to make raids across the Indian frontier and otherwise annoy his powerful neighbours.

After interviews with Lord Lytton at Simla in October 1876, the British agent, Nawab Ata Mahamad Khan, proceeded to Kabal with letters from the Viceroy to the Amir (at whose Court Russian intrigues had formed a party carrying great weight), requesting that chief to enter into negotiations for a new treaty, and inviting him to be present at the forthcoming Imperial *darbar* at Delhi. The

<sup>1</sup> Sher Ali resented an attempt made by the British Government to mediate between himself and his son Yakub Khan, whom he had imprisoned, and he had been greatly dissatisfied with the award of the Commission of Arbitration on the Perso-Afghan boundary in Sistan.



NORTH WEST FRONTIER, PART OF AFGHANISTAN, PISHIN, AND THE MARI COUNTRY.

Showing Routes of Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor 1878-79-80-85.





suspicious Amir, however, delayed his answer by several pretexts, and all prospect of the meeting between Lord Lytton and Sher Ali at Delhi was abandoned, whilst the contemplated treaty also fell through.

Meantime Russia was mobilising her troops on the Bulgarian, Armenian, and Turkistan frontiers, so that it was highly necessary for the Indian Government to take timely precautions in anticipation of possible hostilities.

The unmistakable manifestations of the Amir's scarcely concealed ill-will towards India, taken in conjunction with the precarious relations between Great Britain and Russia, made it necessary, therefore, for Lord Lytton to consult Sir Frederick Haines, the Commander-in-Chief, on the subject.

In November, whilst Colonel MacGregor was in Armenia, Sir Frederick Haines submitted a rough sketch of feasible operations which should be undertaken by the Indian army in the event of a war breaking out between Russia and Great Britain; and, among other measures, the Commander-in-Chief recommended the despatch, with the least possible delay, of some selected British officers to drill and assist the Amir's troops at Herat, Kandahar, Balkh, &c.

The Amir, on hearing of this proposal, remarked, "*Before the English look elsewhere, they had better attend to their own home.*"

In January 1877 war was confidently expected with Russia both at London and Calcutta, and the

Commander-in-Chief's staff were engaged in planning operations for a Central Asian campaign. It was resolved that, to meet Russia, the Kandahar and Herat line was the one for offensive object, *if only Afghanistan was allied to us.*

Shortly after, General Llamakin's famous proclamation was issued, and in April war was declared against Turkey by the Emperor of Russia. Colonel MacGregor had now returned from Central Asia, and all his thoughts were concentrated on the expected fight with the White Czar's troops on the Turkistan frontier. His Memoranda on the aid to be afforded to Turkey by India in Armenia have already been alluded to. The one of May was not without its effect on the military councils of the Indian authorities; and shortly after, 1st June, Colonel MacGregor wrote another brief paper for the Commander-in-Chief, in which his opinions are plainly stated.

As early as October 1876, Lord Lytton had given orders for the construction of a bridge of boats across the Indus at Khushalgarh, forty miles south of Attock, and now, in May 1877, Colonel MacGregor wrote:—

“I think that some very much more efficient arrangements should be made for crossing the Indus at Attock. In the event of operations having to be undertaken through the Khaibar, the strain on the bridge would be enormous. Another bridge, or two even, should then be run up, and an English officer with proper staff placed specially in charge. To

enable us to do this, sufficient boats or pontoons should be sent there. Enough are by no means procurable at a moment's notice.

“The Pindi-Kohat road should be improved, and care taken that the bridge should be really kept efficient. I do not consider this road of anything like so much importance as the Attock line. The practicability and suitability of the Kuram route has been much exaggerated. The distance from Rawal Pindi (which must always be our base in any operations in North Afghanistan) to Kabal by Kohat and the Kuram is 391 miles, by Peshawar and the Khaibar it is only 292 miles. The road by the first is unmetalled the whole way, while 196 of the second, to Hari-Sing-ka-Burj,<sup>1</sup> is metalled. Both routes have to cross the same river. The Kuram route goes over one pass 13,500 feet high, and from the Paiwar to Kabal, nearly 140 miles, or thirteen marches, the country passed is always over 6000 feet. On the other road, the last forty-four miles only are above 5000 feet, and the highest point passed is 8173 feet. The fact is that the snow, if nothing else, would make the Kuram route quite impracticable from December to March, whereas the Khaibar route has been traversed many times by our troops. All this I think proves that, if Kabal is to be attacked, the Khaibar is the proper road to take, and consequently the Pindi-Kohat road is not so important as the Pindi-Peshawar.

<sup>1</sup> Six miles from Peshawar.

“The next road to the south is that which connects Dera Ishmail Khan with the railway at Chichawatni.<sup>1</sup> I think the improvements indicated on this line by the Commander-in-Chief should be made; because in the event of the Amir, secure in the protection afforded by the high snow-passes on the Kuram route, attempting to operate in the direction of Kandahar during the winter, the road from Dera Ishmail Khan to Ghazni affords the only route by which we could threaten his communications and check such intentions. From Chichawatni to Ghazni is 450 miles, and from Jhilam to the same point is 440 miles: when the different nature of the road is considered, I should have no hesitation in recommending the first, because the Kuram is not practicable *throughout* the year, and the Ghwalari<sup>2</sup> route is, and is, moreover, well suited, from facilities of forage and water, for camel-carriage, which could also probably be got to a large extent from the Povindahs.

“The next route is from Multan to Dera Ghazi Khan and onwards. In the present aspect of affairs this route becomes of principal importance, and I think that it would be advisable to lay down a light railway on that part of it from Sher Shah to the left bank of the Indus. Beyond, to the mouth of the Khojak Pass, the road should be improved; but the most crying want of all is the improvement of the road through the Mari hills. This at present

<sup>1</sup> On the river Ravi, in Montgomery District.

<sup>2</sup> *I.e.*, *via* the Gomal Pass.

cannot be said to be practicable for artillery, yet there seems no reason why it should not be made so ; and if the improvement was continued through the Bolan, as it easily may be, we should be in a tenfold better position for getting at Kandahar than we are at present.

“I think, at the same time, the roads from the nearest points on the Indus Valley Railway to Kashmor, Roghan, and Rajanpur should be improved, and bridges of boats established over the river at the points of crossing. This would give us many alternative routes by which to push up supplies to the front, a matter of much importance when such enormous numbers of camels have to graze on the scanty herbage which even the best of the routes affords.

“In conclusion, I consider the most essential points are : (1) *The provision of better crossing arrangements at Attock* ; (2) *the rendering the road to Quetta practicable for guns*. Both are equally important.

“C. M. MACGREGOR.”

In June Colonel MacGregor sent in the following paper :—

“In the Memorandum I wrote for you some time ago, I laid great stress on the necessity which existed for our making Herat quite secure ; but it has since struck me that perhaps I did not make sufficient of a danger which that place was likely ere long to be

placed in, and as you were kind enough to ask my opinion before, perhaps you will not mind my offering it again.

“The danger I allude to is from the Persians. The possession of Herat is so much the dream of every Persian, that he considers it a personal matter; so, even if Russian intrigue is not added to spur the Persians on to attempt its capture once more, there would still be great danger of their seizing such an excellent opportunity as would be afforded if the Afghans came to be engaged in a war with us.

“No doubt if Herat was threatened by the Persians, it would have the effect of inducing the Amir to strive to stave off war with us. He probably shares the national feeling for the possession of Herat, which is not less strong among the Afghans than the Persians, and cannot be indifferent to the chance of its loss.

“But I should doubt the value of any reconciliation with us made under such circumstances, and the stability of any arrangement made in insincerity, and as the lesser of evils, by the Amir could not last.

“Meanwhile our difficulty in regard to Herat would not have decreased, as the Persians would only bide their time; and when our relations with Kabal again became strained, as they certainly soon would, they would be ready once more to pounce down on Herat.

“In my opinion the present is the time to play out the Afghan game; still, though any attempt to

put it off will do no lasting good, a little delay may serve our purpose. Too precipitate action now may ruin all—in fact it may force us eventually to retake Herat at frightful loss of life and treasure, or to acquiesce in a blow to our prestige, the effects of which would be greater than another Kabal disaster.

“The question is, What danger is Herat in, and what can we do to prevent what is now only a danger from becoming a disagreeable reality?

“According to our latest information, the Afghans have about 18,000 men and 60 guns in Herat; and it is certain that, if they would be true to each other, they have in this force the power of keeping the Persians out of Herat for months. But that is just the point—*no Afghan can be true*; and there can be no doubt that both Persians and Russians have a party in Herat who might treacherously deliver the place into the hands of the former, to be used for the purposes of the latter.

“Now, once Herat is gone, a month under the Russian engineers, who, I conceive, will certainly accompany any Persian force, will render it so strong that our retaking it at all must at least be doubtful.

“Now the Persians, I fancy, know pretty well that any attempt to move on Herat is a *casus belli* with us, and therefore they will not move until our hands are pretty full with an Afghan war, which they are of course now on the look-out for.

“We may, it is true, move up to Quetta without



declaring war, but then Quetta is 515 miles from Herat; and they may in the same way move to Kehriz,<sup>1</sup> which is only 85 miles from Herat. It is therefore clear we could not hope to be at Herat till long after the siege had been commenced by the Persians.

“What we want, therefore, is time. But we must utilise that time in a way the Persians can get no inkling of.

“But what can be done to utilise it? It is very hard to say. The difficulties are enormous; yet something should be tried, must be tried. It will never do to sit with folded hands and twiddle the thumbs of resignation.

“If we move a regiment from Quetta, depend upon it it would be known at Teheran in a few days; and as there is a telegraph to Mashad, the Persians could be at Herat before we were at Kandahar. Therefore, what we must do must be a secret. We cannot move a regiment secretly, but we can move an officer. The only plan I can see is to send an officer (or more) in the direction of Herat, to push on, to feel his way, to see what *can* be done, to dare all that may be dared; to give him all the support he wants in the way of money, and a *carte blanche* to do what he considers best to secure Herat, holding out, at all events, till succour can arrive.

“Of course I know that for an Englishman to

<sup>1</sup> Kehriz, on the Persian frontier, where Colonel MacGregor had been escorted by the Afghans in 1875. See *ante*, vol. ii. chap. i. p. 10.

present himself in most parts of Afghanistan now is to sign his own death-warrant, and for him to go through Persia to the Herat border is to secure his being turned back or detained. But it seems to me it might be possible for an enterprising man to go through Baluchistan to the Helmand, and thence work his way, perhaps by Lash-Juwain or Khakhk, and somehow throw himself into Herat. Now, though no doubt the Persians and Russians have a party in Herat, there is also a royal or Amir's party, and an English party, besides, of course, a heap of scoundrels ready to come over to any party.

"If, therefore, such an officer once got into Herat, and if he could keep his presence unknown for a few days, I do not quite see why he should not succeed in getting up a party of his own. I do not suppose there is an ounce of faith in Herat, at least none proof against the jingle of rupees; and an officer might be able to arrange that the Persians did not get in quite as soon as they expected.

"I do not attempt to sketch any plan—to do so would be folly. Such a man would do all that daring, combined with intelligence, would suggest.<sup>1</sup> If he failed, he might be struck off as 'expended.' His failing would not hamper Government in any way, and they could carry on their operations without reference to him, except in so far that every effort should be made to keep Persians from advancing as

<sup>1</sup> It is needless to say that Colonel MacGregor proposed himself to make this attempt.

long as possible. But if he succeeded, Herat might be saved at comparatively small cost, and a check might thus be given to Persian aggression and Russian intrigue for a long time.

"The remedy is doubtless a dangerous one, but the disease is too acute to admit of our hesitating to apply any cure which may give even a chance of retarding such a blow to our prestige as the fall of Herat would be."

On the 4th June, Major-General Roberts, Quarter-master-General in India, forwarded a remarkable scheme, which had been drawn up in his office by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, in which were considered the measures which should be adopted in India, in the event of England joining Turkey in the war against Russia. The expedition *via* the Tigris, recommended by Colonel MacGregor in December and May, was not that adopted by General Roberts; and now Colonel MacGregor concurred with General Roberts in the idea that the whole strength of India should be devoted "*to checkmating the advances of Russia on the north of Persia, the north-west frontier of Afghanistan, and in Central Asia.*" Afghanistan, therefore, was the point to which all the thoughts and energies of the Indian authorities had to be directed. General Roberts's scheme projected the occupation of Herat by the Kandahar line; and Sir Frederick Haines backed up this opinion on the 25th June, pointing out that by such an advance on Herat the signal advantage of acting on the offensive

would be gained, while such a move would cover the Indian frontier from direct invasion.

In case Afghanistan had to be taken possession of, it would be necessary, the Commander-in-Chief stated, "to get rid of every Barakzai chief, whereby the country would be relieved from the greatest curse which hung upon it."

This idea of *getting rid of the Barakzais* (to which clan Sher Ali belonged) was subsequently put forward by Sir Henry Rawlinson in an article in the 'Nineteenth Century' (December 1878), and doubtless found its way to Kabal in due course.

The progress of the Russian arms in Turkey and Armenia was watched with intense anxiety in Calcutta and Simla, as may well be imagined. Then came the advance of the Muscovite army on Constantinople, the passage of the Dardanelles by Admiral Hornby, and the Treaty of San Stefano. The despatch of the Indian contingent from Bombay to Malta, the Congress of Berlin, and the occupation of Cyprus by the Anglo-Indian troops, followed in due course, and the critical period involving a possible war with Russia was tided over, as far as a direct conflict was involved. But Russia saw the way of attacking India indirectly, by gaining over to her side the Amir of Afghanistan, whose scarcely veiled grudge against England could not be misunderstood, and a Russian mission was sent to cement an understanding with Sher Ali by a treaty of friendship, a direct challenge to the Indian Government.

Meanwhile Colonel MacGregor, in addition to the heavy duties entailed on him by the extra pressure put upon his department in the preparation of the schemes for defence and offence, and the ordinary routine works of the office, found time to work up papers on other subjects; and on one important matter, in which he took a deep interest, he made use of his intimate knowledge of the North-West frontier to mature a plan for the reform of its administration,<sup>1</sup> to which subject he had paid great attention ever since he had been employed in his 'Gazetteer' work across the Indus several years before.

On the very day on which the Berlin Congress held its first sitting, the approach of General Stolietoff to Kabal on a mission from General von Kaufmann was announced to the Amir; but the Envoy himself did not arrive until after the conclusion of the Berlin Treaty had been communicated to him on arriving in Kabal in August. Previously numerous schemes for the invasion of India through Afghanistan, notably those by Generals Milutin and Duhamel, had been published in Russia, and the manifest intention of Von Kaufmann was to discredit England at the Court of the Amir.

A Russian general with his staff and Cossack escort having been formally received by Sher Ali in state, with a salute of thirty-six guns and other

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, Appendix to chap. viii., vol. i. p. 360.

honours, it was manifestly time for Lord Lytton to discuss the propriety of deputing a British envoy to the capital of Afghanistan. Both the Viceroy and his Council foresaw the Amir might easily incite the independent Afridis to obstruct a British mission, and it was therefore deemed expedient to despatch a native envoy in the first instance to herald the advent of the British envoy. Accordingly, Sir Neville Chamberlain, G.C.B., was appointed Envoy Extraordinary, with Major Cavagnari as his special assistant, and instructions were given him to proceed to Kabal on the part of the Governor-General of India, and carry out the wishes of the Indian Government in clearing up any misunderstanding that might be found to exist in the mind of the Amir, Sher Ali.

At the same time Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan, the native Envoy, was despatched from Peshawar on the 30th August, in advance, to notify Sir Neville Chamberlain's proposed visit; but this native officer was delayed, and only allowed to make short marches, so that he did not arrive at Kabal until the 10th September.

Finally, Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission proceeded to Jamrud, and encamped there on the 21st September, whilst Major Cavagnari was deputed to ride on to Ali Masjid with a small escort, to demand permission for the advance of the mission through the Khaibar. How Faiz Mahamad Khan was deputed by the Mir Akhor, the Amir's representative

at Ali Masjid, to forbid the approach of the mission, and how an ostentatious exhibition of hostility was made by the garrison of the fort under the personal orders of the Mir Akhor, are now matters of history. The Nawab was instantly recalled from Kabal, and war was virtually declared.

However, before any British troops crossed the frontier, an *ultimatum* was despatched to Kabal, demanding an apology and an expression of willingness to receive a British Resident at the Court of Kabal. The acceptance of these conditions was limited to the 20th November ; after which date, if no answer was received, the British would treat the Amir as the declared enemy of the British Government.

Meantime columns had been formed at Thal, in the Kohat district, under General F. Roberts, ready to enter the Kuram valley—and at Hasan Abdal, under General Sir Samuel Browne, to occupy the Khaibar ; whilst three divisions were assembled, under Lieutenant-General D. M. Stewart, to advance by way of the Bolan and Quetta, first on Kandahar, and thence on the *real objective*, HERAT.

The move towards Kabul was only meant as a feint on the right, and the real attack was the pushing forward of the left. General Biddulph took command of the troops at Quetta, forming the advanced-guard of the division for Herat.

Among the projects submitted to Sir Frederick Haines for the various plans of operations at the

commencement of the campaign, the following scheme for the capture of Ali Masjid was put forward by Colonel MacGregor, who was now Deputy Quartermaster-General :—

“Oct. 22.—*Project for the Forcing of the Khaibar Pass.*—The situation at present appears to be that the Amir has reinforced the detachments in the Khaibar by the greater part of the troops at his immediate disposal. . . . Nine regiments of infantry, three cavalry, and three batteries are now in the Khaibar; while three regiments infantry, two cavalry, and one battery are at Ali Boghan, near Jalalabad.

“Supposing that in addition to this force the Amir’s general can command the services of some 10,000 levies, armed with *jazails*, we should have to face about 7500 infantry, 2500 cavalry, 10,000 levies, and perhaps 30 guns.

“Before going further it is necessary to call attention to one point. I hold the operation before us is not so much the mere forcing of the Khaibar as the destruction of the Amir’s troops. The Amir, doubtless proud of the army which he has got together, urged on by the adventurous, inflated by the importance which the Russians have appeared to place on his alliance, and brooding as all Afghans do, over the stories of our Kabal reverses, has at last brought himself to consider that the result of a struggle with us may at least be doubtful. There can be no doubt that this is the case; no doubt, any impartial student of the Afghan war must see that the Kabal dis-



aster was an exceptional event, due to quite exceptional circumstances. He must be convinced that on every occasion where our troops were commanded with the most ordinary skill the Afghans invariably gave way. But no Afghan will ever see this, nor yet will he see the superiority of our troops, our arms, and our organisation, to what it was in '38. Further, it must not be forgotten that the story of the Kabal disasters, coupled with the care with which, for forty years, we have avoided all cause of quarrel with the Afghans, had its effect not only on our soldiery but on the population of India.

“All this, I think, points to the necessity of our striking a crushing blow with as little delay as possible, after hostilities break out. If the Amir had remained passively at Kabal, I think it would have been better to have advanced on Kandahar. But we must deal with events as they stand. The Amir, in sending strong reinforcements to the Khaibar, has challenged us to attack him, and I submit *we must take up that challenge*.

“In this view I think the assembly of a considerable force of Afghans about Ali Masjid is a positive advantage. It is a step we should encourage by every means in our power, because it gives us an opportunity of dealing the Afghans an early, a crushing, and a fatal blow, and transferring to ourselves in one day all the prestige which arises from taking the initiative.

“Supposing the policy of this step is accepted, it

only remains to be considered how it can be carried into effect with the least possible delay. Considering that we shall, according to the latest information in this office, have some 20,000 men and 30 guns to dispose of, I am of opinion that it would not be advisable to advance with less than 8000 infantry, of which some 2000 would be a reserve. True, Pollock's force only consisted of about 5000 infantry, 1500 cavalry, and 18 guns (a number he considered very efficient); but then he had, according to the highest estimate, not more than 40,000 men against him, and these were without doubt armed in a manner altogether inferior to that in which, thanks to us, the Amir's troops are now, and they had no guns. Moreover, I do not think it is altogether a question whether it might not be possible to force the Khaibar with fewer men. It must always be remembered that the political effects of check in this first trial of arms between us and the Amir would be enormous. Therefore, seeing that we *must not fail*, I have no hesitation in putting the force at the figure above given.

"Exclusive of the garrison of the Peshawar valley, which would consist of 230 artillery, 12 guns, 400 native cavalry, 700 British infantry, 1000 native infantry, there is now already available at Peshawar a force consisting of 460 artillery, 24 guns, 1000 native cavalry, 2100 British infantry, 2500 native infantry, and 200 Sappers, making a total of 5680 men and 24 guns.

"At Rawal Pindi there are now 300 British

cavalry, 400 native cavalry, 700 British infantry, and 1000 native infantry : these could easily be in Peshawar by the 1st prox., raising the disposable force to 2800 British infantry, 3500 native.

“ In addition to these, the 51st (700), 6th Native Infantry (500), and 45th Native Infantry, could be put down at Jhiliam in two days, and if carriage was ready, they could, by going double marches, reach Peshawar (168 miles) in ten days, or say fourteen days from to-day (22d October). This reinforcement would bring the force up to what would be advisable by the date (4th November) indicated in the Government letter.

“ The remaining troops detailed for Hasan Abdal<sup>1</sup> could move up and take the place of those who had gone on from Pindi. If Government consider it necessary to deal the blow even sooner, I would suggest that the Pindi troops be ordered to proceed by forced marches to Peshawar, and a brigade of the Kuram force to Peshawar ; operations might then commence by the 1st.

“ I think it would be very advisable if the general officer who is to command the operation, together with an experienced officer of the Quartermaster-General's Department, went *at once* to Peshawar, to collect information, and to render it so complete that not a goat's path could escape his knowledge. This I regard as very important,—first, because our exist-

<sup>1</sup> Hasan Abdal, half-way between Rawal Pindi and the Indus, where the reserve division under General Maude was being formed.

ing information of the Khaibar is very incomplete ;<sup>1</sup> secondly, the whole success of the operation will depend on our having perfect knowledge of this defile. Meanwhile, the troops should be brought up, thoroughly equipped for a month, for 4000 men would be sufficient for the present. . . . The nature of the operation should consist of a turning operation, which, while the enemy is fully engaged in front, will completely sever his communication, and leave him no alternative but disorganised flight or fighting, with his face to the rear, with the disadvantage of ground.

“In order that the above operation may be successful, it will be, as I have said, above all things necessary that the Amir should be induced to send as many of his own troops (in distinction to local levies) down for the defence of the Khaibar as possible, and therefore any measure that would induce him to draw off his forces from the Khaibar, to reinforce other parts of his territory, should be avoided. As the advance of a column by the Kuram route to threaten Kabal would certainly have this effect, I am of opinion that it should be postponed until the forcing of the Khaibar is accomplished. To my mind there seems no necessity

<sup>1</sup> Colonel MacGregor had been for years urging on the authorities the necessity of obtaining correct information of the defiles and passes beyond the borders of British territory, but, as is before shown (see *ante*, vol. i. pp. 331, 332, *et passim*), without success, and his own individual efforts had been ever obstructed by the “politicals.” Consequently, when Sir Samuel Browne advanced into the Khaibar, that general had to rely, almost solely, on the meagre information afforded by Hough's narrative of 1841.

for any haste in the advance of the Kuram column, both for the above reason and because there would certainly be plenty of time left after the forcing of the Khaibar to take possession of the Kuram valley before any advance on Kabal could take place.

“The primary object seems to me to be the reading the Amir’s troops and generals a terrific lesson, and the taking up such a position as would effectually afford the Khaibaris that protection from the Amir’s troops that I understand Sir Neville Chamberlain promised to them. We must, in fact, raise our prestige and redeem our promise before anything else is attempted.

“I am inclined to think that the most effective way of accomplishing our object would be something as follows. Let the troops from the other side of the Indus, as they arrive, be encamped on the healthy high ground about Badabhir<sup>1</sup> or thereabouts till wanted.

“Similarly, either the Peshawar movable column should remain in their lines or move to some healthy spot about Hari Singh Burj towards Kafir Dheyri, the camp being pitched in full sight of the Khaibar. Let two or three days be spent in open reconnaissances by cavalry and infantry of the mouths of the Khaibar, of the Rhotas, and Badpukht hills. Meanwhile it should be allowed to leak out that we meant to go straight at the main entrance and batter down the defences with turning columns

<sup>1</sup> A small post seven miles south of Peshawar

up the Goondur, and perhaps also up the Rhotas hill.

"This done, I should advance the whole force to the mouth of the Khaibar, and bring on a noisy but not serious action of artillery and musketry, and then I should return to camp, and send off openly expresses to bring up more troops from Kohat and from Badabhir, on the plea that the defences were stronger than was expected, and it was necessary to wait for reinforcements from those places.

"The ostensible instructions which would go to these forces would be to march with all speed and join the main force at Jamrud; but the real instructions should be sent in cipher, to the effect that the two columns would concentrate at Bara with a brigade from Hari Singh, and move towards the Soorgurh ridge, and then advancing along it, get into the Loargai glen behind or north of Ali Masjid.

"Leaving a detachment at some suitable spot to protect their rear, the column would then take all the defences of the Khaibar in rear.

"After this I should doubt there being very much opposition, and if the Khaibaris have meanwhile been skilfully handled, they ought to complete the destruction of the Amir's forces in the Khaibar.

"Having cleared the pass to Ali Masjid, the reserve force would move up, and passing through the turning columns, advance at once on the Landi Khana Kotal, which could probably be secured by

a simple turning operation, whence the force would advance and take up a position on the Khurd Khaibar ridge beyond Daka, agreeably to the orders of Government."

"To his Excellency, General Sir F. P. HAINES, G.C.B.,  
Commander-in-Chief.

"ARMY HEADQUARTERS, LAHORE,  
*October 23, 1878.*

"MY DEAR SIR FREDERICK,—I wrote a memorandum about the attack on the Khaibar, and thought you would have seen it this morning, but you were too busy.

"I hope you will be able to see it to-morrow, because there is one point in it, I think, of great importance—namely, that the general officer to command should at once proceed to Peshawar, and that he should have with him an officer of the Quarter-master-General's Department of experience and knowledge of the country.

"I submit with deference that the staff told off is something wanting in this respect, and I hope you will believe that in making this suggestion I was not actuated by personal motives. I honestly thought so and think so, without reference to myself.

"Therefore I venture, should your Excellency agree with me that a little more experience is advisable in the staff, to submit my claims to be sent to assist General ———

"I have worked so long at the compilation of information about Afghanistan, that it has become a dream with me to be employed some day there.

“As apparently Government do not intend going further than Daka, the operation would not be a long one, and I could come back to Lahore before the end of next month.

“Hoping your Excellency will excuse my writing to you direct, and if you can help me I trust you will.”

The three columns of the first line were ready to cross the frontier after midnight on the 20th of November, at Jamrud, Thal, and Huramzai respectively—and on that date, at a Cabinet Council, the order for advance was sanctioned; and the Commander-in-Chief telegraphed at sunset to Generals Stewart, Roberts, and Sir Samuel Browne to put the troops in motion at 12 P.M.—and at that hour the Second Afghan War began.

By daylight on the 21st, Biddulph's advanced-guard was in Peshin territory; Roberts's advanced cavalry pushed on to Ahmed-i-shama, in Kuram district; and Sir Samuel Browne's force turned the enemy's position at Ali Masjid. The fort of Ali Masjid was captured on the 22d—the Mir Akhor and the greater part of the garrison escaping by the Chora valley—and Sir Samuel Browne's camp was pitched at Daka by the end of the month. General Stewart was at Dadar, and his division was pouring steadily to the front through the Bolan Pass.

The Paiwar Kotal was turned by way of the Spingawai Kotal during the night of the 1st December, and the heights were occupied by General



Roberts on the 2d, thereby virtually securing possession of the whole of Kuram.

By December, the Herat division having occupied the Khojak and Gwajha passes, was ready to advance on Kandahar, and Sir Samuel Browne had established himself securely in Jalalabad. The Amir Sher Ali had fled from Kabal to Turkistan; and Yakub Khan, restored to liberty, was in power at Kabal—thus changing the situation materially. In these preliminary operations Colonel MacGregor took no active part; but he was not the less active in the head-work required at Lahore with the Commander-in-Chief, and, meantime, pertinaciously pressed his claims to be employed in the front. At last his requests were acceded to, and he was despatched, early in December, on special duty to the Khaibar line of communications to see to the general state of affairs, without, at first, any specific instructions. He found the two divisions of Sir Samuel Browne and Major-General Maude on the same route, yet quite independent of each other, and in commissariat and transport arrangements perfectly distinct.<sup>1</sup> Colonel MacGregor thus became the only connecting link between the two divisions, and as “officer superintending communications,” advised

<sup>1</sup> “Colonel C. M. MacGregor, C.S.I., C.I.E., served at first in charge of the communications of the 1st and 2d Divisions from Peshawar to Jalalabad. His Excellency must be aware of the services of that officer and how successful they were.”—Extract of Report on the Services of Officers of the 1st Division, Peshawar Valley Field Force, by Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Browne, K.C.S.I., C.B., V.C., commanding.

the two generals of division on all matters relating to such intercommunication. His first survey enabled him to detect the deficiency of all system regarding the transport and maintenance of supplies along the line covered by the two divisions, and extending from the base at Peshawar to Jalalabad. By the 20th December he had got a senior commissariat officer appointed to introduce one system throughout, and placed Major Dyson-Laurie to act in conjunction with him. This uniformity of system, however, seems to have been unacceptable to the commissariat authorities, and was not therefore carried out in its entirety.

Major Cavagnari having recommended the temporary occupation of the Bazar valley, the Government instructed Lieutenant-General Maude to conduct an expedition through this district, and to visit the villages of the recusant Zakha Khels. Accordingly, two columns were ordered, from the 2d Division troops at Ali Masjid and Jamrud, to co-operate with a third column furnished by the 1st Division at Basawal, and concentrate in the valley. The Jamrud force, in all 1200 men, marched on the 24th January, halting for the night below Shudumna tower; and next day General Maude's force proceeded to Barakus without opposition.

On the 25th, Brigadier-General Appleyard's column of 1200 men left Ali Masjid, and marched on Karamma, where the towers belonging to the local tribe were blown up.

On the same date, the troops of the 1st Division

left Basawal under Brigadier-General Tytler, marching on Chunar, where this force was augmented by 45th Sikhs and 27th Panjab Native Infantry—the united column now numbering 1200 of all ranks.

On the 26th, Colonel Armstrong, after destroying Chunar, attacked and destroyed the village of Kasabai, joining Appleyard's column, which proceeded to destroy the Sitsobi villages—the inhabitants of which had, very naturally, taken to the hills and refused to come in. Meanwhile Appleyard's column effected a communication with General Maude's force at Burj, where the village towers were blown up, and continued the march towards Bazar. Colonel MacGregor accompanied General Maude on this expedition as chief of the staff.

The hill-tribes were now roused, and attacked Maude's rear-guard, near the Obcha Tangai, wounding two of Major Battye's Ghurkhas. During the night there was considerable firing at the pickets all round the camp—one of the 25th Foot being killed and two wounded.

On the 27th, four companies of infantry, with some sappers, seized the Sitsobi Pass, to enable the column to pass, and were met by an escort of 400 men from Maude's headquarters, under Colonel C. M. MacGregor. The same day the three columns concentrated in the Bazar valley, and the camp was placed in a strong position on the plain. There was no doubt of the hostility of the Zakha Khels, as the force was fired upon night and day; moreover, the villagers had deserted their houses and fired them themselves.

None of the tribes showed themselves in the day-time to any bodies of the troops ; but the hillmen kept prowling about the heights and ravines, and fired on small parties whenever they got a chance—so that this sort of guerilla warfare was not a little harassing to the troops.

*Jan.* 28.—General Maude determined next to reconnoitre the Bokhar Pass towards Bara. As the country was unknown, and resistance was expected, he took 1000 men and a couple of guns with him ; and on the troops reaching Halwai, two miles from camp, fire was opened on them from the hills. From this point every vantage-ground was contested by the Zakha Khels up to the pass. General Maude did not attempt to force the pass, but retired his troops to camp, being fired upon in rear till past Halwai. Lieutenant Holmes of the 45th Sikhs was wounded, one Ghurkha and one *dhoolie*-bearer killed, and two other casualties made up the loss sustained by the British.

The next day the towers of Halwai were blown up, but the Zakha Khels came out in swarms ; the whole country seemed alive with them, and the British casualties were four.

On the 30th the Kuki, the Aka, Kambar, and Malikdin Khels, Sipah Afridis, as well as Shinwaris, Urakzais, and Saagar Khels, were assembled on the Bara hills prepared to resist any further advance of General Maude, who telegraphed to army headquarters that a further advance would assuredly bring on a regular Afridi war. Meantime Sir Samuel Browne

at Jalalabad was momentarily expecting an attack, and telegraphed for the Basawal column to return. Colonel C. M. MacGregor accompanied this column under General Tytler back to Daka and Jalalabad, where he reassumed his special duties connected with the organisation of the transport of the Khaibar route to the front.

The Afridis, on seeing the British depart from Bazar, ceased harassing the retiring troops, and gave no further trouble in this quarter.

At the end of February the Commander-in-Chief, Sir F. P. Haines, with headquarters staff, arrived on a tour of inspection at Jalalabad; and whilst there he received letters from Yakub Khan announcing the death of his father—or rather, as he put it, that his “*worthy and exalted father had obeyed the call of the summoner, and throwing off the dress of existence, hastened to the region of divine mercy.*” The Commander-in-Chief returned to Peshawar on the 7th March, Colonel MacGregor accompanying him; and on the 20th March Colonel MacGregor went with Sir F. Haines to inspect the troops under General Roberts stationed in Kuram, going to the top of the Paiwar Pass, where the 72d Highlanders were complimented by the Commander-in-Chief on their achievements. At the end of March the Commander-in-Chief left for Simla, and Colonel MacGregor returned to duty on the line of communication through the Khaibar.

Colonel MacGregor was appointed Adjutant and

Quartermaster-General of the 1st Division Peshawar Field Force, on its advance early in April, as Chief of the Staff to Sir Samuel Browne. A reconnaissance had been made from Jalalabad towards Gandamak which heralded the move to the front, an operation, however, that was terribly retarded from want of transport. Thus, for carriage of camp and fifteen days' supplies, there were only 2800 camels and 1500 mules effective, giving a deficiency of 6000 camels and 2000 mules actually required for baggage of the division.

Colonel MacGregor's former experience, as Director of Transport on a large scale during the famine operations of 1874 in Tirhut, now stood him in good stead. He set to work strenuously, after reporting the breakdown of the commissariat in camels as "*very serious*." He at once, however, made arrangements for progressing the move forward, and by the 7th April the post and telegraph offices were transferred to Fatehabad.

Colonel MacGregor had now thoroughly organised the security of the line of communications through the Khaibar, by carefully selected encampments and fortified posts along the entire route between Jamrud and Jalalabad, each of which was capable of being reinforced or reduced at short notice whenever it might be found necessary, as it was impossible to put any trust in the disaffected tribes along the road.

Meantime the Viceroy had decided to depute Major Cavagnari as envoy to Kabal, to communicate

unreservedly with the new Amir, Yakub Khan; and at last a move was made to Gandamak.

Colonel MacGregor to General Roberts at Ali Khel, Kuram [original in cipher]:—

“*Gandamak, April 13.*—I write a line to let you know we are here—that is to say, the following: I-C Royal Horse Artillery, 13/9 Royal Artillery, Hazara Mountain Battery, 10th Hussars, Guides Cavalry, 17th Foot, Rifle Brigade, 4th Ghurkhas, 27th Panjab Infantry, 300 Guides Infantry, Sir Samuel, and Cavagnari. We are encamped about two miles short of the village of Gandamak, and we move on to a new position in front to-morrow. I telegraphed and told you about the mission. The man (Bakhtiar Khan) went some days ago, and must be at Kabal by this time, so that in three or four days more we ought to hear what will come of it. If they say the mission is to go on, there will be another delay of a month; but if not, we must move as soon as we can. But the transport of this division is in a very bad state, and it is really impossible to say when we shall be in a position to move forward, certainly not before the 1st May.

“Colley<sup>1</sup> is to be here to-morrow. The bearer of this is going by the short cut to you—that is, he will not go to Hisarak, but by a short cut to the top of the Lakarai Pass. He says he will be with you on the morning of the 15th, as to-day is nearly over

<sup>1</sup> Military Secretary to Lord Lytton; afterwards Sir George Colley. He was killed at Majuba Hill in February 1881.

(4 P.M.) Do you think the Lakarai Pass<sup>1</sup> would be a good route for you to adopt, and come down and join us at Tezin? I have said nothing to any one, but it seems to me it might be a good move, as it would completely outmanœuvre them, if they thought you were coming by Khushi. A telegram came here to say considerable reinforcements had arrived at Khushi, so perhaps they mean to defend that line. As far as we can make out, there are no preparations for defence of the passes. It is said that the Amir has moved a force to Butkhak. I don't think they can hold the passes: we can manœuvre them off the whole road. I sincerely hope for our sakes Yakub will *not* treat."

The following communication, sent by General Roberts at Fort Kuram, across the Safed Kuh mountain-range, to Colonel MacGregor at Gandamak, may be interesting as an example of cipher correspondence used during this campaign, and therefore a curiosity in its way:—

KURAM, 17th April 1879.

MY DEAR MACGREGOR.—Your letter, dated 13th, reached Ali Khel at noon yesterday, and this [Fort Kuram] about 11 P.M. Sir Sam's note is dated 14th, so perhaps you made a mistake in the day of the month. A messenger of mine—

*Original.*

XUY CTU. DPMHC YZ EUT TCTSTZEU,  
said that Cavagnari's BPZ XPV  
TWATLETK there that KPO, and  
that the general opinion was OD  
XK accept the BFFVFFYZ and PQQT  
to YHQ ETQBV.

*Interpretation.*

who left Kabul on the eleventh,  
said that Cavagnari's man was  
expected there that day, and that  
the general opinion was Y[akub]  
K[han] w[ould] accept the Mis-  
sion, and agree to our terms.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix—Advantages of the Lakarai Pass.



I shall be ready EY BYST any day PIETQ EUT EXTZEFTU; a BYYZ will be PKSPZEPGTYHV, but I trust there will not be great delay, or LPBTCV may KFYPAATTQ. They have KFTK in ZHBMTQV lately; however, nearly all are being QTVETK ZYX and ITK well.

I thought of the CPDRQPF QYHET, but decided it would be better to GY MO EUT VUHEQGHQKPZ, which we know is IFE IYQ LPBTCV, and by entering LPMHC at a KMITQTZE AYFZE, we shall probably have less KFIJFLHCEO FZ LYCCTLEFZG VHAACPTV and IQPGT. I have made a road TFGUE miles beyond PCFDUTC IFE IYQ XUTTCTK GHZV, and in a few days it will be completed to IYHQETTZ BICTV, or within TFGUE BFCTV of the FYA of the VUHEQGHQKPZ. This will assist materially. No YAAVVEFYZ the PIGCPZV can bring can VEYA us, and I hope to be PE KYMHZKF, if ZYL DHVUF, before YHQ KTAQEHQT IQYB PCFDUTC FY DZAAZ. Woodthorpe will be on BPEHZGF on the EXTZEFTU if not VEYAATK MO VZYX.

My fullest *saluam* to Sir Sam, and thank him for his note.—Yours sincerely,

FRID. ROBERTS.

KURAM, 1.30 P M,  
Thursday, 17th April 1879.

I shall be ready to move any day after the twentieth; a move will be advantageous, but I trust there will not be great delay, or camels may disappear. They have died in numbers lately; however, nearly all are being rested now and feel well.

I thought of the Lakarai route, but decided it would be better to go by the Shutargardan, which we know is fit for camels, and by entering Kabul at a different point, we shall probably have less difficulty in collecting supplies and forage. I have made a road eight miles beyond Ali Khel fit for wheeled guns, and in a few days it will be completed to fourteen miles, or within eight miles of the top of the Shutargardan. This will assist materially. No opposition the Afghans can bring an stop us, and I hope to be at Dobundi, if not Kush, before our departure from Ali Khel is known. Woodthorpe will be on Matungi on the twentieth if not stopped by snow.

On the 14th April Sir Samuel Browne's headquarters and column reached Safed Sang, which it was found safer to occupy than Gandamak. On the following day Colonel MacGregor again pressed the question of transport on the Quartermaster-General

at Simla. "We want," he telegraphed, "at least 1000 more camels, come from where they may. They can readily be provided from 2d Division, which should be ordered accordingly. I consider the whole working of the Commissariat Department, whether as regards supply or transport, to be most unsatisfactory, as after four months' breathing-time they are not ready." Accordingly a number of camels and mules were transferred from General Maude's division up to the front, in view of an advance being ordered on Kabal.

On the 24th April, Bakhtiar Khan, the agent sent on by Cavagnari, brought back letters from the Amir dated 20th April, proposing that he, Yakub Khan, should visit the British camp. This proposal was accepted by the Viceroy, and preparations were made for the reception of the Amir, much to the disappointment of Colonel MacGregor, who longed for an advance on Kabal. The Amir made his appearance at Safed Sang on the 8th May, and the negotiations commenced which were terminated by the famous Treaty of Gandamak. "Cavagnari," writes Colonel Dyson-Laurie, "obtained the Treaty of Gandamak in a great measure owing to Colonel MacGregor establishing the fact that Sir Samuel Browne could advance upon Kabal—an advance which the transport difficulties were held to prevent, and it was only the energy of Colonel MacGregor which prevailed in bringing this about, and enabled Cavagnari to impress this mobility of the division

upon Yakub Khan." This treaty was signed on receipt of the sanction of the Government, on the 26th May, without ceremony, and ratified by Lord Lytton on the 30th, the ratification being handed to the Amir by Sir Samuel Browne in full *darbar* on the 6th June. Everything was now ready for the withdrawal of the force of 2600 men from Safed Sang; but as cholera existed on the route, and the summer season had commenced, great precautions were necessary to ensure the health of the troops on their return to India.<sup>1</sup> The sun's rays, combined with that fell disease cholera, were far more terrible enemies to encounter than any amount of

<sup>1</sup> "A march at this time of year in Afghanistan," writes Surgeon-General Ker-Innes, "involved exposure to a temperature ranging from 110 to 115° Fahr. *in the shade*, and in spite of every precaution, the suffering of the troops was, as might have been expected, great. . . . Had it not been for the prevalence of cholera, the troops would, however, have performed the march with comparatively few casualties. On reaching Jamrud and Hari-Singh-ka-Burj, and especially as they made their final marches, their distress was very apparent. Their clothes were stiff and dirty from the profuse perspiration and dust. Their countenances betokened great nervous exhaustion, combined with a wild expression difficult to describe. The eyes injected and even sunken; a burning skin, black with the effects of sun and dirt; dry tongue, a weak voice, and a thirst which no amount of fluids seemed to relieve. Many of these men staggered rather than marched into their tents, and threw themselves down, utterly incapable of further exertion until refreshed by sleep and food. This was very marked in the 51st Light Infantry. Nor did the officers appear in any better plight. The principal medical officer, 2d Division, remarks on the arrival of the 17th Foot at Landi Kotal, on the 14th June, that every officer and soldier in the regiment was more or less ill on arrival, and likely to be fit for little duty for the following three or four days. The medical officers were worked terribly in the cholera hospitals, and suffered in proportion. There were 200 deaths from cholera, of which 75 were Europeans, during this withdrawal."

Afghans and Afridis; more especially as a tedious march to the rear entails vast fatigue without the excitement of an advance to the front. The most difficult operation by far of this campaign was the withdrawal of the 1st Division, and the details of this were carefully worked out by the Chief of the Staff, Colonel MacGregor, whose practical common-sense and unwearied energy carried away all obstacles, and baffled the most tiresome difficulties. The whole of the retirement was effected successfully, thanks to the arrangements of the Chief of the Staff and the Quartermaster-General's departmental officers, and almost without molestation. The Amir's subjects were quiet all along the route by which the British troops passed. Within the then newly arranged scientific British frontier, however, such is the irony of fate, an attack was made on the baggage of the 9th Lancers by the Afridis (now so-called *British subjects*), when two of the cart-drivers were killed and some of the officers' baggage stolen.

On the 21st June, Sir Samuel Browne was able to report to Sir Frederick Haines that the Peshawar Valley Field Force was broken up; and he himself, accompanied by Colonel MacGregor, left for Mian Mir on the same date.

By the treaty, Kuram was retained by the British, but Southern Afghanistan was restored to the Amir. The evacuation of Kandahar, therefore, commenced, and to all appearances the Second Afghan War had terminated successfully.

In July, Major Sir Louis Cavagnari, as resident Envoy to Kabal, crossed the Shutargardan Pass with his escort of Guides, and met the Afghan escort sent to conduct him to the Court of Yakub Khan, where the mission arrived and was received in state on the 25th July. The Amir's demeanour and the spirit of the people seemed friendly, and peace appeared to be assured.

The Government of India had some difficulty in coming to terms with the Afridi tribes now placed under their authority, and, true to his principles, Colonel MacGregor objected to paying these robbers the black-mail demanded by them. He thus wrote to Colonel Charles C. Johnson, officiating Quarter-master-General in India:—

“SIMLA, 12th August 1879.

“MY DEAR JOHNSON,—I have read these papers: they only show that no satisfactory arrangements have as yet been come to, and that they hope to arrive at some such later on.

“For the present the garrison can remain as it is, and afterwards I will reduce it to four native infantry battalions. With these we could hold the whole pass, Afridis or no Afridis.

“I don't approve of political arrangements with these gentlemen—they never stand. For 88,000 rupees we could have a good corps of 600 strong; that, put in proper positions along the pass, would hold it easily in spite of Afridis, and the only safe way of settling the business is to do this—take up

proper positions right through the pass, and hold them. The Afridis are very averse to bullets coming their way, and they would soon acquiesce in our holding, as they could not help themselves. This way of doing it would not only succeed, but will gain their respect more than if you spent ten times 88,000 rupees in political arrangements. The pay of the political officer will come to something considerable, *plus* his establishment, and a good brigade in the Khaibar would do all that was necessary without any such."

For his services in connection with the campaign of 1878-79, which terminated in the conclusion of the treaty at Gandamak, Colonel MacGregor was rewarded by being gazetted a Companion of the Order of the Bath, on the 25th July 1879.

On his thirty-ninth birthday, therefore, he was C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., a brevet colonel with five medals, and Deputy Quartermaster-General at Army Headquarters, with a record second to no other officer of his standing (twenty-three years' service) in the Indian Army.

## APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II.

ADVANTAGES OF THE LAKARAI PASS<sup>1</sup>—PROJECT FOR THE  
ADVANCE ON KABAL.

"CAMP SAFED SANG,  
*April 14, 1878.*

"At present the two columns destined for Kabal are situated at Safed Sang and Ali Khel respectively, about thirty miles apart as the crow flies, but with a difficult range of mountains between them. These points may therefore be considered as their advanced bases, from which the final operations for the reduction of Kabal will be undertaken, and it will be well at once to consider what should be the future plan of operations.

"There are, however, one or two things in connection with both forces which must primarily be considered. The first is, that owing to the great scarcity of transport, it will be necessary to cut down the scale of baggage to some considerable extent, and thus, owing to the men being deprived of much of what was before considered necessary to their comfort if not efficiency, it will be necessary to weed the strength of the force, considerably reducing it, probably not less than one-fifth.

"This being the case, it is evident that a plan which might have been justifiable under the circumstances of our having sufficient forces at our disposal to enable them to act independently, becomes no longer tenable.

"The plan which till now has been proposed, and on which my former letter was based, was that the two forces, operating by totally separate lines, would be unable to communicate with each other until they joined under the very walls of Kabal.

"But under the circumstances noted above, it is sub-

<sup>1</sup> See the *Second Afghan War*, vol. II. pp. 174, 194, 195.

mitted that such an operation would be dangerous in the extreme, as it would expose our forces to the risk of being attacked in detail.

"It has therefore become necessary to abandon the idea of these two divisions operating by entirely separate lines, without communication with each other, and adopt some other plan more in accordance with the actual circumstances of the moment.

"Luckily the existence of the Lakarai road over the Safed Kuh range furnishes us with the means of changing our plan and adopting one that will be more suited to the means now at our disposal.

"There seems little doubt that this road is practicable at the present moment for laden animals, and therefore it will afford us a means of effecting a junction with the Kuram force, not only immediately after the advance is given, but under conditions that will make it impossible for the enemy to prevent it.

"It is therefore advisable that the 1st Division should be permitted to get into position at or near Surkhhab with as little delay as possible, from which place it will threaten Jagdalak, so as to draw off the enemy from the direction of Lakarai as far as may be. At the same time the Kuram column should proceed in advance of Ali Khel, in order to threaten the Shutargardan. The exact point to which this advance should be limited would of course be decided by General Roberts; but it seems necessary that it should if possible be far enough in advance to induce the belief that no idea of using the Lakarai road was entertained, yet not so far as to entangle the column in the defile of Hazar Darakht. On the day ordered for the advance, the position of the two divisions would be as follows: 1st Division at Surkhpul, one brigade threatening Jagdalak Pass, and one brigade ready to cover Roberts's advances. Kuram column, say at Rokian,<sup>1</sup> with a detachment pushed on to-

<sup>1</sup> Rokian, three and a half miles from Ali Khel.



wards Hazar Darakht. The advance part of this column would be composed of troops who would be left on the Kuram route, and the rear of the troops who would advance.

"Then, on the order for an advance, the troops in the front of the Kuram column would stand fast, and the rear would come up and turn off quietly to the Lakarai road, their left rear being covered on one side by the advanced detachment, and their right front by the 1st Division on the other.

"Till some trustworthy men who have been sent to report on the Lakarai road return, it will be impossible to determine the exact point of the two columns of junction. It may be that it will be necessary for them to come down to Hisarak; but it seems not unlikely that a road will be found which turns off the Lakarai on to the Karkacha route, which will be practicable for mules, by which a column of infantry and mountain-guns could be sent to Tezin, the heavier portion of this column coming on to join the 1st Division.

"Directly the Kuram column is on the top of the Lakarai ridge, it is pretty certain it will be able to communicate with the 1st Division, and from this moment it may be said that the two columns have effected their junction, as they will then be able to work in unison.

"As soon as this has been effected, therefore, it will be possible to arrange with almost absolute certainty that the Kuram column will be at Tezin at the same moment that the 1st Division is at Bala Hisar Zarat by the Royal road, or in the Tezin valley by either the Lakarai or Iro Manzil roads.<sup>1</sup> The defence of the enemy between the points Hisarak - Tezin and Surkhab - Zarat must necessarily be feeble, as he will know that whichever way he fronts another column is coming in his rear, and as any force attempting to hold the Tezin valley will be between two fires, it may be taken for granted that it also will be abandoned.

<sup>1</sup> See Part III. 'The Second Afghan War,' p. 162.

"This may be deemed to complete the first stage of the operation; the Kuram column in position at Tezin, the 1st Division at the Ziarat holding hands, the passes in rear clear of the enemy, our line of retreat secure, and the Lataband, the Chinari, Pul-i-Chashma, and Haft Kotal roads threatened.

"If there is any resistance at all, it may be presumed, to put it at its worst, that the enemy will hold the passes of the range between Tezin and Khurd Kabal, as also the Khurd-Kabal defile; but we shall by this time certainly be in a position to know which of the passes is held in greatest strength, and which had therefore better be attacked—whichever we attack successfully, the enemy will have to abandon the others.

"Therefore, what we shall have to do is to force by a turning operation the evacuation of the Pul-i-Chashma, the best route, and then bring our heavier baggage up by it to Khurd Kabal.

"It will depend on circumstances which cannot well be foreseen at this time, whether it will be advisable to send a column by the Lataband road in order to get in rear of the Khurd Kabal. It is probable this may have to be done; but whether or no, the defence of the Khurd-Kabal defile is an undertaking which may be considered beyond the tactical skill and power of the enemy. We already know of two paths which turn it—viz, the Gosband Dara and the Chinari road; and it seems very improbable we should have much difficulty in forcing the enemy to evacuate it.

"This brings us to the third period of the operations, which would comprise the advance from Butklhak (both columns concentrated) and the reduction of the Bala Hisar. It seems improbable that the enemy will make any stand in the open country; but if he did, it is probable that the severe defeat he would almost certainly receive, would do much to indispose him to attempt the defence of the Bala Hisar.

"But as, of course, we must be prepared for such a defence,

it is necessary now to consider the best method of reducing that fort. The force would advance in mass from Butkhak and take up a position west of Bagrami, noted in the map as that occupied by Headquarters Camp in September 1839.

"From Bagrami, as operations against Kabal will be seriously affected by the inundations to the west and south of the former place on the left bank of the Logar river, it will be necessary to turn off all water directed on to this tract into the Logar river bed, and it seems probable that the best point at which to do this would be at a point about two and a half miles south of the camp near Kala Wali Mahamad, where an easterly spur of the Takht-i-Shah ridge promises a suitable place. This work will of course have to be guarded, and therefore an intrenched position would here be erected, or suitable detachment placed for its protection.

"Half-way between the camp as above and Kabal is the position of Siah-Sang, on the heights of that name, and almost south of it on the main road are two detached mounds, which are about 1800 yards from the gate of the Bala Hisar, and which affords a good position directly covering our line of communications. The heights of Siah-Sang appear to be only about half a mile across in the direction of Hindu Khoja, and extend from the former village to about 1100 yards from the Bala Hisar near Shah Shahidan. A battery on these heights will therefore be within easy range of the face GH of the fort, will fairly enfilade the north face DH, partially enfilade the south face FG, and range easily through the whole of the occupied portion of the fort, and give a fair view of the interior of the citadel and the works on the higher ground beyond. No less range than 1800 yards can be obtained from the mounds, but from them the whole north face DH can be taken obliquely in reverse, and in other respects the position is almost as good as Siah-Sang. In combination these two positions for batteries would be almost perfect.

"The eastern side of the Bala Hisar is boldly salient and easily enveloped without much exposure of the right flank of attack to the city, or of the left to the hills. Operations from this side conducted against it would moreover leave the city perfectly safe from even stray fire, while the battery at Shah Shahidan can shell the whole city, should such measure become desirable.

"The right attack at Siah-Sang could no doubt be amply secured by works against any counter-attack, and a post or two to the east of it would connect it with the Headquarters Camp. The left attack on the mounds appears to be a commanding position with uninterrupted view over the cultivation to the west and south, and works extending half a mile along these mounds would perfectly ensure their safety.

"The two attacks and the Headquarters Camp would enclose a cultivated valley about a mile square, the advantage of which for horses and cattle would be very great.

"As regards the defences of the Bala Hisar, a glance at the sections shows that they are weakest at this very east side, not only in themselves, but in the obstacles of ditch and mound, and the walls can be seen to their fort.

"With regard to the actual mode of attack which will have to be adopted, this can only be definitely settled on the spot, when more recent and trustworthy information regarding the state of the defences are at our disposal, and therefore it is impossible now to say whether it will be most advisable to escalate, blow in the gate, sap up to the walls and mine for a breach, or batter with artillery in the same view—at all events, it may fairly be hoped that ten days will suffice to place us in the Bala Hisar.

"In regard to the manner in which it is proposed to provide supplies for the two columns noted above, our calculations must be based on the following data: first, each column will bring with it twenty days' supplies; second, all baggage having been cut down to the very lowest, every available animal will be utilised to bring up more supplies,

and with this view depots will be formed at Surkhpul, Jagdalak, Tezin, and Khurd Kabal, or as many of these places as can be safely arranged for, and as there are troops to guard. In regard to supplies from the Kabal valley, it is not easy to estimate what amount may be expected; but as in case of necessity the country can be requisitioned and prompt payment given, it may be hoped that some will be forthcoming.

"If, however, the worst comes to the worst, and it is necessary for the force to be detained any length of time at Kabal, it will always be possible after the capture of the Bala Hisar to utilise a portion of it to bring up supplies from the depots, the farthest and principal of which will be at Safed Sang.

"In regard to fuel, the country between Surkhpul and Butklak not producing this article in any quantity, arrangements are being made which will do away as far as possible with the necessity for cooking—*e.g.*, the British troops will be provided with cooked Australian beef and biscuits, and the natives with a preparation of *gha*, *atta*, and sugar.

"The forage question is also no doubt a difficult one; but seeing that the tract of country has been traversed before, by armies of greater and less strength than ours, there is no reason to doubt the ability of this force to do so likewise, especially as our animals start fresh. And it must also be remembered that the accounts of the routes to Kabal are taken from the reports of officers who accompanied either Sir John Keane's force in 1839, or Sir George Pollock in going or returning, and that these forces traversed the country at the very worst time of the year for forage—September and October; whereas at this period, the country, as far as can be seen, does produce a considerable supply of grass.

"It now only remains to note that, whereas by the adoption of the plan of operation of advancing the two columns in totally separate lines, the south column will be absolutely *en l'air*, cut off from its own communications, and totally

devoid of any possibility of receiving any assistance from the north column, and the point of junction of the two columns will be actually in possession of an enemy strongly posted, with interior lines and his own line of retreat quite safe, by adopting a plan of operation such as is sketched above, the advantages are all on our side, and consequently, whether we are opposed or not, we shall have carried out the operation on correct scientific principles, a fact which is likely to have a much better political effect on our enemies, hidden and apparent, than a hasty disjointed advance could possibly have.

“C. M. MACGREGOR.”

## CHAPTER III.

## ALI KHEL TO KABAL.

1879

*‘Tis the summons of heroes for conquest or death,  
When the banners are blazing on mountain and heath’*

**TERRIBLE NEWS—HOW MATTERS STOOD—SIMLA TO ALI KHEL—IN KURAM VALLEY—ANARCHY IN AFGHANISTAN—PUSHING ON ARRANGEMENTS—WANT OF CARRIAGE—A DIRECTING HAND NEEDED—THE ADVANCE—KARATIGA—THE HAZAR-PARAKHT—SHUTARGARDAN PASS—KHUSHI—THE AMIR COMES IN—SAFED SANG CAMP—BATTLE OF CHARASIA—GENERAL BAKER AND MAJOR WHITE—HINI HISAR—THE PROVOST-MARSHAL—SLAH-SANG—KABAL ENTERED—SHERPUR ABANDONED BY THE AFGHANS—NEK MAHAMAD AND THE AMIR—SCENE OF THE MASSACRE—RIDE THROUGH THE CITY—COMMISSION OF INQUIRY—EXAMINATION OF PRISONERS—EXPLOSIONS IN THE BALA HISAR—SENTENCES OF DEATH—THE MILITARY COMMISSION—EXECUTIONS—PROJECT AGAINST HERAT.**

*“Lahore, Sept. 7.—The most terrible news has come from Kabal.<sup>1</sup> The Herat regiments broke out*

<sup>1</sup> The massacre of Sir Louis Cavagnari and his escort took place on the 3d September, and the news first reached Captain Conolly at Ali Khel late at night on the 4th. The Viceroy summoned a Council on the 5th, when General Massy, then commanding the Kuram column,

and attacked the Residency ; the escort fought, but were eventually overcome. The Residency was burnt, and the whole Mission was massacred.

“In consequence of this Roberts is ordered off. He sent for me, and put me down for a brigade ; and I recommended him to get Baker<sup>1</sup> for the other ; Lockhart<sup>2</sup> for Assistant-Quartermaster-General ; Durand,<sup>3</sup> Political Secretary ; Mignon,<sup>4</sup> Commissary-General ; or Hawkes<sup>5</sup> and Luckhardt.<sup>6</sup>

“He got Baker a brigade, and Durand ; but the Chief<sup>7</sup> or Lumsden,<sup>8</sup> or both, put a spoke into my wheel. The Chief said Roberts could take me as anything else ; so I am to go as Chief of the Staff.

“Got everything ready, and started [from Simla] at 8 A.M. Met Murray,<sup>9</sup> 72d, on road, and Malony, who appears to belong to 3d Sikhs. The road very bad. Got to Kalka in eight hours, and got a snack of something, and then on to Umballa and Lahore.

“*Rawal Pindi, Sept. 8.*—Arrived at Lahore 7.30 A.M., and found Murray there. Very nice as usual ; anxious to go, but he cannot. He told me that the

was at once ordered to occupy the Shutargardan Pass. This occupation was carried out by Lieutenant-Colonel Currie on the 11th September.

<sup>1</sup> Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, C.B.

<sup>2</sup> Now Sir W. S. A. Lockhart, K.C.B.

<sup>3</sup> H. Mortimer Durand, Esq., Political Officer.

<sup>4</sup> M. J. J. Mignon, Bombay Staff Corps.

<sup>5</sup> Lieutenant H. M. P. Hawkes, Bombay Staff Corps.

<sup>6</sup> Major W. Luckhardt, Bombay Staff Corps.

<sup>7</sup> Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Frederick P. Haines, G.C.B.

<sup>8</sup> Adjutant-General, Major-General P. S. Lumsden, C.B., C.S.

<sup>9</sup> Captain R. H. Murray, 72d Highlanders.



Viceroy had not given Samuel Browne<sup>1</sup> a division.

“MacPherson<sup>2</sup> is going to have a brigade. He comes up with me. Porter also has arrived. Shall try and get him as deputy surgeon; he is much the best man.

“Got to Jhilm at 4.45, and off at 5.30 again onwards.

“*Peshawar, Sept. 9.*—Arrived at Pindi at 4.30 A.M. Found no *gharie*. Baboo says only horses for two *gharies* a-day; so I telegraphed to Simla to complain of this, and to Roberts, to say how matters stood.

“Wrote to Lyall as follows:—

““I wanted to see you before I left; but it was such a skurry to get my things ready. that I found after all I had no time. The late events make it very necessary for us to make up our minds what we shall do. I believe there will be some who will say we ought never to have sent a Resident to Kabal; and if we did so, we had every reason to expect something very like what has just happened. I am not one of these. I think, under all the circumstances of the time, we did exactly what was best; and though events have turned out most unfortunately, they do not offer to my mind any reason whatever for turning back. The policy which said we must have a Resident at Kabal and the complete

<sup>1</sup> Major-General Sir Samuel Browne, V.C., K.C.B.

<sup>2</sup> Colonel (afterwards Sir Herbert) T. MacPherson, C.B., V.C.

control of Afghan foreign affairs was a right one, and late events do not make it less so.

“‘Therefore, under the present juncture of affairs, the thing to do is to say to the Afghans: “You *shall* give in. You have killed Cavagnari and his 100 men; but we are sending another representative with 10,000 men, and he *shall* stay there, whether you like it or not. We wish one thing from you, and that is friendship; but whether we get this or not, we will have your obedience. You may chafe as much as you please, but we will be your masters; and you will find that the only escape from our heavy hand will be by your entire submission.”

“‘Depend upon it, there should be no turning back. We have got into a conflict with a race of tigers, and it is only by treating them with a rod of iron they will ever give in. What is wanted now is firmness in the path you have begun. It is the right one; and though it has cost the life of about the finest fellow in India, what is one life to the great object you have before you?

“‘And remember there is no other way out of the business; any wavering now, any looking backward, will be fatal. They have killed Cavagnari, then send Snooks; if they kill him, send Jones; if they see we are firm and consistent—if they see that their cowardly treachery and fanatical bloodthirstiness only makes us draw the yoke tighter—they will give in sooner or later, because they are curs at bottom.

“‘I have never looked to political employ, but if

I can be of service I offer myself. I am quite game to take the place Cavagnari's death has left vacant, and to carry out what I believe the right and only policy to the death.

“The pay to me is no object. I am just as game to take up the berth on my present pay, and I should not fear not succeeding in the long-run. I hope you will excuse my writing thus to you; I am sure you want no prompting to make you persevere in the right path, but I feel so strongly on the necessity for firmness at this juncture that I cannot be silent. With Roberts and the splendid regiments at his disposal, there need be no fear of the result of any conflict; but it is after we have (as we shall) vindicated our superiority that we shall have need of our greatest firmness, and this must take the form of putting another man in Cavagnari's place with a sufficient guard to hold his own. For such a service you would get thousands of volunteers, and one of them would be my humble self.’

“Heathcote<sup>1</sup> came in. He is honest, energetic, and is to command from Ali Khel on. Got up at 6.30, and had a *lecée*. Henderson came with Tara Sinh, who put in a proposal by which I calculated he would have made Rs.70,000 in a month. Heathcote got off after me. About one I awoke and heard the voice of a European in my *gharie*. Thinking this odd, I listened, and fancied it was

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Heathcote, Bombay Staff Corps, Director of Transport.

Heathcote; so called out, and it was. His *gharie* had run into a bullock-train cart and lost a wheel. Came on to Attock, and then stayed.

“*Matanni, Sept. 10.*—Got into Peshawar, after a deliciously cool night, about 9 A.M. Went into the *dāk* bungalow and had breakfast, and bought tent, table, chair, and pony for Durand. Then went over and saw Sanford; do not know what to make of him. He is clever. I think I will take him up. Heathcote arrived; went over to mess of the 17th for lunch. Got off about 4.30. Found *dāk* bungalow full. Burlton, a gentlemanly Commissariat officer; Lewis, good head and linguist.

“*Kohat, Sept. 11.*—Got off at 5 A.M. Rode to Aimal. Presently Johnson came in, a frontier civilian. Then rode on through pass. It is very easy, both with reference to road and holding. Found 5th Panjab Cavalry horses laid for me at Sharaka. Rode on, last half quite alone; looked out for a line where a railway could be made, but a tunnel of a mile would be required, and it is not worth it. Got in here at 10.30 to *dāk* bungalow; no room. Burlton here as well, clever; also Faught, doctor 92d, very powerful; also Padre Adams, a really good chap, I should say; and Morison, 14th, a good man, and two uninteresting doctors. Just as I had turned in, Ross, 1st Sikhs, came to say he was sorry he did not know I was here; why did I not come to mess? Good, hard-headed Scotch Ross!”

Meanwhile a small combined force, consisting of

the 5th Ghurkhas, the 23d Pioneers, and Captain Swinley's mountain-battery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Currie, left Karatiga at 2.30 A.M. on the 11th, and reached the crest of the Shutargardan Pass by 6.30 A.M. without opposition. An intrenchment was at once commenced under Lieutenant Nugent, R.E., which was completed by the night of the 12th. Heliographic communication with Ali Khel was established, and the laying down of the field-telegraph commenced.

By the 12th September some 6000 men had been concentrated at and near Ali Khel when Sir Frederick Roberts arrived.

The Amir had written, saying that he hoped for an opportunity of showing his sincere friendship for the British Government and for recovering his good name before the world.

"*Thal, Sept. 12.*—Got off by 2.30. Walked to Sher Kote; when it got light, then galloped. Road good to Ibrahimzai, then heavy to Mohsum Talao, owing to heavy rain last night. Saw Faught at bungalow. Got very well to the stage from Sarozai, when I got a demon of a horse, whose paces were so excruciating I walked most of the way. Very hot; felt like sunstroky, so, as I did not want to risk anything, went into Gandiawar *serai* and bathed my head, and got a drink; felt better, and went on. Got to Thal about one, passing Chapman, 1st Bengal Cavalry; hailed me, so went in, put up with him instead of Plowden, where I meant to. Got a

telegram from Roberts telling me to arrange for reducing posts, Plowden to take all other side Thal; did so. Saw Plowden; nice fellow, but . . . a political. He dined at mess and praised up Cavanaugh, who was no doubt very fine.

*Fort Kuram, Sept. 13.*—Got off by six. Passed Sapri Manduri, Alizai, Shinak, Balesh-Khel. Country easy, but, owing to undulations from hills coming down in longitudinal billows, not easy to make road. Got to Balesh-Khel about eleven, saw all 21st; did not know who they were except Gowan; stayed till 4.30, then off; road better. Changed horses at Wali Mahamad Killa, and got in about 6.30. Dined with the 14th and met Colonel Ross, whom I like; good sterling man.

*Ali Khel, Sept. 14.*—Went round lines of 14th and picked out three nags, and rode off. Took one, and said would telegraph about others.

“Got a change at Shilozan, the new cantonment, on a bare stony plain with nothing to recommend it. Rode on to Paiwar, over beastly undulations of stone like fingers, to Turai. Got a villanous brute in exchange. Rode up the Kotal: bad road—no improvement since I was here in March. After breakfast with General D. Massy, Pretyman<sup>1</sup> came up, so rode with him. We walked nearly whole way. Country fine, forest and rocks. Saw the Matangi hill, which we used to look to from Gandamak to open signalling. Got a good idea of country; seems

<sup>1</sup> Captain G. T. Pretyman, R.A., aide-de-camp to General Roberts.

very enclosed and confined. Got in about six. General Roberts very cordial ; he is very sanguine about the advance, thinks they will fight : it will be a great thing for us if they do.

“The Nawab, Sir Ghulam Hasan Khan, K.C.S.I., arrived ; he had left Kandahar and got within sixteen miles of Kabal, when, hearing the news, turned off. He says Yakub will bolt, and should be hung. Major Hastings is coming up as political. What these men are for I do not know : most unnecessary. The road to this is all down a valley, and is pretty good. Hills well covered with forest, and much terraced cultivation and plenty water ; people Jajis.

“*Ali Khel*, Sept. 15.—Slept well. Saw Ghulam Hasan, who says he thinks the Amir knew of it : there was estrangement between Cavagnari and him. Ala-ud-din, brother of Padshah, chief of Ghilzais, came in, also the Hisarak Jajis, who have held out. Have arranged with Roberts that I shall write a memorandum of news for general information every day. After he has seen it, it will be published : this will save me trouble. Also talked about organising an Intelligence Department, in which he agreed. We hope to advance on 28th or so. This may be a big business ! Hyat Khan (assistant political officer to Hastings) has arrived. Roberts seems to have great faith in him. I do not know him, but will soon take his measure.

“*Sept. 16.*—To-day Roberts had a meeting of the

scoundrels round ; I only went to it at the end, and found him completely surrounded by them, with no arms. I remonstrated with him, and he said he would not do it again. I also told Hyat that he should be ashamed of himself for allowing such a thing. Have not got different departments in hand yet, but soon I will have it. I also mean to attend at all the political interviews, both to get a thorough knowledge of the whole thing, and make myself as fully instructed in this line as in every other. Had a long talk with Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Perkins, (commanding R.E.), about the attack on Kotal, and mean to get it settled. Ala-ud-din came to terms ; he agrees to keep his people quiet to within two marches of Kabal, and to provide all supplies and transport he can ; this for a pay of 2000 rupees *per mensem*, and a present of 3000 rupees. I think all this black-mail paying is very wrong in principle, but our force is so small that it requires all such help. I do hope this will turn out well.

“ *Sept.* 17.—Another long telegram came from the Landi Kotal, giving an account of the massacre by a man who had escaped. I give this in my daily memorandum of news. I told Roberts to-day I would like to be present when any hogs came to see him, as I wanted to hear all that was going on, and he said he would always call me. The local carriage is not coming in now ; this may be owing to the *Eed*.<sup>1</sup> By the way, there was one thing struck me ;

<sup>1</sup> The *Eed*, fast of Ramzan.



a young man was told he might go away to his home for the *Eed*, and he said he would rather not go, and when pressed still adhered. Does this mean that he himself is friendly, but knows of some devilry up among his people, and does not wish to take part in it? This is what I argue, and shall tell Roberts to-morrow. After dinner Roberts called me into his tent, and said some letters had come from the Amir. The tone was friendly and helpless, that of a man overcome by misfortune. He forwarded letters from Jafir in Turkistan, which said there was a bad spirit amongst the troops, and that a nephew of the Emperor had been round by Shahr Sabz, Kolab, and Charjui looking at the country.

“Another letter from Ayub, saying that on Thursday a mutiny had taken place among the Kabali troops at Herat, and that they had killed Fakir Ahmed, who dying had said, ‘Give my respects to the Amir, and say that I am thankful I died true to him.’ The story is very much the same as that of the outbreak at Kabal, and shows there is no approach to a government in Kabal or Afghanistan anywhere. A letter came to the general to say that some more men had been saved, and some of them through the instrumentality of Ibrahim, my old friend. I will get the general to let me address him, as he may be useful to me. Did this, and he agreed. Roberts asked me to go down to Kuram to stir the people up there. I agreed at once, although I did not want to go one bit.

"*Fort Kuram, Sept. 18.*—Got ready and off by eight; rode to Paiwar a brute of the 12th that went like a ballet-dancer, but got better. The country is decidedly pretty, and the bit by Zargum Khel is beautiful, and must be more so when Sikaram Peak<sup>1</sup> is covered with snow. Got into the Paiwar Kotal by 10.30, sent for Colonel Gordon, and found out what waggons were working; also from Shafto, Commissary of Ordnance, what amount remained to bring up. Rode on at eleven on an old screw to Turi. Saw Kitchener, Transport, and arranged he was to work the *kahars*. Shall write to Massy<sup>2</sup> to have an officer up there to do ditto. On to Hahib Kal'a; road not so good as it ought to be; indeed all the roads in Kuram are worse than they should be. Saw Green, 12th Bengal Cavalry, who explained that the 12th were prepared to go without a single animal from Government. Rode on; got in at two; went straight to Burlton; got from him balance on hand now; balance and amount to be sent up—average amount carried by local carriage. Also, Booth, Transport; got a return from him; find a great many sick; told him I would inspect tomorrow. Then to Christie, who said all local carriage was working, and no coolies would come forward. . . . Went to the mess of the 14th Bengal Lancers, and got them to make me honorary mem-

<sup>1</sup> Sikaram, the dominating peak of the Safed Kuh range, 15,500 feet.

<sup>2</sup> Brigadier-General Dunham Massy, commanding Cavalry Brigade.

ber; they are nice. Their colonel, Ross, is silent as the grave, but sterling.

“*Fort Kuram, Sept. 19.*—I got a telegram ordering 3d Sikhs to march, so order them to march day after to-morrow in two days; they will get there in quite time enough. In the morning went, and inspected all the bullocks and mules; gave very strict orders to Booth to send on all that were at all able to take a load. We cannot afford to lose even the services of a broken-down bullock. Got more telegrams from Roberts about the artillery waggons; have, however, arranged that all that can possibly go on shall do so; this will clear all out by the 21st. Went over to Colonel Money, 3d Sikhs, and told him to give me an indent for carriage on the new scale, as I mean to bag all over for Commissariat. 3d Sikhs is a very fine regiment; over 500 Sikhs and only 30 Pathans; I think they should go on. The papers say Yakub has played us false, and has roused the Mohmands. They will get a precious good licking if Jenkins comes across them.

“*Fort Kuram, Sept. 20.*—Subahdar Sada Meer, a *Laghman* of the 3d Sikhs, came to see me—a particularly fine specimen. The burden of the Afghan's song was, that all Afghans were brutes, and treacherous to the core. These people never seem to think that this abuse is applicable to themselves, yet I fancy he would be as bad as any, this man who talked so glibly about the faithlessness of Afghans. Got Money to send me indents for carriage on the

new scale, which leaves about ninety of his camels free. Shall send treasure on it with 3d Sikhs to-morrow. Roberts telegraphs for all the *kahars*<sup>1</sup> to be sent on. Gave the order. I think it would be better to 'bide a wee,' but I never refuse an order if it is in any way possible to carry it out. Got a long letter from Lyall, in which he says he relies on me to strengthen our policy. He simply notes my offer to take Cavagnari's place; but perhaps he may see it after all. Morty<sup>2</sup> came up with Combe and Carew and Stewart, who brought in the 5th Panjab Cavalry. Morty is looking all right. I recommended him to go on to-morrow and join."

Letter to Lyall:—

"*Fort Kuram*.—I am so glad to hear that it is quite determined to go through with the Afghan policy, which I believe to be the only one. Not that I doubted it for an instant, but it is gratifying to hear it. I certainly will do all I can to get Roberts to adopt the strong and straightforward course, which is the best in dealing with these people. . . . I went up to Ali Khel, but soon found there was need of some directing hand behind before we could go forward. The Transport, Commissariat, Ordnance, and Medical Departments were all working at cross purposes, and not with sufficient life—so I have come back here to stir them all up; and now,

<sup>1</sup> A *kahar* is a stretcher-bearer or carrier of sick.

<sup>2</sup> H. Mortimer Durand, political officer (brother-in-law to Colonel MacGregor).

except two unimportant items, which will be up in three days, I have got all that is wanted to the front. The Transport, as usual, is our greatest difficulty, as there is very little of it, and what there is has been almost starved by the Commissariat; but it is coming up, and we must just make the best of it. There is no doubt that ever since the tribes round this valley heard of the massacre, they have become in a very excited state, and there are rumours of an attack being made somewhere about Balesh Khel, where the line is open to the Alisherzais, Masozais, and other *baisaks*.<sup>1</sup> Still, I doubt their efforts being very potent, and if our troops keep a good look-out, it will only be a flash in the pan. Why on earth they sent the 20th, an Afridi regiment, up here, I do not know. Beyond the Paiwar they seem quiet. The Jajis have all come in to Roberts, and one hears little of those Zakha Khels of these parts, the Mangals. Ala-ud-din, brother of Padshah, head of the Ghilzais, also came in and expressed his determination to keep his people quiet, and to do what he could to help us with camels and supplies, of course in consideration of a *douceur*. I have just heard that 300 Ghilzai camels have come into Ali Khel, so I hope the difficulty of having to fight our way to the valley of the Logar may be thus got over. Roberts is going to send Baker on to Khushi as soon as he can get up transport to move

<sup>1</sup> *Baisaks*, or bodies of men, about 200 each, attached to a *baisak* or standard.

him, which may be by Wednesday. This will have a good effect, as it will show these people we are really coming; and as the Khushi men said they would do what they could for us if we came, they may get us supplies, and perhaps some transport. The road, too, over the Shutargardan is being improved by Baker, who promises well. Once in the Logar valley, it will be pretty plain sailing to Kabal. There all depends on the resistance which we shall meet. I scarcely think it will be very desperate; but still, as we have no heavy guns, it might be pretty smart before we get in. The Afghans have, however, the usual military abhorrence of having their rear cut off strongly developed, and I think we shall be able to take up a position which will make them make tracks. Once in Kabal, we shall still have difficulties. It is impossible yet to say what the Amir will do; but what we must do is clear—take up an unassailable position, and ‘bide’ there till spring, going out and thrashing any gathering which may dare to come too close. If all goes well, we may get some supplies from the Shutargardan before the snow comes, and we must requisition the country for more, and then trust to the Khaibar column to give us what more we want, and keep open our communication with India. In regard to our dealings with these people, I have great faith that if we really show them we will put down all rebellion with a strong hand, and at the same time are just and conciliatory to them, we shall in time tame them as

much as Yusafzai or Bannu is tamed. There is no patriotism amongst them, and their substitute, fanaticism, will not bear them up long. Afghanistan can never again be what it was to us; it must become subject, and no sort of encroachment can be allowed from the north and west. But I must say that I think some effort should simultaneously be made to regain our influence in Persia, because, if it be possible to drive Russian influence out from that country, we need not care so much about Afghanistan. And the first thing to be done, as in all such cases, is to get a really strong able man to represent us. Durand has gone to join, looking very well."

"*Kuram*, Sept. 21.—I have had a day of worry. Roberts has suddenly conceived a desire to push on, and telegraphs to me a programme of movements, forgetting or ignoring that there is absolutely no carriage. However, I never make differences, so I said it shall be done, though I do not know at present how it is to be done. I got the 14th to agree to go without any carriage, and the 9th Lancers with only twenty instead of about eighty. G-3 and 11th want a great deal, and I do not see how they can get off; so I wrote to Burlton to the effect that we must use local carriage for them unless other Government carriage comes in. There is an awful *gul mal* about the artillery. All the ammunition has not gone, and Roberts wants all the artillery to go, and I have to get back the waggons before Tuesday morning. I have sent express to tell C-4 what to

do. Then the 11th Guards are not yet relieved, so I sent an order to send them up by double marches, so as to get them off. I daresay all will come right : it generally does, when one does not fuss too much. I do not see what more can be done, so I am going to sleep.

“*Kuram, Sept. 22.*—No carriage having arrived, cannot march the 11th Native Infantry, G-3 Battery, or 9th Lancers to-morrow.

“*Kuram, Sept. 23.*—No carriage in. Got the 14th off (Bengal Lancers), and sent the 9th Lancers carriage. Roberts says now he will put off his advance for two days. However, he wrote he was sure no one could have done more than I had, which is so far satisfactory, and is only the truth ; one cannot move regiments without something to move them with.

“*Kuram, Sept. 24.*—Got off 9th and 5th Panjab Cavalry wing. Some transport has come in, about 90 camels and 230 good mules, not enough for both G-3 and 11th ; so I shall send G-3, other wing 5th Panjab Cavalry, and Ordnance stores under charge of latter.”

*Sept. 25-26.*—Kuram to Ali Khel.

“*Sept. 27.*—Roberts went off.

“*Ali Khel, Sept. 28.*—Last night Gordon<sup>1</sup> got a telegram saying they were going to attack the Paiwar Kotal, so he immediately wired to Roberts to

<sup>1</sup> Brigadier-General T. E. Gordon, left as commandant of Kuram force.



stop the 67th. Roberts said 'No.' Poor old Townsend was wounded, and now we hear he is dead—I hope not.

"*Karatiga, Sept. 29.*—We were supposed to march at three, but, as might have been expected, we did not get off till six. The march was a lamentable instance of the carelessness and happy-go-lucky style in which we do things. There was a small advance-guard, a few men with the guns, others scattered about, and the rest in rear; no attempt was made to keep the baggage and troops within a reasonable space, and the consequence was the whole line of march was sprawling along three times as long as it need. Then many unnecessary and long halts were made up to Drai Kala, up to which it was safe, the baggage was at least kept behind. Up through the Hazar-Darakht defile all precautions were thrown to the winds, and everything was allowed to go on as it pleased. Every one was complaining there were no orders, and there seemed to be no head. MacPherson had his breakfast comfortably and got in himself at four, without a sign of an enemy.

"*Karatiga.*—At six a report came that the rear-guard was attacked, and when I went to bed at nine it was not in. Then the march was much too long, considering the state of the baggage-animals: it should not have been more than ten miles, it was eighteen, and many animals marched double marches from Pindi and Peshawar, and only got in late last

night, were loaded at three, and did not get their loads off till nine, fifteen hours; the consequence was that fifty camels were lost, and many mules, and the inevitable result will be considerable disorganisation of the train. The road is pretty fair, though stony up the bed of the ravine the whole way. The country is strong, but not so much so as I expected, and I do not think they would ever be able really to stop the road: it would require much better arrangements than they could ever make. The G-3 Battery could not go on, and to-morrow they say we are to go to Khushi. To-night we are in an awful position in a hollow completely commanded, but I suppose our luck will carry us through. Passed Townsend<sup>1</sup> on the road: he is not seriously wounded—a bullet has lodged in his jaw; nothing dangerous, though perhaps painful.

“*Khushi, Sept. 30.*—Spent a very decent night—rather cold, but not too much so. Started at eight; road to Surkhi Kotal easy, but stony. Up not very difficult, but a severe tug for horses; on reaching top all trees cease, and the country is inexpressibly blank and barren, but the climate was lovely; the road to the ‘Shutar’ is quite easy; the troops are on the summit in a good position. Got my horse shod by the mountain-battery under Morgan. Got MacPherson to give me a guard to go to Khushi, and got off at once. The road down is

<sup>1</sup> Deputy Surgeon-General S. C. Townsend, principal medical officer.

very steep and bad, though the guns got down all right; rest of the way is very stony down the bed of the stream to Akhun Khel, where is a very strong little position enclosed between two *darbands*, as in Persia. Arrived at 3.30 at Dobandi, a small village with cultivation stretching along the bank of the river for a mile: it is inhabited by Babar Ghilzais. By the way, these are very fine men, but are the most uncouth and animal-looking of any I have seen. Mercy is a word not known to them. From Dobandi the road turns half right to the Shinkai Kotal, which I reached at 4.15. The ascent is easy and practicable for guns. The road then goes over a stony waste, just like Persia, for some six or seven miles to Camp Khushi, which seems a flourishing village, situated down the bed of the Shutargardan stream. There is much cultivation and trees, and a picturesque little fort. Got in about six. When I arrived the general received me with great *empressement*. Said he was so glad I had been at Ali Khel.

“*Camp Khushi, Oct. 1.*—Slept last night in a tent with Major-General J. Hills, V.C., C.B.<sup>1</sup> He was detailing his woes from having been promoted to major-general too soon. He now has to go home. Got general to put in an order about Sergeant MacDonald,<sup>2</sup> who behaved very well. General called me over while he gave orders about a pro-

<sup>1</sup> Now Lieutenant-General Sir J. Hills-Johnes, V.C., K.C.B.

<sup>2</sup> Colour-Sergeant Hector MacDonald, 92d Highlanders.

clamation he proposes to issue to the people of Kabal, saying that no one was to be hurt if they came in ; and in the afternoon he was exercised as to what he would do to Kabal. In the evening we went over to the Amir, where I saw the *mustaufi*<sup>1</sup> and Daud Shah,<sup>2</sup> who recognised me. They seemed anxious to stop us ; but I am glad to say Roberts would not give in, but said he would send the proclamation mentioned above, at which they seemed satisfied, saying, '*Bisyar khub, bisyar munasib.*' To-morrow the whole force goes to Zargunshahr, where, by my advice, all will concentrate. Roberts would have split his force into three ; though they might have held their own, it would have been adding to the danger needlessly, and is quite against Cocker. Got my ribbons sewn on to-day, and find, even by overlapping, I have no room for more, so what I shall do when I get the second Afghan medal I do not know.

"*Camp Zargunshahr, Oct. 2.*—Got up and worked about carriage. That dog Padshah said he would bring in 300, and only brought nineteen. Just as we were starting, some people said they thought they heard guns, so Padshah Khan's son was sent off to find out what it was. With great difficulty got Baker's lot off, and despaired almost (for I never really despair, which I take to be a very unmanly sentiment) of getting MacPherson's brigade off, but

<sup>1</sup> The *mustaufi*, or minister of finance, Habibulla Khan.

<sup>2</sup> Daud Shah, late Commander-in-Chief, Afghan army.

somehow, at the last moment, it was managed. We started at eleven, and rode over undulating stony plain for seven or eight miles to this. This is truly the land of *sags* and *sangs*. The Amir rode with us with perhaps 100 rag-tag, Daud Shah, the *mustaufi*, Wazir Shah, and Mahamad Yahiya. Amir had a fine Turkoman horse he had at Gandamak with him, and some of his people rode others. Daud Shah rode a very powerful bay, which he said came from Kataghan.<sup>1</sup> Talked to *mustaufi* and Daud Shah, who were pleasant. It somehow went against my grain to be talking to men who may have had something to do with poor Cavagnari's murder; and besides, I do not think it is right or looks well to have these dogs riding with us, as, if anything happened, it would be very awkward to have them all round us, so I warned Roberts, and he said he would be careful. Have got a bad cold, and am feverish, so felt the sun very hot, and as I have only a 'single fly' bell-tent, the heat was not much mitigated. Wrote out the order of march, putting every one in their place, and ordering proper precautions for covering front, flank, and rear, and for taking up pickets on arrival. Afterwards the Wali Mahamad came to see the general, and had a private interview with him. His people said openly the Amir could have helped the mission. Roberts means, if he can find anything against the Amir, to quod him. We are in very great difficulty about carriage.

<sup>1</sup> In the Kunduz province of Afghan-Turkistan, south of the Oxus.

Every night there is the same bother; we do not know where the carriage for to-morrow is to come from, and have only the Ghilzai promises to trust to—a broken reed indeed. News has come that the ridge above the 'Shutar' was occupied by considerable numbers of Machalgah, Gardez, and Zurmat Ghilzais. Money went out and attacked them, and drove them over the hill, killing thirty and wounding some more,<sup>1</sup> with a loss on our side of only Griffiths, 3d Sikhs, and a sergeant of 67th wounded slightly. Got the general to send the news off to the Amir, and telegraphed back to Money, '*The general congratulates you heartily; husband your ammunition and supplies, and go in at the brutes. General Gordon has been ordered to send for 100 rounds ammunition more, and more supplies.*' A report came in that there were some guns and a regiment in a fort some four miles to the right, so I went and asked Hastings to find out about it; he reports it is nothing at all. Found M—— had put out no pickets at all by day, and had very inadequately protected himself from surprise by night, so sent him an order to do so at once. When will British officers cease from carrying on war in this careless fashion?

"*Camp Safed Sang, Zahidabad, Oct. 3.*—Still feeling bad with a cold, but had to get up and run about as usual. Had my usual scratch breakfast, badly cooked. It is a good thing I am very

<sup>1</sup> See p. 56, Part III., MacGregor's Second Afghan War—Money's Defence of the Shutargardan Kotal.

strong, or I should have been snuffed out long ago, with all the hardships I have had. Met my old friend Ibrahim Khan, who came in on a letter I wrote to him. He is looking old, and has dyed his hair. He was very glad to see me. I think I shall find him useful in getting me things. Then he can get me a lot of things I shall want, and which I fancy Kabal can produce, such as teapot, cups and saucers, Turkoman cloth, carpets, ponies, &c. I told him to give me a list of all our well-wishers, and all who were directly or indirectly engaged in the massacre. I have told Roberts that the crime is unparalleled in the annals of history, and the punishment should be likewise. So if we find that the Amir and his people are implicated, we must seize them by a *coup d'état*, and then hang them from the gate of Cavagnari's residence. He said he will tell me all who were against us, even if his own father was amongst them. We are getting lists from several other independent men—all separately, as it ought to be a very long one. Baker has been kept behind to guard all our supplies, and to-morrow we send back all our camels, &c., to fetch them up.

“*Halted at Safed Sang, Zahidabad, Oct. 4.*—The equivalent of 1200 camels went back to-day to bring up everything from Zargunshahr. As it is fourteen miles there and fourteen miles back, we shall not see them, I said, till six or seven; and, as a matter of fact, the head was not in till eight, and the tail will not be in before twelve or one. After a

deal of worry, got Colonel Heathcote<sup>1</sup> to tell me the number of animals he had, and what he wanted, by which I find we are some 600 camels short of what we want. Wright, too, gave me a deal of bother before I could get out of him what was wanted in the way of transport for six days' supplies. Ibrahim Khan came over, and we had a long talk. He said Cavagnari never tried to make friends with any one, but isolated himself, and gave himself up to partridge-shooting, so he never heard anything that was going on. He said he could only raise a body of Kizilbash horse. I will speak to Roberts about this. Sent Combe back to see what had become of the convoy. He came back at eight, and said he had been to the rear, and had seen Baker some six miles back. Shortly after, Murray, 72d, came up, breathless, to say heavy firing had been heard by the bridge [across the Logar]. I came out, told him quietly to turn out two companies 72d; then told general, and went to turn out Ghurkhas also. Told Knowles to have wing 67th ready; then to Pratt to have 5th Panjab Infantry ready. Then I suggested the village being surrounded at daybreak, and told Massy, who ordered the 14th [Bengal Lancers] to surround the village. Then came back and arranged that Knowles should go with wing 67th, 5th Panjab Infantry, and mountain-battery, with Hastings and some of Padshah's men, and if they did not come out and give up their arms, we would make them.

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Heathcote, chief Transport officer.



Ordered Knowles not to engage till he had sent back word as to the result of the summons, when we can settle what to do. I hope it will all be settled quietly. Our men shot one man with a red coat, who was brought in; and a man of the Amir's suite, coming into camp, had his horse shot by a sentry.

"*Camp Charasia, Oct. 5.*—According to Roberts, we should have been in Kabal to-day; but owing to delay, caused by want of transport, we shall not be there before Tuesday. Got up at 6.15, and saw that every one had moved off as ordered. The 14th, at four, surrounded the village; then the 5th Panjab Infantry and 67th, with mountain-battery, moved up and waited. The result was that two men were killed and five captured, of whom Roberts ordered three to be shot. We marched at eleven, and only went about seven miles; then came to an open plain with the village of Charasia at the far end, thickly wooded. It was very hot, and Roberts in the afternoon must needs go down to the village to look at a fort to leave our supplies in.

"*Bini Hisar, Oct. 6.*—I told him yesterday we ought to occupy a very strong conical hill above the [Sang-i-Nawishta] pass, but he said, No; and so we sent out patrols, who, almost immediately after clearing the village, found the heights all occupied. So Baker<sup>1</sup> was sent with the 72d, 200 [Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke], Ghurkhas [Major Fitzhugh], 23d Pioneers [Lieutenant-Colonel Currie], four mountain-

<sup>1</sup> Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, 18th Foot.

guns [Captain Swinley], and some 200 5th Panjab Infantry [Major Pratt], and another party of 200 Highlanders, 100 23d, two squadrons 5th Panjab Cavalry [Major Hammond], and three guns, G-3 [Major Parry], went also. Baker seemed cool, confident, and quiet, and laid his plan for turning the enemy's right quite off his own bat, telling off the party under White<sup>1</sup> to play with their front, and push on as soon as the enemy began to feel his flank attack. This he carried out steadily, and at last turned them out of all their positions with a loss of three officers wounded, and some eighteen men killed and seventy wounded. White went at a party on a very strong position on a hill which flanked their left of the pass. He met with a desperate resistance, but took it at last, and lost three killed and wounded; then finding them going, he pressed on, and at last got into the pass, seized the conical hill, and took twelve guns. So that altogether it has turned out most successfully; but to Baker and White belong principally the honour of the day.

"*Camp Bini Hisar, Oct. 7.*—I must now put down every single thing as it happens. This I did not do to-day, therefore I must put down what I remember. Got up at 3.45 A.M., some devil having blown off fifteen minutes too soon. Very cold. Blew the advance without seeing whether everything was ready or not, consequently found

<sup>1</sup> Major J. White, 92d Highlanders.

no one in their places, and the general waiting; thought he would have been in a rage, but he was not. Then we got off, and went to left or west of village through gardens to the foot of the hill, when we turned to the right, and skirting the hills, came out on plain, where Parry opened his guns. Saw the hills the 92d got up to pass. Found White there. Roberts said, 'I congratulate you. I was sure the 92d would do well.' Then he went up to some men and said no one could have done better. Then we went on, and in half a mile came up with Baker. He seems to have managed his work very well, and to have inspired confidence in his troops. Find we have captured eighteen guns, have lost eighteen killed and seventy wounded—total, eighty-eight. So we have had, as fights go in India, a smart little affair. Got into camp about nine; got a bit of fowl to eat—all I had all day. Then we went to top of hill, where 23d have a picket; from this there is a capital view of the Bala Hisar and the whole country round. The walls are very much dilapidated, and are, I fancy, in the same state as they were in 1839. It is evident the way to get into it is to seize the point marked K on the map, put up a couple of mountain-guns and a few good infantry shots, and then, enfilading the two approaches on the south, storm it; then all the rest would be at our mercy. Some men came in to say the Bala Hisar was empty, and they wanted us to come in; but I told Roberts this wish was suspicious

in itself, and he had better send and see if it really was empty. Then there is the story that the place is mined, and, curious to say, just as I was calling his attention to this, a big explosion actually did take place, which may be a warning. A party of the 67th came in, and as they are not to go back to-night, they will have a cold night of it; but it serves them right, as they should at least have brought their greatcoats with them. Got all the pickets placed out. About ten some shots were fired to our right. Ibrahim Khan promises to be of use to me. Our men gutted a village to-night, against orders, so the provost-marshal flogged no less than 150 of them.

“*Camp Bini Hisar, Oct. 8.*—I not only forgot to write my journal as things happened, but I have for six days forgot to keep copies of the orders I have sent out, which, considering that many of them were most important, is quite inexcusable. I thought we were going to have a quiet day, but no sooner did I get up than it began. First a report said the enemy had deserted their cantonment at Sherpur, and had retreated to Deh Mazang on the other side of Kabal, so I proposed that the cavalry should be sent to cut them off from going further on the Bamian road. So Massy started with 725 cavalry. He went over Siah-Sang to Sherpur, found it quite deserted, with seventy-eight guns in it. Then he went on, and got over the Baraki Pass to the west of Deh Mazang. Then a report came that

they were going to attack the Chandaol,<sup>1</sup> so I told Roberts to send Baker with 92d, 23d, two mountain-guns, and two Gatlings to co-operate with Massy. All this was done, and Baker got over the ridge and found they were intrenching themselves on the Asmai heights. He made nothing of them, and at sunset sent in to say he was going to attack, a foolish thing to do when night was coming on. By the way, we sent up a wing 67th and two companies Ghurkhas and two more mountain-guns to him; and at three the rest, 67th and 28th, with four horse-artillery guns, go to him. I do hope they will take it, else we shall be in a hat. We have nearly eaten all our provisions, and if we were to get worsted, not only would the whole country be up, but we should get no supplies. I hope Roberts's luck will carry him through; but we are playing a risky game, and if a disaster takes place? What then? It is all very well as long as things go smoothly. There was an alarm last night. About two, shots were fired, and every one solemnly turned out as if a division of Russians were on us; the guard also marched solemnly up. Roberts told me he was going *tamasha banawing* (!), and wanted me to stay in camp. I did not encourage the idea, and I think, perhaps, we will not try it on again.

"Oct. 9.—MacPherson started at one, and Gough at five, with the rest of the cavalry, to hunt up the Turkistan road.

<sup>1</sup> The Chandaol Bazaar, the Hindu and Kizilbash quarter of Kabal.

*Siah-Sang, Oct. 9.*—Roberts went off about four. I did not stir, but lay till eight, then got up. About 8.30 he sent back to say they had all bolted, and Baker was in their camp and had taken twelve more guns. So he came back about nine. In his usual impulsive manner he said we would all go to Siah-Sang. I said, 'Yes; if it can be done.' He said, 'I hope so; we shall see.' The end was that we started about 10.30, and rode straight down the road to the Bala Hisar; but beyond a few people who blessed us, met nothing. We had only a few *sowars*, and rode on to Siah-Sang, which is a fine position. Here we camp. Roberts is very hot on catching Abdul Karim, who is said to be in a village under the hills to the east; but all our men are knocked up, so I advised waiting till to-morrow. Ordered ten *poshtins* for my servants, and Ibrahim brought me a Russian teapot and some grapes. Perkins reported that Sherpur was being looted, so we are going to see for ourselves to-morrow. We must somehow prevent their carrying off the wood.

"*Camp Siah-Sang, Oct. 10.*—Got up at 6.30; found Roberts did not mean to go till ten, so went back to bed and did not get up again till eight. At ten we went over to Sherpur, not more than two miles; found it of course quite empty. A long straggling wall, with bastions, meant to extend all round the Bimaru hill, but only finished on two sides. It has an immense amount of accommodation, very good rooms with broad verandahs. There are sub-

stantial gateways at intervals, and the Bimaru hill is meant for the citadel. It is altogether too ambitious a place, and would take 20,000 men to hold it. There are two or three water-ducts running through it, a good deal of cultivation inside, and some wells. Ibrahim came to see me, and I gave him a list of what I wanted; he also said he would give some supplies. I told him to send in anything he had at once. All the Hindus in the place came in and salaamed, and then all the Kizilbashs. I hear they offered Cavagnari a house in their quarters, and would have protected him for a month at least. I do not know what he can have been thinking of. They say he never tried to make any friends, and held aloof from every one. He has paid bitterly for his neglect. Roberts has written a proclamation.

“*Camp Sikh-Sang, Oct. 11.* — Morty is very much concerned about the Amir, and says he is being treated badly, and condemned without a hearing. I think there is quite enough proof to make us suspect him, and if we suspect him, we should quod him. First, there is no doubt he gave Cavagnari no assistance whatever, and never tried to. He gave him a house where there was no possibility of a fight being made, and he could have shut the gate of the Bala Hisar when they went for their arms, as it must have taken at least an hour for them to do so. Then he has given us no assistance either in supplies, transport, or news, the latter especially. On the 6th and 8th he must have

known exactly where the enemy were, but he never told us; and the fact of Nek Mahamad<sup>1</sup> coming into our camp, and his never telling us, is also much against him. Then there seems little reason to doubt that he has done all he can to stir up the tribes against us; altogether, we have quite enough to make it necessary we should have him under restraint. At twelve we went down to the Bala Hisar and rode through it. I had a wing of 72d down, and took two companies in with us, and left one on the gateway and one outside. We rode mostly all through it, and then went to Cavagnari's house, which is a poor place, and a regular rat-trap, closely surrounded by houses, and completely looked into by the upper hill. Hamilton's and Jenkyns's bodies were buried, but Cavagnari's and Kelly's do not seem to have been found, and are supposed to be buried under the ruins. We must dig them out. The place was thickly marked with bullet-marks, and these had quite evidently been fired from both sides, showing how hopeless the defence of such a place must have been. We saw the place where Hamilton charged out, and three times took the gun, firing at them, and the place where he and Jenkyns were killed. Then we came home, and to listen to Morty Durand talking about treating these fiends with justice of the High Court kind was sickening. Wrote out programme for to-morrow, when we are

<sup>1</sup> Nek Mahamad, the Commander-in-Chief of the rebels, had visited the Amir in the British camp the night before the battle of Charasia.



to make our entry into the Bala Hisar, never to go out of it again I hope. The troops are to line the road, and a salute is to be fired and the flag hoisted ; then we are to go into the Diwan-i-Am, and the Amir and all his people are to be quodded. At least that is what Roberts first determined on ; but I am afraid Morty and Hastings have got at him, and he is shaken in his intentions, and I do not know what he will do. Went to him and warned him that our supplies were running very low, and it would be a risky business if we did not get them in ; so he had Wright and Cook up, and made it quite plain. The first is to feed the troops every day ; the second, to store five months' supplies.

*"Camp Siakh-Sang, Oct. 12.*—We all went into Bala Hisar. I arranged everything. Ghurkhas came down on the upper Bala Hisar, one company 67th on gate, all troops lined road from camp. This was quite straight and very broad, with trees, and the sight was very impressive. One company 67th and band went ahead, latter playing like mad. Got to the Diwan-i-Am ; found door locked—had to wait. Went inside ; nothing was ready, and Zakaria was not there, so we had to wait for him. All this is very bad, and reflects on those who should have had everything arranged. Then Roberts read out the proclamation, which the *kazi* translated very indifferently. In fact the whole thing was undignified, and, a cat appearing, it was nearly ending in a screaming farce, as Roberts cannot endure that

species of animal. However, the 67th cheered him, and then he left me to quod Zakaria, Yahiya, the *mustaufi*, and the *wazir*. I told off separate rooms for them, and put double sentries on them, and showed Colonel Knowles (67th) the whole place, and left them in his charge. In the evening Roberts told me he wished me to be president of a commission<sup>1</sup> to try these devils, a task which I do not like at all. Then he told me he thought of exploring in the Bamian direction; and as the 85th, 3d Sikhs, and 44th are coming, I may get command of this brigade, and of the party to Bamian: this will be only fair.

“*Camp Siah-Sang, Oct. 13.*—We rode all through the city. Its appearance does not disappoint me; it is just what I expected—mean, filthy, like an Afghan’s heart. The people were neither respectful nor disrespectful, and seemed to show they did not care a d——n one way or the other. Afterwards I went with Nuzuff Ali Khan, a maundering old idiot, chief of some Arabs who have a prescriptive right to be in Bala Hisar, to see about a room to hold the commission, and settled on a room of the Amir’s, and told them to get it all ready. Then went and saw all the prisoners, who looked very sorry for themselves. It is a strange turn in fortune that I should have the *mustaufi* in my hands now.<sup>2</sup> Then came home. Reported that the 14th

<sup>1</sup> Colonel C. M. MacGregor, president; Dr Bellew, Mahamad Hyat Khan, members.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, vol. ii., chap. i., p. 9. The *mustaufi* of Herat had arrested Colonel MacGregor in 1875.

could not get the guns in, so ordered Gordon to send an officer (Royal Horse Artillery) and detachment with a guard of fifty men to bring them in on twenty-four elephants. Also ordered two squadrons 12th Bengal Cavalry to reconnoitre the Charikar road for any signs of the Turkistan regiments who are said to be coming. Just as I was going to bed, Knowles sent me a letter found in a coat going to the *mustaufi*, so had it copied, and told them to put it back and give it to him, and look very sharp for any answer that might be sent. We may get hold of something. I shall write letters to all of them and see if we cannot draw them. To-morrow I shall take the deposition of Daud Shah, get body of Bakhtiar exhumed and examined, and also dig for Cavagnari and Kelly; then we will have a military funeral over them. Also get the general to send a *purwana* to all regiments who have not been in any way engaged against us, to say we did not wish to be enemies of theirs.

“*Camp Sialh-Sang, Oct. 14.*—Took up the work of the commission, wrote out a list of the men to be examined, of all persuasions. Examined one Diwan Hira Nand, who gave very little information, and that only to show that there was a bad feeling between Amir and Cavagnari, which the latter professed to ignore and think light of. In the afternoon Ibrahim sent me word that Nek Muhamad was in the city, so asked Hills to try and catch him. He did not do so; but he did not search the house at

all. Ordered the *kotwal*,<sup>1</sup> Mahamad Aslam, into quod, on account of a statement that he had stirred up the people to go out and fight us at Charasia; we will find out more about it to-morrow. Had meant to have examined Amir to-morrow, but Roberts said we had better not a while, as it might look as if he was a prisoner, which he is. Green<sup>2</sup> came back. He went as far as Kala Ilaji, and went to the different villages *en route*, and they expressed themselves quite ready to give up the grain due from them. Heard that Mir Fakir was at Deh Bala, near Shakardara, and owing to some quarrel, was surrounded; so shall offer a reward of, say, 1000 rupees for him. He was brigadier-general, and fought against us. I do not think that men who merely fought against us without having been concerned in Cavagnari's business should be killed. Any way, I will not sentence such men to death. A telegram from the Queen was published, very eulogistic.

"*Camp Siakh-Sang*, Oct. 15.—Examined Yahiya Khan, but, though I threatened him a good deal, I could get nothing out of him; he absolutely refused to incriminate himself one bit. Also examined an old merchant named Dada Sher, and another old driveller called Saiad Jan, but got very little out of them. To-morrow shall examine the *kotwal* and *wazir*, next day the *mustaufi* and Zakaria. I do

<sup>1</sup> Chief magistrate of Kabal.

<sup>2</sup> Major Green, 12th Bengal Cavalry.

not like this, . . . but I will not find them guilty unless I am convinced of their guilt. The Foreign Office said the punishment should be *short, sharp, and repressive*. It cannot be *short*, unless we catch men whose guilt is patent. With all others we must inquire thoroughly. I do not believe it ever does good to kill men indiscriminately, and *I will not lend myself to it.*"

"*Camp Siah-Sang, Oct. 16.*—Examined the *kotwal*<sup>1</sup> to-day, and was just finishing him when a great explosion occurred. Went out, and saw it was in the direction of the Bala Hisar, which was enveloped in a cloud of smoke; shut up the court and went to see. Got as far as the Diwan-i-Am, and found that the 67th were clearing out, and the Ghurkhas running down the hill. Told the colonel to get his ammunition out and take all the men out, put a guard on both gates, and turn every one out. All this took an hour or two. Then went down and moved the troops and every one half a mile away, drove every one away from the gate, and then went out into the open myself. At four precisely I was looking to see if the fire was decreasing, and we (Spratt and I) came to the conclusion it was, when first a sort of lateral explosion took place, followed instantly by another tremendous one. In the direction I was—to the south—only a few stones came and some bullets, and I thought all was over. Sent Spratt to find out how many Ghurkhas were missing,

<sup>1</sup> Mahamad Aslam Khan, the *kotwal* or chief police magistrate of Kabal.

and went back to gate; heard that some six men had been killed by the last explosion, so left Spratt and went to the general; got him to order 67th and Ghurkhas into camp. The casualties to-day are Shafto and twenty-one Ghurkhas missing, one 67th, two 5th Panjab Cavalry killed, and some Afghans and followers, and about six wounded.

"Some men—Bourke amongst them—volunteered to go in and see if they could save any one in the Bala Hisar, but I did not see the good, so I vetoed any such idea. It is one thing to try to save a man when you believe it may be done, another to go into an unknown danger to look for men who may all be dead. It struck me to-day that it would be much better to destroy the Bala Hisar altogether, and move all intact into Sherpur. I would not object to this, as it would not split the force up into two. I told the general, and he had thought of it also, so we are going to speak to Baker about it to-morrow. This is a misfortune, but is not without alloy, as it might have been worse; so I think it will be better to blow up the big magazine to-morrow, and then quit the place, take all the timber and anything worth having, and destroy it by degrees. Even if we ever leave this again, these devils will never have the energy to rebuild it.

"Heard that Money had had another tremendous fight at the Shutargardan, and had beaten enemy off with a loss of two killed and twelve wounded. He killed forty of the enemy, who were found on

the ground, and some 150 more are supposed to be killed and wounded.

"*Siah-Sang*, Oct. 17.—Got orders out for the occupation of the Sherpur cantonment and the destruction of the Bala Hisar. I do not object to occupying Sherpur as long as the whole force goes there, but I did to our holding both, for we are not strong enough for it. A letter came in from Money to say all communications with Ali Khel were stopped, and he expected to be attacked on the 16th (yesterday). Gough went off with the 5th Panjab Cavalry, 5th Panjab Infantry, and four mountain-guns, and sent in at nine from Charasia, to say he was all right, but could not get communication with the Shutar-gardan. Examined the brother of Yahiya, Mahamad Sarwar—got nothing out of him; also Mirza Mahamad Zakaria, Captain Nabi, and a funny old scoundrel, called Baz, who made the proclamation. There is no doubt it was made, and that Nek Mahamad was the instigator; but there is no direct evidence to prove the *kotwal* ordered it to be made, and therefore there is not enough to hang him, though I daresay that will be done. Roberts says that he hears the Ghilzais mean to oppose Charles Gough, and that we must go out and help him in. I do not think these devils mean to let us be quiet in the winter; but their power is a good deal broken, and we have got most of their arms and ammunition, and nearly all their guns. I go to-morrow with the general to see where our quarters are to be, and having fixed

on my rooms, I shall get glass doors out of the Amir's house, and have a fireplace made. I have already told Ibrahim to lay in supplies of food for me.

"*Siah-Sang*, Oct. 18.—Went with the general down to look for quarters; settled on taking those in the south-east gate. Roberts evidently wants his down below; so I shall have my choice of those up above. Shall get a plan, and tell them off to-morrow. Examined the *mustaufi* to-day, and got the man who dragged Cavagnari's body through the streets, though he says he did not drag but carried it, and gave it over to Mirza Mahamad. Owen told me to-day that in the city they had taken him for Cavagnari, and said they thought he had escaped. He is something like him. I never thought of it before.

"*Siah-Sang*, Oct. 19.—Did not do much to-day. Wrote a summary of the *kotwal's* and *chaukidar* of Mundai's cases, and gave it to Massy's commission,<sup>1</sup> which condemned them to death, with three others, and they are all to be hung to-morrow. Had a talk to-day with Ahmad Ali Jan, son of Mahamad Ali Khan, who was Sher Ali's favourite son. He has a good manner, and might turn out well, though I cannot fancy any Afghan turning out well at all.

"*Siah-Sang*, Oct. 20.<sup>2</sup> — Took Wali Mahamad's

<sup>1</sup> *Military Commission*.—Brigadier-General Massy, president; Major Moriarty, Bombay Staff Corps; Captain Guinness, 72d Highlanders, members.

<sup>2</sup> No. 1125, dated 20th October, from Major-General Roberts to Chief of Staff, par. 44: "I further desire to bring to notice the services



evidence. All directed to show what a well-wisher he was of ours, and how much the contrary the Amir was !

“ *Siah-Sang*, Oct. 21.—I take the following from the notes of the proceedings of the commission : (1) *Prisoner*, *Sultan Aziz*. — Mahamad Hyat states : ‘The city people are unwilling to come forward openly ; but I have ascertained beyond doubt that this man was the moving spirit on the night of the 5th to get people to go out and fight us. He was also present himself at the fight with a standard.’ Accused simply denies his guilt. The commission sentence him to be hanged. The commission is composed of Massy, a captain of 72d, and Moriarty. Eleven men have been hung (including two ordered to-day) up to date. I therefore intend to see that no prisoner goes to the commission without a clear statement of the nature of the evidence, and without a chance of bringing witnesses in his favour.

“ *Siah-Sang*, Oct. 22.—Saved five men’s lives to-day—that is to say, if I had not inquired into their cases, they would have been hanged. They did not seem a bit grateful, and made no remark. One old man, Jahangir, was reproved by his son for not thanking me, and he turned and muttered something, whether a curse or a blessing I do not know. Then he passed his hand over his beard, as if to say, ‘May of the following officers : Colonel C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., Chief of the Staff. This officer’s soldierly qualities are so well known that I need not say I have throughout derived the greatest assistance from his energy, ability, and experience.”

my beard be cut off if I do not do what I say!’ One of the accused was Abu Bakar, a merchant, against whom there was a regular got-up case, the principal witness being his deadly enemy. Old Nakhshband seemed very grateful to me for getting him off, and said, ‘May God spare your child!’ a wish I heartily agree with him in. Supplies are coming in better now, but we are still far off from having enough yet. I hope we shall get enough to enable us to carry on till we can get things up from the Khaibar. There seems to be a strange want of life in that force; they are still only at Jalalabad. They might easily have been here.”

“*Siakh-Sang, Oct. 24.*—Engaged half the day in taking down trifling cases. Let two fellows free, and then got Daud Shah up; his evidence is not worth much. I cannot get at any sign that the attack on Cavagnari was premeditated. I am inclined to think it was not; but perhaps it may come out later on.

“*Siakh-Sang, Oct. 25, 26, and 27.*—Nothing but depositions! I must try and get Roberts to give me a brigade; then I shall have very little to do, and be in a better position to do it. I am going to suggest my being sent to Herat: it would be a grand thing if I succeeded in taking it and holding it all the winter. I think I could, but he will not let me.

“*Siakh-Sang, Oct. 28 and 29.*—Broached my views about Herat, but he would not see it; and when I said I might go, he said, ‘Oh no! we could not spare

you.' My idea is, that instead of sitting here doing nothing, we should try and secure Herat this winter ; and the way I would do it would be by taking 100 cavalry, 100 infantry, and two mountain-guns as my body-guard, raising as many Kizilbashes as I could get here—say 1000—adding to these the Hazara horse of late Amir, and then going and raising the whole Hazara country, sweeping on like a wave, and making a rush for Herat. It would be somewhat risky ; but I think I could do it. What I want Roberts to let me do would be to go on a sort of mission to the Hazara chiefs, with a view of seeing the country, and I would then sound them, and if I found them game, I would try a rush on Herat ; it would be a grand game.

*"Siah-Sang, Oct. 30 and 31.*—More depositions, the usual sort of thing. To-day we got on the track of a letter of the Amir, which will, I hope, lead to something. Roberts went down to Yahiya Khan's house. I am going to talk to him to-morrow about the money taken being prize. If it does not belong to the Amir, it certainly should be prize, and I shall try all I know to get it made so." <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Upwards of 8½ lakhs of rupees, and a quantity of jewellery and gold coin *tillas* and Russian 5-rouble pieces, in all amounting to 9½ lakhs, were found, which were fairly recognisable as prize-money for the troops ; but the whole treasure was subsequently refunded to the Afghan Government.

## CHAPTER IV.

## KABAL AND SHERPUR.

1879-1880.

*When the drum beat at dead of night,  
Commanding fires of death to light."*

CAMP SIAH-SANG—MOVE INTO SHERPUR—RECONNOITRING TOWARDS THE KHAIBAR—THE AMIR'S CASE—REPORT OF THE COMMISSION—THE *MUSAJATI* EXAMINED—PROOF OF YAKUB KHAN'S COMPLICITY—THE INK FREEZES—THROUGH MAIDAN—DEPORTATION OF THE AMIR—THREATENING SIGNS—ARRANGEMENTS FOR A FIGHT—THE BRITISH HATED—AN AWFUL DAY—LOSS AND RECOVERY OF THE GUNS—SHERPUR INVESTED—HOT WORK—MAJOR GREEN'S MARCH—THE SIGNAL-FIRE—A GLOOMY LOOK-OUT—DAUD SHAH—THREE VICTORIA CROSSES—MESSAGE FROM THE QUEEN—JALALABAD—AFFAIR WITH THE MOHMANUS—THE PARI DARA DEFILE—INSPECTING DEFENCES—MOUNTED INFANTRY—SENDING OFF WOUNDED—OCCUPATION OF KABAL—EQUIPMENT COMMITTEE.

On the 1st November the camp at Siah-Sang was broken up, and the main body of the 1st Division moved into the cantonments of Sherpur, which had been prepared for winter quarters.

"*Sherpur Cantonment, Nov. 1.*—Got up at half-past eight. As I was dressing, Ahmad Ali put in

his head and said, 'Good morning.' I looked blankly at him, and he bolted. Sent orderlies for my things left behind on the hill, then went to see my quarters, which have not progressed one bit. Wonder, if Roberts gets command of the two divisions, if MacPherson will get one; then I might get his brigade, and I should have less toil and more credit. One of the fellows we had up to-day was Mahamad Hasan, a fearful liar, and a man who killed two of his brothers with his own hand. The general evidently suspects the Amir to be implicated in a plot, but I have no evidence to that effect as yet; he was doubtless most culpably apathetic when the attack was going on, but no more. By the way, I must get a list of what they call the *Yakubzai*. In this country you cannot absolutely believe a single soul, they are all either friends or enemies, and they will not say anything against this relationship.

"*Butkhak*, Nov. 2.—Up at 6.30, start off at seven, and ride with the general to Butkhak,<sup>1</sup> eight and a half miles. The road is nearly level all the way, but stony; the Logar a deep, swift, but narrow river, crossed by a masonry bridge. Then the road goes over country which is swamped, when the Logar is in flood, for three miles; then becomes stony, ascending. MacPherson had his camp pitched in a somewhat straggling order on right bank of the Khurd Kabal stream. Madad and Saadat, the chief

<sup>1</sup> Butkhak, a new post established by General Roberts, garrisoned and connected by telegraph with Kabal.

men of the Ghilzais of this part, came in. We had an indifferent breakfast, and then marched at eleven for the Lataband Kotal. For six miles the road goes over open stony country to the Surkhai Kotal, which is easy, then over little *kotals* for ten miles to a ridge called Amir Khan. There are three passes over this. I thought the one to the left was the best, easiest gradient, but longest. The middle is very bad, and could hardly be made; the right, or south, is very steep, but soil easier. We went over the middle, and had to lead our horses over it. Then we went up the bed of a river for Lataband—at first through a very nasty defile; then we came on a very large camp of Kuchis; then on by a very easy slope, up a ridge, to the top—about five miles. We trotted up the whole way, which was rather cruel to the animals—indeed my pony was very nearly killed, and so were several others. We got back about six; went and dined with Broome.

*"Sherpur, Nov. 3.*—Roberts first meant to go through the Khurd Kabal defile and then come back, but, at the last moment, Daud Shah said something about the Chinari road, so he decided to try that, and we started at nine.

"After about six miles, we went south and up the Chinari valley, then entered a very nasty, narrow defile, with no road at all, and tremendous cliffs overhead. This for six miles, then the hills opened out, and we turned south-east and went for four miles, when we came on to the Khurd Kabal road.

Then we changed our direction over very open, easy ground, for eight miles, to the Khurd Kabal stream, at about four miles passed the Haft Kotal road to Tezin. Going down the river-bed for one mile, we entered a narrow defile with precipitous cliffs, road in the water. This for two miles, then we left it and turned over bank of river for three miles to camp, which we reached at four o'clock, having gone not under thirty-two miles. We only waited to change horses, and then rode in to Sherpur.

*"Sherpur, Nov. 4.*—Got up about eight. I have strained my back-sinews somehow—I suppose from a constant strain in keeping up a trot with the general's infernal marc. At eleven we went out to meet the 3d Sikhs, which we did opposite the Bala Hisar, when Roberts made them a speech. The 9th Lancers passed us, looking well, but undermounted; the 5th Panjab Cavalry very good and serviceable; Morgan's battery also very serviceable; the 3d Sikhs is magnificent, also the 5th Panjab Infantry. Sorry not to see old MacQueen at their head; he is so ill he will have to go back. Then back to listen to more lies. To-morrow we examine the Amir.

*"Sherpur, Nov. 5.*—Had one Nur Ali up, to try and find out where the rest of the Amir's money was, but did not succeed. Got the Amir's seals; went to take Amir's deposition; he did not let anything out, and complained of having been made a prisoner and being badly treated. There is no use going on with this evidence—one gets nothing out

of it; and so I am going to read it all over and see what other questions we should put to these people, and then we must shut up and draw up our report. The upshot will be, there is no proof of the thing having been planned, though there are some grounds for suspicion that it was. There is no manner of doubt that the Amir was most apathetic, and did nothing; and there are very strong grounds for suspecting that he was not quite free from conniving at the resistance offered to us at Charasia. On the whole, he must never be again Amir, and had better be deported to India; and the same must be done to the *wazir*, *mustaufi*, Yahiya, Zakaria, and all that breed. The people are the very greatest set of brutes I ever heard of, and it is evident that they hate us—every one of them. I do not think Wali Mahamad's lot are one little bit better. Moriarty gave me a gold coin which nobody ever saw before, and which is believed to be very valuable.

“*Sherpur*, Nov. 6.—Engaged all day in writing up my report on the case; I hope I shall make a good thing of it. Went to the general to get him to promise Nek Mahamad and Mahamad Karim their lives if they told us the truth about all this business. Gave him information as to the Amir's property, and a lot belonging to Khushdill and others.

“*Sherpur*, Nov. 7.—Sent out a party of fifty 14th Bengal Lancers, under Mitford, to search the village of Chihaltan for property belonging to Khush-



dill, &c. Cross-examined Daud Shah, but he lied awfully.

"Nov. 8. — Mitford's party not come back at 8.30."

"Nov. 11.—Finished the first part of my report, and began the second; hope to finish it in two to three days more. Bellew says he thinks it is wonderfully clear, and if I can get Roberts to think so I shall do. I will get him to telegraph the *mutlah* [gist].

"Nov. 12. — Writing report — finished second part.

"Nov. 13.—Writing report—finished third part. A letter came from Adjutant-General about the business of the 8th, and we are to go to-morrow to look at the ground. MacPherson is coming in to-morrow.

"*Sherpur*, Nov. 14.—A letter having come from Adjutant-General, calling in question the letting the enemy escape on the 8th October, we rode out round the Asmai hill, past Kala Aoshar, to look at the ground. — showed us the ground where he was drawn up, and where he went for the night. At sunset he appears to have withdrawn his whole force into two villages, and not have come out till half an hour before daybreak—that is to say, for nine hours he left the enemy alone, with the Charasia road quite open, and the Argandeh road partially guarded. Between him and Baker there must have been three miles of country, with trees through

which they could have got away. He should have sent parties to reconnoitre the hill in the Deh Afghan direction, and having got round by Kala Aoshar he should have left a party on the Sherpur side, established a signalling party on the Koh Aliabad, and kept himself as close as he possibly could. He should have communicated with Baker, and at night there should have been one line of vedettes all night all round the hill. He would by this have been at once informed of any attempt of the enemy to break through; and though this would not have prevented them getting into the city, he would certainly have prevented their breaking into the open. I think if they had found themselves surrounded they would have gone into the city, but that is no excuse for — not surrounding them, and inasmuch as he did not do so he is to blame.

“It appears that Wali Mahamad will not go to Balkh; I wonder if the general would let me go. I might kick Ghulam Haidar out, and then, getting the Uzbegs on my side, might go round and have a shy at Herat by myself. I do not think Roberts would let me go, however. I find seventy-six men have been hung.

“Nov. 15.—Still at report. General went to Butkhak. Had the *mustaufi* up—he said he was sorry he was a prisoner, as he thought he could be useful to us.

“Nov. 16.—Finished that d—d report. Roberts telegraphed that it was very able and exhaustive,

and completely made out the Amir's guilt. Hope to have a little peace now.

"*Nov. 17.*—The report is being copied all day by about some six or seven different men, and will probably be ready by to-morrow, and get off by the post. Roberts has written a very complimentary letter about me, which I shall get copied to-morrow. It is not so bad; I have been mentioned very well in despatches, and then this—all in two months.

"*Nov. 18.*—My report was sent off with following letter by Roberts, dated 18th November:—

" "I have the honour to submit, for the information and orders of his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council, the report of the commissioners appointed by me to inquire into the causes and circumstance of the late outbreak at Kabal. Immediately after my arrival here, I determined to intrust to a carefully constituted commission the duty of collecting all possible evidence regarding the late outbreak and the attack on the British Residency. It was at first intended that the commission should be charged with the trial of all persons accused of participation in the attack or of any connected offences; but I found that this would involve undue labour and delay, and eventually the commissioners were relieved of all judicial work.

" "In nominating the members of the commission, I was most careful to select such officers only as

were specially fitted for the very important and difficult task before them. To the office of president I appointed Colonel C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., Chief of the Staff. Colonel MacGregor's character and ability are well known to his Excellency in Council, and his close study of Afghan politics and acquaintance with Persian were added qualifications for the post. The other members selected were Surgeon-Major Bellew, C.B., and Mahamad Hyat Khan, C.B. Dr Bellew I chose on account of his linguistic attainment and extensive knowledge of the people, and Mahamad Hyat as being a Mohammedan, and therefore more able to enter thoroughly into the feelings and prejudices of the Afghans than any European could hope to do. The commissioners have now brought their work to an end, and the enclosed report shows the extent and result of their inquiries. It is, in my opinion, a very able summing up of the information elicited, and reflects the greatest credit on Colonel MacGregor and his colleagues. The scantiness of direct evidence made their task one of extreme difficulty, but they have nevertheless succeeded, to an extent which I did not anticipate, in throwing light on the causes of the outbreak, and upon the conduct of the Amir and those about him both before and after the massacre of the Embassy. The guilt of Yakub Khan is now established almost beyond question, and I believe it only requires his removal from Afghanistan to produce such direct and certain

evidence as will leave no room for future doubt either as to his own complicity or as to that of his father-in-law or ministers.

“ ‘Once the people are satisfied of the fact that Yakub Khan and his ministers will never again be in a position to take revenge on those who may have offended them, it will not be long before the *conclusive proof of their guilt is forthcoming*. For the present men’s tongues are tied for fear of the consequences, and so long as Yakub Khan remains in Kabal, this state of things will continue. *I have, however, received the orders of his Excellency in Council to arrange for the ex-Amir’s journey to India*, and his departure will, I feel confident, enable me to clear up without delay any mystery which still hangs over the outbreak. I trust his Excellency in Council will concur in the opinion that great credit is due to Colonel MacGregor and his colleagues for the patient and comprehensive inquiry, and for the skill with which the information elicited has been brought to bear on the main points at issue. The inquiry involved close and continuous labour for some weeks, and its result will, I hope, be satisfactory to Government.’ ”

“ Nov. 20.—Rode out about nine with Roberts to meet Collett and Badcock. Got as far as the Kotal on the Butkhak road. Our party consisted of Sherston, Chamberlain, and Carew.

“ Nov. 21.—Old Nakhshband came and spoke to me about himself. I said I would do what I could

for him. He was very grateful. Then spoke to the general about Mahamad Saiad and Paghman. I hope I shall be able to keep him in. The general said he was going out, as he thought there would be a fight. I hope there will be, and I shall be able to get a chance of doing something; it would be a great thing. *Wrote to Viva,<sup>1</sup> and told her about the ink freezing.* Ibrahim Khan says that the Kizilbash look on me as their friend. I will get up a strong Kizilbash party in the country before I am done with it, and these, with a regiment or two of Hazaras, will enable me to keep the country quiet.

*“Argandeh, Nov. 22. — Rode out at twelve. We walked the whole way for sixteen miles. It is a pretty ride through cultivation, and we did not get in till 5.30 to Argandeh. Dined with the general.*

*“Camp Maidan, Ghazni Road, Nov. 23.—Very cold at night. Got up about eight, started at ten. After breakfast, ascent very easy and gradual to Kotal and Takht, then descent; same to Maidan, where we found Baker en route. Spoke to general about the transport, and I telegraphed to ask Low if he would take it. Baker very anxious to go at some scoundrels who are collecting near, but the general directed him to collect supplies. When this is done there will be less objection to his going; he might then go round by Shekhabad and by the Tangi*

<sup>1</sup> Sir Charles's daughter, Genevève, then aged eight years.

Warkak to Logar, then in. After lunch, went to top of hill to west; saw up valley a bit and had a very good view of valley itself, which has a very large number of villages and is profusely cultivated.

"*Camp Maidan, Nov. 24.*—Got up about seven, and started on a wild-goose chase to a village in Nirikh valley, where it was said there was a refractory *Malik* called Bahadur Khan. Of course he had flown, so we burnt his villages and came back. The country passed over, as well as Maidan, was wonderfully fertile and populated.

"*Sherpur, Nov. 25.*—Up at six, and after breakfast started back and rode into Kabal, twenty-three miles, arriving about two.

"*Nov. 26.*—A report came in from Baker that he expected to be attacked. Warned the 5th Ghurkhas and 5th Panjab Cavalry to be ready to go to his aid.

"*Nov. 27.*—Up at 8.30. Went and arranged about Low coming to direct transport. No news in from Baker yet, so suppose night passed over quietly. The 5th Panjab Cavalry and 5th Ghurkhas allowed to send their animals out to graze.

"*Nov. 28.*—Baker says he went out with 300 Highlanders, 200 3d Ghurkhas, and found the enemy on the heights above Bini Badam; but he turned their flank and they bolted, and he burnt their village. I do not think this burning of villages is a good plan: it exasperates them and does not funk them. To me it is specially repugnant, as it reminds

me of the days when they used to do the same with the Highlanders.

"*Sherpur, Nov. 29.*—Wrote the orders for the Amir's departure and journey from here to Peshawar. They take great care of him. The general, who last night was talking about putting me in here, now says we cannot stay; but he is in favour of breaking up the Afghanistan State into four, and returning to our frontier, holding Kandahar and a cantonment at Gandamak. He is quite ready to agree, if the Government wishes, to the Persians having Herat. Got a note from Moriarty to say he had heard the Kohistanis were collecting in large numbers, and meant to attack us. I suppose we are in for a winter of worry. I hope not.

"*Sherpur, Nov. 30.*—A busy day, what with reports of Kohistanis coming down, and getting the Amir off. Have arranged everything, and he starts at 6 A.M. with escort of one troop 9th Lancers, one squadron 5th Panjab Cavalry, two guns horse-artillery, under Major Hammond. Sent out four patrols on the four roads to Kohistan; they saw nothing. Shall send them out again to-morrow. Rode round position. Set Perkins to work to make shelter-trenches and gun-pits, and told general officer of day and field-officer to look out after their flanks. I hope it will all go right about the Amir: it would be a nice go if he escaped.

"*Sherpur, Dec. 1.*—Up at five. Went to Amir's camp, hustled them about, and got him off about six.



Went in just before with the general: he was very civil. He asked if I was going, and when I said, 'No,' he said, '*Een che taor dosti ast.*' He asked that Yahiya Khan should come with him, also Abdul Ghias; but this could not be, so we let Abdul Kayun go. He seemed to be quite happy and contented at going. Then got home. Sent a party off to Yahiya Khan's house to take possession of it, with 150 camels. I believe they found an immense deal of property. About 1.30 we went out to meet Sir M. Kennedy.<sup>1</sup> Went out about six miles, then met them all walking, the explanation of which was that Sir M. Kennedy had had a fall and hurt himself. Met Lockhart, Hogg, Hanna, and others, all looking well. Did not get back till 4.30. Dust awful

"Dec. 2.—Had very little to do all day. Morton came in, and I explained to him what his work would be. After breakfast Roberts told me that Lockhart<sup>2</sup> had been appointed Assistant-Quarter-master-General, which I am very glad of."

"Dec. 5.—We all rode out to Charasia to fight our battle over again. Had a very pleasant ride. Lot of fellows there.

"Dec. 6.—Arranging about our four political prisoners going to-morrow with one squadron under Green. Went to sale and bought an enamelled plate, a very curious china plate with Arabic inscriptions, a china bowl, and a carpet with a new pattern; ugly—

<sup>1</sup> Sir Michael Kennedy, Director-General of Transport.

<sup>2</sup> Major Lockhart, now Colonel Sir W. S. A. Lockhart, K.C.B.

too much yellow. Then tried my new horse. Think he will do very well for me, being up to weight. The general has put off his trip on the 9th, owing to threatened disturbances which are brewing up all round Kohistan, Maidan, and Logar; and men are said to have gone down the road to stir up the tribes. The Chief does not like this, and he is looking careworn. He has told off a force to take Mir Bachha's fort, Baba Kushkar, which is about twenty miles off. MacPherson is to go in command. A telegram has come from Viceroy, pressing on him for an answer as to what course should be adopted. Now he says he thinks the Treaty of Gandamak should be maintained, and the Kuram route upheld. Got all the orders off.

"Dec. 7.—Up at 5.30. Went and got the prisoners off. Old Yahiya was very amusingly querulous. He was grumbling, 'Oh dear! oh dear! it is so cold! *Oh bachha!* where are my socks? Tell Yasuf I leave him in the Lord's hands. How can I go without my riding-trousers!' &c. They got off all right, however. Then we arranged how to thrash these devils. MacPherson goes with the brigade towards Argandeh to try and draw them on, and Baker goes round by Chihal-Dukhtaran and tries to get in their rear. If they can manage this well, it will be a good business. I also suggested getting up the Guides, and propose putting them at the bridge, north of Butkhak, so as to try and keep the gentlemen at Baba Kushkar together till we can get the

Maidan troops round to them. Our trip downwards is, of course, put off till matters are settled up here, but then we shall go on.

“*Dec. 8.*—We had a parade of all the troops in garrison on the ground near Wazirabad. The ground was excellent, and the troops were drawn up in two lines, the infantry in front, cavalry and artillery in rear; the day was lovely, and altogether it was a pretty sight. The general looks very well on his Arab; he rides well. All the Sardars and people were there, and I fancy did not like the look of the troops much. After parade I wrote out MacPherson’s instructions for him, and had a talk with Baker about what he should do. I hope they will make a good business of it. Also ordered Jenkins to come to bridge, west of Butkhak; but soon after we found that Baba Kushkar was a great deal more to the west than it is marked on the maps, and so I counter-ordered the Guides, and told them to march in here instead.

“To-morrow Baker goes out, and we shall not have too many troops in camp, so we must prevent any more moving out. This gateway is very much unprotected, so I had the guard increased to twelve men, and put out two sentries. We are thoroughly hated, and not enough feared, and they show the absolute necessity of our holding on here till they get accustomed to us. If we go now, we shall not have improved our position with the people one bit; rather the contrary. We have been too cruel, yet

we have not made them quite acknowledge our supremacy; and they have not yet had time to appreciate our justice. The only serious difficulty I see in occupying this place is in the fact that it would be very unpopular with the native army.

"*Dec. 9.*—Not up till eight, then went down to general, found he was going out to MacPherson's camp, but, as I wanted to clear my table, did not go. Got some three fellows out of quod—one, Taj Mahamad, son of Zakaria, his mother being a sister of Ibrahim's, was a singularly handsome man. Nothing much happened all day; in the evening MacPherson reported the enemy were going towards Kohistan, so arranged that MacPherson should try to cut them off by the Khirskhana Kotal,<sup>1</sup> while Baker went on with his movement. If this is well managed, it will be a very pretty business, and we ought to make a good bag, and then turn our minds to the Kohistanis. Wrote orders to above effect, and gave to Sherston and Smith to carry out. At eleven a note from Baker to effect that report said some 4000 Ghilzais were a little beyond Zargunshahar, but he rightly does not think much of that. I think it will be a real good business.

"*Dec. 10.*—Heard that MacPherson and Baker had moved off as ordered. About ten got a heliogram to say MacPherson had got hold of the Surkh Kotal. About twelve went off to Gor-

<sup>1</sup> Khirskhana Kotal is a pass leading to Koh Daman, six and a half miles north-west of Kabal.

don's camp at Kala-i-Aoshar ; got there about 12.30 ; found Gordon had gone ; went and found he had got his cavalry out all right, and had two guns about two miles ahead. Told him to go on with all his guns and cavalry, and see if he could get a chance to help MacPherson, leaving men to watch the different roads. At two general came up, sent a letter to Baker to say what was going on, and rode on towards Paghman with a few cavalry. Got to hill overlooking valley about 4.15, then came back, general going his usual jog-trot ; got in at 6.30. A letter from MacPherson says the Kohistanis, 5000 or 6000, had come at him, and he had licked them, taking six standards ; our loss only seven wounded, so it has been a good business. Sent a note to MacPherson by one of Ibrahim Khan's men. To-morrow we go out at ten.

"*Dec. 11.*—An awful day. According to programme, MacPherson was to go along by foot of hills to Argandeh and meet Baker in Maidan, and Massy was to join him. We started about ten to see the fun. We got out at eleven to Kala-i-Aoshar, and had got beyond when we heard firing towards Kala-i-Kazi, and presently we got a note from Massy to say enemy were in large numbers, and he was trying to hold them in check. When we got up, we found enemy, 10,000 strong, advancing north on Massy, who was retiring. The general told them to retire into open, and charge them. The 9th Lancers did make a sort of charge, but not a good one, then

retired. Then one gun<sup>1</sup> and limber got stuck, and had to be left spiked ; then retired again to a village. 9th Lancers were quite out of hand, would not face them, and went back, and three guns had to be left in village. All this time I was with general, and shots were coming in. He told me to go and rally 9th Lancers. I went, got a squadron together, and told them to get out to enemy's right flank and charge, but they would not ; then they began bolting ; I went after them, shouted and swore at them, but to no purpose. Then I went back to village, found guns left and everybody gone, and enemy close up, so I turned and went back towards Kala-i-Aoshar. Then told Deane to go and stop all cavalry he could. He stopped some fifty, and we formed up. Enemy came on to within 1000 yards, then turned east towards city, so I took this party and went to join MacPherson, whom we could see hotly engaged. After I had got about a mile, came on MacPherson's baggage ; got hold of all infantry I could—about sixty of 67th Ghurkhas—and throwing them out in skirmishing order, advanced to where I had seen the guns left. Found three guns ; got them out and sent to rear, then advanced again, and got the fourth ; took it off. Thus the honour of retaking all four belongs to me alone. I hope MacPherson will make a good thing of it to-morrow, and this will break up all these devils, else we shall have them dancing about us all the winter.

<sup>1</sup> Of Major Smyth-Windham's battery

“*Dec. 12.*—Up at seven, had a beastly breakfast, and went up to top of house and remained there nearly all day watching for Money’s attack. It was delayed from one cause and another, and did not begin till 12.30. We could see nothing of him, but saw enemy in great strength on top of a frightfully steep position. The result was that about 4.30 Money signalled he could not get on, so the attack failed. That is the second defeat in two days; one more and we shall have to shut ourselves up all the winter.”

A portion of the diary is here missing. On the 13th, Generals Baker and MacPherson operated in conjunction against the Afghans’ position on the Takht-i-Shah, which was taken after severe fighting by the 92d Highlanders. In all, four officers, fifty-five men, and fifty-two horses were killed and wounded. On the 14th, the Afghans assembled on the Asmai heights were again attacked and driven off; but the Afghans regained the heights, and the British were forced to withdraw with the loss of two guns. The whole British force was now concentrated in Sherpur. Killed and wounded on 14th, five officers, seven native officers, 125 men. On the 15th, the garrison of Butkhak was recalled to Sherpur, and Sherpur placed in a state of defence. The enemy was comparatively quiet, looting the city, &c. On the 17th, the Afghans made demonstration on the Asmai heights, and on the 18th the Afghans advanced in force against Sherpur.

“*Dec. 18.*—Sent orders by Combe and Smith to give orders to all to have their breakfast early, as they say they are going to attack at 6.30. At eight sent 100 5th Panjab Infantry out to occupy 5th Panjab Cavalry village. MacPherson and Williams came at 6.30 for orders about making a counter-attack. 8.35, went to Luke to get wire put up at MacPherson’s gate and inside of Commissariat. Told general about Corporal Sellar’s<sup>1</sup> behaviour, and also about Hammond of Guides. Told Hyat Khan to find out if any of the enemy had gone to attack Gough, and sent party 5th Panjab Cavalry to find out. Sent orders for four and a half squadrons, under Williams, to go out on the east and same on the west, under Ross, at 11.10. At 11.30 enemy moving in small numbers from Asmai; 11.45, troops ordered out, as enemy coming down into gardens below Deh Afghan; 12.30, two guns field-artillery shelled enemy on lower slopes of Asmai hill; 12.10, 8-inch howitzer at south-west corner shelled Deh Afghan, two shots; 12.40, told Williams to go out south-east corner and wait; 1.30, turn out 67th to sweep along south face and clear enemy, where possible, but do not get them under fire—72d will support; look out for our men in 5th Panjab Cavalry garden. Two, not to let

<sup>1</sup> Lance-Corporal George Sellar, 72d Highlanders, rushed forward in advance of every one and engaged in a desperate conflict the leading Afghans on the Asmai heights on the 14th December. He received afterwards the Victoria Cross.



Green retire, but support him; 2.30, to look for 67th; found they had slipped along under wall. Told Brownlow he had better do what 67th were ordered; but he pointed out, if he did so, he would be raked. I agreed with him, and went back to general, who sent orders for him to stand fast till further orders. Carey went at three. Sent orders at four for troops to turn in. This sort of thing cannot go on: we must bivouac troops on ground, and only turn out when attack is imminent. The troops would not last long at this rate. After 6.30, letter came for Collett to say enemy were collecting in village to east, so ordered wing 92d to be ready. Then a letter came from Gough to say he had not moved from Jagdalak—why, he does not say: he ought to have started before; but he cannot be here now before the 22d, at earliest. It began to drizzle about seven, has all the appearance of being a very nasty night for the troops. The enemy made no real attempt to attack, but got into gardens and cover as nearly as they could and took pot-shots. They say they mean to attack to-morrow—a regular good attack—but I doubt its being a serious one. I do not like this; I wish we had gone into Bala Hisar, as I wished. We should then never have lost command of the city, and this would never have come to such a head. About ten, Brownlow came over about his section of defence. I told him I thought that he might turn part of his men in. Then Perkins came over to get an order for sappers to go out

and knock down walls all round ; a thing I had suggested should be done at the very first. At 10.30, Roberts came over and proposed we should go all round the pickets. Though I did not like the idea of paddling through snow, we went ; and after three hours' walking through snow, and almost losing our way, we got back very wet and cold, and at last I got some sleep, not before past three though.

"*Dec. 19.*—Ordered Baker with 400 67th, 400 3d Sikhs, and two of Swinley's guns, to go and burn Kala Akhor to east. They did this, and had some sniping with enemy, but they burnt the village. Got communication with Lataband and sent heliograms saying Gough must come. Montanaro, mountain-battery, and two men 9th Lancers, wounded, latter inside enclosure, so sent order for every one to keep under shelter of walls. There were six of 67th, and six of 3d Sikhs wounded to-day.

"*Dec. 20.*—Had a quiet day ; enemy had evidently not the pluck really to attack us. Heard that the transport animals sent off last night got through to Lataband all right, so Roberts is going to send sixty more to-night. Arranged for five heavy guns to open on Kala Sharif at nine to-morrow. A lot of tom-toming and shouting going on till about twelve.

"*Dec. 21.*—The guns opened as ordered and fired ten rounds, but they did little or no damage. About twelve, Roberts went off to the ridge to prospect, as they said the enemy were going to attack us. The troops were got under arms by telegraph at about

1.30. The enemy never really did more than threaten us, and at four we let them turn in. I sent word that two guns were going to try and turn enemy out of gardens to the west, whereupon a lot of infantry turned out, and H—— tried to get up an engagement on his own hook. Talking to Roberts, we have arranged a way of attacking when Gough comes. Got a heliogram to say he would leave Jagdalak to-day, and be here on 24th, so he is at least a week later than he need have been. Telegraphed to Hudson to come to Butkhak to-morrow, and arranged for Green<sup>1</sup> to go out during the night, and try to join him: he will have to run the gantlet of fire from a lot of villages, but I daresay he will get out all right. If Gough gets in on 24th, we ought to polish the devils off on 25th. We shall have about 4500 infantry, 500 artillery, and 1200 cavalry to move out with, and I hope we shall succeed.

“*Dec. 22.*—Nothing doing to-day; troops did not even fall in. Enemy working round from east to north, apparently to surround us, as some also were working round from west to north. Had a couple of talks with the general about what was to be done when Gough comes in. He is very hot on going to Siah-Sang, and I am against it, as we could not keep

<sup>1</sup> Major Green and 12th Bengal Cavalry started at 3 A.M. 22d, and after an eventful march and crossing the Logar with difficulty, and under the continual fire from the enemy, reached General Gough's column at Lataband.

up communication with it. However, after second talk, he has more than half given up his idea of seizing Kala Mahamad Sharif, and we are to go and see if a better line cannot be found from the north-east angle straight to Siah-Sang. Reported that the enemy are going to attack us to-morrow morning, and that the signal is to be a fire lit on the Asmai hill. Telegraphed round to every one to say so. Was woke up no less than fourteen times during the night."

"When we were shut up in Sherpur," writes a very distinguished officer, "the defence of the headquarter gateway had been given to a certain senior officer, who, between ourselves, was a bit nervous. When his defences were prepared he went to Colonel MacGregor and said, 'Now I have done the best I can; but what shall I do if the enemy force their way into the gate in overwhelming numbers, as I have no reserve to fall back on . . . ?' '*Turn 'em out!*' gruffly remarked the chief of the staff. 'Yes, of course,' said ——; 'but if they are too strong for us?' '*TURN THEM OUT!*' roared MacGregor; '*that's what you're there for!*' and no other answer would he give him, as of course it was the first thing he would have done himself in a similar case. It was thoroughly characteristic of the man."

"Dec. 23.—Punctually as the fire was lit on Asmai, the attack began. At first there was a feint on the west, and then a most determined attack from about 10,000 men on the east side, where the guides

were. The firing was heavy, and it went on without intermission till eleven. They threatened also the south side; not at all on north. They were beaten back with great loss, and the enemy fled disastrously, some 5000 making for Kohistan, and the rest towards the Siah-Sang. The cavalry were then sent out, and made a long sweep round to the north and east, and cut up a few. Baker moved out with wing 3d Sikhs and two companies 92d, and two guns to shell a village, but did no good, and came back after destroying some villages. Six companies of 67th also went out, and cleared enemy out of Rikabashi Fort, and burnt some villages in that direction. Juma, *subahdar* of 5th Panjab Infantry, also turned them out of Kala Mahamad Sharif, and it would have been held, only Brownlow came to general and got him to countermand it. We had signals from Gough at Butkhak, who has arrived this side. Sent off to tell him to start at 6 A.M. and seize east end of Siah-Sang, and open communication with us. Had a long talk with general, and he is going to send Baker out with 67th, 3d Sikhs, Guides, and Pioneers, to cover Gough getting in here. If we can only manage to clear them out of the city and Bala Hisar, it will be grand. The Queen has already telegraphed her thanks. Roberts's idea is to storm the Bala Hisar either to-morrow or next day with C. Gough's troops. I think this is very risky, as the Bala Hisar is very strong indeed to an assault: the walls are too high to escalate, and

so the only way in is by the gate, which may be strongly retrenched inside; and if these fellows are determined, they may, being so numerous, beat us off, then we shall be in a worse hat than before. Altogether the look-out is somewhat gloomy. Juma was ordered again to go at five, and get the fort of Mahamad Sharif, and then 200 of the 72d to join. Sent fifteen letters to Gough.

"*Dec. 24.*—Got up, and the general sent to say MacPherson was to go with the force to see Gough in. I sent off. Then Nakhshband came in and said they had all bolted; and so it proved. Gough came in all right, but his rear-guard was not in till four. It snowed all day, and the ground was very slippery. Massy went out with the 9th Lancers and 5th Panjab Cavalry by Bini Hisar road, and Gough with the 14th Lancers and Guides; they found no one, and had an awful day of it, cavalry being no use whatever. MacPherson went into the Bala Hisar; found no one, and all the ammunition gone. A telegram came for Roberts from the Queen, and also one from Viceroy, expressing thorough confidence in him. This is a great thing for him, having this support.

"*Dec. 25.*—Six inches of snow. Nothing much doing; no enemy. Dundas and Nugent buried. General talks of sending a force to burn Baba Kushkar.

"*Dec. 26.*—Nothing much doing. Arranged about sending a force under Baker to Kohistan. A coffee *wala* reported that he had heard it said that Daud

Shah had corresponded with the enemy, and in the evening Heathcote came and said another man had told him the same. Bellew is inquiring into the matter; it looks fishy at present. Sent him another man.

"Dec. 27.—Baker's brigade went off at nine, Lockhart with it, looking very ill. Roberts went out with him, but as I did not know of it, did not go. Arranged for 150 *yaboos* to go back for our *banghy* parcels. Most of the reports have come in except MacPherson's. Dick Cunyugham is recommended for the Victoria Cross; he behaved well.

"Dec. 28.—Captain Tucker, political officer, who had accompanied General Gough's brigade from Gandamak, left Sherpur with a squadron of 12th Bengal Cavalry, and reached Lataband on the 29th, reporting the country quiet, and communication with the Khaibar line restored.

"Dec. 29.—Nothing much doing. Roberts proposed going out to scene of cavalry disaster, so I went. I should have thought the less he saw of this the better. A party of cavalry and infantry under Ross also out. We humbugged about on the snow, and went through the city coming back. Ross got [the bodies of] Forbes, Hardy, a lancer, and five Jats. There are rumours of another *jihad* at Naorak.

"Dec. 30.—Arranged for getting the rest of the political prisoners off, Daud Shah amongst them.

"Dec. 31.—General wrote that he wanted me to try Daud Shah. I asked him what evidence he had, and he told me to go to Durand and ask him. Du-

rand produced the depositions of three men, which went towards proving he had been in communication with the enemy. There are rumours that we are to be attacked again, and I must speak to him to-morrow about getting the defences put in better order. How all this will end I do not know; there is no doubt a very strong feeling of hostility against us, which all this indiscriminate hanging and burning villages intensifies. In fact we have not got a single friend in the country. He is sending Ross out with a squadron of his regiment, 4th Ghurkhas, and some sappers to burn the village of Baghwana.

"*Jan. 1.*—Gave orders for the 14th and 12th to go down to Gandamak. I wrote a despatch giving the true account of my retaking the guns. Our losses have been over 350 killed and wounded, and the Ministry is sure to make capital out of it.

"*Jan. 2.*—The Highlanders made a hideous row on New-Year's night for two hours. They came and drew the general. Heard a capital story. A Scotch sergeant was asked who was first up the hill, said, 'Weel, I was so beesy slaughtering o' thae deels that I could not weel see who was first.' To-day all Gough's brigade went into the Bala Hisar. Told general about Sergeant MacDonald of the 72d, who behaved very well on the 12th and 13th. Hope to get him a commission. There will be three V.C.'s for this business—Hammond, Vousden, and, I am glad to say, Dick Cunyngham, 92d.

"*Jan. 3.*—Did a good spell of work. Got off



twenty letters and telegrams. In the evening Roberts sent to say he wanted me to go to Jalalabad. I will try and work up the Laghman business sharp. Perhaps another bit of luck for me.

"Jan. 4.—Went over to Roberts to talk about going to Jalalabad. He put me off till three, and then said I was to go, and he gave me some notes. I do not see what good my going will do. Telegram from Queen thanking the general for his glorious victory, and one from Viceroy also complimentary. I think his sending me shows he has confidence in me. I think I shall go on to Peshawar, and report on the whole line. Have telegraphed to Kennedy to recommend him as Director of Transport to the 1st Division: also recommend Bromhead for 2d Division.

"Jan. 5.—Read a mild circular from the military department about the situation which says,—‘We have 7500 effectives, and 2500 *can easily hold Sherpur, so that we have a division of 5000 men for offensive operations.*’ This is all humbug. We had not 5000 effectives, and this place requires at least 7500 men really to hold it, which makes all the difference. I do not want to stay long, and shall try to be back in ten days. I am going on a wild-geese chase, and, moreover, it is Gough’s work, not mine.

"Jan. 6.—Left Sherpur about 10.30,<sup>1</sup> and rode

<sup>1</sup> On 6th January 1000 spare transport animals at Kabal were sent to India (and to work on Khaibar line) with a convoy of sick and wounded. Colonel MacGregor accompanied this convoy to meet General Bright and confer with him on the disposition of the troops from Jamrud to Lataband.

out to Butkhak. Found Cotton of the 9th, and Wilmot. Told latter to go into infantry fort. He did not seem to like it, but I persisted. Told them to knock down all walls on the top of the roofs ; also ordered the banquette to be completed all round. Had tiffin, and then went on, and found the road quite quiet to Lataband. Here 3d Sikhs and 24th Panjab Infantry. Saw Norman and Money.

“ *Jan. 7.*—Got my things off at seven, but did not go myself till ten. The road over the Kotal Mulla Umar is much improved, and I got over without much difficulty. I think it would be a better place to have the post over the pass. The road up to top of Lataband is very easy, and I should doubt snow lying much on it, as it is quite exposed to the sun. The road down is, on the whole, easy, but requires clearing of stones. There is one bad bit, so I telegraphed to general to let the sappers remain and make it under Blair. Got down to Seh Baba about 12.30. Found my traps had not arrived, so pottered about and waited, and had lunch with Armstrong. The position of Seh Baba is not a good one, but I do not see how it can be helped. At three, as no signs of my traps, determined to go on. The road goes up and down, but is quite easy and open. Got in about dark to Jagdalak. Acton put me up, and I dined with 51st detachment. They gave me a *dhoolie* and lots of hospital blankets.

“ *Jan. 8.*—Met Douglas, whom I had not seen since Bareilly. At eleven, went on with party of

my old regiment; road very easy, the whole way to Pezwan. The Jagdalak Kotal is a bad position.”<sup>1</sup>

From 8th to 11th January lost.

“*Jan.* 11.—Sent a long telegram about the Laghman business, and asked if I was to return; no answer came. A telegram came from Quartermaster-General about disposition, which I will answer with Bright to-morrow.

“*Jan.* 12.—Still at Jalalabad, settling business with Bright.

“*Jan.* 13.—Got off about eleven, with Dutton and Low. Rode to Rozabad. Chose a site for a new post under a hill to the left of road, about one and a half mile on, then on to Gandamak with Low. Arrived about five; dined with the 10th. During dinner got a telegram from general to say I was to go to Landi Kotal and see about the Mohmands.

“*Jan.* 14.—Started at 8.30, and got on to Jalalabad at twelve. Found that 5000 Mohmands had crossed river, so went on to Barikab. Wanted to have gone on to Landi Kotal, where I should have got about eight, and been in time to go with Doran.

“*Jan.* 15.—Rode to Basawal, and had breakfast with 17th, then on to Daka. Found firing had commenced, so went into fort, and sent off a telegram; then went and joined Boisragon. Found Stewart first, then Boisragon; found he had already sent his infantry at the Gara hill, a very steep, difficult hill, which it ought to have been impossible for

<sup>1</sup> 9th January, Colonel MacGregor arrived at Jalalabad.

them to take. Was of opinion that he had no business to have pushed his attack ; however, by two he had taken it. Then he went over the hill with the support, and got out of communication with Young. For a couple of hours did not know where he was, and talked of going back. However, some one called out that they saw our troops down the bank of the river ; so went down. Then, about 4.30, heard Doran's guns begin ; but it was too late, the enemy had gone ; so having seen they were in communication with each other, left and went back.

"*Jan. 16.*—Meant to have gone down to Kam Daka, but did not. Sent telegrams to Roberts. About four Stewart came back, and said they were all asleep ; so determined to go next day.

"*Jan. 17.*—Went to Kam Daka. Found Boisson had begun crossing, and Doran nowhere. Sent him a note, and he came back. Dissuaded him from going to Polosi,<sup>1</sup> for reasons given in my telegram to general, which, I hope, will be deemed satisfactory. Then came back.

"*Jan. 18.* — Battye left. Nice boy ; shall do something for him. Rode to Basawal ; met the sick convoy coming down. Saw Bellew, Clarke, Fergusson, &c. ; then went on to Carabinier's mess.

"*Jan. 19.*—Before I was up Bellew came and said good-bye. So went out and talked to him, then went to look at two men killed last night by

<sup>1</sup> Polosi, a village on left bank of Kabal river, fifteen miles below Fort Daka, where the Mohmands had assembled.

our patrols while cutting the wire; one was a very fine lad. Then walked down with Fergusson to his *dhoolie*. Poor fellow, he has had a very nasty wound; one eye taken out and nose smashed. Then home to breakfast. Went off about 10.30, and rode quietly. Came on two engineers, Lindley and Darling. Got on; put my bed down in corner of tent.

"*Jan. 20.*—Had to wait a devil of a time for breakfast, but got off at 11.4, and rode into Jalalabad in three hours. Lunched with Bright, read telegrams, and thought over answer to Roberts. Dined with Bright. The 10th, 12th, 14th go to Peshawar. I will try and get the 12th sent back to India.

"*Jan. 21.*—Wrote a long telegram to Roberts, and a letter also, saying I thought that the whole of Bright's Division should be ready to move to Kabal. I believe I am right; but he will not like it, so I wrote to Johnson also to give him my views. The home papers evidently think we are in a hat, and call us the glorious 5000. Telegraphed in evening, and told him the Laghman expedition could move on 27th. I hope general will not order me to go with Bright to Laghman. I think it is very likely. (*Wrote to Viva.*) There is another row coming on. I only hope I will get through it as safely as I did the last.

"*Gandamak, Jan. 22.*—Telegraphed to Quartermaster-General to send up 1-8 R.A. Do not suppose he will. Rode to Gandamak. Very cold ride from

Fort Battye. Got in at five. My baggage only one and a half mile behind. A very good Hazara muleteer. Shall try and get him as private servant.

"*Pezwan, Jan. 23.*<sup>1</sup>—Started about 10.30, and had an easy ride to Pezwan. On way looked at a position at Surkhab, which I think is better than Pezwan. Got in about 1.30. Met Spragge and a lot of the old fellows. Got off again, and rode to Jagdalak Kotal, which seems a very bad position. Shall report it. Found Nugent there. Then to Jagdalak Fort. Got in before dark. Armstrong put me up. Found Gore Langton arrived.

"*Jagdalak Fort, Jan. 24.*—Went to Seh Baba, through the Pari Dara Pass. It is very grand and narrow, but not a bit strong, as the heights above it can be easily crowned, and it can be turned. At Sang Toda met Burlton coming down. From here a fine view of the hills of Tagao and Hindu Kush. On to Barikhab, where met Blair. We went and had a look at a place for a post; found it quite unsuited; then on to Seh Baba. Put up with Blair, and dined with the Sappers.

"*Lataband, Jan. 25.*—After breakfast started for Lataband. Blair came to top of first *kotal*, and

<sup>1</sup> "Of Colonel C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., who has held the important post of Deputy Adjutant-General and Deputy Quarter-master-General, I cannot speak too highly. I have already referred to the prominent part which he bore in the recovery of our guns on the 11th December, and I take the opportunity of recording the admirable manner in which he has discharged the responsible duties attached to his office."—General Roberts's despatch, dated 23d January.

we found the road good enough, with a little easing here and there at a bend, and clearing of stones, wanted. Perkins got Roberts to send Blair an order to make it 4 in 100, which would make it twenty-six miles long, and with no encamping-place between. The road is quite practicable all the way until you come to Perkins's road, where it is not so, owing to the sharpness of the turns. Got into Lataband for lunch. Slept in 24th office-tent, on the ground, on a *blusa* mattress.

"*Lataband, Jan. 26.*—Sat kicking my heels till Roberts came, which he did at 11.15, having ridden out very smartly in three and a quarter hours. He looked about him a bit, and spoke to Norman, and we got off at one, and rode into Butkhak. Here we looked at both forts, and then on, getting in well before dark.

"*Sherpur, Jan. 27.*—Am very glad to get back. Wrote all my letters. Nothing doing. General told me he would recommend me for rank of brigadier-general. Morty has to go away on appointment as under-secretary. He will be a loss."

"*Sherpur, Jan. 29.*—Went to general to talk about defence schemes, and he rather shut me up. He does not realise the necessity for a large force even now; and when that devil, Mahamad Jan, comes again, as he will, we may be shut up again, and the fear is lest some rash undertaking may give him a chance. I am beginning to think the rising this time will be worse.

"*Sherpur, Jan. 30.*—Heard that Griffin is coming up as chief political. I must write to Lyall in answer to his letter about the executions.

"*Jan. 31.*—Went with general round the defences. They are very much stronger than they were before; then to Siah-Sang and Bala Hisar, up to top of Sher Darwaza. Brab<sup>1</sup> walked up from bottom in forty-three minutes. I shall go and see what time I take to walk it in, and shall take a witness."

[*Extract.*—"Colonel C. M. MacGregor, a particularly energetic, intelligent, and gallant officer. Of great war experience, and eminently well-fitted for his present high post on the Staff, or for an independent command in the field."—General Roberts's Confidential Report of Jan. 31st.]

"*Feb. 1-9.*—The Queen's speech came. Very vague, but, on the whole, it does not look like going back."

"*Feb. 13.*—Explained to Roberts the true nature of the case about the river-road, which Bright is always telegraphing about. He wants to begin by the southern road, and then go on by the river. I say, take one or the other; however, this is all fully explained in my telegram. Spoke to Roberts about getting a clear programme of what is going to be done out of Government; but he said it did not matter, as whatever they settled would be sure to be upset. I think we are now in for marching about more or less all the summer; one thing will be, that it will always be pretty cool in the shade. It will be

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant J. P. Brabazon, 10th Hussars, Brigade-Major of Cavalry.



slow, but we shall see a lot of country. I would rather be out of it, only, of course, it will never do for me to go before it is all over. . . . Went and lunched with Baker, to talk over starting some mounted infantry. He agrees that it is quite feasible, and I think it will be a great thing, as I do not much believe in cavalry. They are all very well against a running enemy, who would not fight, but against an enemy who will stand up to them they get as good as they give. I think White<sup>1</sup> would be the man to give it to, with young Hughes and one or two others.

"*Feb.* 14.—Heard Tytler died at Thal. This leaves a brigade vacant.

"*Feb.* 15.—Wrote to general, and asked him to back me up for a brigade. He wrote back that Jenkins would get the brigade, as I was in a very much higher position, and had better stick to it, and he would get me rank of brigadier-general.

"*Feb.* 16.—Went to see the first batch of wounded go. Roberts walked round. . . . I should have been glad if he had made them a little speech, and said he was sorry to lose them, and hoped they would get all right soon, &c. In the afternoon we went down to see some men of 72d and 5th Panjab Infantry equipped as mounted infantry. We generally agreed that the 72d turn-out was the best, and I am to write out instructions to-morrow for every one.

"*Feb.* 17.—Nothing much doing. Hyat came

<sup>1</sup> Major White, 92d Highlanders.

and had a talk. Griffin is bringing up five British and four native officers with him. Hyat does not like the idea of his coming. I suppose Griffin knows too much about him. General is doing all he can to get the Ghazni people in, and has sent the *mustaufi* to Wardak on some such mission. He is also anxious to get Abdul Rahman in. He is playing rather a risky game, and, I think, perhaps is going in for a grand political *coup*, to enable the Government to extricate itself from its entanglement.

"Feb. 18.—The general received the Adjutant-General's letter regarding —."

"Feb. 24.—Engaged all day about transport questions. Also got ready a draft order about mounted infantry, which we will send down to the Chief in a day or two. I mentioned my wanting to get a brigade. I would like awfully to get one.

"From this to 14th March did not write any journal. Nothing doing but what is shown in the letter-books."

"Sunday, March 14.—Went to see Battye in Upper Bala Hisar. Capital quarters: high, breezy, fine view. Met Molloy and Sim there. Rode the mare.

"March 15.—Went to inspect 3d Bengal Cavalry. In good order. Very weak; only 200 on parade. In afternoon, went with Lockhart to Siah-Sang to choose site for 24th and 45th camp.

"March 16.—Went with Roberts to Asmai. Good tug up. Was rather beaten. Perkins has made a

hideous mess of the whole thing. The fort does not command the critical point, and the road up is commanded the whole way by the city. I warned Roberts of this. Sent out two strong pickets—one to Takht-i-Shah, one to Paiminar. Also sent Smith up to make panorama from the top; he brought part of it. It will be good.

“*March 17.*—At 1.30, went to top of Takht Shah. Rode to the *ziarat* of Khoja Khidari, round the east face of Bala Hisar, after passing which the road goes through a very large graveyard, but without any monument of mark. From the *ziarat* I walked up, taking exact fifty minutes; but as I walked slowly, I did not lose my breath, nor was I half so pumped as on going up Asmai. The position of Takht-i-Shah is one of enormous natural strength, and with very little trouble could have been made impregnable. In fact, with their numbers it ought to have been impregnable; but the fact is they did not fight at all. It was the same at Asmai, and also, I think, at Charasia. Money was sent at it with too few men.”

“*March 20.*—Roberts showed me a telegram upsetting all the new organisation. I suppose Viceroy has done this on telegram from Roberts. I worked him up to send telegrams to Johnson, protesting against being interfered with. In the evening we rode up to Siah-Sang to see 24th and 45th, both good regiments, and old friends of mine.

“*March 21.*—Nothing doing as usual. Rode

along Bimaru ridge to see if a post could be made by which we could keep hold of it. Found it could be made; but it would be risky keeping posts out there, unless you had a movable column of at least a brigade. Then on to Siah-Sang: found there was ample room to encamp a division. Then had a talk with Armstrong.

“*March 22.*—Nothing done. Rode out to Paiminar Kotal across the swamp, about four miles. There is a fine view into the next valley, which is a large plain eight miles across, and quite level and cultivable, but very little cultivated. There is another similar low ridge beyond, and then another plain. All these drain north.

“*March 23.*—News come to say that Mahamad Jan was going to proceed from Gumaran to Tezin, and attack the posts on road. The Gandamak movable column was ordered up, a wing 28th, and two guns out to Lataband. I do hope they will not attack, as that will keep this going. Roberts went out with Griffin to Chardeh: I did not go. They are kicking up a great row about the hangings. I see a notice of Grant Duff having asked a question in the House of Commons about my paper on Armenia.<sup>1</sup>

“*March 24.*—Griffin called. Must go and call on him to-morrow. Rode mare; she tried to buck at starting. Gave her a good gallop down to the lake.

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 40.

*March 25.*—Committee on equipment—Armstrong, Lockhart, White, Craster, Bushman, Swinley, MacKenzie, Combe. Told them to go and make out lists of equipment, and when ready let me have it. Bright proposed sending expedition against Hisarak.

*“March 26.*—Telegram from Bright to say that excitement was settling down, owing to report of Mahamad Jan’s defeat. Dined with Griffin. General Baker, Lyall, Tweedie, Brownlow, and all the following there. To-morrow we go out to Charasia.

*“March 27.*—Rode out with general to beyond Charasia; infernally hot. Rode back quietly with Brownlow. As we were trotting, the whole bit came out of the mare’s mouth, but luckily she stopped.

*“March 28.*—I have altogether neglected my account of the campaign. My tent has arrived. Also got a box of cartridges, which has been on the road since September.

*“March 29.*—Grand parade. Not very good. 9th Lancers looked smart; Guides Cavalry serviceable; 92d grand; 23d Pioneers, 72d, 67th, 9th, and 4th Ghurkhas good; cavalry and Horse Artillery gallop past very bad. Gough clubbed his brigade. General sent for Hensman,<sup>1</sup> and showed him Harrison’s new article on the hangings.”

*“March 31.*—Sent off my horses. Rode with

<sup>1</sup> ‘Pioneer’ correspondent.

general to Siah-Sang. Did nothing, so came home. Dined at home."

At this juncture of affairs the British Government were anxious to find without delay some native authority to whom they could restore Northern Afghanistan, without risk of anarchy taking place, on the evacuation of Kabal during the ensuing autumn; but there seemed little prospect of finding in the country any man strong enough for this purpose. Mr Lepel Griffin's instructions were at this time to divide Afghanistan as follows: to hand over Herat to Persia, and to separate Western and Southern Afghanistan from Northern and Eastern Afghanistan. The Government proposed to hand over Northern and Eastern Afghanistan—i.e., Turkistan and Kabal *cum* Jalalabad—to any strong ruler that could be found; and Mr Lepel Griffin's attention was now directed towards Abdul Rahman, who had recently defeated the Mir Shahzada Hasan, his rival, in Badakshan, and thereby acquired prestige in the country.

## CHAPTER V.

ABDUL RAHMAN.

1860.

*"They waited but a leader, and they found  
One to their cause inseparably bound."*

WHO IS TO RULE AFGHANISTAN?—APPROACH OF KANDAHAR COLUMN—A *DARBAR*—ABDUL RAHMAN'S PROSPECTS—BATTLE OF AHMED KHEL—SIR DONALD STEWART'S VICTORY—FIGHT AT SHALEZ—ARRIVAL OF THE FORCE FROM KANDAHAR—A LARGE ARMY—LORD RIPON'S ADVENT—BABAR'S TOMB—AYUB OR YAKUB?—THE *MUSLIM* INTRIGUES—RIDES NEAR KABAL—AN AFGHAN GARDEN-PARTY—MISSION TO ABDUL RAHMAN—YAKUB'S DEPOSITION DISCUSSED—THE AFGHAN QUESTION—ROBERTS'S FORTITUDE—THE SITUATION—ANCIENT COINS—DIVISION OF AFGHANISTAN PROPOSED—A DILEMMA—GORDON'S RESIGNATION—MORE GATHERINGS—ANNEXATION—SUPPLIES—THE PAI MINAR—RETIREMENT OF THE BRITISH CONTEMPLATED—PREPARATIONS FOR DEPARTURE—RECOGNITION OF ABDUL RAHMAN AS AMIR.

"April 1.—Rode out to Lataband with Roberts. Of course he went galloping over the stones. I hope I have not screwed my big horse. Griffin, Baker, and a whole lot came out with us. Rode very hard. Did not see an enemy. Many tents about, showing

the tribes are coming back early. Found the heights crowned. Got in about 4.30. Found the 30th with a good band.

"*April 2.*—Up at 5.30. Selected a horse which turned out the worst of the lot,—an awful brute, who would not walk a step. Had some breakfast, and off at 6.30. Rode over Lataband road; steepish, but good. Got into Seh Baba about 8.45. Then we went round the works, which, are quite strong enough against these devils; then had some breakfast with 22d. Got off about eleven. Bridges lent me a pony, which I rode up to the caves,<sup>1</sup> then got on the one Lyall rode. Got back to Lataband at one. Found the 30th drawn up—a very smart, clean, good-looking regiment; then had more breakfast with 28th. Off at two on big waler. Roberts, as usual, galloping over stones regardless of road. Thought my horse going queer. However, got on at four. Changed to mare. Got to Logar Bridge. Changed to pony, put bit on him, and he went much better. He is very good. Got on about 5.30.

"*April 3.*—Old Nakhshband came and said no one could govern Kabal unless assisted by us, not even Dost Mahamad. He said Abdul Rahman was trustworthy; also, that if we tried to go out of this without hammering these fellows, we should be followed up the whole way.

"*April 4.*—General went to show me a site for transport, which was where I always meant them

<sup>1</sup> Caves at Barikhab.



to be ; then he said good-bye to Morgan's battery ; then home.

" *April 5.*—The *mustaufi* came in. He has not brought back any terms, and Mahamad Jan's lot say they will fight if we do not do what they want us to. Went up with Lockhart, Kennedy, and Kinloch to select sites ; found that there was lots of room. Told Low to move his transport as much up the hill as possible. Saw the cavalry-ground ; it was good, not very dry, but if the fields are cut it will do.

" *April 6* —Had committee on equipment settled pretty well—the British part. We had Bushman, Craster, White, and Combe, who will do very well for secretary—all good men. Sent a long telegram to Sir Donald Stewart by order of Quartermaster-General. I should not wonder if this shows that Sir Donald is going to be put in command.

" *April 7.*—Went at four to see Perkins's Engineer park. Sixty animals, already very well trained, only the saddles are not sufficiently stuffed. It is very complete. A very useful body of men might be raised of such men, one man to each mule, and to work also. Altogether it was very good. Then to see some ground for the cavalry camp, which Gough wanted ; found it a great deal too much exposed, so general did not agree to it.

" *April 8.*—I said yesterday that surely a doctor would say the site was objectionable on health grounds, and sure enough a letter came to-day to that effect. Showed it to Roberts, and was de-

lighted to hear him say, 'Tell him to go and be d——d.'

"*April 9.*—Went to look at 17th Bengal Cavalry. Very bad in every way; very hot. Fearful lot of midges. In afternoon went to Bala Hisar. Telegram came from Sir Donald Stewart to say he wanted a force to be at Shekhabad on 20th. We arranged for Gough's brigade, with Guides and Pioneers. One squadron 9th, two squadrons 3d Bengal Cavalry to march on the 12th to 15th. If things are quiet, we will go with this force, and get to Shekhabad on the 20th, move on 21st and 22d, and meet Stewart on that day."

"*April 11.*—Got photos of Cavagnari, Hamilton, and Jenkyns; very good. Agreed to go and be photographed on my horse by Bourke; hope he will make a good one. In the Quartermaster-General's group I have come out scowling. I wrote to Greaves, asking that if Stewart was to command the whole force, I might be transferred as his Chief of the Staff. My new horse came; he is a fine horse, but has a bad head, and is poor in condition. I hope he is quiet, and does not buck-jump.

"*April 12.*—Went out to see the screw-guns;<sup>1</sup> one of them stuck from dust, which is just what I said they would. Arranged for force under Ross to go out,<sup>2</sup> and Guides to stay.

<sup>1</sup> Major Graham's battery of 7-pounder mountain-guns, which are in two pieces, and screwed together by the trunnion-ring.

<sup>2</sup> A force sent out to meet Sir Donald Stewart's column *en route* from Kandahar.

“*April 13.*—Went with Jenkins and Smith to Asmai. X—— remained on a hill under cover more than a mile from the fight, and he is therefore primarily responsible for the loss of the guns, and not poor Clarke, who died of a broken heart. The conical hill is not a very good position, still they should have held on to it longer. Then went up Asmai, a very steep nasty hill to take, and no doubt assaulted at the wrong point. Jenkins went at it, not enveloping and turning them. They should have gone at it from Deh Afghan side. It was a bad business altogether. On the top met P——, who glared at us and said, ‘Have you come to take stock?’ The Asmai fort is the most ridiculous unnecessary piece of work I ever saw, walls five feet thick. It would be ridiculous, if it were not lamentable. At four went to a *darbar*, where were all the scoundrels who have been fighting against us. Roberts made a short speech, which the *kazi* translated well; then Griffin came on, like a tenor, and read out a speech in Persian, and mispronounced every word. I do not suppose they understood a single word. I have not seen the speech in English; it was not bad, and the Persian was good, but all spoilt by Griffin’s absurd manner and vile pronunciation.

“*April 14.*—Went with White and Smith to see scene of the fight on the 13th December; told Smith what pictures I wanted. Came back and went in to

see 3d Panjab Cavalry ; it is an A1 regiment all round, beautifully mounted. Then went on to the 3d Bengal Cavalry, and got Mackenzie to make me a dodge for my chain bridle. He also showed me a mess-tin he had had made for native cavalry, a very good plan, with iron top for a *taron*, and a copper bottom, and a very dodgy handle, making a spoon also. I do not see why native troops should not have these things as well as British. Rode round with Jimmy Hills to see all the block-houses ; came to the conclusion you ought not to have less than 600 men on Bimaru, and not less than four and a half regiments for Sherpur, Asmai, and Siah-Sang. Have got to like Hills much ; he is a very sensible man, and I have a high opinion of him. We laughed about Griffin's speech ; it was a most ludicrous oration, and our enemies must have laughed. Asked old Nakhshband, and he said he approved of it. It is evident, I think, that Mahamad Jan's party is breaking up, and that all are looking to Abdul Rahman. I expect he will come with a good following, and we shall have more fighting. I would rather we did not ; but if I was sure of getting off, or only getting a slight wound, I would not mind, as every shot that is fired makes me more sure of my promotion. By the way, I have a bet of a dinner with Dutton I am not made a K.C.B.

"*Sherpur, April 15.*—Did not go to the parade of 9th Lancers, as I wanted to work my table off.

Got through everything. Telegram from Bright said that Palmer of Commissariat had been killed,<sup>1</sup> and Captains Hamilton, R.A., and Nugent (51st Foot) wounded, in a reconnaissance to the Awazangani gorge. Went over to Griffin; he was very civil. Took my new horse out; do not like him; he is ugly but good; has a bad cold. After dinner Roberts sent for me. He had heard they were going to fight in Maidan, and wanted Ross to leave his heavy baggage behind; however, he determined not, and we are to ride out to Ross's camp to-morrow and settle then. I think it all looks as if they were going to fight again. I only hope it will be over soon, and we shall get away. I am most heartily sick of this, but I would like to get a brigade before I went. I think if there is more fighting I shall get it, but not unless. Read Colonel Grodekoff's journey through Afghanistan; he seems to be a determined man, and to know how to treat those hogs of Afghans. It is being translated in the 'Pioneer.' Hope we shall get some more guns off to-morrow.

"*Kala Kazi, April 16.*—Telegram from Bright to say he had returned to Pezwan, and was followed the whole way—not a good business. Got my traps ready, but did not get off till two, and Roberts would not start till nearly four. Then we rode out by Aoshar, and a devil of a long way round to Deh Bon, when we got on to the Ghazni road. Passed

<sup>1</sup> Expedition to Hisarak valley under General Bright, 11th to 14th April, from Pezwan.

place where we first came up, and where I sent the order to charge; it was right across the Ghazni road. Got in about six or after. We are to go back to-morrow. Hills is going on to Ghazni; I wish I was. Griffin is very civil to me. Perhaps he could help me to go to Herat, then I might get on to Merv.

"*April 17.*—Returned to Sherpur. Roberts sent Sherston to say he was going out on Monday."

"*April 19.*—Went over to see Griffin; told him about Mazulla Khan<sup>1</sup> having property in Charasia. He immediately wrote to Wali Mahamad to send him a list of all property in Kabal belonging to Mazulla, and he says he thinks it will get to Mazulla's ears, and he will come in; this is sharp. Griffin also said he did not see why a native should not go to Hazara. I must try and get him to send one, then we might go on and take Herat. I shall try to work it.

"*April 20.*—Ross sent in a letter to say that he had sent out reconnaissances in every direction—one of which, under Dutton, had been fired on—and that he was going to halt to get in supplies. He ought to have done that on the 19th by simply requisitioning the inhabitants.

"*April 21.*—Roberts is all right again; he says Lord Lytton has been asked by the Queen to stay on till this is all over, so that Roberts is all right.

"*April 22.*—Went to see Griffin, who showed me a copy of a letter from Abdul Rahman in reply to a

<sup>1</sup> Mazulla Khan, chief of Ghilzais, in Hisarak.

question as to his intentions; it is very diplomatically worded, and says<sup>1</sup> that he thinks Afghanistan cannot fight either of such empires as Russia or England, and therefore they had both better leave her alone. He then talked about going with 500 cavalry to meet Abdul Rahman at Charikar—a mad idea, which I do not imagine he really means. A report has come that Stewart has had a desperate fight near Karabagh, in which both sides went in, sword in hand, and we were beaten! I hope it is not true, else we shall have it hot soon. Also rumours about fighting with Ross at Top. The next few days will tell us what will happen.

*“April 23.*—News has come that Stewart had a good fight near Nani, where 15,000 of the enemy were in position. He went at them, and 3000 Ghazis came down sword in hand; they were utterly routed, and lost 200. We lost 17 killed and 124 wounded, amongst them Young, 19th, and Corbett, Royal Horse Artillery. This is a very good business, so Roberts ordered a salute to be fired. To-day

<sup>1</sup> Dated 15th April 1880: “Now therefore that you seek to learn my hopes and wishes, they are these. That as long as your empire and that of Russia exist, my countrymen, the tribesmen of Afghanistan, should live quietly in ease and peace; that these two States should find us true and faithful; and that we should rest at peace between them. For my tribesmen are unable to struggle with empires, and are ruined by want of commerce; and we hope of your friendship that, sympathising with and assisting the people of Afghanistan, you will place them under the protection of the two Powers. This would redound to the credit of both, and give peace to Afghanistan, and quiet and comfort to God’s people. This is my wish. For the rest, it is yours to decide.”

Roberts told me Stewart was coming here to take command, and he supposed I would go to him. I expressed surprise; he said that he was sorry we were not going to see it out together.

"*April 24.*—A letter from Stewart describing his action on 19th.<sup>1</sup> Says some of the regiments did not behave well, but the 2d Sikhs and cavalry did. Young is cut to pieces almost, Corbett badly wounded. He must have had 59th, 15th, and 25th with him; however, they licked them well, and nothing was heard of any gathering near. He marches to meet Ross to-day.

"*April 25.*—About eight got a telegram from Jenkins at Saiadabad, in which he says he is being attacked. General sent out wing 92d, Guides, four horse-artillery guns under MacPherson, and the most of the movable column under Gough. Jenkins held his ground till MacPherson came up, and then they attacked and drove them back, killing over 100. Our loss, four killed, thirty-four wounded, and about twenty-five horses, no officers. [This affair was the second action at Charasia.]<sup>2</sup>

"Stewart had another fight,<sup>3</sup> six miles south-east

<sup>1</sup> On the 19th April General Stewart's division, marching from Kandahar towards Kabal, encountered an Afghan force of 1000 horse and 13,000 foot at Ahmad Khel, twenty-three miles south of Ghazni. Stewart's troops numbered 3000 rifles, 350 lances, 700 sabres, and 22 guns.

<sup>2</sup> The principal standard of the enemy was captured by the 2d Ghurkhas.

<sup>3</sup> Affair at Shalez and Arzu—British casualties, two rank and file killed, eight wounded.



Ghazni, on 23d April, against 6000 Ghilzais. Licked them—slight loss; enemy 400. Leaves Ghazni on 25th, leaving no one in it at all—a most extraordinary proceeding.

“Ross sent out 100 Sappers, two companies Ghurkhas, to make roads; they were surrounded by 1000 of enemy from Langar under Abdul Ghafur,<sup>1</sup> and he had to send reinforcements, as usual with us. Roberts sending out detachments, and only one brigade left here; luckily all ended well.

“*April 26.*—Went to the hospital in Bala Hisar: got a ducking. Report that they are going to attack Butkhak or Lataband; telegraphed to warn them. General has ordered 200 men out to former: no use.

“*April 27.*—Reports say enemy lost heavily in fight; good thing for Jenkins.

“*April 28.*—News that Ross had had a big fight, and had beaten them with loss of 1200: this is good; it will all add to the importance of the war. I can perhaps get made Chief of the Staff to Stewart. Roberts went out to Batkhak; I did not go.

“*April 29.*—Letter from Ross to say he had a little fight under Rowcroft—only a small affair. Griffin, however, says that they had another fight on Monday. He also says that Mir Bachha<sup>2</sup> will be in to-night. It is great rot having these fellows in like this: they all want thrashing first.

<sup>1</sup> Abdul Ghafur, Akhunzada, of Langar.

<sup>2</sup> Mir Bachha, a Kohistani of Koh Daman.

"April 30.—In the afternoon Roberts sent me, by Kennedy, an article in 'Englishman,' saying that I '*deserved no credit for recovering the guns.*' I think the best thing I can do is to take no notice of it. Lockhart's information is to the effect that Mahamad Jan is turning his attention to cutting off supplies for Ross. This is no doubt the game they should play, and if they did this persistently, they would trouble us very much.

"May 1.—Rode out to village Ghulam Haidar; jolly ride, valley lovely; found camp in splendid position. Found Sir Donald Stewart in a garden, where a tent had been pitched. Major E. F. Chapman, Royal Artillery, Deputy Quartermaster-General to General Stewart's division; Major Euan Smith, political officer. When we left, told Stewart I was to go to him; he said he knew not. As Chappy had been so long with him, he would rather have him, though he would be glad to have me, and was sure we should get on well; but he had heard I was looking out for a command, and that Barter was going, a splendid brigade, and I might get that. I said I would think about it, and he said, 'Yes; we shall have plenty of time to talk about that.' At four we left; nice cool ride back. Rode my new horse; he went very well. Hills is to be recommended for Stewart's division.

"May 2.—Put Stewart in orders.

"May 3.—Griffin has sent a mission to Abdul Rahman. Afzal and Ibrahim have gone. I think

this is wrong, but perhaps he has stringent orders, which force him to patch up a peace somehow.

"*May 4.*—Asked Stewart if he had any orders about me; said No,—but had not had orders to settle about Staff. An answer has come about him and Griffin, to say they want him to stay, and he is to have chief military and political control; but they want him to leave Griffin pretty free, and only when anything Griffin wants to do is against his opinion, is he to interfere. Stewart is apparently willing to stay under these circumstances, but I do not know whether Griffin will. We call Stewart's orders 'General Order'; he commands not far off 40,000 men now, and I am Chief of the Staff to the biggest army since the Mutiny.

"*May 5.*—In the afternoon we went up to Asmai, which Perkins has turned into an impregnable post; but the works are a great deal too costly and solid. Shall talk to Stewart about this. We hear that Lord Ripon is coming out at once; he has chosen the very hottest time of the year.

"*May 6.*—Stewart had a *levée*. It went off well enough, though the 9th and 67th were all late. White has been appointed Military Secretary to the new Viceroy, and goes off at once to join. Stewart has stopped all works, and I think he is quite right. Now we must cut down the medical, engineer, and transport staff. Telegraphed to-day to ask Bright whether he could send back the 8th Hussars and a battery of artillery. I think we

could dispense with some native cavalry ; I shall suggest this.

" *May 7.*—Telegram to-day says that Gordon Pasha is to be Private Secretary. Good selections Gordon and White ! Shows Lord Ripon is looking out for the best men. Stewart seems particularly shrewd, and is very above-board. He says I am to send the daily telegrams to the Quartermaster-General. Stewart is what I call a masterful man—a real commander.

" *May 8.*—Roberts went off with Baker's force to Charasia [into the Logar district and Maidan, with the object of relieving the Commissariat at Sherpur, and of opening up roads to allow traffic and supplies to pass freely]. A telegram come to say that 1000 cattle and 180 sheep have been raided from Jalalabad. Some one will, I trust, catch it for this. We went with Stewart to Bala Hisar to see some buildings. He went over the hospital. He was very pleasant, sensible, and amusing. I only hope I shall get on with him. It rained coming back. Sir Donald does not care for galloping.

" *May 9.*—I rode out to Charasia with Sir Donald. Started at 6, and rode quietly ; enjoyed the ride immensely through green fields with trees,—every sign of plenty and comfort among the people. Roberts met us at the Sang-i-Nawishta. We had breakfast with him, pottered about, and then rode back by Indaki. The view of the Chardeh valley from top of the Indaki Kotal is lovely ; road very good.

Passed through Indaki; large prosperous village. Road bad here for guns; would have to go by river-bed. Then on, road excellent. Passed village Aghil-Shams, and came to Babar's tomb. Enter garden by gate ruined, then found whole garden terraced. A road on each side sloped down centre of each terrace. There had been a waterfall, which had come down in a duct of marble. At head is a mosque of marble, and the tomb is above an elaborately carved stone of marble. The view from this is also very fine. Both sides of road are lined with lovely yellow roses, and some very delicate pink-and-white ones. Then on by right bank of river to Chandaol; then crossed by the Pul-i-Khishti and by Asmai, and home by made road. Found no *dāk* in; pitched into postmaster. Hutchinson came up, not a bit changed; said he would be very glad to be my assistant. Near Indaki Kotal passed a tract covered with very beautiful yellow-tufted flowers, name unknown; ask Collett. Had a long talk with Stewart out and home. Great fellow to talk; think I shall get on with him well.

"*May 10.*—Had a lot of work; got through it most satisfactorily. Sir Donald is a capital man of business. He is very straightforward and Scotch. These are always more reliable than other men, whereas some nationalities are always untrustworthy.

"*May 11.*—Took Stewart some papers, and got through them satisfactorily. Went over list of staff

officers, and determined on extensive reductions of staff and regiments—two brigadier-generals and staff and two cavalry regiments. We have too much cavalry on the line; there are  $7\frac{2}{3}$  regiments above the passes, which is nonsense.

“*May 12.*—Griffin showed me letters from Lyall, Lytton, and an official, about what was to be done with Abdul Rahman. The gist of the instructions is that he is to be treated well, but that no discussion or condition is to be entered into. It remains to be seen what will come of it. He may come, or he may not. If he does, and agrees, the other party will break out; if he does not, we must kick him out of the country. If he will not do, they talk of Ayub; but he is more of an imbecile, if possible, than Yakub.

“*May 13.*—Went out for a ride with Kinloch. Dined at Stewart's. I find I agree with him. For instance, he said that if we had four *corps d'armée* there would be no use for a chief—which is exactly what I said, and they all hooted at me. I am sure I was right, and that the military department, as at present constituted, should be done away with. My ideas are generally ahead of my fellows.

“*May 14.*—Bright has been telegraphing about Mulla Fakir and Mulla Khalil stirring up the people. Like Stewart more I see of him; he knows his work very well.”

“*May 16.*—Political, Euan Smith, went to-day. I rode out with him; he seems a good, honest, steady

fellow. At one we rode out to a picnic at Babar's tomb, given by Ross.

"*May 17.*—Griffin sent me a paper to read, the gist of which was that he proposed that Abdul Rahman should be put up, and, failing him, Ayub. Both these are very bad selections, but there are no other. Hashim is openly hostile, and the Wali is too weak; but the fact is, what I have always said, that there is no solution of the question except taking the state over. I am glad to see Griffin goes against Kuram, and is in favour of Jalalabad; he is quite right. He proposes to give up Hariab valley, and take some land round Pesh Bolak; but we should not go back further than Jalalabad on any account whatever. It might pay to set up the Wali here and support him; otherwise, we must take the whole country.

"*May 18.*—Had a jolly ride out through the villages and fields to the north up to the Wazirabad lake, and another short ride in the evening. A telegram from Johnson asks if it was understood that the movement was to be simultaneous. This shows we may go back soon, and as I suppose Stewart will not stay, I certainly shall not. Some people seem to think there will be rewards given on Queen's birthday.

"*May 19.*—The event of the day is that the *Mustaufi*, Habibulla Khan, has been found out. Griffin got some of his letters to Mahamad Jan, and now it is determined to send him down. If they had only done what I told them long ago, this would

not have happened. Made all the arrangements, and he goes off to-morrow morning. Then Griffin told me that *Hashim Khan was going to bolt*; so that bubble has burst. It looks, indeed, as if we were really meant to stay here. I do not much believe in Abdul Rahman. Had a nice ride this morning out to the village of Khoja Rawash and back; found a capital road the whole way. These rides through the lanes are delightful. Liddell told me a story that a man had meant to warn him about the Bala Hisar; will inquire to-morrow about it. There may be powder in it still, and they may be trying to blow it up.

“*May 20.*—The *Mustaufi* went off at daybreak, and got to Lataband at 3 P.M. A report last night that Hashim was going to bolt turned out to be false, or else he thought better of it. Went out for a ride, and in the way met a man with a lot of muskets on a pony, so I made him come with me. He said he was Wali Mahamad’s man. I told general, Griffin, and Dutton the story about Liddell’s warning, and let Dutton suggest his looking for any mining operations. General had a long talk with Hashim, who said we had no friends, and that all who had tried to be friendly were ruined. This is quite true, and is owing to the imbecile indecision of the Government. I saw from the first that there were only two things to do, either to go away directly we had destroyed the Bala Hisar, or give out at once we meant to stay for ever. The first would



have had a most excellent effect, and the second was the best thing to do. But all the good which accrued from our first rapid advance was lost by this indecisive way of doing business.

"*May 21.*—Had a nice ride out on the Wazirabad 'Chaman' in the morning, and a very slow one in the evening in the direction of Khoja Rawash. Sir Donald does not like galloping, so we walked nearly the whole way; nothing much doing. Took up to him the schedule for reduction of staff, and sent off a telegram to Adjutant-General on the subject. Two brigadier-generals are to be reduced, two quartermaster-generals, and twelve Engineer officers, besides some others. News came in that Gib had had a fight near Mazina, and had beaten the enemy. Porteous, R.A., wounded, and Noyes, 14th. They expect to hear from Abdul Rahman to-morrow; I hope it will be satisfactory.

"*May 22.*—A telegram says, 'Gladstone hopes speedy settlement Afghan affairs.' I hope to goodness we are not to stay here long.

"*May 23.*—Sir Donald told me Abdul Rahman had not answered, but they had heard from our mission. The answer is not very hopeful: it looks as if he was going to have nothing to say to us; and he is quite right, as it will do him no good whatever. If they do not get him to come in, I shall try to get sent.

"*May 24.*—The news from Abdul Rahman is not so satisfactory, and any chance of a settlement gets further off, although Lord Ripon has orders to evac-

uate as soon as a strong ruler can be found. Mahamad Ishak, Abdul Rahman's nephew, has written to stir up the people against us. I must say I do not believe in any settlement short of taking the whole country, and I have always said so. Went in the afternoon to hear 67th band; very good one; very good regiment and colonel. It is perhaps the best regiment here. What an infernal bore staying here is! I do so want to get away and get home.

"*May 25.*—Had capital rides. Griffin sent me a letter of Abdul Rahman's to read. He does not want to come in till he knows exactly what we want, and I do not believe any one can tell him, because no one knows.

"*May 26.*—Rode out by Bala Hisar to Bini Hisar, and then back. In going round the bay I went smart, as I did not know the country, and might have been fired at. I must have ridden ten miles. In the evening rode round by Khoja Rawash (north-east of Kabal) about eight miles. Sir Donald says the Viceroy thinks we shall get away by July, and as all the troops cannot stay, I do not think the chief will; and then, of course, I shall not, and I may get home in August after all. I must ask about going on a mission to Kunduz.<sup>1</sup> I am not sure how this will do, still, it might be worth trying.

"*May 27.*—Rode out by Deh-i-Afghanan and Deh-

<sup>1</sup> Kunduz—one of the principal khanates of Afghan-Turkistan, south of the Amu Daria. The chief town is about 190 miles north of Kabal.

i-Mazang, round the Asmai and Aliabad hills, and back, I suppose about eight or ten miles. In the evening went round by Wazirabad, then to the lake, and back by Khoja Rawash, and in at the 92d gate. Ordered Arbuthnot's column [at Jagdalak] to march on Chiprihar, to attack Mulla Fakir, and then go on to Laghman by Darunta, and two regiments to go from here to Jagdalak. Hutchinson arrived. I do not know what there is for him to do, but he will be able to help me about regulations. Roberts got Morton to write to me to ask if I could tell him anything about an order of Maude's last year in Bazar, saying '*no prisoners were to be taken.*' I said I knew of no such order. I suppose he alludes to an order that any one found with arms within a mile of the Khaibar road was to be shot. By the way, John Morice says that Hyat Khan has been saying that 170 men were hung, and that 70 of them were for fighting against us. By the way, Hashim Khan has asked us all to a breakfast on the 29th, and I advised the general not to go without a proper guard; so I have ordered 100 men of the 9th, and I will get him to take the Lancers also. Got the general's leave to go out and see Roberts at his camp to-morrow. Shall get old Nakhshband to come up with me, and put him on to find out what is up with Hashim. I should not be one bit surprised if they meant some infernal treachery; it would be just like them. I hope, however, that seeing the guard of honour will put them off.

"*May 28.*—Rode out by Nanachi, by the direct road to Kala Ghulam Haidar. Country very pretty, with splendid crops, and many people carrying produce on donkeys; altogether, an air of great plenty and peace pervades the whole scene. None of the men are armed, and all were polite. I doubt very much if the people hate us, and if they were not so worked upon by their *mullas*, would not perhaps be at all disinclined to receive us. If I was made Amir of this country, I would make friends with the *mullas*, as they are the people who have the influence, and not the *sardars*; and when I had got them in hand, I would begin to break their influence by showing them up. Found Roberts looking very well, and not careworn like he used to be here. Every one looking better for the trip. Kennedy has won the Derby lottery, over 5000 rupees. On arrival I found a note from Griffin, that there was no chance of anything happening, as his own people were all about. The place for Hashim's breakfast is changed to the *Wazir's* garden; but I have ordered 50 men to accompany the general. I think it is a mistake going without a proper guard, and I have told Sir Donald so."

"*May 29.*—Queen's birthday parade. Afterwards we went to breakfast with Hashim at the *Wazir Bagh*, which we were told was near Babar's tomb, but was more than a mile off through intricate lanes. There was one of the delightful garden-houses at the end, with half-a-dozen magnificent plane-trees, and

a stream of water down the centre. There was also a fine double '*shamiana*' pitched over the front of the building, and under it were tables with any amount of sweets. Presently they brought in food. The *kabobs* were quite good ; also a kind of sausage, some excellent lamb, and *pilaos*, not too greasy. The curds were good ; only sherbet and tea to drink. Afterwards they played backgammon and chess. Ibrahim played very well. We left about one, and had a hot ride home.

"*May 30.*—Must have caught a chill last night, as I have got the most infernal lumbago to-day ; can hardly move, and not at all without pain.

"*May 31.*—Lumbago still bad. Did nothing but equipment committee.

"*June 1.*—Getting better, but cannot ride. Committee still sitting.

"*June 2.*—The mission sent to Abdul Rahman returned ; say they were well treated, and Abdul Rahman would come in soon. I hope he will not, as it will have a very bad effect to put him in, as every one will say that it was the Russians put him in. Had a talk with the *Nawab*, who says the best thing to do would be to bring Yakub back. I wonder if it would ; shall tell Stewart this.

"*June 3.*—Roberts told me he had sent to say he wanted to leave Kabal, and nothing would induce him to stay. He then tried to persuade me to take MacPherson's brigade, but I would not see it, and said I would think of it."

Mr Lyall<sup>1</sup> left Kabul 2d April 1880. Letter to A. C. Lyall, Esq., Kabul, June 1880 :—

“You say, ‘If Roberts and you and Baker had not been in such an unnecessary hurry to deport the wretched Yakub, these difficulties would have been avoided.’ Now, I will take you up on this point. You mean to say that if Yakub had not been deported, our subsequent political difficulties would not have happened. In the first place, you seem to forget the date on which he was deported—viz., 1st of December—and that the row which broke out on the 11th of December was brewing before he left. If Yakub had remained here, you think there would have been no row. I do not agree with you. The row did not take place because Yakub was deported, but, *first*, because they thought we were going to take the country; and, *secondly*, because they saw how weak we were. Yakub’s being here would not have prevented it, but, on the contrary, would have added to our difficulties; for he would either have joined the enemy openly, and thus given the rising the weight of his name, or we should have had to quod him and his myrmidons to prevent their communicating with the enemy, and this would have added greatly to the duties on our already hard-worked troops. I do not regret Yakub having been deported, but I do regret that Daud Shah and the *Mustaifi* were not sent away long before, for they both

<sup>1</sup> Now Sir Alfred Lyall, K.C.B.

increased our difficulties by intriguing against us. I forget what the phrase was which seems to have aroused your ire, but I suppose I said your politicals had made a mess of it. I did not mean you, or Hastings, or Bellew, but the Foreign Office. The cause of all the trouble was because no orders or hint even was given to Roberts as to what was wanted. Although a month had elapsed from the date of the news of Cavagnari's massacre reaching Simla to the date of our reaching Kabal, the Foreign Office had no plan ready, and Roberts was quite in the dark as to what was wanted or not wanted. I suppose the real reason was because the Government at home could not make up their minds. The *first* chance we had of settling this business satisfactorily was when we first came. If Roberts had been told to inflict adequate punishment and come away, we should have been back in India by November, and our name would stand far higher to-day than it ever can now. The *second* chance was when Roberts was trying to get in the Musa Jan faction ; and if he had been let alone he would have succeeded, and would have put up Musa Jan, with Hashim as Regent or Prime Minister. Then directly Stewart joined us, we could have gone back and been all in quarters by end of May ; but this was knocked on the head by Griffin's arrival, and his immediately taking up Abdul Rahman. Since Griffin came there has been an upset of all Roberts's arrangements, but certainly no improvement, and

the end will now be that we shall secure the establishment of Russian influence at Kabal, which is what the war was undertaken to prevent. The fact is that there never were more than two possible satisfactory settlements: one was to have left the country in October after having exacted retribution, the other was to practically annex the country; but I cannot see how Roberts can in justice be blamed because neither of these were carried out. A general can no more retire from an enemy's country than he can annex it without orders, and it was the business of the Foreign Office to see that he had the necessary orders. Perhaps the Indian Government may put it on to the Home Government: with this I have nothing to do; all that concerns me is to show that Roberts should not be held responsible for the deadlock in the present situation. Perhaps, though the proposed solution with Abdul Rahman does not commend itself to my judgment, it may turn out all right, but the future seems made up a good deal of ifs and ands.

"I said in October the only really permanent solution was to annex the country, and I am ten times more of that opinion now. Nothing that will be done now will be permanent; however, as we have gone so far with Abdul Rahman, we may as well finish it. As you say, whoever we put up will have to prove himself the best man, and then perhaps a strong Amir may emerge. It will then be your duty to make him friendly."



To A. C. Lyall, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department :—

“ KABAL, *June 1880.*

“ You ask me to say what I think of the Kabal executions, the —— affair, &c., and I must do so very shortly ; but I think it will be more just to all if I give you a short review of the whole campaign. The first point to be criticised is the advance. Roberts was asked to undertake this, and he did so without a moment's hesitation. I do not think people in England have yet realised what this advance was, and I am sure they have never done it justice ; it was simply the most daring and brilliant feat of arms that has been performed by any British general since the Peninsular war. Before Roberts went to Kabal with 6000 men, I believe you would hardly have got a man in India to undertake to do it under 20,000 ; and owing to the state of the transport, he was never able to have more than this 6000 in his fighting line. I do not know another man in the British army who would have done it ; —— certainly would not. And the daring energy and persistence with which Roberts pushed his advance far more deserved a peerage than anything that has earned it of late ; and we are all very disgusted that all this time has been allowed to pass without any reward beyond empty thanks having been given to our general for his brilliant feat.

“ Roberts has been blamed for splitting up all his troops and leaving Sherpur undefended. It is all

very fine to throw stones, but it was almost impossible to get reliable information; and I certainly think he acted for the best. Moreover, it is all very well to talk of Musa Jan's strategy, but the fact is, that if —— had not brought on the action of the 11th, the 12th would probably have seen the enemy all bolting. On the 11th the enemy were not more than 10,000; and if —— had let them alone they would have been attacked by MacPherson not more than two hours after, and driven back on Baker. Musa Jan<sup>1</sup> had no more idea of attacking Sherpur than London. He had failed to join the Kohistanis, and he was in a hat. MacPherson coming from the north, and Baker from the south, he could do nothing but bolt to south-east, and on the 12th both Baker and MacPherson would have been on him again; but all this was marred by —— . I may mention that we are just in the same position regarding information now that we were in December, only now we have lots of troops, and we probably should do very much the same thing now as we did then—*i.e.*, prevent a junction between the Kohistanis and southerners with our right, and smash up the latter with our left. I know that a good many men, on hearing of the rising all round, would have shut themselves up in Sherpur at once, and called for reinforcements. Roberts did not do this; but, not a bit disheartened, he hit out all round, and only

<sup>1</sup> Musa Jan, eldest son of Yakub Khan, was proclaimed Amir by the Wardak general Mahamad Jan.

after five days' fighting went into Sherpur, and then only telegraphed for one brigade to enable him to retake the offensive again; and this brigade would only have given 8000 men against 60,000. The greatest general is he who makes the fewest mistakes. No general was ever free from mistakes, but I think that the fortitude and constancy and pluck shown by Roberts in those dark days in December show that he is the right grit clean through. . . .

"With regard to the Kabal executions, Roberts has given a complete reply to the cry, and has shown that every man was fairly tried. It is really too disgusting that he has been attacked in this way, after having performed such deeds as he did.

"Then as to the political management of the business, it is all nonsense to say that Roberts is to blame. Whatever he did was done under orders from Simla; and when he was in a fair way of settling it, by putting up the strong party in the country, the Foreign Office sent up Griffin, who immediately committed himself to Abdul Rahman; and now we are in as pretty a hat as you can conceive, and much further off a settlement than we were in March. Abdul Rahman, no doubt, is willing to come to our terms; but he has no party here, and if he is put up, he will probably be kicked out in a week after we leave, then where shall we be? We have earned the undying hatred of the Sher Ali faction already; and if they give in, as they will without our help, they will be new plaster materials for us to

work on. Abdul Rahman will be in our camp, or flying back to Tashkend, and we shall not have a single man in the country who is not our enemy; but all this might have been avoided if they had left Roberts alone."

"*June 4.*—Told Stewart my idea about Abdul Rahman, that I was glad he was not coming in, as it would only be said he was put in by the Russians. He wrote to Lyall to say that the Abdul Rahman idea had fallen through, and there was no one else to put up, and that the best thing we could do was to go. I told him I would have a big *darbar*, and say to all the assembled chiefs—We took up Abdul Rahman because we thought he was the strongest man, but that has fallen through, and now who do you want? They would say, Yakub. I would say, There is the doubt that he ordered the massacre of Cavagnari. They would say, No, he did not. I would say, We will restore him on conditions that his sons are sent as hostages.

"*June 5.*—When I went to see general, Ibrahim Khan was with him, so went to Roberts. He showed me a paper he had written, in which he made out that Kuram was a better route militarily than Khaibar. Khaibar is far away the best road, though, of course, if you have troops on one line up to Peiwar, and on the other only to Peshawar, you could get to Kabal sooner; and then above Gandamak there are just as good places as the Peiwar, and you could as easily get troops from there, in fact

easier. A man brought me four coins, for which he wanted 50 rupees each. I sent them to Talbot, who is our numismatist, and he says they are—1st, a very small coin of Demetrius, King of Bactria and Kabal, B.C. 200, worth about 2 rupees, probably get it for 1 rupee; 2d, coin of Athens, probably date about B.C. 500 to 400, extremely common in Europe, worth about 5 rupees in London. Here they fancy they are of immense value. 3d and 4th, coins of one of the Antiochi, kings of Syria, 300 B.C. to 100 B.C.; probable date of coin, B.C. 300; inscription worth at home, if well preserved, 10 rupees—poorly preserved, 5 rupees. Then there were ten coins which belong to a late Hindu dynasty, probably A.D. 600 or 700, very common, and not very interesting, consequently are worth but little more than their value in gold—i.e., about 5 to 7 rupees. I shall offer the man about 5 rupees for each of the first, and also for second. Went to see Griffin. He told me the Abdul Rahman business had fallen through, and said he would show me a paper to-morrow which he has written about it. He wants to put up some one else. I say what I have always said, that there is no use putting up any one, the only way to settle this country is to take it ourselves; but as Government will not do that, the thing to do is to assemble the chiefs and tell them frankly that we are going, and they must settle amongst themselves who to put up, or whether to put any one up at all. They may pay revenue to no one if they like, and may all be their own masters.

If they would give me a *carte blanche*, I would soon conquer the whole country for them. I would begin gradually by annexing Jalalabad, and then get a lot of volunteers from India and Europe, and ask Government to give me two lakhs a-month, and I would go on to conquer Turkistan and Herat; then get them to give me back Kandahar, develop the trade, and be a real king in fact."

"June 7.—On committee again. Settled about followers. Cut it down to one man per horse, with great opposition from Mackenzie. Letter come recommending Kilgour, 5th Fusiliers, for Victoria Cross. Think he ought to get it. We stuck about cooking-pots, so referred it to a regimental committee, and also about number of *kahars*. These two I think we shall be able to cut down immensely, at least half. There appears to be a scare on in the Khaibar, but I should doubt its being very much.

"June 8.—Had a long talk with Nakhshband about affairs: he is very much against Abdul Rahman, and thinks the only thing to do is to divide the country—give one bit to Wali, another to Hashim, and a third to Ibrahim, who, by the way, he has a better opinion of. Went to Stewart to speak against Abdul Rahman, and I think he agrees, and was inclined to my view, that our only chance now was Yakub. I am of this opinion also. Then went to Griffin; there were a lot of fellows in the room—Christie, Hastings, &c. I asked him if it was true that there was a gathering in Kohistan, and he said

‘Yes.’ I shall begin an Intelligence Department of my own now. Then he read me a letter of Abdul Rahman to the Maidan *Maliks*, in which he told them to be ready after twenty-five days; also one from Mahamad Jan, in which he said he was bringing all the people from the south, and would come by way of Maidan, while Abdul Rahman came from Kohistan to attack us. Griffin told me that it was evident that there was going to be a rising all along the line, and that there was something in the Tira<sup>1</sup> business; but I do not think there is much fear, if people only look out what they are doing. Altogether, it looks as if we were not quite out of this business yet, and I am sure, if it will only get me promotion, I should not care. I told Griffin my ideas about Yakub, and then he showed me his memorandum, sent with his letter [No. 16, S.P.C., dated 5th June], in which he puts before them all the *pros* and *cons* of Abdul Rahman, and insists on our declaring for some one at once, and putting up some one before we leave. It certainly is about the worst hat we ever got into, and it is owing a good deal to Roberts’s way of doing business, as well as to the Government not knowing what they wanted.

“June 9.—The committee is getting on, and is nearly finished—a few days more will do it. Stewart was a good man, but there is no doubt he was surprised at Ahmad Khel. Then he is not active, and though men have confidence in him, he does not go amongst

<sup>1</sup> Tira, the country of the Orakzai (Afridis).

them nor court their liking. If I was in command, I would go amongst the men, and get known to them, and would create enthusiasm amongst them. I think they would believe in me. In to-night's paper it says Gordon resigned the Private Secretaryship, and he has written a most extraordinary letter to the paper, giving his reasons, evidently from some religious craze. . . . It is a wonderful world, and nothing should be expected but the unexpected. Went out for a ride with Hutchinson; met Stewart, and took him along with us. We all agreed Kabal might be made the best station in Asia. It has everything to recommend it—lovely climate, beautiful scenery, splendid rides and drives, boating, skating, military shooting, good food—*'only man is vile.'*

*"June 10.*—Went out for a ride round by Bala Hisar, then few papers with general and committee. We did Line gear, and did it satisfactorily. Then at four to races; saw two, one in which Adams and Thruston rode very well. My name appears in orders as Honorary Aide-de-Camp to Viceroy, which I am very sorry of.

*"June 11.*—Had a talk with Roberts about the situation. Stewart thinks we shall be attacked going out,—I hope not. Roberts agrees that it would be the best thing now to send for Yakub, and that we ought to leave this by 15th July. He has some thoughts of going by Kuram himself."

*"June 13.*—Last day of committee; have now to write the report.



"*June 14.*—The general evidently expects a row ; and I had a talk with him about the necessity of not splitting his force up too much. He ordered Hills to come to Charasia, but we could not heliograph on account of the sun being obscured. Began report of committee ; hope to get through it in a few days."

"*June 17.*—Heard there was a large gathering to the south. I hope they will come ; and if I could only get a chance of the Victoria Cross I would do, then I could go with credit. Told the general that I thought it was risky sending Gough out all by himself. Old Nakhshband came to me, and told me not to let them go too near, or the whole country would rise. I told the general. Must send some one out to select a site for a camp for Hills to-morrow."

"*June 20.*—Got a report that a reconnoitring party from Gough's camp had been fired on. If they get into a mess I shall not be sorry, as it is against my advice their going out. General told me that Hills would have to go back again, or we shall get no supplies."

"*Charasia, June 24.*—Rode out with Lockhart to Hill's camp, and saw all the fellows there—Maclean, Kennedy, &c. Dined at mess. Slept in Euan Smith's tent. His Persian servant very attentive.

"*June 25.*—Started back at eight ; hot ride ; arrived at 9.10.

"*June 26.*—Got up at four, at five started with

Roberts and party, and rode to Karez-i-Mir; road good, but stony over the Kotal; about ten miles. Went and had some fruit with Gough, and started again at eight; rode through very enclosed country—trees, walls, ditches, for four miles. Country very beautiful, then open alongside a very deep difficult ravine to pass above Kara Dushman. Walked to this, then got a change, and galloped all way to near Pai Minar; walked over that shocking bad road, then galloped to gorge, and in by 11.30. Did not feel heat much; had tub and breakfast; about three began to feel seedy.

“*Sunday, June 27.*—Slept on roof very well till 7.30, then woke, feeling seedy; effects of sun on my liver. Had long talk with general about the situation. We are in a regular hat. It is a great blunder having anything to say to Abdul Rahman, who is playing us false. His answer has come: he accepts the Amirship, and says he understands we mean to give him back all the country Dost Mahamad had, and he sent a circular to all the tribes to this effect. This put Hashim and Abdulla in a funk, and they have bolted. Our only other card now (as this must exclude Abdul Rahman) is Yakub; this too would be a blunder, but a lesser one than Abdul Rahman. It is all as I said; there is no settlement possible short of annexation, or at least military occupation, and this it must come to.

“*June 28.*—Walked to top of Shahr Darwaza by the zigzag road to the north and west. We took

forty-five minutes to ride out to the foot, and forty-five minutes to get up to level of Shahr Darwaza.<sup>1</sup> I went up slowly and steadily, and did not lose my wind, though it was rather a grind; luckily, however, we got more than half-way up in the shade, then we walked down in half an hour and rode home, getting in about ten minutes to eight. Ridgeway was in with the general about supplies. I listened and said nothing, but at end said I thought he ought to get up some from below, but he said it would be all right when the crops were cut. I doubt it, and if we had 60,000 devils dancing it is devilish few supplies we shall get. I must speak again about this to-morrow.

"*June 29.*—Shall finish committee report to-morrow, and then get commanding officers to give me their opinions, and then I will send it round to members and rewrite it. I hope it will be thought a good report. Sir Donald very amusing: he has a fund of stories and a good memory; but I am inclined to think he had no difficulties at Kandahar, and his battle of Ahmad Khel was a surprise, and he was only saved by the troops; there was no generalship shown."

"*July 2.*—My bat has come. I must get up and play tennis, this will keep me in health. Went out for a ride, went across country, tried to jump a ridi-

<sup>1</sup> Shahr Darwaza is the name of the southern heights of the gorge through which the Kabal river runs to the northern side of the city of Kabal, formed by a spur from the Takht-i-Shah.

culously small ditch, and my horse came down and fell on my leg; thought I was hurt at first, but was not. Then on, and came down again at another; did not hurt myself again. He is a brute, and cannot jump a bit; will sell him. Mahamad Afzul came in from Turkistan, gave a favourable account of Abdul Rahman. I am sure this game will not do. Ayub or even Yakub would be better. Line cut between Butkhak and Lataband; wonder if they are attacked. I must press going to Chakri<sup>1</sup> on the general again. Went for a walk with Hutchinson along Bimaru ridge, and down by Collet's; he showed me sixteen fine mules, which he wants to keep for the regimental equipment. Arranged yesterday for a trip to the Minar. The 2d Ghurkhas are to go, and part of the 67th. I should not be surprised if we found some chaps on the top, and we may have some sniping. Told Stewart I thought we should go down in parallel columns, one by our road, and the other by the higher and southern road; this really will be a good plan, and we will go by the southern. It will not be very hot, and we shall get down, I hope, pretty comfortably to the Khaibar and Peshawar. We can get on to Landi Kotal, and then into Peshawar next day. Must have a talk with Griffin to-morrow, to see when we can go. I mean to press that we go without any delay, and we might get away by 1st August, and be at Simla by 6th September, just a

<sup>1</sup> Chakri, the village of Sadu and Dadu (*vide ante*, p. 144), two notorious freebooters who gave great trouble.

year after we left, and hurrah, then, for England, home, and beauty!"

"*July 6.*—Up at four, off at five. Rode to foot of Minar Pass. The road goes by Bini Hisar, and then turns to the left, past the Amir's garden to Shewaki, where there is a somewhat rickety bridge, then through fields to where the 2d Ghurkha camp was pitched. On the way Roberts told me that he had recommended Stewart to write Lord Ripon, and propose to go directly we came to terms with Abdul Rahman, which he thinks will be in about a fortnight or three weeks, so we ought to be out of this by the 1st August. I am very glad of this. I walked up to the Minar about two miles, very steep, and the sun being in my eyes the whole way, I felt it very much; however, I never stopped once the whole way. The road is very bad, but is practicable for mules. The Minar is ninety-eight feet high and twenty-one feet in diameter at base. It is clearly Buddhist, from the way of building with layers of slate or flat thin stones; it is quite plain to near the top, where there is some ornamentation. After twenty minutes' rest walked to the top of the pass, which is about three-quarters of a mile further; from there there is a good view of the Khurd Kabal and Chakri valleys, with the Haft Kotal and Karkachar<sup>1</sup> in the distance. The country is very open and easy. There is a fine view of the Hindu Kush, which has hardly any snow on it except on two peaks; one of

<sup>1</sup> Karkachar, a spur of the Safed Koh.

these, a conical one, must be 20,000 feet, but the rest of the range not more than 15,000 feet. Of course no breakfast appeared, those delightfully useful aides-de-camp having made a mess of it. What a useless breed it is ! I hardly know an aide-de-camp that is any use at all ; they ought all to be disestablished. Rode home with Heathcote, Perkins, and Dutton ; overtook the general walking his horse. Things are brewing up for a big row in Europe, and Gladstone is bullying the Turks ; it will end in an alliance between Russia, Turkey, and Persia and the Afghans against India, and we shall get a licking."

"*July 10.*—Had a talk with Griffin about going down ; he agreed that the sooner we went after Abdul Rahman was put up the better, but talked about the 1st September. I must speak to the general about this—it will not do ; supplies will not last either here or on the Khaibar, and we must go by 1st August at latest. I want to go very much.

"Had a talk with general about going down, and recommended him to go by the 1st, and to form a camp for the sick at Marki Khel, and send them from here at once—also about getting all the ordnance down at once ; but he talked about the 10th.

"*July 11.*—Tried again to induce the general to agree to go by the 1st, but he persisted in the 10th ; however, at last he said, 'If you can show me we can go by the 1st, I have no objection.' Must go to Roberts and try and persuade him to go by the 1st.

"*July 12.*—Had a long talk with general about

the situation. The thing is in as good a mess as can be imagined, and now Abdul Rahman does not seem to like coming. I told the general I would send him an *ultimatum* to say that if he did not settle in two days we would make other arrangements. He said they had sent men to him, who were to see him and come back at once and report, and then if not satisfactory, we would write him a letter saying he must settle at once. We have played long enough with this fellow. He will not remain in a week after we go; the other party is much stronger, and wants, even now, to go at him. General says Griffin has written a memorandum objecting to all the defences being destroyed. I hope he will not give in about it.

“*July 13.*—Had committee on transport. Did not do much, as Low was not there; but we settled two points, and put it off to twelve to-morrow.”

“*July 15.*—General told me that Abdul Rahman had come to Tutam Dara, and his messengers would probably be back in a few days, two or three; then, if their report was not satisfactory, he would write a letter, and if he got no fitting reply, he would make other arrangements. Also he told me Griffin had been remonstrating against the premature retirement, and as he did not convince Stewart, he had been trying to work the press, having given a statement to Vaughan and Hensman, and Stewart is very angry. He has also had a difference of opinion with Griffin about blowing up the forts, so altogether they

do not hit it off. Stewart said that if Lord Lytton had stayed, he was going to have recalled Griffin.

"*July 16.*—At five we rode out to MacPherson's camp; they say it has been very hot. The 9th Lancers, in their small tents, look very well and compact. Ibrahim's people, at my request, wrote a petition to the general about the property they would have to leave behind. I will ask him to-morrow what he means to do with it, as I want to get him some compensation. I think we have treated these people very shabbily, and it is little to our credit."

"*July 20.*—Had a long talk with Jenkins, Roberts, and Stewart about what Government should do for the native cavalry. I said—first, give them proper *batta*; secondly, take 7 rupees, and give them 20 rupees a-month; thirdly, give them extra compensation for horses. Stewart adopted all these, and is writing a letter."

"*July 22.*—At five there was a *darbar* to recognise Abdul Rahman. Griffin said we were going to give back all the country according to treaty of Gandamak, which of course includes Kandahar. Then Stewart said a few words, but very well, and Smith put it into very good Persian; then we all went away. None of the *sardars* looked pleased, and I should not wonder if we had some trouble. Must worry out the transport idea to-morrow. Have been thinking of jotting down experiences of the campaign, only I should abuse some one or other



—and that would make enemies for me, and do me no good whatever.

“*July 23.*—General wrote and told me to order — to go and see Griffin. It appears that yesterday — had some squabble with either Karim Khan, the envoy of Abdul Rahman, or his servant, and had hit him. He apologised and paid a fine, and so all was over. Had a talk with Badcock about transport, and settled we would recommend a certain staff and leave it to Government to say who it was to be under. Must write some more about medical comforts, and necessity for better rations for the men.

“*July 24.*—Played tennis. Had another committee. Chapman was not so inclined to dissent; think we shall manage it at last, but there is not much time. Went for a ride with general, then left him, as I had to be home to go to Guides by eight. They were talking of Roberts, whom they seemed to stick up for on the whole.”

“*July 26.*—Stewart said there was something in the paper about me. That brute — called me a grim-visaged Mephistopheles—which may be very truthful, but I do not like it all the same. Had a wretched dusty ride. General heard from Commander-in-Chief; got the relief, and he said that he must go home to see his boy, who was coming out in the spring. So I suppose I must give up all hope of getting home for a year at least.”

At this time Sir Donald Stewart had been em-

powered by the Government to complete the political arrangements with Abdul Rahman, for that chief's occupation of Kabal. He was to furnish the new Amir with ten lakhs of rupees to enable him to establish his authority in the country, and to hand over the capital to his Government. The retirement of the British forces from Northern Afghanistan was then to be carried out as soon as practicable in the autumn, the dispositions being left to Sir Donald Stewart's discretion.

In fact, the position of affairs, as described by Mr Lepel Griffin, certainly now appeared more favourable. The firm and decided tone in which the Sardar had been addressed, the precision and definiteness of the conditions which had been laid down as necessary for his acceptance, had had the anticipated effect.

Abdul Rahman had seen that the British Government had been fully informed of the game he had been playing, that trickery and treachery would not be tolerated, and that, if he intended coming to a settlement with the Indian Government at all, he must be prepared to accept the terms offered to him rather than dictate his own.

## CHAPTER VI.

## KABAL TO KANDAHAR.

1880.

*"They call to the dirk, the claymore, and the targe,  
To the march and the muster, the line and the charge."*

THE MAIWAND DISASTER—LOSS OF HONOUR—DRAWING UP THE PROGRAMME—THE KABAL-KANDAHAR FORCE—A VACANT BRIGADE—APPOINTED BRIGADIER-GENERAL—OFF TO KANDAHAR—THE FAMOUS MARCH—A REGULAR PACE—LONG DISTANCES—THE KHAN AGHA—AN A L STAFF—FORTRESSES OF GHAZNI—FIELD OF AHMAD KHEL—CIVIL BY ORDER—SORTIE OF DEH KHWAJA—KALAT-I-GHILZAI—ROBERTS IS READY—BATTLE OF KANDAHAR—A BRILLIANT SUCCESS—AT KANDAHAR—HOMEWARD BOUND—MARCH TO QUETTA—FAREWELL TO GENERAL ROBERTS.

"*July 28.*—The general told me a telegram had come from the Foreign Office to say Burrows' brigade had been attacked by Ayub, and disastrously defeated and dispersed, many officers killed, and the men bolting all over the country—no more. St John and the *Wali* had returned. What effect this will have on the country it is impossible to say; it will

raise the whole country there at least, and possibly here it will buck up the Sher Ali faction, and all who have joined Abdul Rahman will now leave him. I came back and at once set to work to think what I had better do. I have been thinking whether it would be a good thing to offer to go and join at Kandahar, and see what could be done. I might get in, and instil a little life into them, and raise the Hazaras in Ayub's rear, and at all events get him to retreat.

"*July 29.*—No more news. Found Roberts in with Stewart; he had arranged all about the 1st Division going. I said I thought no troops should go from Kabal, and to send any would be a strategical and political blunder. It is an infernal nuisance. The whole thing may have to be done all over again, unless they can localise the war. I have not sent my telegram about going myself, and half think I will not. Have promised to go and show some fellows the scene of the cavalry action.

"*July 30.*—Telegram came saying that a number of officers had escaped, some killed and wounded; not so many as I thought, and none I know. E-B, R.H.A.,<sup>1</sup> lost two guns. It is not so bad in the way of losses as I thought, but *worse for our honour*, as they ought all to have been killed. Ayub had thirty-five guns. I wonder if there were any Russian officers there. If Ayub now goes on to Kandahar, it may be a good thing; but if he goes up to Ghazni,

<sup>1</sup> Major G. F. Blackwood's battery of Horse Artillery.

we shall have to attack him. Told Stewart my opinion that it would be less a strategical than a political blunder to send troops from here; every effort should be made to localise the war. He agreed with me, and said he had telegraphed to that effect. A telegram from Johnson<sup>1</sup> also said that the 4th Cavalry, 3d and 4th Native Infantry, were on the way up; so there ought soon to be enough, and our force could not get there till it was too late. I hope they will not send them, as it would be a fatal error to do so.

“*July 31.*—Got through a power of work; made the programme of withdrawal. In afternoon Roberts came in and had a talk. I think he came with an object, but he did not disclose it. I wrote a letter, asking him to take me with a brigade, but did not send it. Stewart and he went off to camp; they say Abdul Rahman will not come to our camp.

“*Aug. 1.*—Waited to see if there would be a *darbar*; but about four heard there was to be none, so determined not to go till the morning. If there is nothing, I can ride back again. Telegram from ‘Foreign’ says Burrows brought in a portion of his force, so I fancy it is not so bad; but it may be worse in another way. Ayub may come up towards Ghazni, and that may necessitate our going to lick him. In that case I shall hold out that not less than 7500 infantry shall go; shall telegraph to

<sup>1</sup> Colonel (now Sir C.) C. Johnson, Deputy Quartermaster-General in India.

Greaves about it. Wrote to Roberts asking for a brigade; I wonder what he will answer. There seems a good deal of excitement among Abdul Rahman's troops, and I should not be surprised if there was a row out there, then they would see what nonsense it was sending these small forces out. Will they never learn?

"Aug. 2.—Made out a programme for force<sup>1</sup> to march to Ghazni. 1st *Brigade*—92d, 2d Ghurkhas, 23d Pioneers, 24th Panjab Native Infantry; 2d *Brigade*—72d Highlanders, 5th Ghurkhas, 2d Sikhs, and 3d Sikhs; 3d *Brigade*—60th Rifles, 15th Sikhs, 4th Ghurkhas, 25th Panjab Native Infantry; *Cavalry*—9th Lancers, Central India Horse, 3d Panjab Cavalry, 3d Bengal Cavalry; *Artillery*—6-8 screw-guns, 11-9 and No. 2 Mountain Batteries, A-B and G-3, R.A. Roberts said, 'No field artillery,' and he cut off A-B, R.H.A., and G-3, R.A., but I got him to agree to the rest, so he took it in to Stewart; and when I was in the room in the afternoon, Stewart did not like it at all, and talked of retiring on the day Roberts left. I do not think he should retire, but go in to Logar, and take up a position about Amir Kila, so as to watch Logar and Wardak for about eight days, and then retire over the Shutargardan, or open communica-

<sup>1</sup> This force was detailed for special service under Lieutenant-General Sir F. Roberts, and styled the "Kabal-Kandahar Force." 1st Brigade under MacPherson, 2d under Baker, 3d under General Barter, who was afterwards replaced by Brigadier-General MacGregor.

tion with it, and stay at Khushi. Then Bright on the same day should retire all his troops on Gandamak, and so to India as he pleased. Roberts would then go on, and if he licked Ayub near Ghazni, would retire by the Gomal, or, if he went to Kandahar, by the Bolan or Thal-Chotali or Zhob. But I do not think there should be any force sent, unless it was absolutely necessary; that is, unless Ayub came up all 'cockahoop,' and then he must be licked. I rather hope there will be no necessity to send a force, and we shall get back in peace; but, if one goes, I must go with it. Roberts said he would try to get me as Brigadier-General, 3d Brigade; and as I would like to be in one good fight, that would do very well. Stewart does not like this: he is looking careworn. There is no *darbar* to-day. I rode out, but only got a couple of miles over the Pai Minar when I met them all coming back. This is a terrible *fiasco*. As old Nakhshband says, if Abdul won't trust us so far, how can we trust him? and if he pleads fear of his troops now, what will he do hereafter? It is a very miserable solution to the whole thing. There seems every chance of our having a devil of a flare-up before we go. It would not be half a bad thing if we gave both Abdul Rahman and Ayub a good thrashing before we go, but we must go at once. I do not see how we are to feed our force if we go. We cannot carry large supplies with us, and as the whole country will be hostile, it will be very difficult to get enough. Roberts is very daring,

and will risk anything to get *kudos* out of this. I am afraid I could not get more than what I shall get now.

“*Aug. 3.*—Went in to Stewart early; found him poring over Roberts’s memorandum, which he did not seem to like. Asked me my opinion. I said ‘I agreed with Roberts entirely.’ Then sent off orders about Central India Horse—11-9 to Bright, and 11-11 and A-B, to Hills, also for 6-11 to go down with 12-9. Asked Roberts about the 3d Brigade; he seemed to be anxious to have me.

“*Aug. 4.*—Wrote to Stewart last night, and asked him to put me into Barter’s brigade. He first said it was not vacant; but if it was, he would recommend me, and later on he did so; now it rests with Chief. The details of the Kandahar business came to-day; *very bad business*. Ayub advanced in good order, in line, with reserves; cavalry on right and left, and artillery at intervals. They fired from seven to one; then infantry and cavalry advanced, and the Bombay regiments bolted on to the 66th, and there was a skedaddle—1250 lost, 2 guns, and 700 Sniders, 400 Martini.<sup>1</sup> All the 66th must have been cut up—in fact, a regular bad business, as bad as anything that has ever happened to our arms, and worse than anything in my time in India. This makes them more and more anxious to go; so I suppose there is no putting it off. I am not so confident,

<sup>1</sup> *Killed*—20 officers, 914 men; *wounded and missing*—9 officers, 166 men. Lost 7 guns and howitzers.



and should not be so sure we may not do something rash, and rush at them without waiting to see how they were posted ; but there is no doubt we shall have a picked force, with picked leaders, and perhaps we shall pull through. I must impress on Roberts the necessity for great caution and good intelligence. I do hope we shall make a good thing of it, as it will be the making of me. I should like to get one or two not very bad wounds, which would necessitate my going home. I think it is a great shame they have not brought out some honours before this. We all lose by it, and it shows a great want of appreciation of the way to manage soldiers, who should get frequent fillips during a campaign, especially a long one.

"*Aug. 5.*—To-day Barter's papers came in. It all rests with the Chief now, and Greaves,<sup>1</sup> because if he will help me, it will be all right. Oh that I may get it [the vacant brigade] ! I feel sure I shall succeed, as I will anywhere on my own resources. This staff work does not suit me ; it cramps and cabins one's energies, and leaves me no initiation. It has played the devil with me, and if I can only escape I shall do ; so if we go to Kandahar, and on to Herat, I might possibly end by getting a V.C. after all. Have felt so worried and uncertain all along all day, could not settle to anything. Oh ! if I can only go, and if with the 3d Brigade I can have a devil's own fight, I shall do.

<sup>1</sup> Major-General Sir George Greaves, Adjutant-General in India since October 1879.

"Aug. 6.—A note from Roberts came to congratulate me, so it is all right.<sup>1</sup> Put Lockhart in orders to succeed me, and engaged all day in clearing off and getting off the committee reports. Every one congratulates me. Cunyngham said he thought every one in the army would be glad. The brigade is a splendid one; the 60th are very fit and keen, 4th Ghurkhas the best in the service, 15th Sikhs magnificent, and 25th very good. I ought to do something. Perkins came in and said he thought our going and leaving the force here was the maddest thing out. I shall write to Stewart, so as to be on the safe side, and propose that he (Stewart) should go into camp, and move up towards Logar, so as to threaten it and Wardak.

"Aug. 7.—Up at five, off at six with Roberts. First we went into Low's, then to Jimmy Hills's camp, under Siah-Sang, and then to my brigade to see the transport. Found all the mules, striped, and a very fine lot, all hired. The 4th Ghurkhas, who have *yabrus*, are not half so fit. Saw the commanding officers of each regiment. The 15th Sikhs look a splendid regiment, at least as far as *physique* of the men go, and I hope they will turn out well. Then home. Every one congratulating me, and I think all are glad. I think I am liked as well as looked

<sup>1</sup> "Under instructions from Army Headquarters, Colonel C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I., was appointed, on 6th August, to the command of the 3d Brigade of the Kabal-Kandahar force, in place of Brigadier-General Barter, invalided."

up to, and all believe me a good soldier ; I am sure I hope I shall prove so. I am not yet forty, and am a brigadier-general. I doubt if many men have got the rank so young as I am. My contemporaries are mostly junior ; and now if we only get a chance of a fight, and I do not make a mess of it, I shall have a name second to none in the Indian army.

“*Aug. 8.*—[First day’s march—Sherpur to Bini Hisar, six miles.] Up at 5.30 A.M. Brigade formed up. Rode to head of column, and, sounding the advance, marched off at 6.30 in columns of fours from right. We went due east over the *Chaman*, for a mile or two, and then struck a road from Butkhak to Bini Hisar, and got into camp without going through the village at all. Rode on to head of column, and then stood to see all pass. Much of the baggage was badly loaded, so I issued an order on the subject, and wrote some orders for the line of march, which I shall show Roberts. Told him I had issued orders about each regiment turning out as strong as possible. In the evening Sir Donald came out and said ‘Good-bye’ to every one. The men all turned out and cheered him ; the soldiers believe in him. To-day I bought a *kilta* (load) of grapes, and sent them to the Rifles ; shall do so to all my regiments. I must go amongst the men, and talk to them, so that they will get to know me. Before we get to Kandahar they will swear by me. I know how to get at soldiers’ hearts !

“*Aug. 9.*—[Second day’s march—Bini Hisar to

Zaidabad, fourteen miles.] Up at three. Off at 4.30. Went and stood at the bridge to see everything off. Stayed till nearly six, and saw 2d Reserve Ammunition and Field Hospital, and left strict orders about the rest; but owing to the narrowness of the road, they were very much delayed, and they did not all get off till eight. Beyond the Kotal of White's Hill halted for nearly an hour to let the baggage close up, and so we went on, I halting whenever necessary, and the consequence was we got on well. When we came into the open, I formed open column of companies, and made the men march at open order, with loose files. This makes it easier and cooler for the men and they get less dust. Issued a lot of orders, copies of which I must get and keep, as they will be useful both to me and others. The 1st Brigade, I hear, did not get off till 10.30, and did not get in here till fully 6.30, so they were out all day. Very bad arrangement, the animals standing loaded for hours together. To-morrow we march behind the 1st Brigade; but I must try and find another road, and try and get in nearly as quick as them, otherwise we shall not get in till awfully late. Wrote to general, and suggested I should find a new road from the beginning; but he would not agree, so I must do what I can to get another road after crossing the river. I am not very confident in our disposition, and am afraid that we are splitting our force up too much. They say we shall have to fight at Ghazni against the guns that Stewart left behind!

“*Aug. 10.*—[Third day’s march—Zaidabad to Zargunshahar, thirteen miles.] Up at three, off at four. This is a mistake. The animals got loaded in the dark, and are consequently loaded badly, and practically at four you cannot see an inch, so you do not really get off till 4.30. We got jammed with MacPherson’s brigade, and could not get on. If I had taken my own road, I would have been in here at least an hour before. After passing the river, where the water was only up to a man’s knees, we got to a nasty water-cut, with a narrow bridge, and after that it was all over an open stony plain. I march in open order as usual. Gave out orders—*one* about not loading till a bugle sounded, *another* about sending animals out for forage immediately on arrival, and a *third* about marching animals on as broad a front as possible. In the evening went round the hospitals to see the men who fell out; found some fever and a curious morning vomiting. Went and inspected all the transport animals, and gave orders that the men were not to carry their great-coats. Sent for the quartermaster-sergeant of Rifles, who always goes with the camp colourmen; told him to march at the head of the column 100 paces a-minute, and keep it steadily; this will save the men immensely. I like all my commanding officers, and I hope in time the brigade will like me; I want a good fight.

“*Aug. 11.*—[Fourth day’s march—Zargunshahar to Patkao Roghani, sixteen and a half miles.] Up

at three, off at four. March to Patkao Roghani, over undulating, bare, stony, then open plain for some eleven miles, then water. Halted to water column, baggage all well up. On for three miles, baggage still up; then on for four more, when we got into an intricate country, with water-cuts and cultivation. Passed Jabir Kala; very hot; the men much done up, as also the baggage-animals. This is a great mistake, knocking up animals. Got in very hot. Found no room for my tent, and my baggage delayed because MacPherson crossed it. In the evening went round and placed all the pickets, and visited the baggage-animals of 25th and 4th Ghurkhas. My regiments march very strong. I hope there will be no row to-night. Report says there is no gathering nearer than Ghazni, so we shall get through the Tangi-Wardak<sup>1</sup> all right. At Ghazni we shall probably have a fight. Phayre has been ordered not to go forward till he is quite strong, so we may get there before him; this will be good for us, as it will add to the prestige which already hangs over us.

“*Aug. 12.*—[Fifth day's march—Patkao to Amir Kala, eleven miles.] Up at four, off at five. March through centre of Logar. Road very good, but very narrow, with small stone bridges over very numerous water-cuts, and a very difficult country to fight over. However, I do not suppose these fellows would ever fight in it; and if they did, I should out-

<sup>1</sup> Tangi-Wardak, a defile leading from the Logar valley into the Wardak country between Shekhabad and Amir Kala.

flank them, and so turn them out. Did not get in till 11.30, not more than eight miles in six and a half hours. Several very strong forts scattered about. A most awful hash, as usual, about our baggage, by which that of the 2d Brigade crossed ours, and kept it back. Roberts sent the 2d Brigade and cavalry over the Zamburak Pass. The troops got over, though it was very difficult (7000 feet elevation), but the baggage of the 2d Brigade did not, and so they are to-night without any food, and the force is divided into three parts. I am camped in a regular punch-bowl, surrounded by hills, which command the camp in every direction. I have 200 men on picket, and 200 more ready, but I do not like it, and hope the night will pass quietly. I have to go through the Tangi-Wardak to-morrow, but have been given no information as to whether there is any enemy, so I shall have to act as if there was. Roberts wants me to go to Haidar Khel, but I think it is too far.

"*Aug.* 13.—[Sixth day's march—Amir Kala to Haidar Khel, twelve miles.] Up at three, off at 4.30. Road good enough through the Tangi-Wardak, but very narrow, with large number of water-cuts, the valley gradually narrowing to about half a mile, with great deal of cultivation and numerous strong little forts. I put the whole of the Ghurkhas on rear-guard, and divided the baggage into three, and sent a regiment with each, so as to give them sufficient protection. I halted at Doaba for two

hours, then rode on to where the roads from the Tangi and the Zamburak Pass meet, when, having sent the column on, I went under some trees on the bank of the Shiniz and had breakfast. Here I met the Khan Agha,<sup>1</sup> the most powerful chief of Herat, and head of the Jamshidis; had a long talk with him. He was very anxious for us to go to Herat, saying it was ours—' *Zar Khand!*' Got into camp about two, not very hot. My last regiment not in till 5.15, but the 1st Brigade were not in till seven. To-morrow we have a long march. The Shiniz<sup>2</sup> valley is narrow, with bleak but easy hills on each side. They say there are no more difficulties of road. Went in the evening to see Ross and Morton.

"Aug. 14.—[Seventh day's march—Haidar Khel to Shasgao, sixteen miles.] Up at three, off at four. Blew the 'load' at 3.40, and the head of the column began to move at 4.20. We got on all right till five, when we came in to the tail of Baker's baggage, and old Ross sent me an order to halt; and though I asked to be allowed to find a road for myself, he would not let me, but made me halt one and a half hours, and then said I might go. So I went. Turning off the road to the left, I found that

<sup>1</sup> See Yate's 'Afghan Boundary Commission,' p. 229. After Ayub's defeat, Khan Agha (Jamshidi) intrigued among the tribes of the Chahar Aimak against the Herati chief. While thus occupied, he was seized by Faiz Mahamad Khan and Mahamad Sadik Khan, chiefs of the Tulak and Tagas Ishlan sections of the Taimani tribe, taken to Herat, and handed over to Ayub, who put him to death.

<sup>2</sup> The upper waters of the Logar river are called the Shiniz.



we could get along all right, and so we did ; but the halt in the cool of the morning was fatal, and though I got in at 1.30, sixty-eight men fell out. The country is an open bleak valley about five miles broad, with a fair amount of cultivation and water. The Shiniz runs through it, and villages are met every five miles. The hills on east and west are bare and rocky, but there are evidently passes through them at intervals. To-morrow my brigade is on rear-guard, and I am not going to move till ten or so ; then I shall send off my baggage, keep all but the 25th, and go over the pass in order. To-morrow we get to Ghazni. I am lucky getting a brigade at my age, but I should have done better five years ago, as I was more active. It is very easy work commanding a brigade. It is quite cool at night, and I had to put on my *choga* at dinner and shut up my tent. I have got an A 1 staff.

“Aug. 15.—[Eighth day — Shasgao to Ghazni, fifteen miles.] As I was on rear-guard, I did not sound the rouse till 7.45 ; the baggage of the other brigades, however, got off by 7.30, so that I might have started then. However, got all the animals a good feed, and let the men have their breakfast, and we went off very calmly, and marched at a steady pace of three miles an hour. The last four miles were very hot. The Sher Dahan Pass (9000 feet) is a pass only in name, the ascent and descent being very gradual. It is also not defensible, as the hills on either side are so easy that it

could be turned in any direction. Owing to the gradual slopes of the hills, I should also doubt whether it would ever be stopped in the winter. The road goes to the east of a spur, at the end of which is Ghazni. This is a poor place, and is commanded; but still, if defended, might give a lot of trouble. There are two very curious *minars* here, of which no one seems to know the origin, and Mahmud's tomb. Did not go; as I had had such a grilling, I did not feel inclined; besides, I have got a cold, and am feverish. Got in at three, men quite fit. Reported to general, and he was very civil, and gave me some grapes. Hear he is going to march to beyond Ahmad Khel to-morrow, and that a gathering is to be got up to follow us up. Hope not.

"Aug. 16.—[Ninth day—Ghazni to Yarghati, twenty miles.] Marched at 4.30. Much delayed by narrow roads and water-cuts; however, had a good look at Ghazni, which seems to me to be capable of being made an extremely strong place. And it is very strong even now against anything but very heavy artillery, as, though commanded from the Balal hill, the command could easily be defiladed. I think if there is water, it could hold out for ever against these fellows; and if it had been determinedly held, we should have had very great difficulty in getting in. Sir Donald Stewart said you could ride your horse into it; unless he could jump forty or fifty feet high, you certainly could not. The place is extremely picturesque and beautiful,

and there are a large number of fruit-gardens around. The march then went out on to a desolate plain, which continued mostly to Nani. At Chihal Bacha Gum, five miles, however, there were some fine plane-trees, a shrine, and water—a very desirable hot-weather residence for a *fakir*. On the road met some men from Dera Ishmail. They were traders, and came by the Gomal Pass, and said there was a road by Sirufza, by which Bannu could be reached in four days. . . . At Nani we had to turn off the road, and unload and feed our animals by simply cutting down what fields we wanted. This is the only way to make war. No doubt it puts the people against you, but I doubt if you would have much more trouble in the long-run, as by our way of paying they despise us. Put up my tent, and so got shade, and had breakfast; then on six miles to Yarghati. Passed over field of Ahmad Khel; very large number of graves; good fight, but Stewart *was* surprised. Not very hot, cool wind blowing; dust on arrival in camp awful. Was brigadier-general of day, but found I had nothing particular to do. To-morrow I march first.

“Aug. 17.—[Tenth day—Yarghati to Chardeh, thirteen miles.] Up at three, off at 4.30. Marched to Chardeh. Road very good all way, through a desolate-looking but well watered and cultivated district. My brigade was leading. Morton came and told me to form mass of columns. The cavalry baggage got in right amongst ours; tried to find the

officer, and would have put him under arrest, but did not. It was very hot, and I felt it more, as I have a nasty feverish cough. My dodge for shade is a very good one, and consists only of the bathroom and one pole; it gives shade for about six people. Letters came from Tanner, commanding, and Yate, political, at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, dated 12th, to say they were all right, and were not beleaguered; but Smith tells me they are: I think he is a bit of an alarmist. I am on rear-guard to-morrow, and shall form my regiments in columns in echelon, so as to be ready to flank the baggage or form square in any direction.

"Aug. 18.—[Eleventh day—Chardeh to Karez-i-Oba, sixteen and a half miles.] I was on rear-guard, so did not start till 6.30. For six miles through well-cultivated but uninteresting country, then over a desert flat; good soil, but no water. The water you do come to is simply splendid; there is much more of it than in Persia. I did not get in till 4.30, but owing to a cool breeze it was not very hot. Suggested arrangements about followers being inspected and carried, also about marching in three brigades, and the general adopted both suggestions. Baker came and talked about the pickets, and we all agreed that it would be better to leave brigadiers alone to look after their own camps. Am feeling much better, cold gone. I posted my own pickets, and must do so always. In the evening talked to some men of the Ghurkhas and 25th about possibility of a fight: they seem in good heart.

"*Aug.* 19.—[Twelfth day—Karez-i-Oba to Mukkur, fourteen miles.] To-day marched to Mukkur. General agreed to try my dodge of marching in three parallel columns. I started at 4.30, but found the other two had gone some time before, and in my attempt to catch them up, my baggage straggled so much I was obliged to halt for nearly an hour, and also to make frequent halts afterwards. Our road was over an open plain covered with sand and camel-thorn, and much cut up by water-courses. We got to a river at eleven, and as that ass — never told me of it, we were delayed in making a crossing, and so the rear-guard, which might have been in by twelve, did not arrive till two. However, my baggage was all in, but Baker's was stretching over some eight miles of country. People civil, they say apologetically, 'by order' The division of Mukkur is very fertile; plenty cultivated villages, and water; good climate. Once belonged to Hazaras, who have been kicked out by Afghans. Many Povindah encampments

"*Aug.* 20 —[Thirteenth day—Mukkur to Panjak (Kalà-i-Juma), twenty-one miles] Marched at same hour. They told us we were going to do twelve miles, and they went on twenty-one miles; and the only water was filthy, so the men were much done up. The baggage of the other brigades, as usual, all over the place; so instead of an orderly advance, it looked like the disorganised retreat of a beaten army. Did not get in till 2.30, my rear-guard at 7.15; men

beat. All this to try and cut into Kandahar before Phayre. The general may be exposing his force to be defeated in detail, and Phayre too; whereas, if both got there together, the result must be success. Now it only *may be*, possibly will be, but it is not *certain*, and any risks are unnecessary. What I would do would be to leave the garrison in Kalat-i-Ghilzai with all my *langra lula*, and halt there a day to pull every one together; then go to Kandahar in five sixteen-mile marches, and one short one in. This is the right thing to do.

"Aug. 21.—[Fourteenth day—Panjak to Kajai, thirteen miles.] Marched at four to a place called Kajai, thirteen miles along the road, which was very good, bar a few ravines. Any amount of water; so we got in very comfortably at 11.20. Very hot all day. A heliogram from Kalat-i-Ghilzai says the Kandahar garrison made a sortie, and Brooke is killed, eight officers wounded, and 200 men killed and wounded; no date or reason for making it. I trust Roberts will wait for Phayre, and get in at the same time. I must get a chance of telling him so. I was the first who pointed this out, and Ross and Baker certainly agree with me.

"Aug. 22.—[Fifteenth day—Kajai to Baba Kazai, seventeen and a half miles.] Rouse at one, off at 2.30. Fine moonlight night. Had to get past the 2d Brigade; great delay in getting off, so that by 3.30 we had done very little: then, however, we slipped along. I walked till about 4.30. Country low, undu-

lating hills, with Tarnak river, seldom visible, in deep ravines on the left. It has a deal of Indian corn on both banks. Road intersected by nasty deep ravines. 1st Brigade could not get on; off road. Frightful confusion amongst baggage—always must be, under this *régime*, which is supremely happy-go-lucky. General issued an order for extra issue of rum and meat; very good of him, but there is none to give! News that Kandahar sent sortie to take village of Deh Khwaja; got in, but had to go back, losing quarter of their number. Wood, March (7th Fusiliers), Brooke, Gordon, *killed*; Shewell, Malcolmson, &c., *wounded*. Wretched business. Roberts told me they were going to halt at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and I believe we are going regular marches after that.

“Aug. 23 —[Sixteenth day—Baba Kazai to Kalat-i-Ghilzai, sixteen and a half miles.] Rouse at one, off at 2.30. Did very well till it got light; then MacPherson, who was leading, began to dawdle, so we did not get in till eleven. Last part very hot; road very good, with ravines; river close on left, with large amount of cultivation. Close in, met Gordon of Sind Horse; he did *not* ask me to breakfast. Roberts, as usual, came to see us pass, and told me the 60th were not to be put on rear-guard again. I am afraid we shall have some very nasty fighting in walled villages, in which we shall lose a lot of men. Very hot; did nothing—slept all day. Halt to-morrow. Shall go and see the fort, which looks a very strong place. A wing of Baluchis has been sent

on to Jaldak, so the country must be pretty quiet. I shall try and get away immediately after Kandahar

"*Aug. 24.*—[Seventeenth day—halt.] No march. Had a delicious sleep till six. Lovely night, beautifully cool. Then at seven rode up to fort; went all over it. There is an immense deal more room in it than one supposes, and if the buildings were only arranged in order, with the stores and animals below, and men's quarters above, there would really be an immense deal of room in it. It is very strong indeed, as near impregnable as any place I ever saw. Bomb-proof quarters for the men could easily be made, and there is a very copious perennial stream right in the middle. I should like to have the making of it. There is enough ground and water within range of the guns to grow all the supplies of every sort that would be necessary for the garrison. Fuel is a difficulty, but forests of willows could easily be grown down by the river-side. Went to general, and was glad to find that now he has given up the idea of double marches, and has written to open communication with Phayre. I think it very likely that Ayub will bolt now: I shall not be sorry.

"*Aug. 25.*—[Eighteenth day—Kalat-i-Ghilzai to Jaldak, fifteen miles.] Marched at 2.30 along the right bank of the Tarnak. Road very good all the way, though with a few nasty *nalas*, which are, however, practicable for artillery. We stepped out, and did not halt, so at eight we were in sight of



camp. Very cool and nice up to then. Got in at 9.15. General, as usual, met us, said we were to have no more long marches. Found my little tent pitched: it is a capital arrangement, as I can carry it on the breakfast-pony, and it gives enough shade for four men to have breakfast, and for two to lie down. I also always carry a towel, as it is very refreshing to get a wash. Was brigadier-general of the day, and went round on my pony. Must be more particular next time I go round. Put in an order about men saluting, as they are very slack in this brigade. Orders say we are to go seventeen miles to-morrow to Tirandaz, so the talk about a short march is all bosh. We shall have a devil of a fight. I only hope I shall get out of it with nothing worse than a wound.

“*Aug.* 26.—[Nineteenth day—Jaldak to Tiran-daz, sixteen miles.] Marched at three, my brigade in rear. We got along very slowly, owing to the way the 1st Brigade dawdled. The cavalry baggage, as usual, lapped round and surrounded us. I stopped it, but it was no use, and by the time we got in, it was all round us again. Nothing worse can be conceived. Wrote and reported it. I found my camp pitched in a most extraordinary fashion, in three blocks facing different ways; reported it. When we got in, heard Ayub had raised the siege and gone to the Argandab, whence he can either go by Khakrez to Herat or up to Ghazni. General sent for us all, and the result is the cavalry go on to

Rabat to-morrow, while we go half-way. I said I thought we ought to stop here till we heard more of what was going on, as we should only have to retrace our steps, if Ayub was coming up the Argandab. Now we see the folly of giving up Kalat-i-Ghilzai, as Ayub must get into the Tarnak at that place; and if he gets there before us, we may have to besiege it.

"*Aug. 27.*—[Twentieth day—Tirandaz to Pomazai, fifteen miles.] Marched at 2.30. We were the 2d Brigade, and got off early, and went well all the way. Road good, and no stoppages, so got in by 8.10, while it was quite cool. Had my tent all pitched by ten, fortunately, for it was very hot indeed all day. Roberts has got a go of fever, and is laid up. I hope he will pick up, or we shall be left to the tender mercies of —, and that will be awful. Roberts is at all events go-ahead and decided. Heliogram from Kandahar says that Ayub is intrenching himself at the Baba Wali and Murcha Kotals; but this may only be a blind, as we also hear he is making ready to be off. I think we should now go from Rabat into the Argandab, and come down on his rear: this will make him bolt, and we can follow him up till he gets clear of Zamindawar, and we shall pick up any guns he has to leave behind, and that will be quite enough for us, and I hope they will then let us go back to India as fast as we can. I hope I shall get through all right, and get to Simla and Calcutta.

"*Aug. 28.*—[Twenty-first day—Pomazai to Ra-

bat, nineteen miles.] Marched at 2.30. Being the leading regiment, got on first-rate till eight, when Ross sent us an order to go round by the canal, which increased the distance by some three miles, and we did not get in till about 10.30. It was very hot indeed, and the men were much done up. Hot all day; did nothing but slept a couple of hours. I was brigadier-general of the day. Went round about the pickets, and then to see general. He talks of making a march all night, and assaulting Baba Wali at daybreak. I think this is too much for one day, and am, besides, of opinion we should cut in to the Argandab, and come down on his rear, while Phayre attacked in front. Roberts is ready, but he may put off till Phayre's<sup>1</sup> arrival. I want the Argandab scheme, as I think, if it is adopted, we shall gain all our objects without fighting. MacPherson is all for attacking in front. I would send the cavalry round to the Herat road. News says they are determined to fight. Every one says the mismanagement at Kandahar has been quite terrible. I think — and — should be tried by court-martial. Phayre is to be at Mandi Hisar on the 2d, five days hence. We can afford to wait till then, though it would have been better if we had not come here in such a hurry, and it would not have had the appearance of indecision. I wish it was all over.

<sup>1</sup> Major-General Phayre, commanding 2d Division, Southern Afghanistan Field Force, advancing from Quetta.

“*Aug. 29.*—[Twenty-second day—halted.] Had a long sleep, and lie down all day. Very hot, 101°; not so bad as yesterday, though. I suppose Kandahar will not be worse. Gaselee<sup>1</sup> gave me a memorandum about a road from this to the Argandab, and I sent it on with a letter to Roberts pointing out that the proper way was to go to the Argandab, and then down on Ayub’s rear; but he sent no answer, and when I went to see him this evening, he said he was too seedy to read it even. We march to Mohmand to-morrow, and to cantonments, Kandahar, the next day; so I suppose we are going to attack in front, a great mistake. And there will be great loss of life if they fight, which perhaps they will not. My brigade will have to lead. There seems to have been the most awful imbecility at Kandahar, and ———— should be recalled. Phayre is not expected before the 10th, so we shall not wait for him. I shall go and reconnoitre the pass directly we get in.

“*Aug. 30.*—[Twenty-third day—Rabat to Mohmand, seven and a half miles.] Marched at 3.30. The 2d Brigade got off the road, going a great deal more to the right, and so we, who went right, had to wait for them. The road went over a level plain of good soil cut up with water-courses from the Logar. We were much delayed on the road, and did not get in till 8.30. Very hot again to-day. Went to see the general, who is much better. Was glad to hear he

<sup>1</sup> Captain A. Gaselee, Bengal Staff Corps, D.A.Q.M.G.

had no idea of going straight to the Baba Wali Pass, which is strongly intrenched, and is very difficult; but he means to go round. Primrose recommended him to send his cavalry to the north-west, and to *scatter* his infantry!! To-morrow MacPherson's brigade takes possession of the Karez hill. I do not suppose there will be much, if any, opposition. Then we go round by the south end of the ridge, perhaps not next day, but the day after, when Roberts gets all right. I wish it was all over, but the general said he did not wish to lose lives. I am glad of this; but these fellows mean fighting, and are said to have 30,000 men, and there is some one who knows what he is about with them.

"Aug. 31.—[Twenty-fourth day—Mohmand to Kandahar, thirteen miles. Total, 301½ miles from Kabal.] Marched at 2.30 over a dead level plain, and got to Shikarpur gate at 8.30. Here was a scene of the most indescribable confusion, as all the baggage had cut in and surrounded the troops. The men got some food, and the natives had to buy what they wanted. At 10.30 we got off, and got to the Karez hill. No opposition, put out my pickets, and had a much too extensive line given me. A very hot, disagreeable day. Presently an order came for me to supply a regiment for a reconnaissance<sup>1</sup> which was to go out. They went out

<sup>1</sup> A reconnaissance *en force* under General Gough found Ayub's troops intrenched at Pir Paimal. The enemy followed Gough's reconnaissance back to Old Kandahar, where MacGregor's brigade had to turn out under arms to repel the attack and cover retirement of Gough.

and were attacked, and retired on my position, consequently brought an attack down on it, which went on for three hours, some of the time pretty hot. However, we never gave them a chance; they went on sniping all night. Very demoralising being attacked by an unseen enemy. We lost only ten men, though (one killed, nine wounded).

"*Kandahar, Sept. 1.*—At six went to the general, and he explained his plan of attack. There were a whole heap of officers there—the Kandahar heroes, —, —, and Co.—looking very cheap. He proposed sending cavalry to left to draw enemy out, and then attacking Paimal with 1st and 2d Brigades; but the enemy were too soon, and so cavalry did not get out till 10.30. Then brigades went and drove them back, till it ended in a very complete rout by 12.30. It has been a brilliant success, and we have got all Ayub's guns. Poor Maclaine<sup>1</sup> was found murdered—his throat cut. I looked at him; he seemed an unusually fine fellow. There were a lot of tents, some of them ours. Then we came home, getting in by 4.30. Poor Brownlow, 72d, killed, also Frome and Straton.<sup>2</sup> Our losses about 200, enemy about 200 killed. The 92d and 72d Highlanders did it all, and drove them before them like sheep; a very brilliant feat, and one to take the shine out of the Bombay fellows. Their

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant Hector Maclaine, of Major Blackwood's battery R.H.A., had been taken at Maiwand, and was a prisoner in Ayub's camp.

<sup>2</sup> Captain Straton, 22d Foot, Superintendent of Army Signalling.

regiments are very puny and wretched, and not fit to fight the Afghans.

"*Sept. 2.*—Slept till seven. Nothing doing all day; very hot and beastly. If this sort of thing goes on long, I shall get ill—congestion of liver. Heat immediately knocks me up. Went in the evening to Brownlow's funeral. The stench of the dead bodies was awful; lost my way coming back.

"*Kandahar, Sept. 3.*—Did not get up till eight. Went over to see the quarters told off for my brigade—very unhealthy-looking; then went to the general's quarters. He is looking very ill. Got back very hot. Did not feel the heat much. In evening went with Baker to the citadel, and called on the 7th and 66th; saw a lot of fellows—do not know who they all were. I should say it was very hot and unhealthy in the citadel; wonder they do not order them out. We have taken thirty-four guns, and lost some 250 men; seventy-five out of 92d alone. Seven officers wounded and three killed—with Shewell and MacLaine, five. The general likes me, I think, as he often comes to see me. I go into quarters to-morrow, as we have got a house. I do hope we are not going to stay here long. Phayre comes in to-morrow, and the 15th Hussars.

"*Kandahar, Sept. 4.*—Moved after breakfast into quarters; found them very hot and stuffy all day. In evening went to hospital. Had only one wounded man to show, while the other brigades had many.

"*Sept. 5.*—I went for a ride all round cantonments: the stench was awful everywhere. I feel as if one must get ill stopping here. Not so hot to-day. Went in evening to citadel to Edwardes's quarters; very stuffy.

"*Sept. 6.*—Did nothing all day. Went to city by Herat gate. Good streets meeting at the Charsu<sup>1</sup> might be made something of. Saw Ahmad Shah's tomb; dome beautifully proportioned, brick; few inferior tiles inside; architecture good, spoilt by tawdry ornaments. Passed the captured guns. Went to a sale, bid for a knife, then back in evening. Phayre has come in;<sup>2</sup> saw Wyllie and Somerset, his aides-de-camp. Had talk with Roberts, who is determined to get our division back sharp; glad of it. Am sick of this place.

"*Sept. 7.*—Rode down to call on Primrose with Baker; found him going out, so went to Shewell's sale and got an easy-chair; then back, and saw Phayre, who is just as hale and hearty as ever, although over sixty. Got a letter from Dunsford congratulating me on being made K.C.B. I hope it will come true. A man (Douglas) of the 15th Hussars came to breakfast, and said they were starving, because not allowed to forage; wrote and

<sup>1</sup> At the point of intersection of the main streets is a large dome called the Charsu.

<sup>2</sup> General Phayre's force, the 2d Division, Southern Afghanistan Field Force, arrived at Karez-i-Zarak, about twelve miles south of Kandahar, on the 5th. The headquarters staff rode into Kandahar the following day.



told general, and he replied that he was going to Gulistan Karez, and we were to go with him; very glad. Engaged all rest of day in giving orders for our march down;<sup>1</sup> every one very glad indeed.

“*Mandi Hisar, Sept. 8.*—Marched at 4.45, arrived at nine. Road good all way over plain, mostly cultivable. Passed two or three villages. The Central India Horse is with me. Not very hot. Got breakfast and tent up by 10.30. General did not arrive till 6.30; showed me telegrams from Viceroy, Chief, Duke, Hartington, and Queen, congratulating him on splendid victory and great march. He surely ought to be a peer after this.

“*Abdul Rahman Camp, Sept. 9.*—Marched at 1.30. Got on very well, though it was very dark, as we had a guide. Got to the Arghesan about five, and in at 8.30. Road very good all way—water at several places; country dead level. Heathcote, Colonel 19th, met me; he seems an intelligent man. The regiment is smart. We had an awful day from dust, which went on till after dark; then it rained, and became delightfully cool. I went to see Roberts, who is very cheery again, and seemed all right. If no more rain comes, we march at 1.30. I do not want to stop. General says we may go on

<sup>1</sup> The 3d Brigade, under MacGregor, was ordered to be ready to march the following day (8th), with Lieutenant-General Roberts, towards Peshin.

This Brigade, being composed of regiments which had formed part of the original advance on Kandahar, was therefore the first to be brought back.

to Quetta, which is cool, at all events, then we can get down by degrees.

“*Abdul Rahman Camp, Sept. 10.*—Poured all night, so we halted. The day was most deliciously cool. 15th and 23d came in, so now I have six regiments under my command. I suppose I shall only keep it till we get to Quetta. Telegraphed to Commander-in-Chief to see if there was no chance of my getting three months’ leave. I do not think he will give it me, but it is worth trying. A snake was found to-day at the head of my bed, just where I put my hand to get matches, &c., so I have taken to sleeping in a *dhoolie*.

“Started at three. Lost the way; however, afterwards we got on very well, and were in by eight. Very cool march, excellent road, no water, over desolate country. Passed Takhtipul,<sup>1</sup> where there was a fight in first campaign.

“*Camp Dabrai, Sept. 11.*—Started at 3.30. Road good all the way; coldish at first. Got in by eight. This place, Dabrai, is a desolate spot on a bare plain of good soil, covered with southernwood, and with the Khwaja Amran mountains looming large in the distance: it is the first regular range we have seen for some time. Euan Smith asked me how the command at Kandahar would suit me, and general showed me a telegram from Viceroy asking his

<sup>1</sup> On the 4th January 1879, the advance-guard of the Quetta Field Force, under Brigadier-General Palliser, engaged the Afghan cavalry, 1200 strong, and put them to flight with an estimated loss of a hundred killed and wounded.

opinion about retention of Kandahar. I got him to write a telegram strongly recommending it, then he asked me how it would suit me. This has put it into my head, and I must get up to Simla, and work it. Roberts has been made a G.C.B., and got the Madras command."

"*Dabrai to Gatai, Sept. 13.*—Marched at 4.45 to Gatai; day was just breaking. The road all over fine plain, good soil, and cultivable, if there was only water. At four miles passed between low hills. We went on to Mula Amir on account of water, four miles. Got in by eight. Very cold at starting. Did nothing all day, as usual; there is nothing to do as brigadier-general. Went to see Brackenbury, who is down with dysentery; nice cheery chap and zealous. A telegram gives the Queen's speech, in which she bucks us all up tremendously. General has asked for a special medal and six months' *batta*. I think we shall not get the first, but a clasp, and perhaps we may get three months.

"*Chaman, Sept. 14.*—Marched at two, over a dead plain, with gentle ascent at end to Chaman, a place at foot of Khojak Pass. Found nothing up. Had breakfast with Crawford, Artillery. Roberts told me he was going to send two of my regiments to Shorawak: I protested, as I must get up to Simla. Met Westmacott, road commandant; seems good man, intelligent and gentlemanly. I hope the Shorawak trip will be knocked on the head.

"*Kala Abdulla, Sept. 15.*—Marched at 4.30 to Kala Abdulla. For two miles up bed of stream, pretty easy gradient; then by a zigzag road over Khojak. Not a very good road, too steep for carts, and too sharp turns, two miles up. The position on the top is a very bad one, commanded, and water long way off. The filth and want of ordinary sanitary arrangements very conspicuous. Road down the same, then down the bed of stream. Great many trees, lots of fuel on hills. Kala Abdulla on desolate plain. Ordered to send 4th Ghurkhas and 15th Sikhs by another road. Got the Shorawak scheme knocked on the head. Roberts came over to say good-bye.

"*Segi, Sept. 16.*—Marched at 2.30. Bad guides, who took us wrong at first; however, road all over level. Got in at nine. Passed four or five villages. Soil salt, but would be good with water. Wrote to general to thank him for his letter of yesterday, and asked him to write to Lord Ripon; hope he will. Markey came and told me a man had cholera; afterwards he said he was getting over it. I do hope there will be no cholera, as that would perhaps keep me here indefinitely, and I want so much to go to Simla.

"*Dinar Karez, Sept. 17.*—Marched at 4.45 over dead plain to Dinar Karez. In at eight. Half-way crossed the Lora, which has a good deal of water for this country, which could well be utilised, if raised by Persian wells or pumps, as the soil is excellent,

but there are no people. Glad to say the cholera was a false alarm. Arrived here. No forage, so sent on the Central India Horse to next camp.

"*Mehtarzai, Sept. 18.*—Marched at three. Ascent for six miles over the Ghazarband Pass, then descent. Good natural road, nothing done to it. Easy march; had lots of forage for animals. Quetta valley, open bare plain, good soil, might be made anything of. Found some beer, and bought a dozen. Hope we shall get orders to go here.

"*Quetta, Sept. 19.*—Marched at five, got in by 8.30. Fine plain, with plenty of water. Quetta not bad place, with good soil and water-supply; has the making of a fine station. Captain Curzon Wyllie, political, came to see me; seems nice fellow. Got telegram to say we are to go through Mari country; do not like it. In afternoon, Lieutenant-Colonel M'Calmont and Lord St Vincent. 7th Hussars, came to see me; say wanted to go, said no objections, but shall tell them I will have them work. Came out from England to Quetta in twenty-eight days, good going. Hope we shall have a good fight, and get out of it well; it will do me good."

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE MARI EXPEDITION.

1880.

*Where twined the path in shadow hid,  
Round many a rocky pyramid,  
Round many an insulated mass,  
The native bulwarks of the pass "*

RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY POSTS ON THE SIBI-QUETTA LINE—  
BRIGADIER-GENERAL MACGREGOR'S FORCE—CROSSING THE SARA-  
KHULA — THROUGH THE CHAPAR RIFT — DESERTED VILLAGES  
—A PUNITIVE EXPEDITION TO THE MARI COUNTRY — TERMS  
OFFERED TO THE CHIEFS—SKIRMISH AT SPIN TANGI—A PLUN-  
DERED STATION—THE REAR-GUARD FIRED ON—RESTITUTION OF  
GRAIN—RECONNAISSANCES—ALARM - FIRES—THE FORMIDABLE  
SEMBHAR PASS—THE BOMBAY CAVALRY ATTACKED—FRIENDLY  
LUNIS—THE KOLU VALLEY—MEHRULLA KHAN'S FORT—RE-  
MARKABLE CLIFF—SUBMISSION OF THE MARIS—THE BIHISTO  
HILLS—RETURN TO INDIA.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL MACGREGOR, with the 25th  
Panjab Native Infantry and four guns of 11-9  
Mountain Battery, marched from Quetta on the  
24th September towards Kach, with the object of  
opening the road from that place towards Sibi, and  
of re-establishing the military posts thereon, all of

which had been withdrawn by General Phayre last month to reinforce his division for the advance to relieve Kandahar. Having accomplished this, he was instructed to collect a force at Kach, consisting of the 2d 60th Rifles, 4th and 5th Ghurkhas, 3d and 4th Sikhs, and 11-9 Royal Artillery, for a punitive expedition into the Mari country. The following extracts are from Brigadier-General MacGregor's official report, and private notes.

"*Quetta to Gundak, Sept. 24* (distance, fourteen miles; altitude, 6500 feet).—The march to-day was to Gundak by General Phayre's road, which leads first over the plain north-east, and then enters the hills, through which it follows the course of the Sarakhula<sup>1</sup> stream to the halting-place. There is but one small village in the valley north-east of the Gundak camping-ground, and provisions are not obtainable, with the exception of a few sheep and goats; but there are sufficient trees and bushes to furnish fuel. The Takatu mountain (11,000 feet in height) runs along, due west, from which signalling can be carried on with most of the posts in this part of the country.

"*Gundak to Kach, Sept. 25* (distance, sixteen miles; altitude, 6100 feet).—The road from here gradually ascends to the Sarakhula Pass (6800 feet), and is in fair order; but from that point the rain has damaged it. It follows the bed of the stream through

<sup>1</sup> The Sarakhula or Saraghurg (*sara*, rough; *khula*, mouth, gorge, or debouchure of a torrent, ravine). *Gundak* means a pointed hill.

narrow gorges, and in some places was nearly impassable for baggage-animals. It then emerges on to a small open valley, where the camping-ground, called Saran Tangi, has been fixed. General Phayre's road here enters a very narrow gorge between two hills, which was found to be in such a rough state that it was decided to proceed by the old road leading over the hill to the left. A vile road. Found a nice state of affairs. Do not like this business at all. Have got to establish posts, and have no carriage to do it with. Do not know how I shall succeed; wish I was out of it. It is a ——— shame sending me off in this happy-go-lucky way.

“The column started at 5-45, and reached Kach at 11.30; but the rear-guard did not arrive until 7 P.M.

“*Kach, Sept. 26.*—In consequence of the non-arrival here of the Ghurkhas and 15th Sikhs, the column is halted here to-day. Men have been sent on to repair the road, and to render the passage through the Chapar Rift fit for the baggage-animals. Dr Duke and Captains Brackenbury and Gill accompany this party. Orders were sent last night to Colonel Rowcroft at Kawas to come here.

“The village of Kach has recently been destroyed, in consequence of an attack made by 2000 *ghazis* at daybreak of the 16th August, on the garrison, under Colonel Pierce; and the nearest villages are eleven miles up the valley, but they can furnish hardly any supplies. The post established by us consists of a



small square mud fort built close to the bank of the Mangi river, and is commanded by a hill about 200 feet high, and within 200 yards, which, however, is occupied by a picket, as is also another ridge on the other opposite bank of the stream.

"*Kach, Sept. 27.*—The 4th Ghurkhas, 15th Sikhs, two guns 11-9th Royal Artillery, and one company 2d 60th Rifles, marched in from Wam, arriving at 11.10 A.M. Colonel Rowcroft reports the road exceedingly bad.

"The party sent from Quetta to repair the telegraph-wire arrived this evening, and communication opened with Quetta and other places.

"*Kach to Dargi, Sept. 28* (distance, seventeen miles).—The 4th Ghurkhas, 15th Sikhs, 25th Native Infantry, a company of the 2d 60th, and 11-9th Royal Artillery marched from Kach at 4.30 A.M., led by a hundred sabres Central India Horse. The road crossed the river immediately below the fort, and then zigzags up and down the further side of a low hill, and takes the bed of the river, and leads through a gorge and down the valley, which widens out to about a mile, until the fort of Mangi is reached.

"The fort at Mangi or North Chapar is merely an irregular-shaped enclosure, with walls three feet in height, of unburnt brick, about 300 yards from the river and 600 yards from the entrance of the Chapar Rift. A detachment of one hundred men has just taken up the post, and orders have been issued to improve it by building the walls to seven feet, with loop-

holes, and making a covered way to the river, protected by a *sangar* on the opposite hill. Loose dynamite was found lying about, left there by the natives when they plundered the place. Orders have been given to Colonel Pierce to send a British officer to store it, and to see to the defences.

“The rift is only about twenty feet wide for some few hundred yards at its entrance, and then gradually widens out between the precipices. The total length of this passage through the Chapar mountain is nearly two miles, and most of the pathway is exposed to fire from the cliffs above. Great difficulty was experienced by the transport officer and rear-guard in getting the baggage-animals through the rift, especially after dusk, and the latter did not reach camp till after midnight.

“*Dargi to Nidar, one of the Kosht villages, Sept. 29* (distance, nine miles).—It having been reported that the people near Harnai were selling grain, &c., which they had plundered from us recently, I sent Dr Duke, political officer, with the hundred sabres Central India Horse, to march towards Harnai with the object of stopping the further removal and sale of the grain. The 15th Sikhs marched at 5 A.M., with orders to halt at Sharigh as a support to the cavalry. The remainder of the troops marched at 6 A.M., and halted on some high ground just above the village of Nidar.

“*Nidar to Sharigh, Sept. 30* (distance, ten miles; altitude, 3650 feet).—Marched at 5.45, and reached

Sharigh at 9.30. The road goes through low hills, and leads on to an open plain covered with crops of rice, and well watered. The brigade encamped within a few hundred yards of the buildings which had been erected by the railway people last year, most of which have been unroofed and looted by the natives. Sharigh consists of three villages close together, and was found to be deserted. The inhabitants having very recently and hurriedly left them, most of the plunder from the railway buildings was found in them, as well as a considerable quantity of grain and fuel. Two companies 24th Bombay Native Infantry have been established here.

“*Sharigh to Nasak, Oct. 1* (distance, nine miles ; altitude, 2600 feet).—Marched at 5.30. The road goes over a tolerably level country, and then dips down into a large *nala*, with a stream running through it, which opens into a narrow valley. The railway-house at Nasak is unroofed and empty, and the small village deserted. as are also the only villages within reach. The foraging parties found very little in the villages, but recovered a small quantity of grain in Government bags, hidden in the jungle, which is mostly stunted palm, and in which the men found a number of wild pigs and partridges.

“*Nasak to Harnai, Oct. 2* (distance, eight miles ; altitude, 2600 feet).—The road from here passes over a low ridge through which a railway cutting is being made, and then through low hills until Harnai camp-ground is reached, close to the fort

and railway buildings, which consist of two blocks of quarters, a commissariat enclosure, and a set of go-downs. The fort is well situated in a bend of the river, with a covered way down to some springs of excellent water, walls loopholed, and with small demi-bastions at two opposite corners. On the arrival of the Central India Horse on the 30th, two reconnoitring parties went toward the hills, and found that the natives were carrying off a considerable quantity of grain. The *sowars* were fired on when they attempted to seize the cattle upon which the sacks were loaded. The surrounding villages have been found to contain most of the property and grain, &c., removed by them on our departure, and is now being brought in by them. The camp has been pitched on the left bank of the Pan stream. The Foreign Secretary approved terms submitted.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Our proposals as follow* : Agent Governor-General will proceed at once to Sibi, and there summon Mari chiefs to meet him. He will offer following terms :—

- "1. Restitution of treasure and bullocks plundered from railway convoys.
  - "2. Twenty thousand rupees fine to compensate private losses.
  - "3. Blood-money, according to tribal custom, for those slain
  - "4. Troops to march through Mari country by Kahan to Harrand.
  - "5. Surrender of leaders in late raid. (Roberts and I are somewhat doubtful about this fifth clause, knowing extreme repugnance of hill tribes to deliver up any of their people. We leave this to you to decide.)
  - "6. Approved hostages to be given for future good conduct of the clan.
- "General MacGregor's force will at once occupy Quat-Mandai, one march from railway line, and await result of negotiations."
- "*Reply from the Foreign Secretary* : Terms proposed by you are approved with exception of fifth clause, regarding surrender of leaders. This should be omitted."

“*Harnai, Oct. 3.*—The 25th Panjab Native Infantry and 15th Sikhs were sent on to Spin Kach this morning, with orders to halt there and put the path over the Spin Tangi in good order. The battery, Ghurkhas, and a company of the 2d 60th, remained at Harnai. I, accompanied by Dr Duke and Shepherd, visited the villages and the country in the vicinity of the camp towards Spin Kach. The valley appears to be most fertile in that direction, and well furnished with trees.

“*Harnai to Spin Kach, Oct. 4* (distance, seventeen miles; altitude, 1200 feet).—Marched with the squadron, Central India Horse, to Spin Kach. The road gradually descends 1400 feet; leads along the foot of the low hills, then over the plateau; dips to the river-bed, and takes to the plateau again, after which descends again to the river, and follows the right bank until the camp of Spin Kach is reached, on a ridge between the streams Babian and Kuriak.

“The pathway over the hill at Spin Tangi was reported ready for the baggage-animals to get over; it is a zigzag rising, and rather steep in places. The *Tangi* itself is a deep pool of water, which completely fills up the space between the rocky cut through the hill. The railway people have hitherto kept up communication with Spin Kach by means of a boat and rafts, but these have apparently been washed away, as quantities of *débris* have accumulated among the rocks.

"*Spin Kach* to *Spin Tangi*,<sup>1</sup> Oct. 5 (distance, three and a half miles; altitude, 1500 feet).—The troops left the camp at 4.30, and reached the *Spin Tangi*, two and a half miles, at daylight, about 5.15. The 15th Sikhs and Central India Horse passed over at once and halted on the high bank. The baggage-animals were then sent up in batches by the brigade transport officer, and were handed on by sepoy of the 25th Panjab Native Infantry. The quartermasters superintended the transit of the baggage, which, commencing to ascend the path at 5.15, had passed completely over by 12.55. Finding that it would be rather late for the troops to continue the march, I decided to encamp at *Spin Tangi*, which post consists of a fair fort and a bungalow about 200 yards from it; but all these buildings have been unroofed and are quite empty, most of the property belonging to the late occupants having been found to-day in the village of *Mian Kach*.

"At about 7 A.M. a number of men were observed on the ridge above the *Ganeji* gap, and on the approach of some sepoy whom I sent up to crown the heights, at once opened fire upon the 15th and Central India Horse, at about 900 yards' range, as well as upon the baggage-animals in the ravine, waiting to ascend the pathway. The firing lasted about twenty minutes, and then the enemy retired, having caused the following casualties: two *sowars* (Central India Horse), two sepoy (15th Sikhs), two

<sup>1</sup> *Spin Tangi*, more properly the *Ganeji* Rift or Gap.

*kahars*, and two transport animals wounded. The enemy's casualties are not known.

“*Spin Kach to Kuchali, Oct. 6* (distance, twelve miles; altitude, 1100 feet).—Marched at 4.30 A.M. At the fourth mile the fort and post of Dalojal is reached; it had been plundered and hardly anything left. The road then passes through very narrow valleys until it reaches Zindag-i-Ab, where the valley opens. The bed of the Gundakin stream is passed immediately beyond this post. Four miles further on Kuchali is reached. The troops arrived at about ten o'clock, and as the heat was great, and a large store of *bhusa* was found, the camp was pitched. The remains of property of all sorts was found lying all about the place. The railway engine was standing on the line—injured considerably—with a few burnt carriages attached to it. Of the three bungalows, only one had been much damaged. Large quantities of railway stores were found partly damaged in the fort, which is a low loopholed wall of sunburnt bricks on the plateau.

“*Kuchali to Kalat-i-Kila, Oct. 7* (distance, twelve miles; altitude, 600 feet).—Left Kuchali at 4.30 A.M., and reached Kalat-i-Kila at 11 A.M. The road crosses the Nari river, and then winds through narrow valleys to Gundakin Daf. It then goes down the valley of Bhadra, crosses the river, and passes between the cliffs forming the Babar Kach Tangi; winds through a narrow valley, crossing the river frequently, until Kalat-i-Kila is reached, which con-

sists of a bungalow, surrounded by a loopholed wall, and situated on the plain clear of the hills. Most of the way, from Kuchali to Gundakin Daf, and from Babar Kach to Kalat-i-Kila, is commanded by steep, rocky, and very high hills, many places being quite inaccessible, with perpendicular cliffs, which, if held by an enemy, would prove very troublesome and difficult to turn. The large village of Bhadra is seen in the middle of the valley surrounded by crops. The people were much excited at our approach, and were seen driving off their cattle, &c., but eventually the chief *malik* came out to *salaam* with a lot of followers, all of whom were caused to accompany the force. Nevertheless, our rear-guard was fired on when quitting the camp-ground, and a sepoy, 25th Panjab Native Infantry, and a transport-driver wounded, also a pony killed; and the same men followed up the company for some two or three miles, without, however, doing any more damage. The range they opened fire at was probably 1400 or 1500 yards, so it is very likely they had one of the stolen Martini carbines left by the railway people.

“*Kalat-i-Kila to Sibi, Oct. 8* (distance, seventeen miles; altitude, 480 feet).—Marched at 4.30 over the open valley, and then over a low ridge, after which the river is crossed and the valley becomes narrow, with high cliffs on the right, similar to yesterday's march. The river-bed is followed the whole way by the road and railway, and eventually emerges into the plain at Nari mouth, ten miles from Kalat-



i-Kila. The remainder of the road is perfectly level, and runs along the railway, which is open to this post, although the telegraph is not. On arrival, 15th Sikhs and 25th Native Infantry encamped near the railway station in readiness to go off to India. The 5th Ghurkhas, 2d 60th Rifles, and 2d Sikhs were encamped on the *maidan*, having arrived yesterday; and the 3d Panjab Cavalry is encamped at Nari bank.

"*Sibi, Oct. 9.*—Halted. The 15th Sikhs started for India by rail at 7.45 P.M., leaving eighty-two *kahars* behind to supply any requirements in the corps of my newly formed force. The funeral of the late Lieutenant-Colonel Collins, 2d 60th Rifles, took place in the Sibi cemetery near camp.

"*Sibi, Oct. 10.*—Halted. Divine service held in 2d 60th camp at 6.30 A.M. 3d Sikhs marched into camp at 9 A.M. All regiments engaged in completing requirements in ammunition, shoes, blankets, carriage, &c.

"*Sibi to Kalat-i-Kila, Oct. 11* (distance, seventeen miles; altitude, 763 feet).—The 2d 60th Rifles, 2d Sikhs, and 5th Ghurkhas marched from Sibi at 4.30 A.M., under command of Colonel Fitzhugh, 5th Ghurkhas. The 2d Sikhs were left at Nari mouth, and the other two corps, continuing the march, encamped three miles short of Kalat-i-Kila on a bend of the river.

"*Kalat-i-Kila to Babar Kach, Oct. 12* (distance, seven miles; altitude, 963 feet).—The 2d 60th Rifles

and 5th Ghurkhas continued their march this morning, and arrived at the camp-ground at the entrance of the Babar Kach Tangi. We marched from Sibi with the 3d Panjab Cavalry and 3d Sikhs to the camp-ground near Kalat-i-Kila, and the 2d Sikhs escorted the grain convoy to Kalat-i-Kila itself. The camping-ground the force is assembling on is a very large plateau covered with long grass and some bushes, about ten feet above the level of the river, which runs close to it.

“*Babar Kach*, Oct. 13.—Marched with the 3d Sikhs and 3d Panjab Cavalry into Babar Kach camp at 8.30 A.M. Lieutenant Jennings reports that the village of Bhadra contains a quantity of grain, and that the people have been ordered to deposit in the camp all that they took from the post of Gundakin Daf.

“*Babar Kach to Qwat*, Oct. 14 (distance, ten miles; altitude, 1093 feet).—The 3d Panjab Cavalry moved off at 5.30 A.M. up the valley to reconnoitre; followed half an hour later by the 2d 60th, 2d Sikhs, 3d Sikhs, and 4th Ghurkhas. The village and fort of Qwat was reached at about nine, and found to have been rather hurriedly deserted, as guns and shields and a good deal of property were discovered in the houses. The infantry encamped on either side of the fort, and the cavalry went on as far as Mandai, returning a couple of hours later.

“*Qwat*, Oct. 15.—I sent a party of Sikhs to Mandai this morning to bring in all Govern-

ment property, and destroy everything not worth carrying away. Nothing of any value was discovered, with the exception of nine Government carts, which were brought on. A small cavalry reconnaissance went up the valley about three miles, and found that the road is nearly impassable. The 5th Ghurkhas marched in from Babar Kách with the remainder of the grain which was left there, and some that was taken out of Bhadra village.

“*Qwat*, Oct. 16.—Each regiment was sent out for a couple of hours to-day, taking all its transport animals, for the purpose of cutting and bringing in the *jwar* crop, which has been collected in front of the fort.

“I made a reconnaissance to the entrance of the valley out of which the Harnai river flows. No enemy appeared, and, as far as could be seen, the way seemed by no means difficult, although very stony.

“*Qwat to Dalojal*, Oct. 17 (distance, fifteen miles; altitude, 1693 feet).—The whole of the force—with the exception of the 2d Sikhs, one squadron 3d Panjab Cavalry, and two guns 11-9 Royal Artillery, which are left at *Qwat* as a garrison for the present—marched at 5.30 A.M. this morning, and reached *Dalojal* at 1 P.M. The pathway follows the bed of the Harnai river the whole distance, at first through a fairly open valley, and later between high cliffs, which, however, are very

easily crowned, the men being quite able to keep up with the column below.

“*Dalojal to Spin Kach, Oct. 18* (distance, six miles; altitude, 1843 feet).—The column moved off at 5.30. Two companies 4th Ghurkhas were sent on half an hour in advance, and crowned the heights on either side of the gap, but saw no enemy. The troops commenced passing over at seven; and at ten o'clock, seeing that the baggage could not be got over until very late in the day, I decided on encamping at Spin Kach, where the Bombay troops, to form the Thal garrison (consisting of 348 men 15th Native Infantry, 132 sabres 2d Bombay Cavalry, and two guns Jacobabad Mountain Battery), had already arrived.

“*Spin Kach to Kuriak, Oct. 19* (distance, eight miles; altitude, 2443 feet).—I made a reconnaissance up the valley leading towards Thal from Spin Tangi at 11 A.M., in order to look for a camping-ground three or four miles on that road; but the only place where water was found, two and a half miles from Spin Kach, the quantity was not sufficient for the force. No enemy was seen. In consequence of the baggage not having yet crossed over Spin Tangi this morning until 7 A.M., we did not march until 8 A.M. The road leads up the Kuriak stream, and passes over the plateau to the camping-ground. A few men were seen during the march on the high mountain south of the road, who lighted signal-fires, but disappeared as soon as half a com-

pany of Ghurkhas was sent up after them. The rear-guard arrived in camp to-day at 6 P.M.

“*Kuriak to Kanti*, Oct. 20 (distance, eleven miles; altitude, 3343 feet).—The troops marched in two separate columns. One high mountain runs parallel on the right, about a mile off, the whole distance, and the path winds through low hills from Kuriak camp-ground over a *kotal*, about 600 feet high, and then down to a plain. On this occasion all the transport animals have been watered at the camping-ground near the road, and the camp of the whole force pitched along the edge of the deep ravine.

“*Kanti to the Well*, Oct. 21 (distance, nineteen miles; altitude, 3243 feet).—Marched at 5 30 A.M. Crossed the Sembhar valley, and again entered the hills, passing over a low *kotal* (4043 feet), and down to the halting-place. The only water is found in two small pools under a cliff a little further on, through a narrow gorge, through which the road passes. There is a sufficient quantity for a large force, but for the men only, and is slightly salt in flavour. Under these circumstances, I decided to push on to the next water, at the entrance of the further end of the pass, particularly as the road was reported to be a made one, and very passable for mule-carriage. Leading from this halting-place there are two rather steep *kotals*, and at the fifteenth mile the road became almost impassable in a small narrow gorge, and for the next three miles is little

better than a narrow rocky ravine, in which the road is almost sure to be washed away by a good fall of rain. The last mile is outside the pass over the open to the well, and owing to waiting constantly for the baggage, and even the ammunition, to close up, the leading troops did not reach the camping-ground until 5.20 P.M. Fortunately it was a bright moonlight night, and the bulk of the baggage arrived before morning; but the rear-guard of 3d Sikhs and 2d 60th did not clear out of the pass until 11.30 A.M. on the 22d. The absence of water and want of food have much knocked up the transport animals, and ninety-two have been left dead and abandoned. This pass may be said to extend over nearly ten miles, and would be a most formidable one to get through if held by even a not very numerous enemy. I sent the cavalry to Biland, where water for the horses was obtained from a tank, the well-water being almost undrinkable on account of its salt flavour.

"*The Well to Thal, Oct. 22* (distance, seven miles; altitude, 3243 feet).—Some companies from the 2d 60th Rifles, 3d Sikhs, and 15th Bombay Native Infantry were sent into the pass at 8.30 A.M. to relieve and assist the rear-guard, and, with the remainder of the troops with the baggage, field-hospital, &c., we marched to Thal and encamped. There is a good supply of water, the *karez* water being brought close to the station, and the river water can be turned on when required. Nothing

was left in the buildings, and even the wooden part of the roofs was in most cases removed, but the villagers to whom the stores were given to take charge of, are returning nearly everything. The fort is square, with a round tower at each corner. A commissariat go-down is built in the centre, with a large well, and the barracks for the garrison are built outside the fort.

"*Thal*, Oct. 23.—Halt. In order to fill up with provisions and rest the animals, I halted to-day. Heard in the evening that the 2d Bombay Cavalry when coming through the Sembhar Pass had been fired on, so ordered the 3d Panjab Cavalry, squadron 2d Bombay Cavalry, and 4th Ghurkhas to proceed to its assistance at 4.30 P.M.; the detachment had, however, nearly cleared the pass by 5.30 P.M. The officer in command reported having seen the bodies of seven followers who had been killed along the road, and that a good many men had collected on the hills over the Sembhar watering-place and fired on the rear-guard, and that one *sowar* was wounded. A number of Lunis came to-day and professed friendly intentions, requesting at the same time permission to go and fight the Maris with us. The thermometer goes down to 37° during the night, but the days are still hot between 11 and 3 P.M. in a tent.

"*Thal*, Oct. 24.—All supplies not having been received, the troops again halted to-day, but during the afternoon nearly everything required was brought in. The detachment 2d Bombay Cavalry marched

in from the Sembhar Pass, where it had halted during the night. I sent Lieutenant Brackenbury with the 5th Ghurkhas to bridge the river which crosses the road towards Chotiali.

*"Thal to Chotiali, Oct. 25* (distance, ten miles; altitude, 3243 feet).—Started at 6.30 over a flat plain to the river, where it was found unnecessary to build a bridge as a good ford was discovered. The road thence runs along at the foot of the low hills up to which the jungle-trees and grass come. The camping-ground is beneath the village of Chotiali, which is little more than a ruin now, with about a dozen inhabitants—the result of an attack made on it about five years ago by 1500 Maris, who killed every one they could catch, and destroyed the place.

*"Chotiali to Paniali, Oct. 26* (distance, fourteen miles; altitude, 3243 feet).—Marched at 6 A.M. over low spurs of the hills, then over the level plain, which is covered with excellent grass and a few trees, until, at the tenth mile, the jungle gets thicker and the bed of a river without water is crossed. The halt was made at the fourteenth mile, and camp pitched on the left bank of the river-bed, in which were found several pools of water.

*"Paniali to Bahanwala, Oct. 27* (distance, fourteen miles).—Marched at 6 A.M. over a level plain covered with good grass and a good number of tamarisk and other trees, and about three miles wide. At the tenth mile the path enters the hills and turns up the bed of the Bahan river. It is tolerably easy



going until just previous to emerging from between the two hills, where the road is liable to floods. Water was found in pools along the bed of the river. The camping-ground is covered with grass and trees, and is just large enough to encamp six regiments.

“*Bahanwala to Baladakha, Oct. 28* (distance, eleven miles).—The 3d Panjab Cavalry and half a battalion 3d Sikhs marched at 6.30 A.M. this morning with the object of reconnoitring the country in advance of Baladakha, including the *kotal* leading into the Kolu valley. With the rest of the troops we followed an hour later. The path leads through a valley and over low undulating hills. A brigade can easily be encamped on the ground of Baladakha, where our camp was pitched. The cavalry returned at 4 P.M., and reported that the *kotal* is almost impassable for animals.

“*Baladakha to Nikra, Oct. 29* (distance, nine miles).—The 3d Sikhs and 5th Ghurkhas started at 3 A.M., the former to take possession of the heights, while the latter made a road over the hills; and the cavalry went on at 4.30 A.M. to be in readiness to pass over into the Kolu valley as soon as possible. The remainder of the troops remained encamped where they were until their turn arrived to move over.

“After four hours' hard work in removing large stones, building walls, and filling in holes, the cavalry passed over, followed shortly after by their

baggage, the field-hospital, and reserve ammunition ; and each corps, as it arrived, was signalled by heliograph from camp, and took up the pickets on the hills, allowing the others to move on. The ascent to the second *kotal* from the upper valley is about 500 feet, and the descent thence to the Kolu valley about 1200 feet. There is no water to be found in this upper valley or near either *kotal*. The rear-guard reached camp at 10.30 P.M., bringing in everything by the aid of large bonfires lighted all along the pathway.

“*Nikra to Karam Khan Kila, Oct. 30* (distance, ten miles).—The troops marched at 8 A.M. up the flat valley of Kolu, which is nearly five miles broad all along. The village of Oriani is passed ; the Malikzai villages are to be seen, and Jelal Khan is then reached. All the male population, of about a hundred, turned out to pay their respects. All these villages are much the same size, about fifty houses enclosed in a high wall of thirty feet, with a few round towers. The camp was pitched immediately beyond a new fort, built by Karam Khan, which was deserted some days ago in consequence of the expected arrival of this force. In the evening a man named Alu, a Bijarani, came into camp with a report that Mehrulla and a lot of Mari headmen had got together at Bazar Kach, and didn't quite know what to do, and that they were anxious to find out what Government wished. He went off again with a message to them, that they had better come in at

once if they really meant to do so, and hear the conditions to be imposed.

"*Karam Khan Kila to Bhor, Oct. 31* (distance, thirteen miles). — Marched through a gap called Dowla Wanga, and down the steep side of a range of hills for about half a mile; then, between precipices on either side, into the Bhor valley, which just here is not more than a quarter of a mile wide. The camp was pitched a mile from the mouth of the gorge above mentioned, and near several pools of water. The hill on the north side, as far as the eye can reach from this camp, is a perpendicular rock from the summit to about fifty feet down (whence the earth slopes away for 200 feet more), from which the Maris could annoy the camp very much with perfect impunity for some hours until outflanked *viâ* the pass; but there is a pathway, in a re-entering angle, by which one man at a time can manage to get to the top, if not opposed.

"*Bhor to Kui, Nov. 1* (distance, thirteen and a half miles). — Marched at 7 A.M. Our path followed the valley up a rather steep ascent to a *kotal*. Further on there is a sudden descent of 200 feet to a lower valley, and then a very steep rocky path is found, which descends to the large valley of Kui. The camp was pitched three miles further on. The remarkable cliff referred to yesterday is on the right all the way, and is quite as high and inaccessible, only one break occurring about four miles from the camp of yesterday, and advantage has been taken of

it by the natives to make a path over it into the Kolu valley, which is named the Laniai Pass. This tremendous natural barrier is nearly thirty miles in length, extending almost in a straight line from Sadik, in the Bhor valley, to a high conical hill, called Kunal, close to Mahmand. The Mari chief, Mehrulla, arrived in our camp at 1.30 and had an interview with me. I explained the terms to him, and, at 5.30, he and his following were escorted out of camp.

“*Kui to Manjra, Nov. 2* (distance, eleven miles).—Marched over the plain through a gap, and across a level country to this camp-ground, which is a long flat piece of ground along the bank of the river.

“*Manjra to Mahmand, Nov. 3* (distance, four miles).—Moved the column over a low saddle and down to Mahmand, and encamped a mile west of the fort. The advance-guard of cavalry found the fort quite deserted yesterday, and some of the houses partially destroyed by fire, but apparently not very recently. The footmarks of sheep, cattle, children, were found all about the place quite fresh. Mehrulla Khan, Karam Khan, and a few other headmen are now in camp, and will accompany the force to Kahan, as a guarantee for the fulfilment of the terms which Government has imposed, and which they say they agree to.

“*Mahmand to Khaniki Nov. 4* (distance, eight miles).—Marched along the Manjra river east and

south through a gorge, and out on to the plain beyond, called Khaniki, where the camp was pitched.

"*Khaniki to Ghur Daf, Nov. 5* (distance, thirteen miles).—The march from Khaniki led us up the valley and then across low hills and up *nalas* for the next six miles. Further on we entered the rocky river-bed, until we reached this camp-ground.

"*Ghur Daf to Kahan, Nov. 6* (distance, thirteen miles).—Marched over a spur of the Dojannak mountain and along the bed of the Kahan river. This gorge is about 300 yards wide, the cliffs about 150 feet high, and quite inaccessible everywhere, with the exception of one or two places, and even those are very difficult. Troops caught when well into this place would have rather a bad time of it, unless the high land had been crowned. On emerging from this ravine the Khan valley could be seen stretching away eastward. There are a good many fields of standing *juar* (maize), and the vicinity of the fort is all under cultivation and covered with tamarisk-trees. The camp was pitched one mile west of the village, on the left bank. Mehrulla and Karam Khan met the head of the column a few miles out, and tendered their entire submission to Government, at the same time handing over 50,000 rupees, in coin and jewellery, &c., as an earnest of their honest intentions.

"*Kahan, Nov. 7.*—Halted to give the animals a rest, which they much needed. A few 12-pounder howitzer-shells in good preservation were found on

a tomb some little distance from Kahan yesterday ; but no signs of the two guns said to be in possession of the Maris have been discovered as yet. The whole village of Kahan is contained within four mud walls about eighteen feet high, with a round tower at each corner, and an odd one here and there along the walls, which are 250 paces in length each face. I permitted no one to enter the place, as a compliment to Mehrulla Khan for his behaviour in regard to the Government claims against his tribe.

*"Kahan to Sajji Kach, Nov. 8 (distance, nineteen miles).—*Marched at 5.30 A.M. between some low hills, where, in a ravine called Kaka-Ku, there is a good pool of water with a very small stream above it. From here the route led down the valley, occasionally passing over low hills, to the Pathr river. The camp-ground is close to some pools of excellent water in the bed of the river.

*"Sajji Kach to Ketchi-ki-Kot, Nov. 9 (distance, six miles ; altitude, 8600 feet).—*Marched down the valley, which is nearly level the entire distance. The camp was pitched just north of the fort, built on the edge of a ravine. Lieutenant Mardall, 3d Panjab Cavalry, who died last night of typhoid fever, was this afternoon buried close to two small tamarisk-trees north of the fort, the band and firing-party being furnished by the 60th Rifles, and the service read by Major Mainwaring, 4th Ghurkhas.

*"Ketchi-ki-Kot to Chatt, Nov. 10 (distance, twelve miles ; altitude, 2240 feet).—*Marched, at

5.30, through low hills. The whole way is excellent throughout. At the tenth mile a *kotal* named the Burzen Pass is reached, and then the path descends to this plain, where the camp-ground is good.

"*Chatt to Kalchas, Nov. 11* (distance, eighteen miles).—Marched along the foot of the Khupp range through tamarisk-shrubs and long grass until, at the eighteenth mile, the Kalchas *nala* was crossed, where the camp was pitched.

"*Kalchas to Bet Baksha, Nov. 12* (distance, seven miles).—Marched over and between low hills the whole way to the camp-ground at Bet Baksha, which is roomy and on the right bank of the Chachar river.

"*Bet Baksha to Toba, Nov. 13* (distance, thirteen miles).—Marched along the northern slope of the Bihisto hills, over a tolerably open valley, and along the river-bed; then again over an open country for a mile, and along the stream again until the camp-ground was reached at Toba.

"*Toba to Drigri, Nov. 14* (distance, fifteen miles).—Marched from Toba over a small *kotal* and into the valleys beyond, and, for the next five and a half miles, through a succession of narrow defiles and gorges. A quarter of a mile further on, the road branches off north. Here the 3d Panjab Cavalry and 3d Sikhs separated from the force and went their own route to Dera Ghazi Khan *via* Harand, and the remainder of the troops marched to the post at Drigri, on the British frontier."

The expedition was now finished. At Drigri orders were issued to the effect that the Mari Field Force was broken up, and Brigadier-General MacGregor took his departure on the 15th for Rajanpur *via* Fatehpur, leaving the command of the troops to Colonel Rowcroft.



## CHAPTER VIII.

## QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL IN INDIA.

1880-1885.

*"Cogite concilium et pacem laudate sedentes  
Illi armis in regna ruant"*

APPOINTED QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL — KNIGHT COMMANDER OF THE BATH — AT OSBORNE AND WINDSOR—SERVICES OF THE GUIDES—THE DEPARTMENT—INTERCHANGE OF INFORMATION —PRESIDENCY DISTINCTIONS — AYUB KHAN'S ADVANCE AND DEFEAT — INTELLIGENCE BRANCH — ON FURLOUGH—BOMBAY AND ADEN—WAR OFFICE IN LONDON—THE CLAN MACGREGOR—'THE DEFENCE OF INDIA'—A FOOL'S PARADISE—WHAT ARE WE DOING? — IGNORANCE OF RUSSIA'S MOVEMENTS — FEELING IN PERSIA — PUBLICATION OF THE BOOK — GOVERNMENT DISAPPROVAL—EXPLANATIONS—RESULTS OF TELLING THE TRUTH—CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION—INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY COMMISSION—CONFERENCE AT RAWAL PINDI—THE PANJDEH OUTRAGE —WAR PREPARATIONS—IN PESHIN—THE KHOJAK AND BOLAN —LOSS OF RANK—COMMAND OF PANJAB FRONTIER FORCE.

No sooner had the Mari expedition re-entered India than its gallant commander was appointed (19th November) to the much-coveted post of Quartermaster-General in India, and Colonel MacGregor at once

proceeded to the army headquarters to take over the active duties of that office. He was also gazetted (10th December) to the local rank of Major-General, a position and station seldom attained by an officer of similar age and service in the Indian army, for he was not more than forty years of age, and could reckon twenty-four years' military service.<sup>1</sup>

After entering upon the work of his department, to the Intelligence Branch of which he devoted special attention, the strain upon Major-General MacGregor's constitution, produced by the continuous hard work, physical and mental, during the trying campaigns in Afghanistan and on the frontier, had by this time told seriously on his health, and by timely advice he sought the much-needed rest and relaxation for brain and body in a few months' leave of absence to England.

*Jan.* 17.—Soon after his arrival in London, General MacGregor was invited to Osborne, where he was received by the Queen with much kindness and consideration. He very often afterwards referred to the gratification he experienced on this occasion, when her Majesty presented him with some books containing his name with her autograph inscription. At this time Major-General MacGregor, who was already a Companion, was raised, on the 1st March, to the rank of Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath, of which most honourable Order

<sup>1</sup> Lord Wolseley became a substantive Major-General at thirty-five years of age after only sixteen years' service.

he received the insignia and the *accolade* of knighthood from the hands of her Majesty at Windsor in the same month.

Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor soon afterwards sailed for India, where, from the dates of his letters, it appears he was hard at work at the Quartermaster-General's office in Simla early in April.

In addition to the ordinary routine of his official duties, Sir Charles lost no time in setting to work to thoroughly reorganise those multifarious sections of internal army economy, such as distribution, transport, supply, and communication, &c., which with their thousand and one intricate subdivisions came within the scope of his department.

One especial trait in MacGregor's character was his love of strict justice and fairness. It has been said of him by those who knew him best, that he was generous to a fault, even to his own personal risk and disadvantage.

How just and fair he was under most adverse circumstances, which would have deterred most men, has already been alluded to ;<sup>1</sup> for instance in China, where, it will be remembered, he risked the charge of insubordination rather than see a *sowar* of Fane's Horse suffer flogging undeservedly. Indeed it was to the expression of his opinion on this occasion that he owed the loss of what had ever been the dearest wish of his heart—viz., the Victoria Cross.

Having thus himself suffered so keenly from rank

<sup>1</sup> See vol. i. chapter iv. p. 159.

injustice, he never lost any opportunity of bringing forward to proper notice the services of his brother officers.

As an irregular cavalry officer he had a warm sympathy, and a true feeling of *camaraderie*, for the various frontier corps; and one of his first letters after reaching Simla as Quartermaster-General may be quoted here, to show how zealously he backed up the recognition of any gallant and meritorious services.<sup>1</sup>

"To Major-General GREAVES.

"SIMLA, 12th April 1881.

"I enclose a letter from Colonel Campbell of the Guides. I simply do not understand the services of the Guides being so completely ignored. A regiment that could produce such men as those who died in the Residency at Kabal, I think deserves that some recognition should be made; but after that, throughout the whole second campaign, the Guides were ever foremost. They led the Khaibar column right up to Jagdalak, and when called on, marched straight into Kabal. They were at the capture of the

<sup>1</sup> When president of the commission of inquiry to investigate the circumstances attending the attack on the Residency at Kabal, Sir Charles MacGregor had brought prominently to notice the conduct of the escort of the Queen's Own Guides. He wrote in his report: "They" (the commission) "believe that the annals of no army and no regiment can show a brighter record of devoted bravery than has been achieved by this small band of Guides. By their deeds they have conferred undying honour, not only on the regiment to which they belong, but on the whole British army."—See *ante*, chap. iv. p. 150.

Takht-i-Shah on the 13th [Dec. 1879], and of the Asmai hill on the 14th, and held the most exposed part of the Sherpur cantonment. Everywhere their conduct was magnificent, and Sir F. Roberts repeatedly acknowledged their services. Campbell commanded the infantry at the attack on Asmai and at Sherpur, and at the second fight at Charasia. Stewart commanded the cavalry throughout; and in the very brilliant charge on the 13th December, Hammond always distinguished himself, but especially on the 14th, when the steady way the Guides came down the hill, if anything, surpassed the splendid way they had assaulted it. I heard Jenkins himself say that Hammond was worth a company to him, and Campbell and Battye also behaved very well. I know scarcely any who more thoroughly earned the C.B. than Campbell and Stewart, and they were, besides, officers of very distinguished service before the Afghan war was heard of. I spoke to Sir Donald about them this morning, and I hope he will include them.

C. M. M."

"To SIR DONALD STEWART,  
Commander-in-Chief.

"SIMLA, 27th April 1881

"Do you approve of our keeping troops at Chaman? The position is bad militarily, though, I believe, healthy; and it seems that if we hold the top of the Khojak, there can be no use in holding Chaman also. I have been thinking of this, and thought I would bring it to your notice."

"To Colonel G. CHENEY, *Military Department.*

"SIMLA, *May 25.*

"I return Girdlestone's letter and enclosure with thanks. I have always been crying out against the system, which is very prevalent in India, of one department of Government not knowing what the other is doing; and the fact of a military report of Nipal having been written as far back as 1872, and not yet communicated to the Commander-in-Chief, is a very good instance.

"Nipal is a country where military operations are very possible, yet, as far as I know, none of the many reports which must have been written by Residents during the last seventy years, have found their way to us. Now, we are trying to extract information from the Foreign Office, and I hope ere long we shall be able to get a report on Nipal ready."

"His Excellency Lieutenant General Hon. A. E. HARDINGE, C.B.,  
Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army.

"SIMLA, *June 2.*

"I hate all Presidency distinctions, and shall always be ready to do what I can for good men either from Bombay or Madras; but it is only in the Intelligence Branch that I have a chance. I hope they will introduce some, at least, of the recommendations of the Commission of which I was a member; but there is always the fear of their accepting anything for economy without giving enough consideration to efficiency.

"I was glad to see General Hume's order about the Bombay troops. I expect they were more sinned against than sinning. The best troops in the world will get defeated if under a bad general, and I must say that I think one of the most crying wants of our army is to provide for the selection of the best men for generals. With a good general everything possible is done, and done well; but no money, no amount of blood, will save operations conducted by a bad one. I believe we have as many good men as our neighbours."

"To Captain W. J. GILL, R E.,  
Intelligence Branch, Horse Guards.

"SIMLA, July 23

"I am very sorry you were not able to accomplish all you intended, but the journey you did make may be useful some day.

"The Russians are, as you say, getting on famously for their own interests, but how about ours? I pointed out the importance of Sarakhs some years ago, and I believe that we shall find that they will be there ere long; then they have a straight run in to Herat.

"We have made an awful mess of it politically. I suppose a week will settle who is to be master of Kandahar, and all accounts seem to say that Ayub has the best chance. The last news is that the Amir's outposts in front of Giriskh have been driven in."

"Lieutenant-General Sir F. ROBERTS,  
G.C.B., V.C., &c., Madras.

"SIMLA, Sept. 28.

"We were very much shocked to hear of poor Kennedy's death in so sudden a manner, and I am sure you will feel it much.

"The news has just come that the Amir has beaten Ayub, who has bolted to Herat. The Government people are delighted. I wonder what they will do now? They ought to get Abdul Rahman to go on and kick him out of Herat, as that is the critical point now. I got your long letter. I always say that they had better have left you alone at Kabal. Abdul Rahman may of course turn up trumps, but I still think it was mere gambling to trust to him. We have got a long report on Burma ready, and I am just sending an officer to go and fill up blanks in our information, and when he has finished, I will send you a copy. When you get to Madras, I shall write to you about helping us in the Intelligence work, with the assistance of one of your Quartermaster-Generals."

"To Lieutenant-General the Hon. A. E. HARDINGE, C.B., Bombay.

"CALCUTTA, Dec. 29.

"It is very uphill work trying to get our army into good working order for service. There is no finality about anything. We are very fond of having commissions to report on every or any thing, but their recommendations are seldom if ever accepted; and if a commission of the best officers in the army



recommended anything, all would be upset on the dictum of a ——. We are trying now to get the Transport into working order, but are always afraid a fit of economy will upset the whole thing.

“I hope in time to get the Intelligence Branch into good order; but we are much underhanded, and Government treats us as if we were trying to do something wrong in wishing to get information of possible theatres of war, and there is all sorts of obstructions from different Government departments not interested in the scheme.”

“Colonel J. BROWNE, R.E., C.B.

“CALCUTTA, Jan. 28.

“If we had held on to Kandahar, the railway would have been finished to Peshin by this. Now it will never be touched until a great emergency arises again. Affairs in Burma are what they call *strained*, but nothing short of Theebaw coming down and smacking Bernard’s cheek will make us go to war; and even then I am not sure that the Secretary Foreign Department would not be instructed to direct Bernard to offer the other cheek also.”

“E. BERNARD, Esq., C.B., C.S.I., Rangun.

“Jan. 31.

“I will send you Roberts’s letter in a few days. We have been working at Burma for some time past, and Major MacNeill has been sent there to complete our information. I shall be obliged if you

will help him in getting information about resources in transport and supplies in British Burma.

"I think we could roll Theebaw up in about three weeks from leaving Rangun."

The Quartermaster-General obtained a year's furlough from the 14th April, when he proceeded by the mail-steamer *Rome* to England. On his journey he took the opportunity of inspecting the fortifications at Bombay and Aden, and whilst at sea the following letter was written to Sir Donald Stewart :—

"*April* 19.—I went round all the fortifications at Bombay with the engineer in charge and Blood,<sup>1</sup> and I was very much disappointed in the amount of protection afforded by them.

"Batteries have been made at Mahalakshmi, Malabar, Colaba, and Oyster Rock : there are two others, but they need not be considered, being quite useless. The two first batteries, provided their guns were effective against armour up to ranges which would make the guns of an enemy ineffective against Bombay, are well placed. I cannot now say whether this is the case, having no table showing range, penetration, &c., of modern guns ; but I am under the impression that the guns in position in those batteries are not powerful enough, and therefore it seems that a ship with armour could anchor out of their effective range (against ironclads) and shell Bombay.

<sup>1</sup> Major Bindon Blood, R.E.

“The Colaba Battery is quite useless, being so placed that its guns could not reach any point which an enemy’s ship could approach, because the shoal round Colaba Point extends so far out that an enemy’s ship could not, if she wanted, come within the effective range of this battery.

“We now come to the Oyster Rock Battery. By itself this battery is of no use, because an enemy’s ship keeps in deep water, out of range, till she is right past it, and then takes up a position from which she could shell Bombay town and arsenal at her leisure without any of the batteries in the harbour being able to reach her. It therefore comes to this, that the defence of Bombay rests on the two monitors [Abyssinia and Magdala], but, considering there are no gunners for them nearer than Portsmouth, this seems rather a precarious sort of defence. Of course they could put garrison gunners into them, but imagine how many times the guns would hit under such circumstances. I can hardly imagine anything more ludicrous than to see a par-boiled, sea-sick garrison gunner, who has never laid a gun at sea in his life, trying to lay it on an enemy’s cruiser moving at the rate of twelve knots.

“It is not for me to do more than point this out, although I must say it does seem to me most extraordinary that such things should be allowed. To me it seems there is absolutely no excuse; for when lakhs are being spent upon offices, &c., it should certainly be possible to provide money for fortifications.

"In 1875<sup>1</sup> I wrote strongly against the folly of leaving the arsenals at Bombay and Madras unprotected, but that was seven years ago, and nothing has come of it. I think just the same now. The Bombay arsenal should be moved *at once*, partly to Poona and partly to Asirgarh;<sup>2</sup> indeed, the ground would fetch a price that would cover the cost of a new arsenal.

"I am going round the Aden defences with Colonel Goodfellow,<sup>3</sup> R.E., and the engineer in charge."

"*April 28.*—I went all over the Aden defences. . . . These may be said to consist of the two batteries of Marbut and Tarshein, which sweep the entrance of the harbour, and are well enough placed; but on looking at the chart, you will find that any ship drawing twenty-seven feet and under can get past these batteries, under Little Aden, entirely out of range, and once these batteries were turned, there is, of course, nothing to prevent such a ship from shelling the buildings at Steamer Point at her leisure.

"There were two most ridiculous facts which occurred, and which I must tell you of. First, after some difficulty the several gates of the Ras Marbut fort were opened, and we got in. I then went round

<sup>1</sup> When on Ordnance Special Commission.—See vol. i. chap. viii. p. 358.

<sup>2</sup> Asirgarh, a strong fortress in Nimar District, Central Provinces, near Chandni, on the Great Indian Peninsula Railway.

<sup>3</sup> Colonel C. A. Goodfellow, R.E., V.C.

to each gun, till, standing in the embrasure of one of them, I noticed the ditch had been filled up, and that *I could walk out*, or any one walk in (?), at pleasure. Then—would you believe it?—this fort, which must have cost a great deal of money, is built so that its guns *do not command the water* for a considerable distance from the shore. True, seeing this, they have erected a four-gun battery immediately in front of the fort, which does command the water; but surely the man who made the fort should be hung, if only in effigy. I then went all over the old fortifications, which were erected to keep out the Arabs. Of these I need only remark that they constitute a permanent compliment to the supposed fighting qualities of the Arabs. The whole of the range from Jebel Shamshan<sup>1</sup> to the sea has been scarped, every pinnacle is crowned with rifle-towers, and every bit of ground bigger than a *teapoy* has a battery of guns on it. Then these are connected with a massive double wall of masonry, whilst outside the whole isthmus is blocked by massive ramparts with bastions. It would be interesting to know what the cost of these was, and I hope Sanford will try and find out. It must have been enormous, and I am quite sure that a sixth of the sum would have made Aden quite secure. On the cantonment side the only protection from big guns is a battery on Sirah Island of two 12-ton guns. I don't think

<sup>1</sup> Jebel Shamshan, the highest peak on the peninsula of Aden, 1776 feet.

this is enough, as now there is nothing to prevent a ship getting round the promontory to the south of Sirah, and then, being completely out of sight, shelling the crater at her leisure.

"I heard at Aden that a Colonel Crossman is coming to do wonders. What I think is wanted, is a battery on the promontory near Sirah; to put the Marbut and Tarshein batteries at Steamer Point into proper order; and by some means to close the Little Aden channel, so as to compel ships to pass within range of these batteries. I should hardly think this was very difficult, as there seems to be a good deal of stone lying idle in this part of Arabia."

On his arrival in London, Sir Charles placed the whole of his collection of voluminous notes and personal papers referring to the campaigns of Afghanistan in the hands of an artillery officer, who compiled, under the direction of the general, a succinct account of the Second Afghan War, which he proposed having published, when completed, in England.

Meantime the indefatigable general lost no time in examining the working of the Intelligence Branch of the British War Office, at this time located in Adair House *pro tem.* (in the old building now converted into the Junior Carlton Club), under the direction of Colonel Cameron, V.C., the present chief of the Military College, Sandhurst.

He thus writes to Colonel Sanford, Deputy Quartermaster-General, Simla :—

"LONDON, *June 22.*

"From what I have seen of the Intelligence here, I do not think that, considering the short time we have been started, and the smallness of our establishment, we have any sort of reason to be ashamed of what we have done.

"The Intelligence Branch here certainly does a great deal of work; but a large amount of it is not, in my opinion, purely Intelligence work. In fact, the Intelligence Branch here is a sort of an attempt at being a great general staff on the Russian model. I must say I don't think this is right, and we certainly could not undertake such work as they do unless we were trebled in numbers.

"I think, if each year as much is done as we did last, that five years will see us in possession of very complete information of all the countries which come into our *répertoire*.

"We are weak in mapping establishment and clerks, but that is a matter of money."

Same to same.

"DALMALLY, *October 4.*

"The Military Department does not seem to be able to get out of the obstruction vein which was so prevalent under —, and their treatment of the Intelligence Branch is disgraceful. They cannot see that if they would treat us generously now, we could get all the information compiled at once, and then it would not require a large establishment to keep it

going. The home Intelligence Branch is treated properly, but here they seem to have realised the necessity for it. In India they seem to be going on ——'s idea, that we got on very well before Intelligence Branches were heard of. There is one plan by which I think I can help, if you will talk to Lockhart about it, and then go to the Chief. Here in England one can get any number of literary men to undertake jobs, and if the Chief will sanction it, I will get a good deal of the necessary preliminary work done here. I will advance the cost out of my own funds, and take my chance of getting it back from Government. . . .

"In London there are greater facilities for doing this. When I go back (to town), I am going to attend the Intelligence Branch regularly till I have thoroughly mastered all their system, and know exactly what information they have got which affects us, and then I will write about it. . . .

"I am very glad you have got some mules for the Sappers. We must be thankful for what we can get, but go on '*pegging away*' at Government till we get things right for service. We are ahead of them at home in the transport scheme; but even this may die of inanition if Government are not kept constantly jogged about it. They have been making great capital here about so many men having taken their discharge. It was perhaps unfortunate that it happened just when it did; not that it mattered very much all the same, but if we are never to do any-



thing because we may have a war, it will be reversing old Moltke's ideas. He does everything he can to keep his army efficient for the same reason that — & Co. would do nothing.

"I don't mind betting that in the long-run the Military Department scamping our offices will be more expensive than if they had given us what we wanted.

"I hope the difficulties about the men who travelled for us are settled by this time. There should be no difficulty about the leave part of it. It was done in my case twice. Once my leave in Persia was allowed to count as service, and when I went to Baluchistan I was held to have been on duty."

During the summer, Sir Charles took his little daughter Viva, now ten years old, on a tour through the most beautiful parts of England, and amused himself with sketching, painting, and photographing lovely bits of scenery which took his fancy, and places and objects of historical interest.

With the autumn, this pleasant journey was continued into Scotland, and there Sir Charles had the opportunity, so long wished for, of visiting those portions of the Highlands which had constituted the famous MacGregor country in olden days—the shores, mountains, and glens of Loch Katrine and Loch Lomond.

The general was deeply impressed by the associations connected with the romantic prospects now

beheld for the first time. All the instincts of his race were aroused, and his ardent temperament was fully kindled by this visit to the scenes of his ancestors' exploits and sufferings, so that on his return to London, he set energetically to work towards the re-establishment of his Clan's reputation and unity, and with his characteristic enthusiasm, though not without some considerable trouble, he at last succeeded in awakening the dormant kindred spirit among his fellow-tribesmen.

Accordingly a meeting of the Clan Gregor was held in the George Hotel at Glasgow on the 6th January 1883, and another meeting and dinner took place on the 26th, which were well attended by members of the Clan.

"QUEEN'S HOTEL, MANCHESTER,  
27th Jan. 1883.

"There was a very large and most enthusiastic meeting at Glasgow yesterday. After a good deal of talk, all of which evinced on the parts both of the speakers and of the audience the deepest interest in the Clan, it was determined to appoint a committee to consider and report,—(1) whether it would not be possible to come to a satisfactory understanding with the old Clan Gregor Society, and instil into it new life; (2) what should be done in the event of its not being possible to do so. This, you see, is just the conclusion we came to at Edinburgh, and I may say also in London; and therefore I hope that the

Edinburgh and Glasgow sections of the Clan, as being the largest, will be enabled to work together<sup>4</sup> not only harmoniously, which all must see to be of great importance, but also with some enthusiasm. My experience of this world is that nothing can be, or has ever been, done without enthusiasm either in a body or in some individual. I am glad even to have got so far in the object I have in view, which is simply to fuse us all together into one brotherhood. There are some who look on a Highland clan as a small hereditary monarchy; but I am sure a study of the numerous works on the subject will convince any one that the constitution was far more that of a republic. One man was elected chief, and was given a larger share of the lands of the clan than others, in order to enable him to support the dignity of the position, and this really was his only title to be better off than others. I therefore hold that all of the name are, according to ancient traditions, brothers, and I would try to make them all brothers in reality, so that each may help the other, whenever it is in his power, for the sake of the old name. All my proposals—such as the writing of a history, the keeping up of a roll, the foundation of a museum, &c., &c.—are directed towards this end alone; because my experience tells me that enthusiasm, even when kindled, requires fuel to keep it up.

“I have already helped many of the name because of it, and if I knew more of them, I daresay I shall be able to do more in the future;—so I say,

in the words of the boating song, let us 'pull, pull together,' and we shall, I am sure, make something of this movement so happily started. I purpose to write a pamphlet and distribute it; in this I will embody fully all the views I hold on the subject, and it will, at least, show what one of the name hopes.

C. M. MACGREGOR."<sup>1</sup>

In addition to the above proposed institutions, General MacGregor projected a school for boys and girls of the Clan, and an asylum for poor disabled MacGregors. Both of these he thought should be in Glenorchy, where he hoped a bit of land could be bought, and where the locality was very healthy and accessible by rail.

"UNITED SERVICE CLUB, *January 1883.*

"I am collecting materials for a really complete history of the Clan Gregor, which I propose either to compile myself, or get compiled by some competent person. I do not disguise to myself that this will be a difficult task, as, owing to the barbarous and cowardly persecutions to which the Clan was subjected, the members of it are now very much scattered, and I am afraid many of their records are lost. Still, having had considerable experience in collecting information of a similar nature, I have found it nothing less than extraordinary how, when once begun, much easier the task turns out than has

<sup>1</sup> Letter to John MacGregor, Esq., 10 Dundas Street, Edinburgh.

been expected. Facts long forgotten are remembered, and searchings amongst old papers reveal more facts and clues to others. I am therefore not inclined to despair, and hope, with the assistance of members of the Clan, to gradually get together enough information to make a beginning. It is in this view I address you, to ask if you can help me with any papers which may be in your possession, any traditions or anecdotes you may remember, or any references to works and papers in which information may be found, or to people who may be able to help.

“Any genealogies of the Clan, copies of epitaphs on tombstones, old letters, agreements, &c., &c., would certainly be most useful

“Hoping you will be able to help, and assuring you that if, in addition to any information you can afford, you could help me with suggestions as to carrying out my idea, I shall be most grateful.

“C. M. MACGREGOR.”<sup>1</sup>

This letter was circulated through the MacGregors,

<sup>1</sup> Rough idea for a History of the Clan Gregor (1) Sketch of the descent, manners, and customs of Highlanders generally, (2) ancient history of the Clan Gregor, (3) history from commencement of persecutions to withdrawal of proscription of name, (4) biographical sketches of the more distinguished members of the Clan, (5) description of the country formerly known as MacGregor country, with traditions and anecdotes, (6) genealogies and epitaphs; (7) extracts of notices of the Clan in other works, (8) documents relating to the Clan; (9) a roll of the Clan Gregor in 1883. A map; any portraits that can be got, &c.

and meeting with a favourable response, was followed up by a private circular :—

“CLANSMEN,— While travelling about lately I have met many MacGregors, and from conversation with them, have been induced to form the opinion that there is a strong feeling of clanship prevailing among those bearing our name. It seems to me, therefore, that it would be advisable, and, I trust, also practicable, to take measures to revive and sustain this honourable spirit ; and as I hope there are many of the name who will be found to agree with me, I write to you to propose that a meeting should be held of as many of the leading members of the Clan as may be willing and able to be present, to consider what measures are practicable for the resuscitation and fostering of Clan feeling amongst us, and for the establishment of a system of mutual aid and support from each and all of us to the other. . . .

“ Proposals for consideration :—

“(a) That there should be an annual gathering of the Clan at some convenient place.

“(b) A roll of the Clan should be made and kept up.

“(c) A comprehensive history of the Clan should be written.

“(d) A Clan Gregor Society should be started, for the benefit of all who may be in want of aid.”

The amalgamation of the Clan Gregor Society was carried out during the following year,<sup>1</sup> and Sir Charles was President of this institution until his death.

On the 6th February 1883 Sir Charles married Miss Jardine, and a fortnight after the wedding, he and his bride started for India, travelling through Europe, and visiting the principal cities of France, the Riviera, and Italy, on their way to Venice, where they were joined by Sir Charles's little daughter, Viva, so often mentioned in the diaries of his travels in Asia.

After spending a week in Egypt (during which interval the general critically went over the scene of action at Kassassin, and examined the lines of Tel-el-Kebir, out of which Lord Wolseley had driven Arabi and his Egyptians five months previously), Sir Charles and Lady MacGregor and his daughter went on to Bombay, and reached Simla in April, when the duties of the Quartermaster-General's office were resumed at army headquarters.

Meantime the *Intelligence Branch* was an especially cherished section of Sir Charles's department. From the first he had initiated, from his own resources, an Intelligence office wherever he had served, and now, by his example and energy, he rapidly succeeded in animating his colleagues and junior officers

<sup>1</sup> See letter from George MacGregor, Esq., 30 Rothes Drive, Dennistoun, Glasgow, 6th November 1884.

with something like enthusiasm (without which he always said nothing could succeed) and ardour for adventurous and far-searching work. Here again the zeal of the general, at every step, encountered dogged obstruction, and certain members of the Indian Council and Civil and Political departments did all they could to stifle the new-born spirit of inquiry and the activity of this scientific branch of the service instituted by Sir Charles MacGregor.

The prevalent *laissez aller* system of the much-praised *masterly inactivity* politicals had long found favour at Calcutta and Simla, and Sir Charles came to the conclusion that the only way in which it was possible to awaken the apathetic officials to a sense of the unpreparedness of India against external danger, would be for him to work out in detail the actual state of India from a military point of view, the numbers, resources, and armament of the country as they existed, and compare with these the stupendous power wielded by Russia in Asia.

He therefore set to work with characteristic, thorough-going devotion, and carefully prepared, with minute details, in conjunction with the advice of the best military minds and heads in the Indian service, a plain statement of the danger in which India then stood.

Some of his letters concerning his study of 'The Defence of India' and the improvement of the Intelligence Branch may be here quoted, as they exhibit



some glimpses of the development and progress of his scheme.

“To Major the Hon. G. C. NAPIER, C.I.E.

“June 5.

“Many thanks for your paper, which I have read with much interest. With reference to your remarks at the end, I should be much obliged if you would write a paper showing how soon the Russians could put a force of 20,000 men down at Herat. Work it out as though you had to put that number of men there, and show where you would get the troops from; where they would embark; how long they would take to get to the east coast; how long to disembark; what route they would take, (1) supposing Persia was openly on their side—(2) if she was passive—(3) if she was hostile; what supplies would they require; what baggage; what transport—they would have to take at least two heavy batteries with them; what would be the best means which could be devised for ensuring that we should receive very early and reliable information of what Russia was doing.

“*Entre nous*, I am preparing a paper on the reverse of this question—viz., how soon could we put a force into Herat of 20,000 men with heavy artillery. I think I would undertake, *if Government put their backs into it*, to put such a force into Herat in ——— days.”

"To Lieutenant-Colonel Sir R. SANDEMAN, K C.S.I.,  
Agent Governor-General, Quetta.

"SIMLA, June 15.

"I am making out, *as an exercise*, some calculations as to the arrangements necessary to put a force *en route* to Kandahar in the shortest possible time. Of course the question of supplies enters largely into these; and to enable me to be sure that no supplies that are procurable locally be carried up needlessly, I should be much obliged if you let me know approximately what quantities of supplies you could put down within fourteen days at each or either of the following places—viz., Quetta, Gulistan, &c., &c.  
. . . Of course it may not be possible to give any accurate estimates, owing to your not being able to make inquiries; but your great local knowledge and experience may enable you to give some that might be very valuable to us. Of course you will understand that I am not making these calculations on account of any probable move, but only to be ready, as such a move is not impossible."

Writing from Simla on the 20th June to Sir Frederick Roberts, then Commander-in-Chief of the Madras army:—

"SIMLA, June 20.

"We shall be glad to get your programme, as then we can make out our annual tour. I rather want Sir Donald to make a good long march, and have as little to do with Calcutta as possible. If I was

him, it would see me not. Nobody up here cares, two d's about Russia. If we were paid for it, we could not play their game better. I am sure it is a hideous blunder letting them get to Herat. The effect on India will be enormous, and I am sure we could prevent it. I think an officer should be sent as soon as possible with ten lakhs of rupees to put the defences in order, and to gain influence and prestige for us. Of course Abdul Rahman would not like it, but he would sooner have a British officer there than Ayub, which will be the case if he does not look out; besides, we could buy his consent for a lakh. Simultaneously the railway should be pushed on to the other side of the Khojak Pass. I would send a division down and give the work out on contract to regiments, who would do it in six months. Then another lakh or so would induce Abdul Rahman to ask for it on to Kandahar.

“I am having two papers got ready; one to show how soon we could put 10,000 men in Herat—another, how soon the Russians could do the same. We are about equal *now*, and we could beat them, but every day tells against us. . . . Yes, I remember writing to you about the Intelligence Branch, and was delighted but not surprised to see how thoroughly you entered into the spirit of it. I don't know who it is, but there is some one in the Military Department who is very hostile to our Intelligence Branch. They are always nagging us; but we

have given way enough, and we mean fighting next time."

"To his Excellency, General Sir D. STEWART,  
Commander-in-Chief in India.

*"July 5.*

"I wrote to the Foreign Office some days ago to ask if they had good information as to what was being done to extend the Atak railway. They replied that it had been completed up to Kizil Arvat, and did not know whether anything was being done to extend it.

"Now Ridgeway sends me the enclosed, which says that steps are to be taken at once to extend it. All this should make us alive to two facts: 1. That we have no proper means of getting information of Russian movements Trans-Caspian; 2. That we are taking no steps to push on our own railway.

"I think we are living in a fool's paradise, and are trying to make ourselves think that we can put off the evil day when complications with Russia will arise by doing nothing—by burying our heads in the sand, in fact. The steps we should take at once are, in my opinion, to send an officer to the Caucasus to report on what is going on there—*i.e.*, on the distribution of troops, the facilities for moving reinforcements by rail, and for embarkation and disembarkation on the east coast of the Caspian. Another officer should go to Astrabad, and go about

as much as he could along the east coast, and make good arrangements for getting early information of what is going on ; whilst a third officer should be sent to the Daragaz frontier. I know we have Stewart at Khaf,<sup>1</sup> and at all events he is doing no harm ; but we want more officers than him.

*“Secondly, Our answer to the Trans-Caspian railway should be to make eight miles of our Harnai line to every one they make, and therefore I think efforts should be made to put a strong force on to the line this cold weather—I mean more than we are sending. I write this in case you should feel inclined to take the question up to Council, and see if something cannot be done.”*

“To General SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, Bart., G C.B., V.C., &c.,  
Commander-in-Chief, Madras

“SIMLA, August 13.

“My paper is a very long one. It will not be published, but printed and circulated, and you may be sure you will have one of the first copies. So much vague jaw is expended on what the Russians can and cannot do, that I begin by showing exactly what they can do. Then, and not till then, I hold we are in a position to see exactly what the danger is, and then only can we take steps to provide against it. These steps divide themselves into—(a) measures necessary to maintain our hold on India inviolate ; (b) diplomatic measures to be taken—i.e., in way

<sup>1</sup> Khaf, on the Persian frontier, west of Herat.

of alliances, &c., ~~against~~ Russia; (c) military operations, both offensive and defensive.

"With reference to the first, I want to shew what measures are necessary to prevent any chance of a rebellion in our rear, and I take this province by province.

"If you had time to give me your ideas with reference to Madras and Burma, I should be awfully obliged, and would duly acknowledge or not mention your name, as you pleased. What I want to know is—(1) the most important points to be held in Madras, and the garrisons; (2) what movable columns would be necessary to keep all going; (3) what troops would be available for service outside the Presidency.

"I am making all the use I can of volunteers, Europeans and Eurasians generally.

"It is a *d—d* big question, notwithstanding ——— and suchlike, and I should be glad to think only two or three were gathered together to think it out; but no one seems to care a '*twopenny dam*.'<sup>1</sup> It will not come in their day, but I think it will come in yours and mine, and I can't help seeing its magnitude and our carelessness.

"If I can manage it, I will get some copies of the first proofs, and send to you and a few others who are interested in and capable of understanding the

<sup>1</sup> See Colonel Yule's Anglo-Indian Glossary. *Dam* originally an actual copper coin. "I don't care a *dam*"—i.e., in other words, "I don't care a brass farthing."

question ; but I don't know more than six men who come under that category."

"To his Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir F. ROBERTS.

"SIMLA, August 23.

"I have finished the Russian part of the question, and have proved, to my own satisfaction at least—

"1. They have many more men available than would suffice for the invasion of India.

"2. They could put forces into Herat, Kabal, and Chitral in sixty days after starting. How many days this would be after our hearing of it depends altogether on our Intelligence arrangements, which at present are as bad as they can be.

"3. If once in possession of these places, they could reinforce them to a sufficient number and in sufficient time to make it impracticable for us to turn them out. What would be the state of affairs under these circumstances, think you? I think if we allow them to get so far, it is only a question of time when they will be in a position to invade India.

"I am now taking up the other side—viz., what should we do? First, I must see what number and disposition of troops are necessary to make India *safe*. Till we know this we cannot know how many we shall have available for exterior operations. I am afraid we shall be fearfully short of men, but we shall see. One thing I am sure of, no plan of the

defence of India can be worth much as long as this sort of legislation goes on."

"To his Excellency General Sir D. STEWART, &c.

"SIMLA, *September 28.*

"You know there have been reports for some time of the massing of Russian troops in the Trans-Caspian district. Now we hear that General Komaroff is to take 10,000 or 15,000 men to Merv. What are they going to Merv for? We have heard that the Merv Tekkes have given in to the Russians, and I believe this is true. What then can be the good of their going to Merv? My idea is they are not going to Merv. They are making the going to Merv a pretext to enable them to collect troops about Sarakhs, with some other objective in view. That objective, I hold, is Herat, and I fully expect that our dream will very shortly be broken by some rather startling news.

"I don't know what you think, but I am decidedly of opinion that if they get possession of Herat, the consequences will sooner or later be disastrous to us. They will complete the railway<sup>1</sup> to that place in five, ten, or twenty years; and when this is done, Mr Ross, or Major Stewart, or half-a-dozen others, will show you, to an hour, how soon 10,000 or 200,000 men can be put into that place. Then the invasion

<sup>1</sup> The railway from Uzanada, on the Caspian, to Kızıl Arvat, Merv, Chaharjui, and Samarkand, was opened for traffic on May 27, 1888, less than *five* years after the above was written.



of India will become quite a feasible project, because, no one can know better than you that we have not the men to meet 100,000 Russians.

"But even supposing that we could hope that they would stop at Herat, the result of their getting there must be ruinous to us, because, inasmuch as the invasion of India is a feasible project to Russia, if Herat is in her possession, we shall then be forced to increase our army to an extent which will drive the financial member into the grave.

"There are many things which can be done to stop the Russian advance. I think that one of the first is to stop their being able to make a rush on Herat and take it by a *coup de main*, and I consider it is our duty to take immediate steps to this end.

"If you go with me so far—viz., that we should stop them getting to Herat—I will show you how I think we can do this. But remember I honestly believe we have not a day to waste."

"To his Excellency General Sir D. STEWART, &c.

"October 1

"You so far agree with me that you say that Russia is preparing for her next move—(1) by getting the Kalat Atak ;<sup>1</sup> (2) by arranging with the Mervis ; (3) by getting a footing at Sarakhs.

"But what is the next move after she has accom-

<sup>1</sup> The Daman-i-Kuh or Atak district includes the country between Kizil Arvat, Askabad, and Sarakhs, along which General Annenkoff's railway is now laid.

plished this? It is undoubtedly Herat. Meanwhile we do absolutely nothing. We see her throwing forward her parallels, and do not turn a spadeful to prevent her.

"I don't say she is going to invade India at once, but I see that the steps she is now taking all tend to place India at some future day in great danger. These steps are clearly,—1. To take up such 'positions that she can make an easy and sudden advance to positions of vast strategical importance at a time when we are otherwise engaged and when we cannot prevent her. In fact, she will absorb up Sarakhs and up to the Oxus. 2. Her next move will be Herat, Kabal, Chitral. You say, 'I know that any move across the Afghan frontier would mean war with England.' I do not know it—I wish to goodness I did. I wish even Russia knew it. But even if she did know it, when she is prepared for war with us, I don't suppose she will give us much warning; and once she has got to the positions I have named, the first we shall hear of her advancing to the second line will be that they are in her hands. For I hold, and I do not think any one can disprove it, that if we let her absorb up to Sarakhs and do nothing at all, we shall not, when the second phase of her operations comes to be carried out, be in a position to prevent her going to Herat. 3. Having got hold of these places, she can rest on her oars just as long as suits her convenience. She will have won the two first tricks; and while she is making

railways up to Farah, improving the navigation of the Oxus, and making a gun-road to Kabal, she can employ her spare moments in raising sedition along our whole border. Now, what I want our Government to do is to copy the Russians, to look ahead a bit—to do, as you say, all that can be done without declaring war against Russia. *One of the first steps is to have the north and west boundaries of Afghanistan laid down, and there is not a day to be lost: now, there can be no counter-Russian claims to any part of it, but this may not be the case a few months hence. Having laid down the boundary, the next thing is to inform Russia solemnly that if she crosses that border it will be war with us.* I don't believe at present she believes this, anyhow we have never yet told her so in plain words.

“But of course this will be of no use unless we take steps to make Herat safe. At present there can be no doubt in the mind of any one who knows the country that Russia could put a force into Herat without our being able to prevent her; and if she gets to Sarakhs, she will be all the more able to do so. Herat is in such a state of anarchy politically, and in such a weak state defensibly, that she must fall to a sudden assault. We must prevent this. We must arrange to have Herat put into such a state of defence that she would not fall to a *coup de main*.

“Therefore I hold we should do two things at once,—(1) *lay down the Afghan boundary on the*

*north and west; (2) arrange for the safety of Herat,—and I should like to have a quiet talk with you as to the best means of doing these things. I can see the difficulties in the way of our accomplishing them satisfactorily; but if we agree that they should be done, I am by no means disposed to despair of their accomplishment. I have said I wish Government to act with forethought; I will add, I wish them to act with every caution. I honestly believe, to descend to the ridiculous, this is a case like Eno's fruit-salt, a stone may stop the tiny rill, but not a mountain the raging torrent."*

"To his Excellency SIR DONALD STEWART, &c., &c.

"SIMLA, October 19.

"We have heard before that the troops on the Atak had been reinforced, and also that large numbers were collecting in Turkistan, and this seems to confirm these reports.

"I have pointed out that the probable lines of advance of the Russians will be—(1) Krasnovodsk, Askabad, Sarakhs, Herat; (2) Samarkand, Kilif, Balkh, Kabal; (3) Khokand, Marghilan, by Kolab, Faizabad, on Chitral, or by Terek Diwan Kul and the Baroghil,<sup>1</sup> on the same place. We have heard that 15,000 to 20,000 are collecting at Askabad. This says there are 25,000 at Turkistan and 15,000 are going to Khokand, all of which places are on the lines named above.

<sup>1</sup> These passes are practicable for wheeled artillery.

“What does this mean? If they are going to attack Merv, they do not want any troops at Khokand; if they are going to attack Bokhara, they don't want any at Askabad; but if they are not going to attack either, but are only getting into position for operations in Afghanistan, then these movements are exactly the ones which would be necessary. (I enclose a skeleton map to illustrate what I say.) Meanwhile, what are we doing?”

Soon after this last letter was written, the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Donald Stewart, made a tour of inspection through Central India, which lasted through the remainder of October and during November. At this period Sir Charles and Lady MacGregor accompanied the Chief, marching and camping with the Headquarters Staff, their furthest point reached being Jabalpur.

The beginning of the winter was spent by the Quartermaster-General and his family at Calcutta,<sup>1</sup> where Lord Ripon's Court was then held, until January 1884, when Sir Charles had to attend Sir Donald Stewart at the great camp of exercise formed near Bangalore under his old friend Sir Frederick Roberts, then commanding the Madras army.

From Bangalore Sir Charles and Lady MacGregor accompanied the Commander-in-Chief to Madras,

<sup>1</sup> On 22d December 1883 a good-service pension of £100 per annum was conferred by her Majesty's Government on Sir Charles MacGregor, as a reward for distinguished and meritorious service.

from which place they proceeded in turn to Secunderabad, Serangapatam, and Mysore, returning to Bombay by way of Haidarabad, where they were present at the gorgeous ceremonies with which the investiture of the Nizam with administrative powers by the Governor-General was celebrated.

From Bombay Sir Charles and his wife visited Poona and many places of interest, and finally arrived at Simla before the hot weather commenced. Here the headquarters remained for the hot season, during which time Sir Charles MacGregor, active as ever, made several excursions into the mountains. He often remarked, at this time, that he was not fitted for a settled life, and ought always to be wandering. Simla, with its social gaieties, dinners, balls, and parties, was always distasteful to General MacGregor; and although he was exceedingly hospitable, and liked entertaining his own friends in his own house, he did not care to go out into society. At home he was always bright, cheerful, and happy, seeming to throw off all the cares and anxieties of office directly he entered his own door; and he used to spend most of his leisure time, such as it was, in painting or singing and playing at lawn-tennis.

Still Sir Charles was hard at work in putting together and working out in detail the minutiae of facts, figures, and statistics, the examination of plans and maps and papers, anything and everything which in the slightest degree could assist in his plan for the defence of India. This one thought ab-

sorbed his whole attention apart from his regular and prompt fulfilment of his official duties, as the following extracts prove.

With reference to a letter from Captain de Laessoe, Foreign Department, on the concentration of Russian troops in Central Asia, the General writes :—

“To his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

*“February 25.*

“I wish you would read this case through. It shows what a lamentable state our Intelligence is in. The Foreign Office ask us for information! What information have we got? What means of getting information are allowed us? We can't send a sepoy five miles from Bannu without asking the Foreign Secretary, Panjab Government, and the Viceroy!!! Surely the time has come for some systematic plan for gaining reliable information on such a vital subject to be devised. I think an informal committee, composed of Durand, self, and Chesney, would do this, and that if your Excellency would aid us, we could make some practical proposal.”

Writing to Durand on the same subject he remarks :—

“I think myself we should have a regular system of securing accurate, early, and regular military information of Russian doings. I think if Chesney, you, and I were to get together and have a talk, we could propose something. What do you say?

I have got several men in my eye who would be available for the purpose."

In a memorandum written later (April 7), he says :

"At present we seem to be dependent for our information on Russian movements in Central Asia on :—

"(1) News-writers stationed at Kandahar, Herat, Merv, Bujnurd, Daragaz, Shiraz, Mashad, Ispahan, and Askabad.

"(2) Such information as Afzul Khan sends us from Kabal.

"(3) Bazar *gup* from Peshawar and Peshin.

"(4) Translations from Russian newspapers (which are, however, generally out of date).

"(5) Stray reports from the Berlin and St Petersburg Embassies.

"(6) Reports from Colonel Stewart (at Khaf), &c.

"This is, I think, very unsatisfactory. No news-writer who is known to the local authorities can possibly write anything of value, as it may be taken for a fact that their letters are read before despatch. Then, of course, Russian papers are quite different from our own. Our papers record every scrap of information they can get hold of, often with very little thought as to whether it is advisable it should be published or not. Russian papers, on the contrary, never publish anything the authorities do not wish to be known—*i.e.*, nothing that can be of much use to us.

"In order to show how unsatisfactory our information is, I need not go back further than one



month, when the news burst upon us that *the Russians had occupied Merv.*

“But there is another more singular instance of our ignorance. In June last, and since, rumours have been flying about that the Russian garrisons in Turkistan and Trans-Caspia have been lately increased; and the Foreign Office note (dated 17th January 1884) sums up by supposing that ‘there is now an excess of 60,000 men available for any emergency, and concentrated principally in the direction of Bokhara and Sarakhs.’ This simply means that the Russians are supposed to have sufficient men available (after providing necessary garrisons for Turkistan and Trans-Caspia) to enable them to advance on *Herat* and *Kabal*.

“To this moment we are in doubt whether this concentration has really taken place or not, and it is evident that our councils must be paralysed as long as this state of affairs continues.

“I therefore take it for granted that this state of ignorance is allowed to be unsatisfactory, and proceed to consider how it can best be remedied.

“The first point for consideration is, What do we want to know about Russian movements, &c. ? and second, How can we best gain the necessary information ?

“Now, what we want to know I take to be this. We should know at once what is the actual distribution and strength of the Russian army, and especially that part of it in Turkistan and Trans-Caspia ;

and we should have early, accurate, and regular information of all movements of Russian troops from the Caucasus and Russia towards Turkistan and Trans-Caspia. . . . In order to make sure of getting this information, it will be necessary to——” [Here follows a long scheme of the steps to be taken, which cannot be published.]<sup>1</sup>

“It should be borne in mind,” he adds, “that there are two maxims in getting good information. It should come from as many different, independent sources as possible, and it must be well paid for. No rule can be laid down as to what amounts should be paid to our secret agents; that must depend entirely on the value and accuracy of the information tendered, and the celerity and secrecy with which it is received.”

In a later memorandum:—

“*April 23.*—A really accurate idea of the real state of feeling at Teheran regarding England and Russia would be most valuable. We assume that the Persian Government are so completely under the thumb of the Russians that they cannot be expected to go against them at all. Is this true? If true, who among the leading men at Teheran are especially Russophilist? and is there none who leans towards England? If no hope can be entertained of gaining over any of the leading men at Teheran, it would be a good thing if . . . Of

<sup>1</sup> The identical course suggested in this scheme has since been taken up and acted upon by Government.

course we may take it for granted that Ayub Khan means to try and get back Herat, and perhaps eventually oust Abdul Rahman. Nothing is impossible in Afghanistan. He means to do this by hook or by crook, which being interpreted means, either with our aid or that of the Russians, or without either. But it would be very valuable if we knew more of his real hopes and fears, in order that we may know better how to utilise him for our own ends, if he is worth it. I saw Ayub<sup>1</sup> once, but he was too young to enable me to form any opinion of him. The same information would be valuable about the leading men with him, such as Loll Naib, Hafizalla, Hashim, and the Surtip. How do they hope to get back to Herat? Who do they propose to work through? &c., &c. Everything we can get as to the disposition and intentions of all this party will be very valuable."

"To H. M. DURAND, Esq., C.S., Foreign Department.

"SIMLA, *March 24.*

"Will you be at your office to-morrow? If so, at what hour? I want to see you. The Russians are going it, and unless we take the bull by the horns at once, we shall be in a hat that neither the diplomacy of the Foreign Office nor the blood of many soldiers will get us out of.

"I have just seen a paper by Condie Stephens on the topography of the Hari-rud. There is an air of

<sup>1</sup> *Vide ante*, p. 17; 'Khorassan,' vol. ii. p. 38.

truthfulness and common-sense about all his reports that makes one think he should certainly be sent with any commission; and the tricks he points out in the Russian maps show the necessity for a properly constructed survey party. I have not yet received the proofs of my paper. Ridgeway told me they would be sent off on Saturday, 15th."

"His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir F. ROBERTS,  
G.C.B., V.C., &c., Madras.

"SIMLA, April 5.

"I believe your Governor [*i.e.*, the Right Hon. Mountstuart E. Grant Duff] has a very complete knowledge of foreign politics, and I should be very much obliged to you if you would take an opportunity of asking him quietly what he thinks of the chances of our being able to make an alliance with Germany, Austria, Turkey, against Russia. I am inclined to think such a coalition would be feasible, but of course I am rather abroad when I come to talk about European politics. I daresay he will be against the idea, but I should like to know his reasons.

"I have finished three parts of my paper, and two are in the press, and the third is ready. The fourth and fifth I hope to get ready this week, and sixth and appendices in another fortnight. I have now come to a final arrangement about the parts.

"I. What can Russia do?<sup>1</sup> II. Internal Defence

<sup>1</sup> Ultimately the headings were as follows:—

Chapter I., pp. 1-50—"Can Russia invade India?"

of India; III. Diplomatic Measures necessary; IV. How are we to provide sufficient Troops to defeat Russian Operations? V. Strategical Disposition of our Troops; VI. What Improvements in Communication are necessary?

"Part V. will be considered under four heads: (1) If the Russians remain in their present positions till we are ready; (2) If they take up positions at Herat, at or near Kabal, at or near Chitral, before we are ready; (3) If from these positions they advance towards India; (4) If we are driven out of Kandahar and advanced positions, and have to fight on our frontier.

"I can't say what the appendices will be exactly, but I hope they will include—(1) Notes on the defence of our seaports; (2) Note on the defence of the obligatory points in India; (3) Details of routes,

Chapter II, pp. 51-104—"Internal Defences of India"

Chapter III, pp. 105-144—"Diplomatic Measures necessary"

Chapter IV, pp. 145-182—"How are we to provide a sufficient Force to meet Russian Operations?"

Chapter V., pp. 183-210—"Offensive-Defensive Military Operations from India."

Chapter VI, pp. 211-228—"Communications"

In addition, Chapter VII, pp. 229-232—"Offensive-Defensive Operations from other points than India."

The headings in Chapter V. were—(1) Provided Russia remains in her present positions till we are ready to undertake operations to cover Afghanistan, (2) Supposing she takes up positions at Herat, at or near Kabal, and at or near Chitral, before we are ready; (3) If, having gained these positions, she advances towards India; (4) Admitting that we have been so supine as to take no adequate steps to meet her, and we are driven out of the Kandahar-Kabal line and have to fight on a line from Jalalabad to Quetta; (5) Allowing that we have been defeated on this line and driven back to our present frontier.

&c. ; (4) On the sphere of operations of our movable columns in India ; (5) Reports on the defence of Afghanistan ; (6) Latest information about the Hazarajat and Kafiristan, &c., &c. ; (7) Organisation of the lines of communication of the forces noted in Part V.

"But I will not wait for the appendices to get the report out and send round copies. I should like to know to whom you think I should send them. Who did you send yours to? I cannot say how many pages this will run to. I calculate the three first parts will come to about 200.

"The game we have to play is very difficult, but all the more honour to us if we win. There are signs that our miserable Government is somewhat roused. The Boundary Commission will certainly come off. Who do you think they will send?"

"To Colonel G T CHEENEY, C.S I., R.E.

"SIMLA, May 21.

"I am glad you think I have succeeded in arousing conviction as to the reality of the danger we are in. I shall be glad to come over and see you whenever you name a day, and talk it over. The great point I want to raise is, Is the danger real? If we are agreed about this, we can very soon settle what should be done. Of course I give my ideas of what this should be, but I am not so wedded to my ideas that I would not work heart and soul for whatever was thought best for the general cause.

"I am going on with the paper, and am going to

work out all the necessary details. I have not sent it to Lord Ripon yet, indeed I have only sent it to a few experts to get at their opinions. When I get them I will bring it all out, and send it to every one I can think of. Perhaps you could help me in this. I am averse to publishing our nakedness."

At last 'The Defence of India' was printed and issued just as it was settled that the demarcation of the Russo-Afghan Boundary should be fixed by an international Commission.

"To Lieutenant J. M. GRIERSON, R.A., Staff College.

"SIMLA, *June 19.*

"About the Boundary Commission. I fancy they will prefer to send any one but me.<sup>1</sup> They talk of Temple, Griffin, and St John, and I fancy they are very likely style of men to go; but if they would send me to hold Herat, I would not care who drew red and green marks on a map. I hope you will send me Hamley's paper.<sup>2</sup> Mine is finished, and

<sup>1</sup> On the 21st July Sir C. MacGregor writes to Lieutenant-Colonel Kinloch, 4th Battalion King's Royal Rifles: "You will have heard ere this that they are going to send Sir P. Lumsden, so I suppose he will select his own men, and I shall have nothing to do with it."

<sup>2</sup> "Russia's Approaches to India," a paper read at the Royal United Service Institution, on May 16, 1884, by Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hamley, Royal Artillery, who adds in a note to the printed report: "And here I may mention that, since this paper was printed, I have seen evidence that most of the views here set forth are shared by an Indian officer, whose name would be at once admitted as of almost decisive influence in the question"—alluding to the advance sheets of 'The Defence of India,' by Sir Charles MacGregor.

is now being printed. I am proud to think that it has given the whole Council fits ! ”

“To Colonel W. S. TREVOR, V C., R.E.,  
Secretary to Government, P.W.D.

“*July 17.*

“I have read your paper. I see that you assume that you will have eight to ten years to prepare. If there was any certainty of this, I should agree with you, but the exact contrary is the case, for the Russians are in a position *now* to take Herat.

“They may perhaps be afraid to do so at once ; but if we do nothing, they will always be in a position to do so before we can prevent them. Therefore the time we shall have to prepare rests with them, not with us. Whenever they are ready, they will begin without giving us any warning.

“I am quite sure that your plan of having a Resident with no British troops to back him, and intrusting the defence of Herat to Hazaras, will never do. No Resident could stay in Afghanistan anywhere without a force at his back. I see all the difficulties of our going to Herat as clearly as any one, but I am convinced there is no other way of making that place safe, and therefore the sooner we face it the better.”

“To Colonel J. W. MACQUEEN, C.B.,  
Secretary to Government, Panjab.

“*July 18.*

“About Herat of course the whole question turns, whether it is a sufficiently important position to fight



for, and whether we are not bound to fight for it. I hold it is most important, and that we must fight for it. If so, the only way to secure its safety is to go there ourselves; no reliance whatever can be placed on any Afghan rag-tag to hold it for us. I see all the difficulties as well as any one, but no one has yet answered my question—What measure short of our going there will make it safe? I can understand a fellow saying he does not want an omelet at all, but not those who say they would like an omelet, but who try to get it without breaking eggs. Will you let me see your paper?"

"To Captain J. C. F. GORDON, C.B.

"SIMLA, *July 24.*

"I have nothing to do with the Boundary Commission. A great luminary here, who lately distinguished himself by the introduction of a bill for the transfer of power to the Babus, has been still dropping pearls of wisdom. If he saw your letter (the spirit of which *I* commend much) he would say,—‘How very indiscreet! it might provoke the Russians.’ So now, if you cough too loudly up here, we say, ‘How very indiscreet! it might provoke the Russians.’ Never mind, my boy! I always say the politicals are the soldiers’ best friends, and they are now preparing for us as pretty a kettle of fish as the most ardent could desire, and you and all of us will get our chance yet."

"To Major-General Sir G. R. GREAVES, K.O.M.G., C.B., &c.<sup>1</sup>

"SIMLA, Aug. 20.

"I want to have a talk with you about the situation generally. I have had my say in my book. The fate of such productions is, we all know, 'Yes, it's very true; but let's have a peg!' Now I do not want this to be the case *in this case*. There is doubtless a good deal that a real radical reformer would like to upset in our system of organisation out here; but I think the question for us is, How can we get ready for contingencies in the shortest possible time, with the least dislocation of present arrangements, and despite all that the 'rest-and-be-thankful' school can do?

"Though there are points which might be improved in our Staff and departments, I think we could get through a campaign all right very much as we are.

"One great want is men. The first point is, How many do we want?—and the second is, How can we get them? I have tried to answer this in my Chapter IV., but I may be wrong; and if we could get the Chief to settle the first point, *we* might work out the second, and then get him to let us submit the whole scheme officially to the Military Department. Coming thus from the Chief, they could not burke it. In order to get the Chief to settle the first point, I think we might submit a memorandum officially to him. Tell me what you say to all this."

<sup>1</sup> Adjutant-General in India.

'THE DEFENCE OF INDIA,'<sup>1</sup>

This notable book, completed, as we have seen, in June, was printed and ready for issue in September, from the Government Central Branch Press at Simla, but only a limited number of this *confidential* publication was actually distributed to certain prominent officials, experts, and recognised publicists, interested in Central Asian affairs; for scarcely had the earlier copies been glanced through at the Foreign Department in Calcutta, than, by order of the Supreme Government, the further distribution of the volume was hastily stopped, and the remainder of the now suppressed work rigorously impounded.

The Quartermaster-General had previously exercised the greatest possible caution to ensure the exclusive and confidential character of his book, by personal superintendence of the printing process, by seeing the type distributed after use, and by taking each sheet when pulled from the press into his own custody. He also took the greatest pains that those copies sent out only reached persons whose reputation was assumed to guarantee the safety of the information contained within.

In a prefatory note the author explains the cir-

<sup>1</sup> [*Confidential.*] The Defence of India : A Strategical Study. By Major-General Sir C. M. MacGregor, K.C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., Quartermaster-General in India. Simla : Government Central Branch Press, 1884.

cumstances which led up to the preparation and production of the book, and he further requests each reader of his "Strategical Study" to send him critical remarks, whether in favour of or against the views therein set forth; his only object being, as he states, to get the right thing done, whatever that may be.

There can be no breach of confidence now in giving a brief sketch of the contents of this highly valuable book, the reasons which alone rendered it improper for general circulation being fully explained in the preface, which may be quoted at length :—

*"Preface.*—The following pages have been written under the strong belief that a great danger is impending over our Indian empire, and therefore that it behoves all Englishmen to try to realise exactly what that danger is, and what measures should be undertaken to meet it. It may be taken for certain that the ranks of those who believe that there is no danger to India from Russian encroachments in Asia have been very much diminished by the late uncalled-for and deceitful advance of that Power to Merv, and that therefore any warning is now but little required. However this may be, I hope what I have to say will at last open the eyes of all Englishmen, and decide those who may yet be wavering that the danger is now real. I have proposed certain measures to meet the Russian menace. I believe all are sound and all are feasible; but as long as my readers agree with me that the danger is

real and must be met adequately, I have no wish to split hairs as to what is best to be done. Once those in power in England and India are roused to a just appreciation of the situation, I shall have no fear of the result. Therefore I earnestly appeal to each one who reads my paper to do all that lies in his power to aid in the great work which it recommends; for that work is no less than the preservation of our Indian empire. It may be asked why I have not addressed myself to the general public of England and India by means of the press. My answer is, Because I believe doing so would do more harm than good, inasmuch as though I believe if I did so it would raise a strong popular feeling on the subject, still there is much of what I have said that should not be known to the Russian Government, who, with all their *finesse*, are not so well informed on many points as they would wish to be and are trying to be. I therefore, instead of addressing myself to the general public of England, appeal to those whom I believe to have the power to aid; and I ask each one who reads this paper, while keeping it *strictly confidential*, to do what he can to assist in getting done what is necessary and advisable." Leaving out, therefore, all facts, details, suggestions, and figures which (from their minute accuracy) can be considered confidential, or in the remotest degree detrimental to the interests of the Government and the service, the following meagre notice of the subjects of each separate chapter will serve to indicate

sufficiently the argument of General MacGregor's exhaustive disquisition.

Chap. I. *Can Russia invade India?*—In his first chapter Sir Charles considers the possibility of Russia, from her present position in Asia, invading India now (1884) or at any future time. He shows that, the Caucasus being subdued, Turkey cannot cope single-handed with Russia; whilst Persia, the Turkomans, Khiva, Bohkara, and the Khanates are all subordinate to the Muscovite Emperor. Next he shows the enormous fighting strength of Russia, the proportionate force which must be retained for her frontier defence, and the sufficiency of the remainder available for an invasion of India. Then, as to the feasibility of this operation, it is pointed out how easily the obvious vantage-points can be seized without hindrance. Sir Charles suggests that the Russians would probably advance five columns of attack,—viz., an Atak column, *viâ* Sarakhs, on Herat; an Oxus column, *viâ* Chaharjui, on Bamian; a Jam column, *viâ* Balkh, on Kabal; a Marghilan column, *viâ* Kolab, on Chitral; and a Pamir column, *viâ* Terek Diwan, on Kashmir.

The author calculates that, on the sixtieth day after the Russian forces have been put in motion from their respective bases, they could reach their secondary bases, and that Russia would have a very fair chance of arriving at her objectives before England could take any practical steps to prevent her.

The Russian plan, it is suggested, would be—"To

hold on to Herat at all hazards, reinforcing it to any extent necessary from the Caspian ; to hold on to Kabal, thence threatening India long enough to draw the English into entangling themselves in a campaign in North Afghanistan in the winter ; to play the same game with the Chitral column, by threatening to advance on Peshawar, and to use the Pamir column to keep up a constant irritation on the Kashmir frontier ; to embroil the English in every way with the Afghans, and so exhaust her, that she would be glad to seek a *modus vivendi* ; then to offer to evacuate Chitral and Kabal and withdraw the Pamir column, for acquiescence in a new Russian frontier, drawn from the crest of Terek Diwan Pass, south by the watershed of the Pamir, to the Hindu Kush, then by the crest of that range to the Koh-i-Baba, and then to include the whole of the country of the Hazaras, and the province of Herat to the Farah-Rud." This new frontier would be all that Russia need aim at in the *first* campaign. Then she could afford to wait until a favourable opportunity arose for the real invasion of India, having, in addition to the possession of the big battalions, the prestige, the *Ikbāl*, of an Asiatic conqueror.

Chap. II. *Internal Defences of India*.—Sir Charles now turns to what Great Britain should do in view of such an invasion, and bases his scheme on certain principles—the maintenance of a firm hold on all places of strategical importance, and on the communications ; the provision of places of refuge, and

movable columns; the practice of great economy, and the necessity of the garrisons being mainly British.

The author discusses in detail the defence organisation of each Presidency, the proposed distribution and the utilisation of volunteers and armoured trains. He makes a special point of the necessity of enrolling the Eurasians, Portuguese, half-castes, and native Christians, alien races, and others whose lot must be cast in with the British. But what then? The conclusion arrived at is, that Russia can put, say, 95,000 regular troops, within eighty to one hundred days after the summons, into positions from which she can undertake the invasion of India; whilst Britain, *by prodigious efforts*, could only place in line *xyz,000* men on the frontier to encounter the invasion, without proper reserves.

Chap. III. *Diplomatic Measures necessary.*—The great object is for Britain to utilise her breathing-time and meet Russia elsewhere than in India. European alliances are indispensable, and Russian trade must be crippled if invasion is threatened.

The north and west boundary of Afghanistan must be demarcated, a commission being at once sent to Herat for the purpose, and that city should be occupied and fortified without delay. Endeavours should be made to gain over Persia, or at least to neutralise her giving assistance to Russia. An immediate alliance with China, &c.

Chap. IV. *How are we to provide a sufficient Force*



*to meet Russian Operations?*—In this chapter Sir Charles considers to what extent our military forces in India must be increased to enable us to meet the advance of 95,000 Russians, excluding all irregular levies, into Afghanistan.

He takes for granted, that at least *xyz*,000 men are required, and proceeds to estimate their composition and distribution. He then shows how many units of each branch are required for this army, and calculates how many units we are short. He points out the resources in men which we have in India which only require organisation, and recommends the steps to be taken.

“Procrastination and temporising may defer the storm for a brief season; but every hour that is spent in mere procrastination, without taking advantage of the lull to face our difficulties, will only cause it to acquire accumulative force. . . . The only thing now left for us to do is to grasp our nettle, and to take up such a strong position in defence of our Indian frontier as will make Russia see the hopelessness of attacking us. Nothing short of this will do.”

Chap. V. *Offensive - Defensive Military Operations from India.*—Provided Russia remains in her present position, the only way to make Herat secure is for Britain to occupy it. Supposing Russia has been allowed to gain possession of Herat, she will have gained the outworks of India. What should Britain do? She would have to fortify Kandahar

strongly. Sir Charles then works out all the steps of the operations by Russia, against Kandahar and Kabal, and the dispositions of British troops needed to check them. The successive advances of Russia and the final actual invasion of India are then treated of, and the corresponding lines of defence to be occupied are thoroughly discussed. "If we take up the game at once, a field army of  $xyz,000$  men and a home army of about  $yzx,000$  men would suffice. If we lose Herat, we shall require a field army of  $zxy,000$  men, and the home army will have to be increased by at least one-fourth. If we lose Kandahar and Kabal, our field army would have to be increased to  $xxx,000$ , and the home army by another fourth. If we have to fight on the Indus, we should require a field army of  $xyx,000$  men; and to hold India quiet, we should want probably not less than  $yxx,000$  men—that is to say, in the last stage,  $zzz,000$  men would be necessary. . . .

"It may be said, and this is the only other argument worth considering, that we could not raise such a number of men, and if we could, the game would not be worth the candle. Such a statement I most entirely refuse to admit. I fearlessly assert that England can raise enough men, and can pay them; and for the rest, I am one of those who think that no sacrifice is too great to face when national honour is in danger."

Chap. VI. *Communications*.—General MacGregor states that he has entered into all the details with

the only spirit which leads to success in war, and that is, determination to win. In Chapter VI. he discusses the state of British communications and those of the Russians, and in reference to the first quotes the memorandum on the development of the Indian railway system prepared by Major Stewart, Assistant-Quartermaster-General, and advocates certain improvements as absolutely necessary to secure India from disastrous defeat.<sup>1</sup>

Chap. VII. *Offensive - Defensive Measures from other points than India.*—"Russia, like France, is a purely aggressive Power. Her great wish is to get to the open sea. Those who stand in her way are Austria, England, and Turkey. . . . In order to carry out her designs, Russia must attack Turkey; in order to paralyse England she must threaten India; and to annul Austria, she must threaten her with a Slav rebellion. The peace of the world can probably be secured by the coalition of Germany, Austria, Turkey, and England; but if war did break out, Russia and France would be overmatched. Should Germany keep out of the alliance, a successful issue would not be certain."

"*Epilogue.*—In the foregoing pages I have tried to point out, as shortly as the vastness of the subject will allow, what I, and probably, at this time, the majority of Englishmen who have any knowledge of the subject, believe to be a great danger hanging over our Indian empire, and consequently—for the

<sup>1</sup> These measures are in many instances being carried out.

two are inseparable—the honour of England. My aim has been to state what I believe to be ‘the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.’

“If there should be any, at this stage of Russian aggression, who still refuse to believe, and who would still resort to the favourite device of the ‘masterly inactionists,’ of calling every one who raised a note of warning Russophobists, I can expect no better fate at their hands. I suppose they will say I have exaggerated the danger, and have proposed measures so grandiose that no Ministry would ever contemplate putting them in hand.

“As to my having exaggerated the danger, it is very easy to make such an accusation; but I protest against its being made, unless it is backed up by some arguments which will really cut away the ground from under my feet. The whole question really lies in a nut-shell. Has Russia the wish and the means to attack us in India, and is such an undertaking a feasible operation of war? As to the wish, I think the whole history of her advance eastwards for the last hundred years sufficiently proves this, at least to those who are open to conviction. I have not troubled my readers with any sketch of this advance, as there is no necessity to repeat what can be found in a hundred different books, articles, and letters. As to the means, I have shown in the first chapter what these are, and in the same chapter I have sketched without bias what would be the course of any further unopposed ad-

vance by Russian troops ; while in the Appendix will be found the grounds on which I base the belief that an advance on India is a feasible operation of war. By these proofs (or others more trustworthy) alone can my statement be refuted. Mere assertion and hiding one's head in the sand is not proof, and I sincerely hope the English people will demand from those who, even at this eleventh hour, pooh-pooh all action, nothing less than a clear and detailed refutation of my arguments.

"From those who, even now, do not believe, I only ask further, honest and searching investigation of the subject. To them I say, 'Not only I, but the great majority of those who have made the subject their study, believe there is great danger. You perhaps do not; but unless you think us all absolute fools and knaves, let the fact that we do, induce you to make a more thorough and more earnest study of it than you have yet done. If the result of your labour is to confirm your belief, let us, in the name of patriotism, hear your views backed up by unanswerable arguments. If you can prove that I am wrong, I shall be the first to acknowledge my error, and to welcome your reassuring conclusions; but, in heaven's name, let us have nothing but real proofs.'

"As to the measures I propose being on too grand a scale for the acquiescence of an English Ministry, I can only say that, if I am right as to the danger, it will not be in the power of any English Ministry

to refuse to carry out, if not the exact measures I propose, other measures at least as great and expensive. If Russia does advance further, she will have to be met with adequate measures, and with adequate force. An English Ministry may try to put off the evil day by timid procrastination and by tinkering; but, fortified by the experience of the past, and the prescience which a study of war in general, and this question in particular gives, I prophesy they will fail, and just inasmuch as they neglect to face the danger adequately, so far need they bring further danger and disaster on their country. I allow that I have proposed a very extensive programme. I have done so because the peril is very great, and I am convinced that nothing short of it will meet the case; at the same time, I am not so foolish as to be wedded to each detail of my plan of action. All I ask is, that enough should be done, and done in time.

“With these few words by way of epilogue, I close; but, in doing so, I make one last appeal to all Englishmen who have followed me so far, to do all that in them lies to rouse the English nation to a just appreciation of the crisis which is coming on us. If this can be done, there need be no further fear or doubt.

“There is, I think, only one point to which I have not alluded—namely, the possibility of our coming to some agreement with Russia. Is such a thing possible? If so, I am sure most Englishmen would

hail its conclusion with gladness. Of course, if her Majesty's Government opened communications with the Imperial Government to the effect that, desirous of continuing friendly relations, they wished to see if there was no *modus vivendi* between the two Powers, the Russian Government would reply that to remain on good terms with the British was and always had been the main aim of their existence, and they would be ready to *promise* anything to secure that friendship.

"But Russian promises are, I am afraid, at this moment not a marketable commodity. What we want is to be let alone. A mere promise from Russia to sin no more is incontestably not worth the breath expended in uttering it: we must have some guarantee that we should be let alone.

"The only guarantee that would be of the smallest use to us would be the absolute withdrawal of the Russians from the east coast of the Caspian below the Yaman Airakti Bay. If the Russians would do this, we might consider how far we could meet their wishes.

"Russia's most absorbing wish I understand to be a port in the Mediterranean; but it is impossible to think how she can get this without the concurrence of Turkey, and as that Power cannot agree without losing territory, I don't see how it can be accomplished.

"Myself, I don't see what advantage to the commerce of Russia the possession of a port in the

Mediterranean would be. I don't see even how the Russian trade would be benefited by her possession of Constantinople, unless she got all the country intervening between Odessa and that place in addition.

"The fact really is, that Russia does not want a port for purely commercial purposes, but for aggressive purposes. During peace, her vessels have the freest access to the Mediterranean, but during war, Russia can be confined to the Black Sea. If she had Constantinople and the Dardanelles, or some other port on the Mediterranean, she could gradually assemble a fleet there that might be very useful to her, because it could act on the sea-communication between India and England, and threaten the Suez Canal.

"So that if she got a port on the Mediterranean, we should gain nothing thereby. If she is in a position to put pressure on us now, she would be in a better position to do so then, and most assuredly she would use it. She may give up the line of the Atak to gain a port in the Mediterranean ; but, depend upon it that the idea that she would be so grateful to us for helping her to it that she would never again worry us on the Indian frontier, is altogether a delusion.

"I therefore regret to say I can see no way of coming to a satisfactory understanding with Russia by diplomatic means. It is certain that we do not want war, and will not provoke it ; but it is also



certain that we must fight her if she takes one step more towards India; and I solemnly assert my belief that there can never be a real settlement of the Russo-Indian question *till Russia is driven out of the Caucasus and Turkistan*.<sup>1</sup>

“C. M. MACGREGOR, *Major-General,  
Quartermaster-General in India.*”

“To Colonel A. S. CAMERON, V.C., A.Q.M.G.  
Intelligence Branch, Horse Guards, London.

“September 4.

“I got a telegram last night from ‘Cameron,’ London—‘Six copies, “Defence of India,” please.’ As you are the only Cameron I know, I write to tell you that I have sent six copies to H. S. King & Co., 45 Pall Mall, with instructions that if you apply personally for them they are to be given to you and a receipt taken. While thus complying with your request, I wish you, please, to understand that I do not give them to you in your official capacity as head of the Intelligence Branch, War Office.

“The publication is a *purely private* one, and I do not wish that it shall be regarded in any way as *official*. You are at liberty to show it to any officer, or member of Parliament, or member of the Government, as long as, while doing so, you inform them of the *private* and *confidential* nature of the publi-

<sup>1</sup> See article in ‘Quarterly Review’ for January 1887—“Constantinople, Russia, and India”—which bears out the same conclusion.

cation. Please apply for them the instant you get the letter, so that they may not have time to look at them, and see that the package has not been opened until you see it."

General MacGregor's tocsin resounded loud with no uncertain tone, and its sounds reverberated widely, spreading, as the author of 'The Defence of India' intended, a general feeling of alarm at their insecurity, now forced on their attention, among the authorities at Calcutta, and almost a scare in the Indian Council and Downing Street.

Like Miltiades before Marathon, the general deprecated above all things procrastination. "Never since the foundation of the empire," he said, "has India been placed in so imminent a peril." How her defence might be accomplished he explained. The sentiments of the Government and of the India Office were divided. "Depend upon it," he wrote, "if we delay, all may be lost; but if we take immediate measures, we may obtain the victory. Consider the alternative,—the decision rests with you."

By October a certain number of copies of 'The Defence of India' had been distributed to a limited and select circle of military authorities, members of Government, heads of departments, and a few publicists, by Sir Charles MacGregor, with the express purpose of eliciting additional information and criticism. He wrote: "I shall be very pleased to receive from any gentleman who may read this 'Study,'

any remarks he may have to offer in favour of or against the views I have set forth. In fact, as my only object is to get the right thing done, whatever that may be, I earnestly invite such remarks, and promise to give them every consideration in a second edition of this work."<sup>1</sup> Besides, Sir Charles wrote to each recipient as follows: *This publication is a purely private one, and I do not wish that it shall be regarded in any way as official. You are at liberty to show it to any officer, or member of Parliament, or member of Government, as long as, while doing so, you inform them of the private and confidential nature of the publication.*"

In spite of the precautions taken by Sir Charles, owing to the unfortunate indiscretion of certain parties in London, several articles and paragraphs, alluding to and quoting from 'The Defence of India' appeared in some of the papers; notably in the pages of the 'St James's Gazette.'<sup>2</sup> Now the 'St James's Gazette' was an anti-Government organ, and the Cabinet of Mr Gladstone would appear to have looked upon 'The Defence of India' as a

<sup>1</sup> Numerous replies were received, which, it is to be hoped, will some day be appended to a second edition of the work.

<sup>2</sup> "After the receipt of the first copies had been acknowledged from England, I got a letter from a friend urging me to let the question be publicly discussed in the press. I answered, refusing point-blank to let my book be used for the purpose, but said that I saw no objection to his *showing* it to a few of the editors, provided he first of all got an assurance, *on honour*, that the book was not to be alluded to or quoted from in any way."—Letter to Sir Donald Stewart, Commander-in-Chief in India.

work endangering the Liberal party ; for the Earl of Kimberley telegraphed out to Lord Ripon to know whether he (the Governor-General) or the Commander-in-Chief (Sir Donald Stewart) had taken, or intended to take, any steps to mark disapproval of the circulation of General MacGregor's book in a manner which practically amounted to publication of a discussion of matters of a delicate and confidential nature by the Quartermaster-General.<sup>1</sup>

Sir Charles was called upon for an explanation through the Commander-in-Chief, and stated the steps he had taken to preserve the confidential character of the work, and that no one, reading his prefatory note, could be led to suppose that it was written in his public and official capacity as Quartermaster-General. Besides, he had submitted, some months previously, a preliminary issue of his book for the consideration of his Excellency the Viceroy and the principal members of the Supreme Government before the regular copies had been sent out to others, and he had not received the slightest hint that the circulation would be considered objectionable.

He wrote to Sir Donald Stewart : " It was in no petty search for notoriety I wrote the book and cir-

<sup>1</sup> On learning the substance of the Secretary of State's telegram, Sir Charles telegraphed to Captain A—— D—— in London, to recall any of his books which might have passed into the hands of editors. Only *one* editor was recalcitrant, but by 26th November A—— D—— was able to wire that all the copies were out of the hands of the editors.

culated it. I saw then,—I see now,—a danger hanging over our Indian empire, and I considered it my duty to point it out clearly and fearlessly. I did so. I endeavoured to tell the whole truth on the subject, and I submitted it for the honest consideration of all. I meant to have performed a public service, and now find I have committed an official mistake, for which I beg to express my deep regret."

He had, indeed, performed a public service, and the unpalatable truths laid bare by Sir Charles's unflinching *exposé* of the situation were shortly to be brought home to the Indian official mind.

As it turned out, it is understood that Lord Ripon would have taken no serious notice of the work, although he officially expressed *in Council* his regret at the circulation which had been given to it—i.e., the notice taken of it in the English press—had not the matter been taken up by the Government of Mr Gladstone at home, and had not the Secretary of State (Lord Kimberley) pressed upon the Governor-General the necessity of taking steps to suppress the book and its author if possible.

The incident terminated with the only result possible, that Sir Charles MacGregor's explanations were accepted, perhaps not with the best grace, and he was told in official language to sin no more.

Perfectly aware of his own integrity and honesty of purpose, the single-minded Quartermaster-Gen-

eral pursued the even tenor of his way with unshaken purpose. His great idea was to prepare, as far as in him lay, for whatever crisis should arrive, and the events he had foreseen were not long in making their advent apparent even to the most blinded of Government officials. Before Sir Charles vacated his appointment, his precautions and advice were fully justified.

The Indian Government professed\* to undervalue the warnings of Sir Charles MacGregor; but none the less, they were tremendously impressed by the irrefutable arguments so well pushed home in 'The Defence of India.' The effect was unmistakably shown in the Indian Budget of 1885; and lately we have been reminded of the change effected, although the promoter of this increase has not received that acknowledgment of his share in the movement which he so well deserves.

"At that time," said Lord Randolph Churchill (13th March 1888) in the debate on our *Indian frontier policy*,<sup>1</sup> "we were brought as near to war with Russia as we could be without actually being at war. The Prime Minister [Lord Salisbury] demanded an enormous vote of credit, and the Indian Government incurred immense expenditure in order to send up large bodies of troops to the frontier. The frontier was defenceless. There were no railways and hardly

<sup>1</sup> Mr Slagg moved—"That in the opinion of this House the unwise frontier policy of the Government of India is producing grave financial difficulties in that country," &c.

any roads and bridges to enable our troops to move about with ease or without very heavy loss and expense. Such was the state of the frontier at that time. We knew that the Russians were perfecting their arrangements in Central Asia, with the view of bringing up large bodies of troops to Afghanistan, and the Indian Government decided that for the ordinary security of India it was absolutely necessary to undertake a more complete defence of the frontier. When our frontier was brought very near indeed to the frontier of so great a Power as Russia, was it unwise or foolish to take steps to enable us to defend our frontier? Is there any nation in the world which in the circumstances would not have adopted a precisely similar policy? . . .

“When I was at the Indian Office large estimates were submitted to it for two branches of frontier defence. One branch related to road communication and bridges, and the other to the construction of great fortified works. Both were submitted to and approved by the House of Commons; . . . but I believe that by far the main amount of the expenditure has been confined to the construction of railways, roads, and bridges across the rivers in that part of the world.”

Sir R. Temple on the same occasion “quite believed that it had been imperatively necessary for the Government of India to increase their army by 30,000 men, including 10,000 British troops, because it was essential to show before the people of India,

and before the world, that they had two army-corps mobilised on the North-Western frontier."

General Sir E. Hamley re-echoed with emphasis Sir Charles MacGregor's forecast of Russian invasion. He said: "The chances were that if she, Russia, should find occasion to threaten our frontier, she would begin by the invasion of Afghanistan, and when she had possessed herself of the three corner cities of Herat, Kabal, and Kandahar, she would, in the space between these, proceed to create an advance base of operations by filling it with immense supplies of men and *matériel* for a campaign against India. This was the programme that our Indian officers had to face, and he would for a moment place the House in their position. Half-way down the upper part of the Indus was a great mass of mountainous country, having a great depth of passes 200 or 300 miles in length, and thus it formed a natural rampart; and so long as we watched the issue on the banks of the Indus, we might be satisfied that the invader would only attempt an entrance at its own peril. But half-way down, this natural rampart ceased, and the lower part of the Indus, down to Karachi, had for its right bank a great plain stretching away up to Kandahar, presenting no serious obstacles to the march of an army. If we were to await Russia behind the Indus, we should certainly, in the event he had been imagining, find her coming down the plain; and should she succeed in planting herself there, she would be able to operate with enormous advantage.



But besides that, our Indian officers were of opinion that nothing could be more dangerous than to sustain even the slightest reverse upon the frontiers of India. He had another authority to the same effect, and that was General Skobeleff, who said, 'Everybody who has concerned himself with the question of a Russian invasion of India would declare that it is only necessary to penetrate a single point of the Indian frontier to bring about a general rising. Even the presence of an insignificant force on the frontier of India might lead to a general rising throughout the country, and the collapse of the British empire.' Not only was Skobeleff a great fighting soldier, he was a scientific soldier who well knew the politics of war, and Indian officers believed General Skobeleff."

The author of 'The Defence of India,' however, needed no apologist, resting assured that his warnings, however disregarded at the time, must eventually be listened to. His duty had been accomplished with perfect disregard of all consequences which might injure his personal interests, even at the risk of losing his appointment, rank, and position; whilst his premonition was, meantime, on the eve of full vindication.

When the cool weather set in at the end of 1884, Major-General MacGregor took his wife on a pleasure trip of sight-seeing through the state of Rajputana; and they also visited in succession the principal cities of the North-West Provinces, including the holy city

of Benares, Patna, the old headquarters of Sir Charles during the Tirhut famine of 1874, the barracks at Dinapur where the outbreak of 1857 took place, the Residency at Lucknow, the Well of Cawnpore, the mosques and monuments of Shah Jehan at Agra, besides Ajmere and Udaipur.

During their progress Sir Charles felt the greatest pleasure in pointing out to his wife all the interesting monuments of the historical sites visited. Of all the monumental buildings in India, Sir Charles's deepest admiration was lavished on the famous Taj Mahal at Agra, which indeed he looked upon as the most perfect piece of architecture of its kind in the world. He revisited with unwonted interest the several scenes of the tragedies enacted during the Mutiny, and the various fields of action in which he had been personally engaged during that eventful period of his youth. Finally, their journey was brought to an end at Calcutta, where Lord Ripon was just about to resign the administration.

Lord Dufferin, the newly appointed Viceroy, now took up the reins of government at Calcutta, and the most serious business awaited his consideration in relation to the Central Asian question, in which Sir Charles MacGregor was so well qualified to advise with authority.

At this time the British Commissioners for the delimitation of the Russo-Afghan boundary had established themselves on the banks of the Murghab river, on the borders of north-western Afghanistan,

under their chief, Sir Peter Lumsden (who had formerly been Quartermaster-General in India); whilst to their annoyance, and to the chagrin of the Indian Council, they found that General Zelenoy, who by rights should have been on the spot to meet them, had absented himself, and his Cossacks had already pushed far forward the camp of their advanced outposts to Pul-i-Khatun, a site still regarded as within the debatable ground claimed for Afghanistan by Abdul Rahman; so that no inconsiderable amount of apprehension was experienced in the Foreign secretariat of the Supreme Government.

In view of these anticipated complications, it is not wonderful that one of the first acts of Lord Dufferin, as Viceroy, was to despatch to the Amir of Afghanistan a cordial invitation to a friendly interview on Indian territory, which was unreservedly accepted by Abdul Rahman, and the arrangements for the meeting were very happily carried into effect without delay.

At this time, unfortunately, whilst playing at lawn-tennis in the Fort gardens, at Calcutta, Sir Charles MacGregor had the ill-luck to break a tendon of his right leg, thereby rendering that limb almost wholly useless for some time.

Whilst still suffering from the effects of his accident, the general had to attend the camp at Rawal Pindi, where the Amir was received by Lord Dufferin on the 31st March.

There was a grand gathering on this important

occasion, and the Duke and Duchess of Connaught, Lady Dufferin, and many other ladies, including Lady MacGregor, were present at the State ceremonies, which included a banquet to the Amir and a review of the division by the Viceroy, accompanied by the Kabal chieftain and their respective suites.

A ceremonious *darbar* was held on the 8th April, and negotiations were satisfactorily carried on between the Amir and the Governor-General.

At this meeting it was arranged that the defence of Herat should be left entirely to the Afghans themselves, but that the Indian Government would supply engineer officers, under whose direction the fortifications of that strategical point should be placed in a state of efficient defence against a *coup de main*; whilst the British would also supply an armament of modern ordnance and ammunition wherewith to enable the Afghans if attacked to hold their own, at all events long enough to allow a relief force from Kandahar or the Helmand to come to their assistance.

Disabled as he was, with his wounded leg (the injury occurred on the place of a former wound) tightly strapped up in plaster of Paris, and only able to move painfully by the aid of crutches, Sir Charles contrived to take his full share in the important discussions carried on during this conference at Rawal Pindi, carrying on all the time the work of his department without intermission; whilst the Duke of Connaught and other Staff officers came, not unfrequently, to sit with him, in his tent, and to take

his advice and counsel on all occasions about the innumerable details inseparable from the public service.

Meantime the complication of the Russo-Afghan dispute had become serious. The contemplated visit of the ruler of Afghanistan to the Panjab had been viewed throughout Asia as a pledge of amity and alliance with Great Britain, and was therefore looked upon with extreme disfavour at St Petersburg.

The Russians, to effect a counter-stroke, had accordingly planned a *coup*, which they lost no time in carrying out effectively; and on the very day before the Amir reached Rawal Pindi (31st March), the small Afghan force posted in Panjdeh, their station on the Khusk, had been attacked and driven out of their position, several miles towards Herat, by the Russian troops of General Komaroff, and the British commissioners had been forced to leave their camp at Bala Murghab, which was burnt and plundered.

The telegraphic news of this unprecedented act of hostility, which only reached London and Rawal Pindi on the 9th April, caused intense excitement throughout Europe and India, and lent additional interest to the investiture of the Amir with the Grand Cross of the Star of India by the Viceroy on the 11th of the month.

At army headquarters messages were instantly despatched to the various military centres in Bengal

and Bombay, warning the Commanders-in-Chief and the Staff departments of the imminence of the crisis; and Sir Charles's hands were full of work, his bodily pain put altogether aside by the constant brain-work called into action by the emergency.

Nevertheless, there was no need for excitement or hurry, at least in the Quartermaster-General's Department. So perfectly had Sir Charles MacGregor foreseen the approach of such a crisis, so minutely had he prepared beforehand all the details, necessitated by a sudden mobilisation of two divisions for an advance beyond the Khojak, the occupation of Kandahar, and the defence of the line of the Helmand or a march on Herat, that the various commanders and executive heads of departments had been duly schooled in all the precautionary measures for some considerable time previously. All preliminary calculations of ways and means, movements, transport and supply, had been laid down in anticipation of an immediate and sudden move, so that the strategical combination of columns at the front could be effected without a moment's delay whenever the command to march should be signalled from Whitehall.

Everything pointed to war. Within a fortnight after the fight at Ak Tépé Sir Peter Lumsden was recalled. Mr Gladstone brought up in the House a vote for eleven millions, which was passed before the end of the month; and a "Queen's Message" called

out the reserves of the United Kingdom. Meantime, after the departure of the Amir from India, Sir Charles and Lady MacGregor went to Simla, where, although still very lame, the Quartermaster-General worked assiduously in hastening the final arrangements for a Central Asian campaign.

How wistfully he looked forward to obtaining a command during the forthcoming war can only be imagined by those who knew his ardent and enthusiastic temperament. But it was not to be. On the 2d May Lord Granville gave an intimation of a peaceful settlement of the Afghan boundary dispute, and from her would-be heroic attitude Great Britain suddenly descended to the practical but painfully inglorious submission of her quarrel to the arbitration of the King of Denmark (an arbitration, by the way, which was never decided). The surrender of Panjdeh was supposed to be fully compensated for by the recognition of the Zulfikar Pass as Afghan territory, and the work of delimitation of the boundary was proceeded with.

As soon as the war scare had subsided, Sir Charles MacGregor went in June on a trip for a month's exploration in the interior passes of the adjacent mountains, and he was never happy until he had ascended the highest practicable peaks in the district, for the purpose of obtaining the most extensive panoramas of the surrounding country. His pastime was subservient to reconnaissance for the purposes of military information, and he never looked across

a valley without noting its capabilities for a position, or surveyed a fruitful plain without estimating the amount of supplies and forage which was obtainable from such a resource. In fact, during his utmost relaxation from service his brain and mind were ever on military duty.

In the following August the Quartermaster-General was despatched by Lord Dufferin to Peshin to report on sites for sanatoria and on the frontier defences beyond Quetta.

This duty, which occupied some six weeks of the hottest weather in the trying climate of that rugged country, was finished in September, when Sir Charles returned to Simla thoroughly ill from fatigue and exposure to the climatic effects, which were at length beginning to tell on his hitherto iron constitution.

During this journey the changes of temperature were so frequent and unequal, from the great differences of altitude experienced in ascending and descending heights and valleys, that not seldom in one day's march the thermometer would show 57° Fahr. in the traveller's tent at one time, and within a few hours might record 102° in the shade. No wonder that constant hard bodily work under such conditions tried severely the health of the general, who, writing to his wife, says, "I have got a bad cold from a chill, and quite lost my voice.

"I was in the saddle ten hours yesterday and seven to-day, and the sun is terribly hot. I have a split-



ting headache, and feel as if I were going to have fever." A few days later he writes: "I have been so very seedy that I thought it best to get in here [Peshin] to a house and keep quiet. I seem to have a complication of evils; but the worst is that I can't sleep, and as soon as I doze off I awake with a start and a sort of nightmare."

From this attack Sir Charles never recovered, and although he bravely fought against it and refused to believe himself really ill, it was in truth the beginning of the end.

"I had an awful night last night; I felt suffocated, and could hardly breathe, and had no sleep at all. I did not go out this morning with them, as I didn't really feel up to climbing hills. I hope the attack will pass over. I don't know what it is, and there is no doctor; but perhaps it is nothing serious, and I don't want you to be alarmed."

With regard to the practical results of Sir Charles's visit to the frontier, he writes: "The air on the top of the Khojak Pass was delicious. This would form a very good site for a sanatorium, and the tribes round are absolutely quiet. The occupation of the Khojak would be a great advantage, as it would cause the roads to it, and especially the crossings over the rivers in Peshin, to be improved, and it would familiarise our troops to the route."

From Gulistan Karez the general writes: "We got up at three, and were at the top of the pass [Khojak] by 4.30, and walked along the top of the

range till ten, up and down the whole way; then we had had enough of it, so we halted for breakfast. Afterwards we determined to descend, and got down into the bed of a ravine, and walked on for four miles in a most blazing sun, till we came to some water and trees. Then I threw myself down, and said, 'I don't care for any one; and I will not move another step to-day;' so we anchored. We had been six hours walking in the most frightful hot sun, and over no road at all; however, I wanted to see the nature of the range, and was quite satisfied. It got dark at seven, so we went to bed. I had only my greatcoat and plaid, but I found a fragrant shrub, and made them cut me a heap of it, and it made a very nice bed, just like heather. My pillow consisted of my big hat, the saddle-bags over that, then my back-pad and a towel—very comfortable. This morning we walked for about six miles down the ravine, and then met our horses and rode in here, ten miles, over a hot plain. Then I had a tub and breakfast, and now I am in quite a benevolent frame of mind. They say this is the finest place in Sandeman's dominions. It certainly has a fine stream of water, and a row of willows; but the glare in these parts is so strong, that I wear my dark glasses all day, even when trying to get a little sleep."

Of the Bolan Pass Sir Charles writes: "I was astonished by the easiness of the Bolan road. I cannot conceive how any one could prefer the Harnai when they decided to make the railway, while this line

is so very easy. Lord Dufferin asked me to say whether I thought a railway could be made, and I have no hesitation in saying that it can be made, and very easily too. While they have been throwing millions away on the Harnai line, this line could have been finished ages ago."

The five years of duty during which he had held the appointment of Quartermaster-General were now nearly expired, and Sir Charles occupied himself through October in packing up his effects and breaking up his establishment at Simla, as Lady MacGregor proceeded this month to England with his young daughter.

On relinquishing his appointment, Sir Charles applied for permission to retain his rank as major-general, to which rank, if not strictly entitled by right, yet by precedent and extraordinary service he had fully earned the right to hold permanently. His meritorious and distinguished conduct in the field should have secured this reward; but there is, unfortunately, no room to doubt that the gallant career of General MacGregor had excited a certain amount of jealousy among one or two influential persons at headquarters. Moreover, one who held a very high executive position, and who could have so used his influence as to permit Sir Charles retaining the well-deserved recognition and confirmation of the substantive rank of major-general, which he had already borne so long during five years of good and unrequited service, refused to support his applica-

tion. From the letter containing Sir Charles MacGregor's application to the Adjutant-General in India for this privilege, the following extracts may be quoted. It is dated 15th February 1886.

"2. I am induced to make this application by the fact that several officers [viz., Major-Generals Dormer, Buller, Stewart, and Brackenbury] have already been promoted to that rank in accordance with clauses 12 and 13 of the Royal Warrant (of 10th November 1881), and that three of these officers were junior to me as colonel; and there seems every probability of other officers still more junior to me being ere long also promoted over my head.

"3. It is not for me to compare my services with those of the above officers. His Excellency is so intimately acquainted with my services (under both of the above-quoted clauses) that I am satisfied I could have no fairer exponent of them than him. It is still less for me to expatiate on the rewards which my services have brought me as compared with those of others, who in the same campaign did not hold higher positions than I did, and who have not held higher or more responsible positions since; but I hope I may be permitted to draw attention to the fact that my services during the last twenty years have not brought me a single day's acceleration of promotion.

"4. I was promoted to lieutenant-colonel for services performed in the Bhutan campaign of 1864-65-66, and the only step of rank I have received

since, came to me by length of service. And further, my services of two years in the field, in Afghanistan, have not even gained me any better appointment than I should have gained if I had never quitted Simla at all.<sup>1</sup> In fact, I am now drawing less pay and holding inferior rank to what I did five years ago ; and several officers who were then my juniors are now entitled to rank before me.

" 5. His Excellency knows, and the Government of India know, that I have never spared myself throughout my whole service ; and as they were pleased to confer on me two steps of rank for services performed as a subaltern during my first nine years of service, I ask not for the same, but for some of the same consideration for services performed during my last twenty years of service in positions of great responsibility and great difficulty.

" 6. In the ordinary course of events (if I last so long), I must get my promotion to major-general in a year or so, and therefore it does not seem very much to strive for it perhaps six months sooner.

" 7. Yet to me *it is* a great thing. No man can say that I have ever shown a clutching after higher emoluments or the empty swagger of title. What I have striven for is higher opportunities for usefulness to the Government, and what I do feel acutely

<sup>1</sup> " For Afghanistan I got no step in rank ; and in the matter of appointments, I have been no better off. If I had never been to Afghanistan at all, I should have been Quartermaster-General all the same—in fact, I have good reason to believe I might have actually got it one year sooner."

is, that in a few months I may have to acknowledge that my services for twenty years—services which have been as unstinted as they have been highly acknowledged—should not have brought me a single step in rank.

“8. I know that no promotions have yet been made in the Indian army under the clauses under which I seek it; but I cannot believe that, while the advantages of these clauses are freely extended to officers of the Imperial List, those of the Indian List are to be excluded from them altogether, and therefore I submit this application.”

“There is little but the name of the thing left to strive for,” writes Sir Charles in a note which accompanied the foregoing letter, “still this is something to me. If I got it one day before as an acknowledgment, I should be much pleased. I do feel *most acutely* the fact that even twenty years’ work, which I put against twenty years’ service of any other man in India, has done *nothing* for me.

“Of course, even if Sir Frederick sends this [his application] on, he may not succeed, yet I hope he will. The fact recorded on paper that the man best qualified to judge did recommend me for special promotion will be very much to me, not perhaps while I am in the service, but when my clans-people come to read and inquire what I have done with my time.”

It was indeed a very bitter reflection for a sensitive, high-minded officer to make to himself after having served so well and faithfully, sparing neither

health nor strength in the interests of India, that, he, Charles MacGregor, losing rank, position, command, power, and pay as a major-general, by no fault of his own, but rather by jealousy excited by his unusual merit, should revert—in fact, be reduced—to a station actually lower and inferior in pay and rank to what he had been at the end of the Afghan campaign. In a letter written just after his application had met with an ungracious denial, *Colonel* Sir Charles MacGregor writes: “The more I think of it, the more pained and annoyed I feel at the way I have been treated.”

The unlooked-for ingratitude of his superior officers was a rankling source of deep grief rather than of indignation to the colonel, who, always keenly alive to any injustice, felt that occasion had been found to slight and humiliate him.

Suffering as he was from impaired health brought on by his late tour in Peshin, the shabby behaviour of the authorities in this matter contributed materially towards depressing his hitherto elastic spirits; for undoubtedly a more severe blow could hardly fall upon a gallant gentleman, whose soul had always been bound up in his professional career as a soldier.

However, even to Colonel (now no longer General) MacGregor a command of some sort could not well be refused, although he was passed over for the command of a division (being superseded by a colonel of artillery<sup>1</sup> junior to him).

<sup>1</sup> Colonel D. MacFarlan, R.A.

Instead of resigning and throwing up the service in disgust, as many a man in his position might have done, and as one or two doubtless wished he might do, he resolutely determined to serve on, doggedly concluding to force his way to the highest post obtainable in the Indian army; and with this view he decided to accept the command of the Panjab Frontier Force when it was offered to him, and after seeing Lady MacGregor and his daughter off to England from Bombay, he proceeded to Abbottabad to take up his duties on the North-West Frontier.



## CHAPTER IX.

## LAST SERVICES.

1885-1887.

*"The soldier with his mark of war,  
The medals on his breast,  
Star of the brave that decks him now,  
When his sword is laid to rest;  
And the iron sheath is worn away,  
That was tenantless on the battle day."*

CAMP OF EXERCISE AT DELHI—INSPECTION OF FRONTIER POSTS—  
RENEWED ILLNESS—LETTERS TO WIFE—INVALIDED HOME—  
FAREWELL ADDRESS TO PANJAB FRONTIER FORCE—ARRIVAL  
IN ENGLAND—FORTITUDE DURING ILLNESS—CAIRO—THE LAST  
SCENE—GLENGYLE.

IN December Sir Charles was ordered to the Camp of Exercise at Delhi, where he commanded a division under Sir Frederick Roberts. He had the satisfaction of forming and commanding a brigade of Highland and Scottish regiments during these manœuvres. Although at this time General MacGregor was in reality suffering, and in ill health, he manfully insisted on carrying through all his duties. He found it difficult to sleep at night, and finally, whilst in

this delicate state, got wet through, having to remain several hours in drenching rain at the review on Proclamation Day. A severe chill was the result of this exposure, which brought on a renewed attack of fever, and eventually resulted in his fatal illness.

Yet Sir Charles recovered, for a time, sufficiently to undertake the inspection of all the posts in his command, going over the familiar ground which he had formerly traversed so often in his younger days, and which he had described so accurately with such painstaking in his 'Gazetteer of the Frontier.'

*Kohat, 7th March 1886.*—"I left Bannu on the 2d, and had a capital field-day of the whole garrison about four miles out. Then we rode for twelve miles and drove another twelve, till we got to a place called Bahadur Khel. Did you, on the 2d, feel nervous and conscious of danger? I didn't, but you ought, because I slept all night with twelve barrels of gunpowder in a room below, with two fires within ten feet of it!! This is true: an infernal store-keeper being in the house, had the audacity to do this. It takes a good deal really to rouse the MacGregor, but I guess that practical experiments in 'Guy Fawkesing' just about does it, and you should have seen me go for that man!! Next day we rode twenty-two miles, and on the 4th we drove fourteen and rode seventeen miles, and had a field-parade at the end. Yesterday I had an inspection of the 3d Sikhs, and to-day is Sunday. They say Chesney is coming out as military mem-

ber. I am very glad, as he is a man of great breadth of mind, and we want these. I do wish you were here. I am a solitary sort of individual with domestic tendencies, which, if carefully fostered, might lead to my perfect subjection! Note this!"

He wrote on the 13th March 1886: "These nights are really awful. I dread every time the sun goes down, as, although I am nearly always worn out, I know I have got to lie long hours in bed, hoping for a wink of sleep, and longing for the dawn. My head aches so, I don't know what to do. My brain goes on for ever working, working. I try not to think, and I think a thousand times more, and then the brain gets so excited there is no sleep. I believe if you could watch my brain at night, you would find it moving like water on the boil. Last night I only slept three hours, and the night before, and before that, and now I am tired to death. I light the candle a dozen times in the night, and feel often inclined to cry out, 'O day, day, do come! shall I never see light again?' and with all this I look so well they congratulate me."

At this time (March) there was every reason to suppose that the Government would send an expedition against the Buners, who had on several occasions lately raided over the British frontier. Whilst it was still undecided whether or not this expedition should be despatched under command of the brigadier-general commanding the Frontier Force, the anxiety of mind suffered by Sir Charles as to his

capability of carrying it through on account of his enfeebled health may be gathered from some of his letters at the time.

He writes : " I do wish this Buner business was settled. I mean to apply for leave the instant I decently can ; but I cannot do this till it is settled there is to be no expedition. I do hope there is to be no expedition, as there is no doubt I am not in a fit condition to go, and I am afraid I shall break down in it. The doctor says if I do not go to this Buner expedition, and get rest and good treatment for six months at home, I may be as well as ever ; but I *must* go through with the expedition, if it comes off. I have opposed it all along as unjust and unnecessary and inadvisable, and if I did not go, they would say I did not care to go, and had opposed it for that reason, so I must ; and if I come to grief in the middle of it, and have to take leave, people must see that it is my health that gives way. I hope after the rest in the summer and autumn I shall be all right and ready for any number of expeditions. . . . I have just been examined by a number of doctors, and they agree that what is the matter with me is irregular action of the heart and disease of the kidneys. They wish me to go home at once, and they positively prohibit my going on service at all, as they think it would bring on an acute attack and very probably kill me outright. This is fearfully unfortunate, not only because it must end fatally sooner or later, but, coming just as

they are going to have a campaign in which I was to command, it is almost impossible for me to refuse to go now. My name has gone to Government, and as I have all along opposed the expedition as unjust and unnecessary, now they will say I am shirking. If I don't go, I am ruined in reputation; if I do go, I shall probably die in the middle of it. The latter would be the best for me; but, my darling, what is the best for you?—to have a husband with a damaged reputation (I know the world will not let me off), or to lose me, and be able to say,—‘He knew he was going to his death, but he would go!’ Good-bye, my darling. I little thought this letter would end so; but if there is war, I must go. If death is to come, I would rather it was with my claymore in my hand. I can face anything, but not disgrace! Say good-bye to Viva for me. Don't tell her, it will do no good. I had half a mind not to tell you, but I could not show such want of trust in you or your nerve, and you and your nursing (if I can only get home) might be the means of pulling me through. Remember, I have apparently been nearer death than this. Good-bye.”

The Government, after all, decided not to send the expedition, so Sir Charles was free to ask for leave to England. Just before leaving Abbottabad for Bombay he wrote: “I have felt the pain at my heart so bad since I came up here, that after consulting my doctor I have arranged to be put on the sick-list during the rest of my time here. I shall leave here

on the 7th, and Bombay on the 16th, so I ought to be in London about the first week in May.

"My own wife, I don't want you to be alarmed ; but I think it is wrong to hide from you what a serious view the doctors take of my case. It appears the chill I got in Peshin, aggravated by that on the review day, gave me this disease ; and it may develop into *Bright's disease*, from which there is no escape. This is the very worst view ; but the best is, that they may all be wrong, and therefore I am coming home at once. Don't you fret. If I get worse on the voyage, I promise I will telegraph for you ; but otherwise you will know it is all right. I hope for the best, but still things may go wrong, and you will come to me if I ask. Better not bring Viva. I will make out a will—a few words. I will leave every single thing I have in this world, including Viva, to you, with no restrictions. There is no one I trust more ; there never has been any one. You will do for her (Viva) what you think best ; and promise me, whatever she does, *you* will never desert her. You have been a mother to her ; continue so to the end, for my sake. . . . I don't repine,—if it is to come, who can stop it ? I hope every one will allow that I have died with a clean sheet, and that no one can throw stones at my honour. I only want a stone (plain and rugged as the hills of the Clan) to say, 'Here lies C. MacGregor, of the old stock of the Clan Gregor, who did his best for the old name.' But all this is lugubrious and sentimental. I am

not well, and feel very weak. Tell Viva I will write to her.—Ever your own Mac.”

A little later he writes: “I really am very seedy, and am beginning to feel quite weak and out of sorts generally. My heart and breathing are all wrong, and I have aches in all my joints. This may be the beginning of the end. I feel as if I had ague all over, and have no appetite. It is very lonely here. I am in the house all by myself, and have no one to talk to. How I do wish you were here to cheer me up! This is a nice ending to all my ambition and hard work, just as I was getting up the last few rungs of the ladder. Of course if I am never to be put to hard work again I shall retire. I should like to have gone on till I was Commander-in-Chief. Now nobody will ever hear of me. Ah, well! what does it matter, after all?”

Sir Charles MacGregor was too unwell to issue a farewell order to his troops at the time he left them, but during his illness he penned the following address, which was forwarded to India six months afterwards, on the expiration of his sick leave of absence. It should be remembered that when he wrote it he was in bed and almost too weak to hold the pen:—

“In relinquishing the command of the Panjab Frontier Force, Sir Charles MacGregor is desirous of saying a few words in farewell. He hopes this farewell will be but temporary, for no prouder moment can occur for him than that which should place him

again in command even of a portion of a force which has raised in him feelings of the highest admiration.

"During his late tour Sir Charles MacGregor regrets that he was so ill that he found himself unable to attempt more than to commence the carrying out those aspirations for their good as soldiers that he so strongly held and holds still. But the leading idea of these hopes was to endeavour to instil into every one, from sepoy to commandant, the incontrovertible fact that peace is the time to prepare for war, and that all should, by constant practice in such measures as come within their competence, unceasingly endeavour to improve themselves.

"Sir Charles MacGregor believes the Panjab Force is as ready for war as any body of soldiers serving her Majesty the Queen-Empress; but inasmuch as no body or regiment can ever be quite perfect, it behoves commandants always to strive for a still higher state of perfection.

"In conclusion, Sir Charles MacGregor wishes each comrade of the force a regretful farewell; and he assures them that, although the time of his command was but short, the many kindnesses he has received from its officers, and the thoroughly soldierly spirit and efficient bearing he has observed in all, will never fade from his memory."

At last Sir Charles took his final leave of India, and sailed from Bombay on the 16th April, arriving at Venice on the 2d May, where he was met by his wife. By this time he was greatly altered by his



illness, and he was only able to reach England by slow stages.

On reaching London, Sir Charles went to stay with his wife's parents, and immediately sent for the cleverest doctors to come and give their advice and opinions on the state of his health. From the first, they gave little or no hope of his ultimate recovery. He had left India too late. After sixteen weeks of great suffering, during which time he lay between life and death, and bore all the discomforts of severe illness with the greatest fortitude and heroism, he had so far sufficiently recovered as to be able to pay a short visit to relatives, and then go to Eastbourne for change of air. This, however, only increased the illness, and he returned to London to be again confined to his room for nine long weeks. The monotony of this life was almost unbearable to Sir Charles, and he tried to occupy his time by drawing and taking lessons in painting; but as the winter approached, and fogs appeared, he seemed to lose all heart, and became so depressed that the doctors agreed to his often-expressed wish to go abroad in search of warmth and sunshine.

On the 16th of December, Sir Charles and his wife left London *en route* for Egypt, and travelled overland in short stages by Paris, Marseilles, the Riviera, and Brindisi. They arrived at Alexandria on the 28th of December, and at Cairo on the last day of the year. The long journey had been most trying to the invalid, and the symptoms of disease

were much increased by the fatigues of the voyage. After about a week, strength returned, and with it Sir Charles appeared to regain all his old spirits. He enjoyed sitting out in the sunshine on the balcony at Shepherd's, meeting many of his old friends and comrades, watching the ever-varying crowd below, making many amusing sketches and caricatures. Sir Charles had no doubt he was making progress, and talked frequently and hopefully of his return to India, and of his appointment to the Lahore Division, which Sir Frederick Roberts had promised to him. He had also been very anxious for a long time about the rank of major-general; but although he was entitled to that rank on the 22d of January, the gazette did not arrive in Egypt till too late. The following letter betrays the preoccupation of his mind on this subject :—

*“Cairo, 29th January. — My dear Mrs —, —We were so glad to get your letter, and to hear of you and the general. Your letter was certainly a little gloomy, but there is no lane without a turning, and I think no misery without some compensation. I am sure, in the memory of much pain and weariness during those many dreary hours at the Langham, there will always remain the thought of your kindness and the general's to me. But sickness is like service, and brings out the qualities that are often otherwise hidden; and with reference to you two, I have a feeling of shame that I knew you so*

long in India, yet never knew of the wealth of kindness there was in you. I see your son has got the medal of the Humane Society, and well he deserves it. I promise to keep my cold grey eye on that young man, and give him a lift when I can.

“We have been here a month now, and I am getting better. I feel ever so much better; though the dropsy is going slowly, still it is going. I believe they are going to make a hole in my liver. If they do, they think I shall get well, and as I am pretty strong, I hope it will come all right, and that I shall once more come out victorious from the struggle with the demon who has been afflicting me so long. I am looking forward very anxiously to my promotion to major-general, which Stewart said I should get on the 4th of March.<sup>1</sup> . . .

“I do enjoy basking in the sun here. With kindest remembrances and much gratitude. — Yours sincerely.”

His gratitude to those who had nursed him during his long illness was almost too deep for words, and he acknowledged all the little acts of kindness of his friends tenderly and gratefully. One of the last letters he wrote was to the doctor who had attended him so long and with such devotion before leaving England.

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Sir C. MacGregor, K.C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E. Bengal, major-general (since deceased), dated 22d January; gazetted 18th February 1887. See Army List for March 1887.

"*Cairo, January 31.*— . . I am in good spirits, and believe it will come all right, though there is some danger; but after having defeated the demons who have worried me for a year, I am not going to be beaten at last. I have almost made up my mind not to attempt to go back to India till October. General Roberts has been very kind, and promises to keep open a berth for me, and it would be foolish to go back before I am really recovered, and able to rise from the ashes of the past year with increased splendour! Do tell me what I owe you in coin. I know well enough what I owe you for your care, trouble, and unvarying kindness—that I can never repay. I don't pray much, and never in the regular periodical manner dear to church-goers; still I do sometimes silently breathe a prayer or two, and I am sure I have no dearer desire than that you may receive some day your reward for your kindness to me. Our paths are so different that I don't suppose I shall ever be much in the way of being able to do much for you; but if ever you think I can do anything for you or any one belonging to you, I will not fail you.—Sincerely yours."

On the 2d of February, the doctors decided to perform an operation, as they imagined there were signs of abscess of the liver. Sir Charles bore the painful operation with his customary bravery, lying on his sofa, and refusing anything to deaden the pain. After a few hours, a violent inflammation ensued, and the patient suffered intensely till the

morning of the 5th, when all pain ceased. During all this time he had no idea of his danger, and his wife thought it better that he should not be informed of it.

On the morning of the 5th of February, Sir Charles expressed a wish to go and lie on the sofa in his sitting-room. Being assisted there, he lay down, and talked to his wife about his little daughter, and plans for the summer. After a time, a regiment passed by with the band playing, when, seeing his wife much affected, he took her hand, and said, "Don't fret, my child. I'm ever so much better, and shall soon be all right." Then he went to sleep, and in sleep his spirit passed away calmly and peacefully.

Full military honours were shown by the garrison of Cairo to the remains of Sir Charles MacGregor by order of Sir Frederick Stephenson, then commanding the troops in Egypt; and Colonel Ardagh, R.E., made arrangements for the conveyance of the body of the deceased officer to England.

During the most critical periods in his last illness Sir Charles had frequently expressed his earnest desire to rest at the last among his ancestors in the graveyard of Glengyle. The solitary grandeur of this Highland burial-place, on the shores of Loch Katrine, in the midst of the MacGregor country, had left a lasting impression on the mind of the general when he had visited the home of his Clan with his little daughter, five years previously; and since that

time he had always wished that his body should lie buried side by side with his kith and kin of the old name, which he had ever done his utmost to uphold.

In accordance, therefore, with these wishes of her late husband, Lady MacGregor, on the arrival of the remains at Liverpool, a month after his death, had the body conveyed to Aberfoyle, near the Trossachs, where, on the morning of Friday, 11th March, a small number of the family assembled to accompany the funeral to the burying-ground.

Throughout the long journey up the glen, past Loch Ard, to Stronachlachar, the snowflakes fell incessantly, so that when the coffin was placed in the boat, awaiting it on Loch Katrine, the wreaths of flowers which were placed on it formed a vivid contrast to the wintry landscape around.

Whilst crossing the lake the snow ceased, but it took an hour for the small procession of boats to reach the opposite shore at Glengyle, where the coffin was lifted on to a country cart and carried with some difficulty through the drifted snow to the ancient site.

The only coronach which accompanied the march of the mourners was the sound of the waving pine-tops, not unlike shadowy echoes of the "*Cha till mi tuilich*," the funeral strains of the MacGregor bag-pipes in days of yore.

The burial service having been read at Glengyle House, the coffin was carried thence on men's shoulders to the grave in the long-disused but sacred en-

closure, where the dust of the brave soldier was buried under the white-curtained heights of Moel Mor, whose hoary crests appeared almost to express their regretful commiseration.

“ Fleet foot on the corrie,  
Sage counsel in cumber,  
Red hand in the foray,  
How sound is thy slumber !  
Like the dew on the mountain,  
Like the foam on the river,  
Like the bubble on the fountain,  
Thou art gone, and for ever ! ”

## POSTSCRIPT.

MEETING AT SIMLA—DUKE OF CONNAUGHT'S SPEECH—SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS'S SKETCH OF SIR CHARLES'S CAREER—LORD DUFFERIN'S EULOGY.

THE news of Sir Charles MacGregor's death caused general regret throughout military and official circles in India, and Sir Frederick Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief, assembled at an early date a meeting to consider how the Indian army could best perpetuate the name and fame of such a gallant soldier.

At a meeting, held at Simla on the 18th May, to take steps to raise a memorial to the late major-general, when the Commander-in-Chief, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Panjab, Generals Chesney, Elles, and Chapman, and many other officers were present, it was agreed that the memorial should take the form of gold and silver medals as prizes for reconnaissance at Sandhurst, a memorial tablet in St Paul's Cathedral, and a portrait of the General in the United Service Institute at Simla.

At a subsequent meeting, held at Poona by the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, H.R.H. the Duke



of Connaught, in advocating the support of the proposals made at Simla, said :—

“ . . . Should any of you be unacquainted with the services of that distinguished officer, I may mention that he served throughout the Mutiny, when he was three times wounded, and also served in the China War in 1860, when he was twice wounded. In the Bhutan expedition he was again twice wounded. He also served throughout two campaigns in the Afghan War, of 1878 and 1880, including the march from Kabal to Kandahar. The late Sir Charles, I forgot to say, served also in the Abyssinian expedition in 1868. After the Afghan War he was appointed Quartermaster-General of the Indian army, and was subsequently given command of the Panjab Frontier Force. Great as were this officer's military services, it is especially with regard to his explorations and his writings that he has earned the gratitude of Englishmen in India. It is chiefly owing to him that we have now a good knowledge of the state of affairs beyond the frontier. He also wrote extensively on the military policy of India, his works being probably more important than any that have been published on the subject. He was most anxious that his knowledge and experience of the tribes beyond the frontier, and the policy to be pursued in Central Asia, should serve to open the eyes of Englishmen as to what was passing there. We owe him a great debt of gratitude for the energy, zeal, and, if I may say so, the courage with which

he openly spoke, showing the risks we were running on our frontiers, and pointing out how we should secure ourselves against any danger there by posting ourselves in a strong position, and completing our communications with the frontiers. I think you will agree with me, when I say that we owe him a great debt of gratitude for the way, and cannot but admire the manner, in which he brought home facts which he knew better than anybody else, showing how we might be exposed to serious danger from one of the most powerful empires in the world were we not strongly posted on the frontier. It was he who brought home, not only to this country but to England, the necessity of being strongly posted on the frontier, and of being well informed of what was passing beyond, and how essential it was that our communications should be completed.

“I think that the Government of India will be the first to own that their hands have been strengthened universally by the arguments used by Sir Charles MacGregor in his powerful book [‘The Defence of India’], which have helped them to carry out what has been done on our positions, enabling them to push on incessantly the railways and other means of communication now existing.”

On the 3d July 1888, the ceremony of unveiling the portrait of Sir Charles took place in the rooms of the United Service Institute at the Town Hall, Simla ; on which occasion the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin,

and the Commander-in-Chief, spoke feelingly of their departed friend and comrade.

"I did not hesitate," said Sir Frederick Roberts, "to accept the invitation of the committee to unveil the portrait of the late Sir Charles MacGregor, for I thought there could not be many at present in India who had known him so long or so well as myself, and certainly no one could have had a greater regard and respect for him. As mere boys, we were together during the Mutiny; and from that time until 1879, in Afghanistan, when we were placed in that intimate relation which the Commander of an army and the Chief of the Staff bear to each other, we were thrown more or less into each other's society, so that I had many opportunities of studying my friend's character, both as a soldier and as a private individual.

"My earliest recollection of MacGregor was in camp near Fatehgarh, in January 1858. He was then attached to the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, which regiment he had joined at Delhi two days before the assault, and with which he had already seen some hard service. He particularly brought himself to notice by his courage at Narnul and Patiali: in both these actions he had personal combats with the enemy, and in the former he was mainly instrumental in capturing a gun. I had occasion to visit a picket of the regiment, which happened to be commanded by my brother, who, on introducing me to his subaltern, said: 'I have a strange companion here.

He seldom speaks except when fighting is going on; then he brightens up and becomes quite agreeable.'

"At that time MacGregor was extremely reserved, and had more than the usual shyness of a boy straight from school; but under the excitement of battle his true nature asserted itself, and neither reserve nor shyness could even in those early days prevent his soldierly qualities from showing themselves. A few months after this MacGregor was appointed to the command of a squadron of Hodson's Horse. He remained with this regiment for about eighteen months, during which time he was continually in the field; he was twice severely wounded, and had two horses killed under him.

"In February 1860, MacGregor was transferred to Fane's Horse, the present 19th Bengal Lancers, then being raised for service in China. With him went 170 men of his old regiment, who volunteered to accompany him. He distinguished himself greatly in China, especially during the advance on Peking, when a battery of artillery, which he was escorting, was attacked by a large body of Tartar Horse. MacGregor, who had only thirty men with him, gallantly led them against and drove off the enemy. His small party suffered heavily, and he himself received two severe wounds. On his return to India he rejoined Hodson's Horse, and was made second in command. His next service was in Bhutan, in 1864-65-66, first as brigade-major, then as deputy

assistant-quartermaster-general. Here he made himself remarkable, as indeed he had on former occasions, by the boldness of his reconnaissances, and was again twice severely wounded. The effects of his many wounds (he had received six in less than nine years), and the constant hard work and exposure he had undergone, necessitated his proceeding to England on medical certificate. He left India in February 1867, but before the end of the year he threw up his leave and joined the army in Abyssinia under Sir Robert Napier, where he did good work in the Quartermaster-General's department.

“In 1874, when all Bengal was moved by the prospect of a famine, which threatened to carry off thousands, if not millions of its inhabitants, it was determined to organise relief-works in various parts of the province. The main difficulty was the feeding the vast number of people employed on these works, and establishing granaries within reach of those who were unable to labour themselves, or even to go to any distance from their own homes in search of food. There were no railways in those days, except the main East Indian line, and the majority of the roads were very indifferent. The arrangements made to meet this terrible calamity were worthy of a great Government, and it was fortunate that a man of MacGregor's capacity was found to superintend the transport arrangements. He was appointed ‘Director of Transport;’ and we may judge of the admirable manner in which he performed his arduous

task by the report of Sir Richard Temple, the Special Famine Commissioner.

"In 1875 MacGregor was able to gratify a long-cherished desire to travel through Persia, towards the northern confines of Afghanistan. In this adventurous journey he succeeded in reaching Sarakhs, and to within a few miles of Herat. It was a daring ride, resulting in the collection of valuable information.

"To MacGregor himself the journey was a disappointment. One of the principal objects of his ambition was to obtain information of the countries bordering on our Eastern empire, and as he always did anything he undertook in the most thorough manner, he could not understand any one being less enthusiastic than himself about a matter which he believed to be of the highest importance. On this particular occasion he imagined, rightly or wrongly, that an unnecessary limit had been placed on his wanderings, and that his efforts were not appreciated; and he resolved (to use his own words) that 'nothing would ever induce him to travel in those countries again.' But such good work as MacGregor had done was not likely to be long overlooked; and the encouragement he received shortly after his return to England from the present Premier (Lord Salisbury), then Secretary of State for India, caused him to volunteer to return to India *via* Persia and Baluchistan. His offer was accepted, and in September 1876 he left London with a view to procure geographical information of the

approaches to India from Eastern Persia. The result of this journey was another interesting book. Captain Lockwood, who was MacGregor's companion during this expedition, died soon afterwards from the hardships they underwent; and I have often thought it was during this time of extreme privation that MacGregor sowed the seeds of the disease which ultimately carried him off.

"All this time MacGregor's reputation was steadily increasing. His grand record of service, his indefatigable industry, and his determination to bring to a successful issue any kind of work intrusted to him, had made him a marked man; and when the Second Afghan War broke out he was selected for special duty on the Khaibar line. At the commencement of the second phase of the war, he was, at my particular request, appointed Chief of the Staff to the Kabal Field Force, and it is impossible for me to say how much I owed to him. His experience of war and his many military instincts peculiarly fitted him for such a responsible position, and it was fortunate for me that I had so tried a soldier with me at a time of such difficulty and danger. When Sir Donald Stewart arrived at Kabal and took supreme command, MacGregor joined him as Chief of the Staff. Admirable as MacGregor was as a staff officer, he sighed for a command; and when a force was ordered to proceed from Kabal to Kandahar, he begged to be allowed to resign his appointment, and he was given a

brigade in that force. After Kandahar he brought his brigade back to India by the Mari-Bugti country, a most difficult march, which afforded him the opportunity he so much desired of showing his skill as a commander.

“At the close of the campaign MacGregor was appointed Quartermaster-General in India. It was during his tenure of this important office that he compiled his valuable ‘History of the Second Afghan War,’ and brought the whole of his energy and great talents to the consideration of that very interesting problem ‘The Defence of India.’ Like the ‘Gazetteer of the North-West Frontier,’ which MacGregor had compiled some years before, this work showed his mastership of detail, his indomitable perseverance, and his careful study of his subject, which his experience of Central Asia and his knowledge of India generally enabled him to treat as no other officer could, I believe, have treated it. It was during the time MacGregor was Quartermaster-General that the Intelligence Branch made such strides. It had been established by his predecessors, but it was chiefly to him that we are indebted for the admirable system of intelligence which now obtains in the Quartermaster-General’s department.

“When his time as Quartermaster-General was up, MacGregor was appointed to the command of the Panjab Frontier Force—a post which he hoped might have given him opportunities of further dis-



tion as a commander. But at this stage, when it seemed as if he were about to reap the reward of years of labour and unwearied devotion to duty, inexorable fate, which so often frustrates human endeavour, intervened. Hardly had he assumed command when he showed symptoms of the disease which prematurely cut short his promising career. Almost broken-hearted at having to give up his command even for a time, he took leave to England, where he made the most determined fight against his fatal complaint—a fight which astonished even those who knew him best, but which could only serve to postpone the end. In the hope that change might do him good, and with, I believe, the feeling that it would be so far on his way to India, and to the work which engrossed his every thought, he left England for Egypt towards the end of 1886. He wrote three or four letters to me from Cairo (the last of which I received some days after the news of his death reached India), all full of hope for the future. There was to be no future on earth for him ! He passed away on the 5th February 1887, at the early age of forty-six years and six months. Had he only been permitted to die in battle at the head of his troops, he would have wished for nothing better. It was in the hope he might be spared for such a glorious death that he made his great struggle for life. It was not for life's sake, but that he might some day lay it down on the shrine of a soldier's duty. Alas that his wish was not fulfilled !

“To attempt more than a mere sketch of Sir

Charles MacGregor's life and labours for the public service would be out of place here ; moreover, the attempt would be superfluous, for the actions of our friend are recounted and his character is shown in the pages of contemporary history written by himself. Those who had the privilege of knowing Sir Charles MacGregor in private life can bear testimony to his upright honest character. A somewhat hasty temper and brusque manner concealed from the outside world a most kind, most affectionate heart. He was a true friend, and many a brother officer has had occasion to thank MacGregor for generous assistance in time of need. His great soldierly qualities are known to us all, and we are assembled here to-day to commemorate them ; and lest they should be forgotten when we, his friends, have left the country, this portrait of him is presented to the United Service Institution of India, of which he was one of the founders, and in which he took so deep an interest. It now only remains for me to obtain the permission of his Excellency the Viceroy, for the portrait to be unveiled."

The Union-jack which veiled the picture, hung in a wooden alcove at the end of the room, having been drawn aside. The Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, said : " We are assembled to do honour to the memory of a brave and noble soldier, and I am glad to have this opportunity, as head of the Government of India, to testify, by my presence, to the high estimation in which we held Sir Charles MacGregor. He was also my personal friend ; and on that account too, it is

most grateful to my feelings to be here. Not among the many distinguished captains I have known could I mention one who came nearer, in martial bearing, love of his profession, devotion to duty and knowledge of the art of war, to the ideal of a powerful, chivalrous warrior. Shortly before his death I had the satisfaction of conferring on him the command of the Panjab Frontier Force; and as we gaze on this admirable likeness, I can safely ask, Where could you find a better type of a gallant 'Lord Warden of the Marches'? Though he died of sickness in Egypt, he had as undoubtedly sacrificed his health and life to the service of his country as did any of those of his brave countrymen who have fallen on the field. This tribute of respect we are paying to his memory is indeed but a poor consolation for his loss. But while, on the one hand, there is one to whom the knowledge of what we are doing in her husband's honour will be specially grateful, on the other, the simple and unostentatious ceremony will witness the desire, innate in the hearts of Englishmen, to express, however imperfectly, the appreciation of a great soldier's merits, and the desire to recognise devotion to duty wherever found."

It may be added that the proposed monument to Sir Charles MacGregor will in the course of a few months be placed in St Paul's Cathedral, as the Memorial Committee expect to be able to have it completed and erected before next June.

**A P P E N D I X.**

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**CATALOGUE**

**OF**

**PUBLICATIONS AND MEMOIRS**

**BY**

**MAJOR-GENERAL SIR C. M. MACGREGOR.**

**1859-1886.**



# CATALOGUE

OF

## PUBLICATIONS AND MEMOIRS:

DATE	SUBJECT.	REMARKS	SIGNED.
1859	Letters on Irregular Cavalry .	In ' Delhi Gazette ' .	" Glenstrae," Lieut. C. M. MacGregor
1860	On the Transport of Horses by Sea		.
1861	On raising Irregular Cavalry for Service in China	Letter to Osborn . .	C. M. Mac- Gregor
1861	Our Native Cavalry . . . .	Reprinted . . . .	By " Ghor- chara "
1862	On Irregular Cavalry . . .	Letter through Ad- jutant General to the Commander- in-Chief, Sir Hugh Rose. Reprinted in Memoranda on various Military Subjects	Chas Mac- Gregor, Lieut.
1864 to 1865	Letters from Bhotan . . . .	To Bengal Harkaru .	Brigade - Ma- jor, Dooar Field Force
1865	Mountain Warfare	..	Lieut. C. M. MacGregor, D. Assis. Q.M.G., Eastern Frontier District
1866	On Collecting Information on the North-East Frontier	Letter to Quarter- master-General	..
1866	Do. do.	" "	..
1866	Notes on Defence of North- East Frontier	Reprinted	...

DATE.	SUBJECT.	REMARKS.	SIGNED.
1866	MILITARY REPORT OF BHUTAN	Printed at Calcutta, pp. 74 (1873)	D.A.Q.M.G., Bhutan F.F.
1866	Narrative of Military Operations in Western Doorgs	...	...
1866	The Experiences of the Bhutan Campaign of 1864-65-66	Reprinted in Memoranda on Various Military Subjects	C.M.M.
1867	On Transport of Supplies in Abyssinia	Memorandum . . .	D.A.Q.M.G., Abyssinia
1867	On the Equipment of Officers on Service	Note	...
1867	On the Carriage of Sick and Wounded	"	...
1867	On Army Organisation (I.)	"	...
1867	On the Reorganisation of the Army	...	...
1867	Supersession of Distinguished Service Majors by Staff Corps Men	...	...
1867	On Army Organisation (II.)	Note	...
1867	Army Administration . . .	"	...
1867	On Army Organisation (III.)	"	...
1867	On Army Uniform . . . . .	"	...
1867	On Army Pay . . . . .	"	...
1867	On Promotion in the English Army	"	...
1867	On Indian Army Staff . . .	"	...
1867	On the Amalgamation of the Staff	"	...
1868	On the Organisation of the Transport Department	"	...
1868	On the Field Equipment of Troops (I.)	...	...
1868	On the Storing of Supplies in Abyssinia	...	...
1868	Design for a Mule Trunk . .	...	Asst. Q.M. G., Army Hd. Qrs.
1868	Design for a Canteen . . .	...	...

DATE.	SUBJECT.	REMARKS.	SIGNED.
1868	Plan for Rescuing our Prisoners from Theodore	Reprinted as "On the Release of the Abyssinian Prisoners."	...
1868	On the Use of Mitralleurs (I.)	(See 1872.)	...
1870	CENTRAL ASIA (Part I.)—North-West Frontier	'Gazetteer,' Confidential, Vols. i., ii., iii., iv., v. (857 pp.) Calcutta	A.Q.M.G.
1870	On the Sham Plain Question (I.)	Memorandum (see 1873.)	...
1871	CENTRAL ASIA (Part II.)—Afghanistan	'Gazetteer,' Confidential, Vol. i. (800 pp.) Calcutta	A.Q.M.G.
1871	On the Field Equipment of Troops (II.)	...	...
1871	Scheme for Association for Publishing Military Works	...	...
1871	Scheme for Introduction of Military Libraries	...	...
1871	On Merv . . . . .	Note	...
1871	Remarks on Major Cary's Lecture	..	...
1871	Design for a Frontier Tower .	..	...
1871	Design for Sketching and Surveying Board	...	...
1871	Design for a Chair for carrying Wounded among Mountains	..	...
1871	Design for a Hammock or Stretcher for Wounded among Mountains	...	...
1871	On Crossing the Baluchistan Desert	Letter to Sir William Merewether	...
1872	About Frontier Management .	Letter to Colonel Maclean	...
1872	Do. do.	Letter to 'Army and Navy Gazette'	...
1872	About Military Instruction .	Letters to Colonel Baillie	...
1872	On Reduction feasible on Sind Frontier	Memorandum	...



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1872	For Secretary Military Inst. .	Memorandum	...
1872	On Military Institution . . .	Letters to General Thesiger	...
1872	On the Invasion of Afridi Land	Memorandum	...
1872	On Political Appointments .	Letter to 'Civil and Military Gazette'	...
1872	On the Management of the 'N.W. Tribes'	Memorandum	...
1872	Scheme for Management of the N.W. Tribes	...	...
1872	On the Punishment of the Moh- mands	Memorandum	...
1872	Comparison of the Sind and Panjab Frontier Systems	...	...
1872	Review of the Operations at Ambela in 1863	.	...
1872	On the Rajanpur Frontier . .	Note	...
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1872	On the Dera Ghazi Khan Frontier	" (a)	...
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1872	On the Invasion of Buner . .	"	..
1872	On the Invasion of the Bozdar Country	"	..
1872	Operations on the Mahaban Mountains	"	.
1872	On the Punishment of the Khetrans	"	.
1872	On the Occupation of the La- gari Barkhan	"	...
1872	On Sir Charles Napier's Cam- paign against the Bugtis	"	..
1872	On the Defence of the Dera Ghazi Border	" (b)	...
1872	On Mitrailleur Batteries (II.)	"	...
1872	On the Attack of the Kohat Pass Afridis	" (a)	...

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1872	On the Kohat Pass Question .	Note (b)	...
1872	Asking for Command of a Bengal Cavalry Regiment	Letter	...
1872	On the Hadianis . . . . .	Note	...
1873	CENTRAL ASIA (Part III.)— Persia	...	A.Q.M.G.
1873	Opinions on the Retention of Peshawar	Précis	..
1873	The Sham Plain Question (II.)	Note	.
1873	Military Institution . . . .	Letters to Colonel Stausfeld;	...
1873	On the Defence of the Khai- bar	...	...
1873	The Yarkand Mission . . .	Letter to Mr Aitch- eson	...
1873	Journey through Persia . . .	Letter to the 'Times'	...
1873	Sir Charles M.'s Prospects in the Department	Letter to General Robert	...
1874	Sir Jan Bahadur's Complaint .	Memorandum	...
1874	Famine Operations . . . . .	Report of Transport Depart.	Director of Transport, Behar
1874	On Nipal. . . . .	Notes	..
1874	Application for post of Deputy Quartermaster-General	Letter	...
1874	On Personal Prospects . . .	Letter to Colonel Earle	...
1874	Camp of Exercise . . . . .	Letter to Sir H. Tombs	...
1874	System of Supply of War <i>Matériel</i>	Scheme . . . . .	Member Special Ordnance Com- mission
1874	Offer to explore Khorassan and Herat	Letter to Mr Aitch- eson	...
1875	From Mashad . . . . .	"	...
.		On Furlough Travel- ling in Persia and Khorassan	...

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1876	On Colonel MacGregor's Prospects	Memorandum for Lord Salisbury	1st Assist. Q. M. G., Army Hd. Qrs.
1876	On the Karun Route . . . .	Letter to Mr Mackenzie	...
1876	Speech at Royal Geographical Society	...	24th Jan.
1876	Do. do.	...	28th Feb.
1876	Native Indian Army (I.) . .	Letter to the 'Times'	...
1876	Along the Frontier and about it	.	...
1876	Appointment of Sir Hope Grant as Commander-in-Chief	Letter to the 'Times'	...
1876	Russian Prisoner at Merv . .	Letter	..
1876	Portion of MSS. of Journal in Khorassan	Extracts rejected from proposed book, subsequently printed and published in 1879	.
1876	Intelligence Department Committee	Note on	...
1876	Operations on the Nāga Hills	Memorandum	...
1876	Selection of Sites in the Murree Hills	Note	...
1876	Appointment of Colonel Lumsden as Adjutant-General	...	...
1876	Questions for House of Commons	...	...
1876	On Native Indian Army (II.)	Letter	...
1876	On the Boundaries of Baluchistan	"	...
1876	ON ARMENIA AS A THEATRE OF WAR	Memorandum, reprinted as Appendix (C) at end of 'Defence of India' (1884)	...
1877	The Aid which could be rendered to Turkey from India	Do., Appendix (D)	...
1877	On Herat	...	...
1877	Committee on Intelligence . .	Report	...

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1877	On foregoing Report . . . .	Letter to Mr Thornton	...
1877	Do. do.	Letter to Colonel Thuillier	...
1877	Do. do.	Letter to Colonel Colley	..
1877	Do. do.	Letter to Colonel Roberts	...
1877	On Matrimony . . . . .	Letter	...
1877	On Defence of North-West Frontier	Letter to Major Cory	..
1877	Committee on Intelligence . .	Note for Report	...
1877	Scheme for a <i>chumme</i> in London	...	..
1877	On care of Arms of Native Troops	Memorandum	...
1877	Operations in Jawaki Land, 30th August 1877	Letter	...
1877	On Title for New Route Books	Note	..
1877	On Clandestine Prostitution	"	...
1877	Schemes of Defence submitted with Rohilkand District, No. 272, and 18th February 1877	Memorandum on	...
1877	On Captain Butler's (9th Regiment) Travels	Notes. Reprinted	..
1877	On the Punishment of the Jawaki Tribe	Memorandum	...
1877	From Erzurum . . . . .	Telegram	...
1877	Map of Persian Travels . . .	Letter forwarding	...
1877	Russo-Turkish War in Armenia	Notes on	...
1877	Do. do.	Letters to Crookshank	..
1877	Design for Utilising Waterproof Sheets as Tents	...	.
1878	The Original Kabal Scale	...	...
1878	CENTRAL ASIA (Sec. IV.)—Routes in Persia and Baluchistan	No. of Routes 376, pp. 620	1st Assist.- Gr.-Mr.- General, Army Head Qrs.

DATE.	SUBJECT.	REMARKS.	SIGNED.
1878	Operations at Jhansi on 4th-6th February 1878	Memorandum	...
1878	Military Situation in 1878 . .	"	...
1878	Intelligence Branch, Q.M.G.D.	Memorandum and Letter to Johnson. Reprinted	...
1878	On the Crossing the Indus, and Invasion of Kabal	..	...
1878	On Field Service Tent	...	...
1878	On Exploring near Mashad .	Letter to Captain Napier	...
1878	On Reorganisation of North-West Frontier	Memorandum	...
1878	On the Military Situation, end of 1878	"	...
1878	On Appointments to Intelligence Branch	"	...
1878	On Reorganisation of Transport in 1st Division	"	...
1878	On the Attack of Kabal . . .	"	...
1878	On the Formation of a Gornal Column	.	...
1878	On the Situation on General Roberts leaving Ali Khel	...	...
1878	On the Attack on the Khaibar	Letters to Johnson	...
1878	Colonel MacGregor's Accounts on Journey	Letter to Adjutant-General	...
1878	Terms offered to the Maris	...	...
1878	Testimonial to Ghulam Nakhshband	...	...
1878	Plan of Camp of 3d Brigade .	...	...
1879	'NARRATIVE OF A JOURNEY THROUGH THE PROVINCE OF KHORASSAN'	2 vols. 8vo. Published by Allen & Co., London	Corrected for the press by Col. W. W. Knollys
1880	On Sending Troops from Kabal to Kandahar	Memorandum . . .	Chief of the Staff
1880	General Roberts's Actions at Kabal	Letters to Lyall	...
	Kabal executions . . . . .	Letters to Greaves	...

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1880	Management of Harnai Frontier	...	Qr.-Master-General in India
1880	About the Memorandum on Armenia	Letter to "Statesman"	...
1880	Mari Operations . . . . .	Despatches . . . .	Brigadier General Commanding Mari Field Force
1880	On Selection of a Commander-in-Chief	...	.
1880	Speech at the	..	...
1880	General M——'s Case . . .	Memorandum	...
1880	The Kabal Massacre . . . .	Report of	...
1880	Committee on Offices . . .	Report	...
1882	WANDERINGS IN BALUCHISTAN	1 vol. Published by W. H. Allen & Co., London. Corrected for the press by A. N. Wollaston, Esq., C.I.E.	
1884	Papers relating to the Operations of the Mari Field Force	..	...
1884	THE DEFENCE OF INDIA . .	1 vol. Simla. <i>Suppressed by Government</i>	<i>Strictly Confidential</i>
1884	Memoranda on various Military Subjects	1 vol. Simla. Includes various foregoing papers	C. M. M.
1884	THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR	Vols. i. ii.	<i>Strictly Confidential. Hitherto suppressed by Government</i>
1885	Do. do.	Vols. iii. iv.	
1886	Do. do.	Vols. v. vi. Index. Simla	

*N.B.*—The rough MS. draft of the above Catalogue, as far as 1880, in Sir Charles MacGregor's handwriting, was found among his papers, evidently incomplete, and probably intended as a guide for binding together his miscellaneous memoranda for future reference. The list, therefore, does not include his innumerable official and semi-official writings during his period of office as Quarter-master-General in India.

# RECORD

## OF

### MAJOR-GENERAL MACGREGOR'S SERVICES.

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#### DATES OF COMMISSIONS.

Ensign, . . . . .	20th October 1856.
Lieutenant, . . . . .	17th November 1857.
Captain, . . . . .	20th October 1868.
Brevet-Major, . . . . .	21st October 1868.
Major, . . . . .	20th October 1876.
Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel, . . . . .	10th November 1869.
Lieutenant-Colonel, . . . . .	26th October 1882.
Brevet-Colonel, . . . . .	18th June 1877.
Local Major-General, . . . . .	19th November 1880.
Major-General, . . . . .	22d January 1887.

#### APPOINTMENTS.

Regimental duty, 57th Native Infantry.	5th January 1857 to 24th September 1857.
Regimental duty, 1st European Bengal Fusiliers.	25th September 1857 to 16th September 1858.
Regimental duty, Hodson's Horse, .	17th September 1858 to 8th February 1860.
Regimental duty, Fane's Horse, .	9th February 1860 to 16th November 1860.
Regimental duty, 1st Sikh Irregular Cavalry.	17th November 1860 to 30th January 1861.
Recruit Depot, Barrackpur, . . .	31st January 1861 to 26th April 1861.
Second in Command, 2d Regiment Hodson's Horse.	27th April 1861 to 19th January 1864
Second Squadron Officer, 10th Bengal Lancers.	20th January 1864 to 1st June 1864.
Second Squadron Officer, 13th Bengal Lancers.	2d June 1864 to 27th September 1864.
Brigade-Major, Bhutan Field Force,	28th September 1864 to 15th May 1865.

Officiating Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General, Eastern Frontier District.	16th May 1865 to 23d January 1867.
Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General, Abyssinian Field Force.	6th December 1867 to 5th July 1868.
Assistant Quartermaster-General, .	6th July 1868 to 5th March 1875.
Director of Transport during Famine Relief Operations, Behar.	October to December 1874.
First Assistant Quartermaster-General,	6th March 1875 to 23d July 1880. .
Officiating Deputy - Quartermaster-General.	25th February 1878 to 21st April 1879.
Deputy-Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, 1st Division, Peshawar Valley Field Force.	22d April 1879 to 25th June 1879.
Officiating Deputy - Quartermaster-General.	26th June 1879 to 14th September 1879.
Deputy-Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, 1st Division, Kabal Field Force.	15th September 1879 to 1st May 1880.
Chief of the Staff, Northern Afghanistan Field Force.	2d May 1880 to 5th August 1880.
Brigadier-General Commanding 3d Infantry Brigade, Kabal-Kandahar Field Force.	6th August 1880 to 3d October 1880.
Brigadier-General Commanding Mari Field Force.	4th October to 16th November 1880.
Deputy-Quartermaster-General, .	24th July 1880 to 18th November 1880.
Quartermaster-General in India, .	19th November 1880 to 27th November 1885.
General Officer Commanding Panjab Frontier Force.	28th November 1885.

On 31st December 1875 Colonel MacGregor was gazetted to be Companion of the Star of India, on 1st January 1878 to be Companion of the Indian Empire, and on 17th January 1881 to be Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath.

MARK S. BELL, COLONEL, V.C., R.E.,

*Office of Quartermaster-General in India,  
Intelligence Branch.*

SIMLA, 16th July 1888.





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